STEVE SHENG: Hello everyone. Welcome to today, 15th of September at 19:00 UTC for the RZERC teleconference. Duane, let me hand it back to you.

DUANE WESSELS: Thanks, Steve. Thanks, everyone, for making the meeting today. We've got sort of the usual agenda. But first, let's do the roll call, such as it will be.

STEVE SHENG: Okay. Sounds good. Let's start with SSAC. Geoff Huston.

GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah.

STEVE SHENG: Thank you. RSSAC, Daniel Migault.

DANIEL MIGAULT: Yeah, I'm here.

STEVE SHENG: ASO, Carlos?

DUANE WESSELS: Carlos said he wouldn't be able to make it today.
STEVE SHENG: Okay. Carlos apologies. IETF, Tim?

TIM APRIL: Here.

STEVE SHENG: Thank you, Tim. GNSO RySG, Howard, are you there?

HOWARD ELAND: Yes.

STEVE SHENG: ccNSO, Peter Koch. Root zone maintainer, Duane.

DUANE WESSELS: Duane’s here, yeah.

STEVE SHENG: ICANN board, Kaveh.

KAVEH RANJBAR: Present.

STEVE SHENG: PTI, Kim?
KIM DAVIES: Yes, I'm here.

STEVE SHENG: Thank you, Kim. Peter, are you there?

PETER KOCH: Yes, now I am. Apologies.

STEVE SHENG: Okay. Thank you. So on the roll call, we have everybody except ASO appointee. Back to you, Duane.

DUANE WESSELS: Thanks a lot. So hopefully everyone has the agenda in front of them. It looks a lot like our previous meeting agendas. If anyone has something they'd like to add to the agenda, now would be a good time to let us know, either voice or on the chat, otherwise we’ll get right into it.

All right, so first order of business will be to welcome Daniel Migault to the RZERC. Daniel is the new appointee from RSSAC replacing Brad who with us for four years or so, or however long it’s been. So probably, everyone knows Daniel, but just in case, Daniel, do you want to give a brief introduction of yourself?
DANIEL MIGAULT: Okay. Thanks, Duane. For those who don’t know me, I'm pretty much involved at the IETF. I was the liaison from the IETF to SSAC, and I'm currently presenting SSAC to RZERC. I'm working at Ericsson, mostly on security.

DUANE WESSELS: Thanks, Daniel. Have you had time to sort of familiarize yourself with RZERC and the procedures and everything and how it works? Do you have any questions for us before we start?

DANIEL MIGAULT: No, I don’t have any specific questions, but I didn't have time to go through all the procedures yet.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. Well, it'll probably be familiar from the other things that you've been involved in, but if something doesn’t make sense, then just let us know.

DANIEL MIGAULT: Okay. Thank you.

DUANE WESSELS: All right. Next order of business will be the minutes from our August meeting. They're on the screen and you have the link. Any comments or corrections, updates to last month’s minutes? Okay, doesn't seem like
it, so we can take those as approved, I believe, and have the staff members post those to the RZERC webpage.

All right, so the meat of the business today will again be to go through this pair of documents that we've been looking at. We've got actually quite a few new comments in both of them. My hope is that for the first one, which is about root zone data protections, I'm hoping that we can sort of go through it today and maybe do some editing during this call accepting comments and modifying the text and getting it to a point where we've really minimized or eliminated all of the outstanding issues or suggestions.

So Steve’s sharing it on his screen, and I think Steve, you'll be our editor today, and indeed I think you're the only one who could be the editor, so can you scroll down until we get something interesting? So this is the preface, and there's a new, longer paragraph above the shorter paragraph which got deleted. The comment from our last meeting was that here, the document should state why RZERC feels this is in scope. So that has been more clearly stated, it’s a little bit longer. I hope everyone’s had a chance to look at this, or if not, can read it quickly. And if there are no concerns about this, then I would ask that we just accept the new paragraph and delete the old one.

I think Peter, this was originally your comment, so especially looking to you for some approval here, I guess.
PETER KOCH: Yeah, thank you, Duane. And yes, that was what I had in mind. Not only referring to the suggestion but also that we explicitly stated it’s in scope. Thank you.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. All right, so then we can go down to the introduction. There’s a lot of comments here in the background section, which probably won’t all fit on the screen at the same time, but from our last meeting, we talked about the opening sentence here which talks about an increase in recognition of the root zone as a critical resource and so I think at the end, we agreed that it might be simpler to just delete that, so that was my suggestion there. And then I think Geoff, you had sort of a long comment here, and of course, I think you should speak to it, but maybe also, can you just say, is the bulk of your comment just suggested new text for that paragraph?

