DAN GLUCK: Hey everyone, welcome to the 28th of April RZERC Teleconference number 50. This call is being recorded and is subject to the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior and Community Anti-Harassment Policy. And with that, Geoff.

GEOFF HUSTON: Right, now I take it you can do a roll call from the attendants. Yes. And I just want to note for everyone. Last week, Johan Liman sent his apologies for this call. And considering that the major item of business was actually the discussion of the letter we received on the 11th of April from Jeff Osborne, which was an RZERC, sorry, an RSSAC response to the letter that we had sent him. I asked Dan to invite Jeff Osborne to this meeting to help us go through this letter and understand some of the points being made and clarify some of this stuff. So with that, thankfully, Jeff Osborne is joining us. So welcome, Jeff, for this meeting.

GEOFF HUSTON: So with that, we've only got one item on the agenda this week, which is indeed the letter that we've received. In point of fact, just to remind folk, we have received two responses from our request for consultation. And that is one from RSSAC and the other from... Where are we? The other from Duane Wessels as the root zone maintainer. I think that's correct. The role there, Duane. And it's the RSSAC letter that is the one that I think we should talk about.

In the letter, they're asking for a meeting with members of both committees to actually discuss this proposal. And I wonder if we could at least at this point go through the five points made in that response to see what areas we need clarification on or would like to discuss with RSSAC. And so with that... I'd like to open this up a little bit and talk about each of them in order. And the first of these is, of course, topic number one, which is the risk reduction estimated at 1.2 percent. What I don't understand is the following sentence, which is a reference to, quote, potential operational risks. Without actually referencing the nature of such risks or even what they are. And then when RSSAC is wondering whether the benefits outweigh the risks, the issue is completely in the sea about exactly what risks are being referred to here. So I'll open that up for comments and whatever from other members and indeed from Jeff Osborne to see if we can't sort of flesh some of this out. So, Jeff.

JEFF OSBORNE: Jeff, you and I have known each other for a while and even been confused for each other. But one thing nobody has ever confused me for you is in your understanding of the technical aspects of this. So let me open the meeting by saying I am the chair of RSSAC and I fully went through five other members begging them, please, for God's sake, don't make the stupid kid have to be the one to defend this in front of the other smart people. So this is one of the problems of ICANN and its related things being part time jobs. I am literally in from a training ride because this was my day off and the other five begged out. So you are stuck with the dumb kid. So what I'll be able to do is correct spelling errors and ensure you that, yes, that's my signature on the bottom of

something that smarter people wrote. But otherwise, frankly, I'm going to have to count on the wits of Daniel, Andrew and asking Duane to switch hats if we want to really get anywhere. So this is all in the in the service of honesty that if I try bullshitting this, I'd be a fool.

GEOFF HUSTON: Thanks, Jeff. So could anyone else share some light on the substance of the risks or the characterization of these potential operating risks that are being referred to in that first item?

JEFF OSBORNE: Geoff, it is your prerogative to try to get as much out of this meeting as you want. But I'll humbly suggest a meeting of the appropriate smart people from the two groups may serve you better. And then I'll leave it at that and shut up and put my hand out.

GEOFF HUSTON: Just call this exploratory digging, Jeff. I'm completely in the dark myself about what's being referred to here. And I was just trying to understand, you know, where that might be heading without, you know, without necessarily, you know, identifying them literally. But just trying to understand what are we trying to refer to here in that point? And then, you know, if it's substantive, fine. Let's include that in a discussion point.

JEFF OSBORNE: As long as you understand both Jeffs are in the dark.

GEOFF HUSTON: Absolutely.

DUANE WESSELS: So, I would defer a lot to Willem as authors and author on these reports. But I think the risks that are referenced here are exactly the risks that were studied in that report and indeed very well quantified by the report. So I don't think it's anything different than just the same risks that those two studies explored.

GEOFF HUSTON: OK, so there's no new material here. It is referring back to the risks in the—let me be very, very specific here. The September 2023 report.

DUANE WESSELS: Sure.

