The document repeatedly emphasises reliance on law enforcement requests as a main basis for suspending registrants. This poses certain risk for users and organisations which may fall under LEOs (Law Enforcement Organisations) illegitimate scrutiny due to misguided practice or intentional malice, possible due to government pressure. This can specifically affect vulnerable groups and reduce the trust of civil society and businesses in the DNS system.

ICANN Bylaws make a strong commitment to follow applicable local laws, and it must be noted that it is not for the LEOs to assess wether a law has truly been broken, and they only act on reasonable suspicion of such occurrence. This is exemplified by the fact that in modern legal systems the repressions LEOs are able to impose are in most scenarios strictly limited and proportionate to the situation. For example, in Poland (of which I am citizen) the maximum duration of the arrest that Police can enforce is only 48 hours, and further incarceration needs a court ruling after on a prosecutor's request.

It should be debated wether a suspension in the presented case is a repressive action which should fall under LEOs' competencies. Suspension of a registrant could be viewed as a very serious punishment.

On numerous occasions, even in countries scoring relatively high on the rule of law, the courts have ruled that the repressive actions was not not proportionate, invalid and/or illegitimate and compensation was provided to the victim: as was in my case, in a 2025 ruling on an illegal arrest which happened as I was conducting journalistic work. Documents available on the Polish Ombudsman office show this case is not isolated, and civil society representatives (such as protesters) have been strongly impacted. In such cases it would be dubious to say ICANN is following a local law by uncritically following a LEO request.

On the other hand, challenging such a request would be strongly problematic for ICANN-appointed bodies and/or registrars, as they would need to become arbiters in a cases not directly falling under ICANN's remit. This could alienate certain governments as stakeholders. Such procedure would most likely be very exhausting on resources as well.

As such, basing the decision of suspension on the preliminary court ruling rather than a law enforcement request would seem much more proportionate and resource-efficient. Such verdicts are generally quickly ruled, as opposed to final ones, which can take years in proceedings. As such, basing the decision on the latter would make the endeavour against the reported problem futile.  

Using an advanced behavioural AI model could also be considered, possibly as a second line of decision-making. According to the Polish Cyber Command such tools can currently have an estimate 90% accuracy even in very complicated cases [source: Brigadier General Mariusz Chmielewski, lecture on future technologies at The Hack Summit in Warsaw, Poland, 14.10.2025]. An appeal way should be clearly provided in such case, with a final third line available this way (this would need a transparent and effective procedure as well).

It must be noted that in certain countries with problems regarding rule of law, courts cannot be considered impartial, especially in cases relating to civil society or businesses targeted by the government. Given that, I do not believe it falls under ICANN's mission to assess wether that is the case and local laws need to be followed nonetheless.

It should also be considered what compensation (if any) should be given to registrants who were in fact acting legitimately (when proved by a final court ruling), and a suspension of services has nonetheless been applied to them following the procedure we are working on here. Such repressive action may have resulted in damages to them, financial or otherwise. This may regulated or addressed by civil courts on a case-by-case basis, if the registrant decides to sue.

While all the above may seem like a fringe scenario, given that vulnerable groups and organisations may rarely overlap with the users of APIs conducting mass domain name registrations, such loophole can be abused by governments on a large scale using dubious actionable evidence presented by LEOs, if not anticipated and addressed properly.

As an ICANN fellow I will be most happy to contribute to this issue further.

The comment explores potential for abuse of the proposed measures by governments against individuals and organisations, including vulnerable group, resulting in reduction of trust in the DNS systems. It explores what measures need to be taken by ICANN in order to actually follow on the commitment to follow applicable local laws (as expressed in the ICANN Bylaws), rather than simply rely on law enforcement requests. A three-tiered decision making process is drafted, based on court rulings, technological solutions and transparency.