GEOFF HUSTON: Yes. That’s the way it turned out. I’ve read it through and I thought, “This doesn’t make sense to me.” So then I thought, “Well, what would make sense?” So everything after the first sentence is indeed a suggested new paragraph.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. I think that it’s well stated, and I would be happy to accept it if others agree that it’s also what needs to go here.
GEOFF HUSTON: While folk are reading it, let me just point out that it’s not the volume of queries which was sort of hinted at in the original first paragraph, the distribution grows in some sense. The issue really is that the mechanism of distribution of contents now includes whole of zone transfer and DNSSEC validation does not adequately protect that case. And that’s the point I was trying to make in that first paragraph. Thanks.

DUANE WESSELS: All right, so last call for any comments about Geoff’s new paragraph before we accept it and move on. All right, seems pretty good. And then here again, I guess this doesn’t necessarily read as replacement text, more as just a comment, right, Geoff?

GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah, look, I actually couldn’t see the point of the sentence in some sense. If I corrupt your machine and take over the internal process, then yes, no matter how you protect the comms, once the data is inside the machine, I can corrupt it and TSIG won't protect you. But the point of the paragraph was meant to be TSIG doesn’t do this job. And I suppose the point that I thought you were trying to make is once—TSIG is a shared secret between a master server and secondary servers. And the model that we’re looking at in hyperlocal relates to a larger set of folks who don’t share the secret.

In this case, these unauthorized secondaries, these opportunistic secondaries don’t get TSIG’s channel protection. Now, I didn’t think hard about text because the other way of doing this is simply to say TSIG only works in the realm between a master and its duly delegated
secondaries, because it is, by its very nature, a shared secret. But you already pointed out it’s a shared secret.

DUANE WESSELS: Right. So I think probably the reason this is included here is because when we’re writing the RFC, or the Internet draft, this was something that we had to spend a lot of time justifying, so this is probably just Internet draft think leaking into RZERC here. So if you’re suggesting that we don’t need it, that’s totally fine with me. Howard, your hand is up.

GEOFF HUSTON: Howard’s hand is up, but my suggestion is we don’t need the last sentence.


HOWARD ELAND: I was going to just say, alternatively, it might be better placed in a previous paragraph and instead of that sentence, say something like, we’re addressing the channel, not the local copying, or something to that effect. If you truly desire to make sure you have it have the scope properly communicated, then we can do something like that as an alternative.
DUANE WESSELS: Right. Well, as far as I'm concerned, this last sentence that's highlighted is really sort of redundant with the previous sentence in the paragraph. They sort of say the same thing, and if the second one is superfluous, then that's fine with me. We can get rid of it.

All right.

GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah, me again.

DUANE WESSELS: Yeah, you again. I'm just trying to remember where this wording originated, and I think it's language from the Internet draft. Go ahead, Geoff.

GEOFF HUSTON: The point was it only works if you validate, and that's not explicitly stated. So it's designed to protect consumers of DNS responses. That is true. But only when the response itself is validated using DNSSEC mechanisms. So I think if you just take the first sentence of my comment and add it to the end, this DNSSEC protection of data only extend to end to end [inaudible] resolution mechanisms that perform DNSSEC validation. If you added that to the paragraph, you'd probably do the necessary qualification here that DNSSEC isn't a general solution. It requires [additional measures.]
DUANE WESSELS: Okay.

GEOFF HUSTON: Hi Tim.

DUANE WESSELS: All right, that’s great. Happy to do that. The next paragraph, Tim, you highlighted and have a comment around the phrase, “shifts the problem around.” This was my attempt to sort of capture what we talked about in our last meeting about how it used to matter where queries and responses came from, and with something like serving root zone data locally, what matters now is where the root zone data comes from. That’s what I meant by shifting the problem around.

And then, Tim, do you want to speak to your comment about the facts of serving data locally?