GEOFF HUSTON: OK, thank you. Peter.

PETER KOCH: Yeah, thanks. And hi, everyone. I am not in a position to talk about what these particular potential operational risks are. But I am grateful to RSSAC to ask this question because we have this interesting quantity. The figure on one side was saying this, that the risk reduction is one point two percent. And obviously, the question is, OK, what is the cost?

No matter what the cost is, I think one of the questions at hand, maybe for this committee, maybe for someone else, because I see further down, RSSAC also has some concerns or has voiced some concerns about who is going to make that decision. But one question could be what price would we, the community, the potential entities suffering from that risk or bearing that risk? What price would they be willing to or could be imposed on them to outweigh this one point two percent risk reduction? And I don't think we've had that discussion, probably because we didn't have these figures. So maybe what we would want to do is either follow the request that we have a joint meeting and then can talk technical details or we send a letter, a message back. Or we just retry when Jeff isn't left alone and everybody else backed out. So they completely collectively feel a bit better. But I think the point risen is not is not outrageous. It is a good remark to make.

GEOFF HUSTON: Thank you. Let me start very quickly with clarification. This is not a substitute for any such joint online meeting that RSSAC is asking for. I think hopefully we're all clear on that. This is really a case of just trying to gain a better understanding of the points that have been raised. And I was going to lean on Lars Johan to help us with that. But Jeff is the substitute for that. So, no, this is not trying to hash things out. It's indeed trying to understand this. So my understanding from the discussion so far is that the potential operational risks that are being referred to here are the risks described in the September 2023 report from NLNet. And the reason why I'm careful to say this is that there is a second report that maybe we should also include here, which is the May 24 report that Wilhelm has referenced, or at least given us a point or

two in the chat meeting, which is also evidently important here. Before we move on Willem, because it's going to come back in point three, could you describe the background to this May 24 report? I was not aware that that was kind of part of this. And if I had been, I think we would have included references to both reports in our letters out to the various bodies.

WILLEM TOOROP: Yes, though, I did present on this report two months ago, I think. So, but yeah, it was not, I also noticed this was not referenced in the letter. But coming back to, yeah, so I assumed it was not necessary, perhaps, because it's more an answer to a question that was asked by RZERC, the RZERC report. But indeed, in the November report, in testbed results are several issues that came up with different naming schemes and different resolvers.

We also note, as Duane has also mentioned in his letter, that keeping the current naming scheme and signing bootservice.net doesn't really change anything, or changes the least, as, yeah, on how resolvers do priming. Basically, resolvers do not use the authoritative addresses from bootservice.net unless they explicitly query for it, which only a few resolvers do, and only under certain circumstances. And most resolvers also have the other addresses from the priming query as well, with an authoritative status or non-authoritative status, and will use those addresses as well to contact the boot service. So I think that observation is correct, that keeping the current naming scheme, which is not 0.1, but 0.5, I think, is the lessest impact, so to say. It's not the correct word, I'm struggling a bit here.

GEOFF HUSTON: Okay, so there is something in there, and I suppose, as some homework for RSSAC members, we should review both of those reports, the September 23 and May 2024 reports, for prep work for any such meeting with RSSAC. Any other comments on 0.1? No? Okay. 0.2.

WILLEM TOOROP: Yeah, so there's operational risks, which are described in the November report, and there's operational costs that Peter Koch also just mentioned. Like, you know, what is the signing process going to be like, and how will that sign zone be distributed? Is that also administrated by the same party that signs the route, and perhaps the signatures can have a longer lifetime, I think, because also the TTL is quite long in bootservice.net, which could make it less expensive with respect to costs, I guess. I'm not sure what the process exactly is, and whether we should evaluate that or not.

GEOFF HUSTON: Right, and here I'm not trying to solve anything. I'm merely trying to make sure that I think we all understand the background for raising this point, and where would that discussion lead us? And you're leading us towards an enumeration of identifying costs, and are there, A, existing mitigating circumstances, or B, are there potential mitigating circumstances, such as a longer TTL, that might mitigate any such costs? But the issue again comes back to a basic point about risks and costs that Peter Koch has made. Any other comments on point one? I think we've sort of come to a conclusion that there is some substance here

that could benefit from a discussion and more evaluation. No other comments? Jeff?

