I am writing to express my concern that the proposed changes threaten the free exchange of information that a fundamental part of the public internet. The changes to 2.7(b)(ii) now include item (5), which brings this section to read that Verisign may "deny, cancel, redirect or transfer any registration or transaction...to ensure compliance with applicable law, government rules or regulations, or pursuant to any legal order or subpoena of any government, administrative or governmental authority, or court of competent jurisdiction..."

This change would inevitably lead to the capitulation to the whims of a variety of governments, from municipalities to nation-states. While some of these governments, unfortunately, have already taken steps to filter or restrict access to parts of the public internet, this new provision takes this kind of censorship further, enabling governments to potentially block access to certain websites not just for users within their jurisdiction but globally. Some examples may illustrate the potential danger, or, at the very least, ICANN's failure to anticipate certain outcomes in this proposed document. Should countries hostile to sexual minorities be allowed to take over domain names associated with LGBTQ organization, regardless of whether or not the organization operates within their jurisdiction? Should Russia be allowed to take over domain names of websites that acknowledge its unjust war of aggression against Ukraine--an expression that violates Russian law? Should any government be allowed to transfer a domain name to their ownership, simply because they want to use a name already in use?

I strongly urge ICANN to reject 2.7(b)(ii)(5).

The proposed changes to section 2.7(b)(ii)(5) are dangerous and undermine both the working order and free exchange of information on the public internet. The changes should be rejected.