TIM APRIL: I think it was more just I was having trouble understanding exactly what the problem in this case was in context of this. I think it’d be something we’d want to expand on for the actual text. But I hadn’t come up with anything good yet. I was trying to think of something. Basically, there's no actual concise problem statement of what the problem is. I wasn’t able to extract one quickly while reading it.
DUANE WESSELS: Do you mean in this particular paragraph, or for the document as a whole?

TIM APRIL: In this particular paragraph. It would be specifically that one sentence that there's that highlighting.

DUANE WESSELS: So this paragraph was rewritten from the other version where earlier, this area talked about hyperlocal root and 8806. So this was a rewrite to sort of try to talk about that, but not use those phrases. Geoff, your hand is up.

GEOFF HUSTON: Look, it is. Instead of saying, “however, in a way this merely shifts the problem around,” you might want to say, “However, this does expose a new vulnerability.”

DUANE WESSELS: Yeah.

GEOFF HUSTON: Because then the next sentence says you need a reliable technique to verify the entirety of the zone content. Does that work for you, Tim? Because what that’s really saying now quite precisely is the problem.
TIM APRIL: Yeah. That does it very well.

DUANE WESSELS: Peter, your hand is up.

PETER KOCH: Thanks, Duane. I was just stumbling across the language which is rather strong and not really knowing who the audience is. I wonder whether we would have to expand on this vulnerability more than in that single sentence that follows.

DUANE WESSELS: Right. Would you be more comfortable with something not as strong as vulnerability, maybe weaknesses or concern?

PETER KOCH: I'm really wondering whether that is a new ... Yeah, first of all, a vulnerability might be a bit strong. In engineering speak, it’s perfectly okay, I think, but might trigger some people. And I’m wondering what makes it the new vulnerability. It’s not the fact that people download the root zone data from somewhere else, it’s the fact that this is becoming more prevalent. Do I read that right?

GEOFF HUSTON: I'll jump in here because it was my sentence. It’s not the prevalence, it’s the fact that there are aspects of alteration of the zone content that would be undetectable. As is pointed out somewhere else in this
document, DNSSEC doesn’t cover NS records and the glue. So in some ways, you can alter what you get and no one else can see that you’ve altered it until a long way down the line when you use it for resolution and someone’s doing validation. So if you change the word “vulnerability” to undetectable zone content alteration, I think that exactly describes the problem.

PETER KOCH: Yeah. Thanks, Geoff, but that isn’t really a novelty, right? People have been running their own root nameservers for ages, and they have lived with that vulnerability.

GEOFF HUSTON: Oh, you're wondering about the word “new?”

PETER KOCH: Yeah.

GEOFF HUSTON: Strike “new.”

PETER KOCH: Okay. Fine.

STEVE SHENG: What about Kim’s suggestion? “However, this creates new opportunities for zone content corruption to be undetected.”
GEOFF HUSTON: Is it an opportunity?

KIM DAVIES: I was just trying to avoid the word “vulnerability.”

GEOFF HUSTON: Okay. “Possibilities” instead of “opportunities,” and you’d probably be more neutral.

PETER KOCH: My point was that I wanted to avoid the perception—which you never can, but still, the perception that the vulnerability or the risk or anything is really new. It probably isn't.

GEOFF HUSTON: Okay. Remove the word “new.”

PETER KOCH: [Cool.]

GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah, gone.
STEVE SHENG: People are okay with the current text? “However, in a way this creates possibilities for zone content corruption to be undetected.”

DUANE WESSELS: Okay by me.

TIM APRIL: And then should that be a comma after undetected, and then just continue on with the rest of that last sentence?

STEVE SHENG: That does seem to be expressing two points, right? So I would say this should be the period.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think they're different points, subtly, Tim.

PETER KOCH: That is a statement that is not backed by any reference. Is it something that we want to make as—is it a statement that we really want to make as RZERC, that it becomes more commonplace?

DUANE WESSELS: Right. We don’t have to say commonplace. I suppose we could say something like we feel there's a need for a reliable technique ...
PETER KOCH: My concern is—and I think I raised that either in the text or in the previous discussion, that we are kind of, in passing, giving a, I don't know what, blessing, vetting, whatever we can do, to this “new root distribution technique” without that being explicitly said—which is the nature of in passing. So without that being explicitly said or described. And it’s not our decision either, but it’s an observation we make, and maybe that is also at the core of the recommendation that at least should be a second act, so to speak.