JEFF OSBORNE: Yeah, just to be clear, and I wasn't trying to say in the beginning, I've got nothing to say, but I think people have covered the issue as we were concerned about it, and I think your statement addresses that. So, thank you. Thank you.

GEOFF HUSTON: Thanks. Thanks, Jeff. Point two, we spend a lot of time in RZERC doing the charter, and I must admit, I must admit, I'm kind of a viewer, if not RZERC, then who? But I'm certainly interested in comments around, is this the right pair of bodies to discuss this? If not RZERC, then who is probably also a relevant discussion. I note that this has been a long-standing work item, and to simply go, well, you know, it's none of our business, so we're going to back off, doesn't strike me as a technically satisfying response that if there is net benefit in signing, then, you know, surely we should be doing something. So, where do we want to go with this? Is this a referral back to staff on an interpretation of the charter versus the topic? Is this something where, while RSSAC is perfectly reasonable for RSSAC to raise the question, how does that question get resolved is really where my head is at. So, comments on that, please. Andrew.

ANDREW MCCONACHIE: I will always hesitate as a staff person to offer interpretation of community-developed documents. I don't, I really worry about putting staff in that role because I'm in that role, and I worry about having to do that job. So, I'm afraid I can't, I don't think ICANN policy staff can offer any interpretation of who is the right body to be taking this on.

I mean, you know, so that aside, I think, you know, probably the right thing to do is to just continue forward. And, you know, at the end of the day, there's going to be a lot more than just the RZERC involved. And as the way things typically go at ICANN, if you discuss something for long enough and you get to a point where no one raises their hand and says, I disagree with that, after a while, then you can typically continue to move forward. And we'll figure out some kind of process to help make that happen, to make sure all the right people are consulted, be that through public comment, or be that through consulting other groups or whatever, right? I think we have enough liaisons within the board or within the various groups within ICANN to figure out who needs to be consulted. So, you know, my only advice would be don't let this question kind of limit you in your work or prevent you from continuing to engage with different groups and continuing to move forward.

JEFF OSBORNE: Well, as always, Andrew has something wise to say. My input is just that if we are going to have a meeting of RZERC and the RSSAC, this is an issue that several people in the RSSAC felt pretty strongly about. And the thing it reminded me of, it was kind of like playing tennis and I say, it's out, and the other guy says, it's in, and you look around and go, well, whose call is it? And it's one of the fun things about being a pro, I

suspect, is there's somebody to ask. So I don't know who the line judge is, but that's kind of what happened here where several people said, I'm not convinced that's in their charter. And I think I'm hearing Jeff say, I think it's in our charter. So I'm just wondering, who's the line judge on this? Because clearly there are some people at RSSAC who've asked the question and I wish they were here, because then you could have the discussion and come to the conclusion of who do we ask or where do we look up or how do we find an answer? And everybody's a reasonable person. I think they're just looking for who's the judge in a case like this. And I don't know. Thank you.

GEOFF HUSTON: Any other comments? Because I certainly have a comment here to make. I'll go back to the original point is, is the question worth follow-up considering that I can follow it up earlier ones about what are we doing about signing, commissioned a report, and then there was no one to pick it up. And I suppose, is this a question that is relevant in terms of evolution of the root structure above and beyond the simple contents of the zone itself that could be of net benefit to users as distinct from who is raising it, who is doing the follow-through. I am not sure that there's who is doing the follow-through. I am not convinced that this is an area where discussion with RZERC and RSSAC would add any clarity beyond noting that there is a legitimate concern here about the charter of RZERC and the topics that it's taking on. And I would actually propose a follow-up here that we can certainly have it raised in a joint meeting. But I suspect there is some research work going back through this charter to actually find the points of the charter for RZERC that has been developed and justify from the charter why RZERC feels that it is within

its remit, within its charter, to raise the question. So, that's my view. Duane.