We’re dealing with the ZONEMD first, but the bigger issue is that the way the root zone is distributed either is or might become different. And recommending or not objecting against ZONEMD is one thing, but there might be other questions raised that we may need to address, like where are the sources, is there any joint responsibility of what entities and so on and so forth? And I'm not sure that was already in the document. it doesn’t have to be in this document at all, but if we open that issue, then maybe we should address not only this single technical issue but the other aspects as well. Thank you.

GEOFF HUSTON: Look, Peter, I think you're reading perhaps more into this than you should read. And the point that you're making, I thought, was actually covered in the first paragraph of the background section in any case. What this sentence is saying is when A grows, B becomes more important. It doesn’t say A is good at this point, it simply says when this becomes more commonplace, you're going to have to rely more on a technique for verifying the entirety of zone content. So it’s not saying do
it, it’s simply saying when A, then B. And to my mind, that’s all it’s saying.

The thing that you’re saying that I think actually is observational on the part of RZERC is way back up in the first sentence. It says, “The mechanisms of promulgating the contents of the root zone has moved beyond conventional DNS query and response.” And again, that is now an observation. It was almost the IETF’s decision to make hyperlocal and RFC. And in some ways, that engineering decision about the protocol mechanics, which is not ours to make, has already been made by that act of publication. And this is, if you will, a response mechanism to say, you know, a mechanism for entire zone verification is now important because you’ve gone and published this.

So I actually see the chain of cause and effect already well established here, and I think that sentence is simply stating, to my mind, the obvious, that having started this off, IETF, thank you very much, we now need a whole of zone protection wrapper because you published that RFC.

PETER KOCH: If I may.

DUANE WESSELS: Please.
PETER KOCH: I couldn’t disagree with what you said, Geoff, but I do think that there are aspects of this observation that as a committee, RZERC should either have a look at ourselves or suggest others do that, because just because the IETF publishes and RFC doesn’t clarify the roles and responsibilities in the overall root zone distribution mechanism. It’s also none of the IETF’s decision in a way, and that is already part of the analysis, whose decision is it. Distributed root zone copies have been around, again, for ages, and the RFC more or less documents a very old practice that was maybe shared only by few and now for what it’s worth, encourages in one way or another to be copied by others.

But still, there is some joint responsibility by whatever entity to make sure that the root zone distribution is stable, secure and so on and so forth. And I understand ZONEMD is a part of this, but again, there are other issues, like we’re speaking of shifting the problem around. The question of where the sources of the root zone are isn’t really addressed, and it is out of scope for this document as long as we only talk about ZONEMD, but it is part of the overall picture. This is why I suggested we should look into the other aspects as well. But maybe it’s premature to do this in this document, and point taken.

DUANE WESSELS: Thanks, Peter. If I can just summarize your feelings, it’s probably okay to leave this, to live with the sentence that says “as this becomes more commonplace ...” But RZERC should consider future work to look at the other aspects of all this.
PETER KOCH: Yeah, I think that might be a compromise. Thank you.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. Great, so can we scroll down, Steve? So this is a sentence that I added because as I was reading how this document ends, I felt like there was sort of a cliffhanger there, and this was unspecified. So I just added a sentence that said basically that the root zone maintainer would calculate the zone digest and add it to each version of the zone once all this goes through all the necessary approvals.

Any concerns about this sentence? Okay, so now I'm moving down to the recommendation section. Again, I think during our last call, there was some feedback that the recommendations weren’t clear enough in exactly what they were asking the board to do, so there's a new sentence that just asks the ICANN board to organize the necessary work outlined in these recommendations. I think Kim, maybe that was your feedback. So, is that sufficient to address your concern, or were you thinking something even more specific in each one of these recommendations?

KIM DAVIES: No, I think just broadly assigning this set of recommendations for the board to consider addresses my concern. It’s not like a mandate out of the blue. It puts in place a structure where the board needs to consider it and consider resource implications and set that whole train in motion. But I think these amendments do the trick.
Okay. And then in recommendation three, there's just a slight rewording change to avoid hyperlocal root and RFC 8806 references. Hopefully, everyone thinks that's a good change. And that might be it. Is that everything? Okay. Except we need to add Daniel to the list here.

So assuming that we are really and truly all happy with the document and there’s no further comments or suggestions, the next step would be to go through some sort of formal approval and voting process. But I guess I’d like input from the committee. Do you feel like you need more time to read through it again, or should we go ahead and start the last call sooner rather than later? Any opinions? Peter, go ahead.

Thanks, Duane. My understanding is that the draft itself is in IETF last call. Or is it only working group last call?

It’s in IETF last call. Yes, so the RFC, the Internet draft for ZONEMD is in IETF last call, and the authors and I have been getting good feedback from some of the IESG-assigned reviewers, so that’s the state of it right now.

Okay. Thanks. With that, I’d suggest, unless there is any urgent need to publish the advice, that we wait for the assignment of the RFC number at least, and that would also suggest some minor edits that probably make more sense in a year from now when people read the document.
and no longer refer to something that is in progress at the IETF. Seems to be a matter of very few weeks, if I understand correctly.

DUANE WESSELS: Yeah, you could be right. I don't go through this process often enough to really know how long it would take, how quickly it could happen. But I'm inclined to agree that since it's very close, we could wait. I just wouldn't want to wait a really long time. Geoff, go ahead.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think you're both unduly optimistic about current state of the IETF. I've just been in what was meant to be an RFC edit the 48-hour last call, and the document was almost yanked. Many things can happen between this and an RFC, and it can take from weeks to months, and the range of outcomes is from publication to discarding it.

And while I agree it's a well written draft, it should go straight through, the possibilities are still almost endless as to outcomes here. And the amount of time taken, more critically, could be at a minimum of eight weeks, and perhaps more realistically, around four to five months, often, simply because the IETF is not the IETF we used to know.

So I'm more inclined to simply move this out as almost a show of confidence about the draft's progress to an RFC, rather than relying on the order being the other way around. Thank you.
DUANE WESSELS: Thanks, Geoff. Someone else’s hand was up. Howard, I guess Geoff stole your thunder. Peter?

PETER KOCH: Yeah. Thank you. Maybe Geoff is more realistic than I was. But if that’s true—and anything can happen—then I don’t think it would put us in a good position recommending a method for application in the root zone that then subsequently gets either yanked by the IETF or substantially changed. I don’t think ... Maybe there's something going on that I just don’t know or I don’t understand, but I miss the urgency in the matter that would prevent us from sticking with the good tradition that things that happen in the root don’t rely on Internet drafts only. And if somebody can explain that urgency to me, I might change my mind, but I do think we should publish this document only if the RFC has been published, or at least is in whatever state so that the RFC editor just has to stamp it.

DUANE WESSELS: Other folks have thoughts on this?

KAVEH RANJBAR: Duane, I made my suggestion on the chat. I think I'm with Peter also on the urgency, but I also want us to deliver work, but I fully agree that maybe we should wait a bit more, and my suggestion is to wait two meetings as our deadline and then decide. Maybe we decide based on the situation of the document to publish, because we’re almost ready, correct? Or we know that in a month, it will be done, then we will
publish right after that. So if there is nothing against it, my suggestion is to basically skip the next meeting, or do not put this on the agenda for the next meeting, but the meeting after, we decide to either publish such a version or wait for publication of the RFC first.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. That’s a good suggestion, and I see Howard gave you a plus one. Geoff.

GEOFF HUSTON: Tim’s the document shepherd. Does Tim have any view on the likelihood of smooth progress? Sorry to put you on the spot here, Tim, but it seems like you know more about it than anyone else right now.

DUANE WESSELS: Are you thinking of Tim [Baginski?]

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah, other Tim.

DUANE WESSELS: Yeah, so I don’t think our Tim knows, probably, about ... I don’t think he can answer that question.

GEOFF HUSTON: Sorry. It was a good try.
DUANE WESSELS: Yeah. You almost tricked him. Okay, so that’s good feedback. At least we won't do the last call immediately. We will give it some time and take a look at how the Internet draft progresses and bring it up again in at least two meetings, if not before, if we’re not able to do it before.

All right, so we've got a little bit of time left, and I think we should talk about the other document that we have on the agenda, which is we used to talk about it as signing rootserver.net, but now it’s phrased as signing root zone nameserver data.

As a background, at least for Daniel, the idea here is that RZERC will make a recommendation to ICANN that it task OCTO or somebody like OCTO with doing some research on options and consequences for having signed root zone nameserver data. And this is related to something that was done within RSSAC a few years ago. RSSAC published its document 028 which was a study of root server naming schemes, and if they were signed, what that would look like.