DUANE WESSELS: Thanks, Geoff. So, as you noted at the start of this, RZERC does spend, I think, a lot more time talking about its charter and what's in scope than it does talking about work that leads to published numbered documents. We don't, for better or for worse, we don't have a lot of published documents or experience in producing that kind of work that we could look to for examples on whether or not this is in scope or not, that kind of thing. So, I think that there's certainly, we can take it as a fact that Verisign as a root zone maintainer brought this to RZERC in 2020, asked the question to the group. And then I think, well, then of course, we had the study, which Willem and his colleagues did, which was great. But now I think we're at the point where RZERC needs to decide if RZERC wants to make a statement or publish a document on this topic. And that's a question for the current committee members. And if they say, no, we don't want to, then, okay, then I guess we're done. If RZERC does want to, then I guess we work on that document and make a statement. That's how I see it.

GEOFF HUSTON: So, let me just clarify here. You're looking for a statement from RZERC giving the background to this request and also referencing points of the recently accepted charter that would, I suppose, justify that raising this question is within the charter of RZERC. Yes?

DUANE WESSELS: Well, I'm not sure that the recent changes to the charter have any relevance here. I think that RZERC has done these sort of exercises. We've gone through a list of topics and polled all the members to see if we think these topics are within scope or not. And those have always been very interesting. And there's a whole wide range of responses. I don't remember off the top of my head if this particular topic, if signing rootservers.net, I don't remember how that fell in the last time we did this exercise. If the majority of RZERC members thought it was in scope or not. We could go look at the record for that, I guess. I just think that at some point, RZERC needs to say, yeah, this is something we want to make a statement on or it's not something we want to make a statement on and go from there.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think in terms of foreshadowing, Jeff, I'm not sure we need to spend a lot of time in a joint meeting on this particular item. I think this is homework for RZERC, no matter what. And while noting that there has been, as you point out, this raised in RZERC. We'll certainly hear those concerns and if they want to reiterate them, that's fine. But, you know, we intend then to follow through and look at our past work and come up with some answers as to why this is something RZERC feels we need to make a statement on or not, as the case may be. So, with that, I'd like to move on. Number three, point number three. This one threw me a little bit because I was kind of going, I looked through the report, page 22 says nothing, and then it's, ah, the May 2024 report. The question was, was this concern considered? And I suppose my gut reaction is to say, well, it was part of the material, but let me then throw this open. Willem. You have your hand up.

WILLEM TOORUP: I copied a link to that section in the report to page 22 in the chat. So, that section talks about the worst case scenario. So, it's speculating about a situation that will probably, I think, never happen because revalidation isn't doing so well in the NSF currently. But perhaps, you know, if root servers.net would have been signed, there would be a better reason to do it, I suppose. So, there would be a more well-founded reason to start at least validating the addresses of the root servers. But also, yeah, there's also some more nuances that can be made here, because resolvers do not necessarily need to revalidate all the addresses of all the root servers. They only need to revalidate the ones that they are going to contact if they want to have the reduced risk, so to say. And this worst case number that we calculated is for all resolvers to specifically directly query for all the addresses of all the root servers. Okay, thank you. So, it's difficult to think how unlikely it is, but I would say very unlikely.

GEOFF HUSTON: Right. Any other comments on this?

DUANE WESSELS: Well, I have sort of an adjacent comment, I think. And after looking at these reports in detail, I came to the conclusion that if you want this data to be signed and validatable, there's a price to pay in terms of traffic, if you will. Either the resolver has to do these extra queries, potentially up to 30% as we see here on the screen, which is a worst case, or you have to make the primary response really, really big, which

means TCP and fragmentation and all that stuff. So it's going to hurt either way. So I'm not sure that's helpful, but it's just the way I've been thinking about this, that it's going to hurt one way or the other. And I guess by choosing the approach where you sign with the existing naming scheme, you sort of you leave that pain up to those that are willing to experience it, right? So you don't send huge responses to folks that are not going to validate, right? You make the clients choose if they want the pain or not.