So where we left off with this was that we were going to get some feedback from our friends at ICANN OCTO on how they felt about what RZERC had produced so far. So I had shared the document with them and as you can see, there's a few comments from the OCTO staff in here about the document. I guess I propose that we sort of review some of their comments and talk through it. I think there's probably just still a lot of editing work to be done, not on this call or not maybe during a meeting, but just some editing work to be done to address some of their comments and keep moving this forward?
So let’s see. Go ahead, Geoff.

GEOFF HUSTON: You might want to be informed that the DNS vendor community, after the astonishing success of the first DNS flag day, is proposing on 1 October to have a second DNS flag day. That would bring the default UDP buffer size down from 4096, which is not really a standardized default, it’s just common practice, but actually to bring that practice down to 1232 octets.

Now, there is a section here about size blowout once you put in ... it’s in the background where the priming response exceeds 3800 bytes. You might want to have some information that informs that, because if we are really talking about 1232, even in the priming query, then is this feasible to have a UDP only priming query in the light of DNSSEC?

And while I don’t have answers, I think maybe we should just make sure we understand the implications of that flag day on this proposal. Thanks.

DUANE WESSELS: Yeah. So certainly, that is a concern of the size. When we finalize these recommendations to the OCTO team—Steve, can you scroll down to the recommendation section? So if you haven’t looked at this document recently, you’ll notice that it talks more generically about having signed root server names and addresses, and not specifically signing rootservers.net.
So I think that it’s very likely that the research that they will do could conclude that, well, in order to avoid the size issues, the root server should be renamed with [in-zone] names or some other scheme so that the response doesn't blow up in size. And in my discussions with Matt, he's very much onboard with that. That’s the sort of research they want to do. They do not want to just research signing the existing names with the existing naming scheme.

So I guess that is to say I feel like it’s unlikely that we would end up in a situation where the rootservers.net zone becomes signed. I think people would resist that, mostly because of the size issues.

GEOFF HUSTON: Understood. Thanks.

DUANE WESSELS: Let’s scroll back up to the top, Steve. I think there was a comment, that is no longer here, from Paul. Paul and I had a back-and-forth about some of the language in these first couple paragraphs. The second paragraph uses language like “only authoritative data is signed, glue data is not signed,” and Paul’s point was that it should be stronger, it should say that DNSSEC forbids such data to be signed, and to make it clear that it’s due to the protocol and not some operational decision that IANA or someone else has made.

So I just wanted to highlight that, I guess, for you, Kim, in particular, that if you feel that’s important, that the reader know that it wasn’t IANA’s
decision to do things this way, you may want to take a look at that paragraph, or at least some of these paragraphs.

And then this other comment here from Paul is I have a little bit of a hard time understanding exactly what he meant. If anyone can interpret this, that would be welcome. Otherwise, I can go back to Paul directly and talk to him more about this and see what he meant.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Which one of those, Duane?

DUANE WESSELS: I'm referring to the one where he says more should go here about how such an attacker could modify responses, and he's talking about slippery slopes. So I'm always happy to add more text if it helps. I just wasn't sure exactly what Paul meant here. Kaveh?

KAVEH Ranjbar: I have maybe a bit of a high-level comment, but I was also looking at the charter for RZERC, and the purpose is basically to review proposed changes from any of the members or the CSC. And I think because we are basically asking OCTO and others to do stuff, which mean spending money, I think it will help everyone if we, from the start, clarify where this comes from. Either because—at least my understanding is RZERC shouldn't come up with its own proposal, it should come from someone, and I think it helps to clarify that.
DUANE WESSELS: Yeah. Thanks, Kaveh. That is sort of captured here in the preface, because this all did start with a proposal from Verisign to sign the rootservers.net zone. And I agree that something I struggled with as well is that it’s a little bit awkward that it has kind of morphed into recommending that OCTO do the things that RSSAC asked somebody to do.

I think we can fix that. I think we can address it. But also, I’m just struck by the strangeness of it all. And if the committee felt that it was inappropriate for us to do that, then I’d be willing to have that discussion as well.

KAVEH RANJBAR: No, I’m fine with it, and I think that sentence is clear. My suggestion is if we know that RSSAC is generally supportive of this, we also add that, because more backing won’t hurt. I think in the long run, this will help.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. Thank you. Peter.

PETER KOCH: Thank you. Similar to the other document, I read this as—so this is formally correct because one of the members brought this forward. A bit more information that you just gave, like the root zone maintainer did this because blah-blah, and the committee came to the conclusion that we don’t have enough data to make a final decision, and therefore we recommend this and that.
If that appears in the preface or it was somewhere else in the document is up to the editor, but I’d like to see a bit more text than just saying that one of the members, which is unnamed, brought this to the attention of the committee and therefore we issued this paper. This is a bit formalistic and, well, doesn’t inform the reader. And I disagree with Paul. Not nobody reads the preface. Some people do.

DUANE WESSELS: Yeah, that’s a good catch. We should definitely expand this as we did with the other ones. So yeah, we’ll do that. Thanks. And then I guess from the little bit of last time remaining that we have, I wanted to talk about what’s currently written as recommendation two in this document, which I think was something that Howard originally brought up. And as you can see, there are some comments or concerns from the OCTO folks about it. So Howard, if I recall correctly, your point was that if we consider doing this for the root zone, that may sort of spill over into, if not policy, at least thoughts that it should be done the same for TLDs, and I think that’s how we ended up in this current recommendation two. I think either this recommendation two needs to be really rethought and rewritten, or maybe taken out of this document. And I’d like to get your thoughts about that. Peter, I see your hand is up. I don’t know if that’s for this or the other thing, but either way, go ahead.

PETER KOCH: Thank you. It was an old hand, but I take the invitation. I would agree that the recommendation as it stands is maybe confusing or not clear
enough. I do think that the document can live without that recommendation. If colleagues insist on or suggest keeping it in, it needs a bit more justification.

One of the risks I see is that we appear to say that DNSSEC isn't ready yet. While [inaudible] and can actually agree on that, as a committee, I think we might not want to issue a statement to that extent.

DUANE WESSELS: Thanks. Howard?

HOWARD ELAND: Yeah, so the thrust of my original comment was not necessarily that it should be signed or it should not be signed, but more that, what will the perception be if it is not consistent with the rules handed down by ICANN regarding TLDs, specifically the new TLD process now that people are talking about the next round or what have you?

And I think that is almost a corollary to Peter’s point of, is it our job to be pontificating on the current DNSSEC deployment status? I think both of those come into play. That’s where the thrust of my comment was. I don’t believe that the way this one is worded really captures that in the way that we as a community I think would want to phrase it. So perhaps the wordsmithing is indeed needed here. Thank you.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. Would you maybe be willing to propose some different wording here?
HOWARD ELAND: Sure. I can take a—not in three minutes, but I will—

DUANE WESSELS: No, not at all. Not right now, of course.

HOWARD ELAND: Yes, sir, I will take a stab at that, and I welcome the marinara sauce I'll make with all those tomatoes thrown at me.

DUANE WESSELS: Okay. Sounds good. So, I think we’re basically out of time. If anyone, again, if you want to chime in on this document, feel free. Otherwise, I will plan to work with the ICANN OCTO folks and get more information on their comments and get those resolved. Probably with Steve’s help.

A couple minutes left. Any Other Business before we adjourn this meeting? Oh, Steve, was there not something on the agenda about the upcoming ICANN meeting, the online ICANN meeting? I guess not. I thought that Danielle said something to me about considering changing our schedule for next month.

STEVE SHENG: Yeah, I think as part of the RZERC charter, we say we’re going to meet at least once at ICANN annual general meeting. So I think we’re coming up to that time in one year to have a public meeting.
DUANE WESSELS: Okay.

STEVE SHENG: I don't know if the meeting has been requested, but if not, I will work with Danielle to at least request that to fulfill our chartered procedures.

DUANE WESSELS: Right, so we should do that, and I guess the to her question is, is the expectation that other committee members will be doing ICANN meetings and living in the Hamburg time zone, and maybe we want to reschedule our regular monthly meeting to accommodate that? So we don’t have enough time to figure it out now, we’ll do it on the mailing list and go from there.

Okay. Thanks, everybody, and I see that there was some comments in chat that I’ve noted but not spoken to, so definitely, I just want you to know that I see those and we’ll get those addressed. And I think we can adjourn the meeting.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]