GEOFF HUSTON: Right, thank you. I kind of have this feeling, since there's no hands up, that this echoes some risk analysis work that I've had to do professionally over the years, where you look at the likelihood of the event and the impact of the event. And you start with something like meteorite strike, which is extremely unlikely, but massively impactful. And this kind of seems susceptible to a similar form of analysis, where the likelihood that all resolvers ask all of the root servers about validating all of the addresses, etc., as being certainly in the current environment, an extremely low likelihood. But if that were to occur, a 30% increase in root server query traffic would be an excessively high impact. And it's that kind of analysis that I think might help elucidate this.

I'm certainly happy that we might discuss this in a joint meeting, to understand what other data might help us with the likelihood, i.e., the real amount of resolvers that perform validation, the percentage of which would validate a root server address system, etc., and try and quantify the likelihood of this, acknowledging that a 30% traffic increase

would be a big one, you know, is a major impact if that were to occur. So I would propose leaving that on the agenda of a joint discussion and actually trying to find to what extent, the aim of that discussion, to what extent more data might help quantify the likelihood of such an event. Is that acceptable? I see no hands. Okay, moving on, could you bring that letter back up on the screen, please, Dan? Thank you. So we'll leave this on and see if we can discuss how that risk can be quantified in a little better than extremely unlikely. Okay. Four, fake sharing and decreased stability. Do we have any background on this from anyone?

JEFF OSBORNE: The basic idea, I suspect, and then don't go digging too deeply, is one of those cases where the broad diversity of the root server system is one of its strengths, and this is putting more of our eggs in a single basket than we tend to be inclined to do.

GEOFF HUSTON: And so it's not the signatures, because we're already in a single key signing scenario. It's the use of a single TLD.net that is, I suppose, the source of this. So in choosing an approach that we thought was the least impact in terms of potential naming systems, the use of a single domain for all root servers does indeed compromise, to some extent, the diversity of the root system and potentially has the introduction of single sources of risk. Is that a paraphrasing of where you are, Jeff?

JEFF OSBORNE: That is a very good flavor of the discussion that led to this sentence, exactly.

GEOFF HUSTON: I'm inclined to say—yeah?

WILLEM TOOROP: I'm sorry, Jeff. I wanted to follow up with something you said. You said it's not about this DNSSEC signatures, right? Did I hear you say that?

GEOFF HUSTON: I said it's the KSK, the thing that is a result of validation, always ends at one point. And that's kind of the way we validate. That was all I was referring to, that there's an inescapable part of DNSSEC that is singly rooted, and that's just the architecture. It's beyond that, which was where I understood this comment to come from. And thank you very much, Jeff, for that elucidation, because I think that certainly helps with our thinking on this. Any other comments? Because I think that's where we're stopping, at least to the point of shedding light on it. So, Willem.

WILLEM TOOROP: Yes. So, currently, there is already a dependency on .NET, because it's delegated from .NET. I don't see how a DS record in .NET, signed by the .NET key, is making that fate sharing larger. I think it's similar. It doesn't change the current situation. As a signed delegation, are you then more dependent on the parent than an unsigned delegation?

GEOFF HUSTON: Again, this is not the meeting to hash out answers, but it is the meeting to understand where are the points of discussion with RSSAC that are going to be helpful in moving this topic forward. So, I've certainly noted here, is this really an incremental change to the existing dependencies on .NET? And if so, what might they be? Because it's not clear that we understand that. Okay? And so, it's not trying to give an answer. It's really just trying to say, well, where are we looking for here? So, thank you for that, Willem. Any further comments on point four? Point five. Now, where do we go with this? Which is, the comment was, originally RSSAC 028 proposed multiple schemes that might be feasible. And RSSAC is advocating that further research be done, a more comprehensive plan for root server renaming. We have any light on this, Jeff?

JEFF OSBORNE: We do. The basic idea here was, if you start from the idea that we are getting a limited return for the effort, you know, which was, by the time we get to the end of this, we had decided this is a lot of work for a small effort. And in addition, it was likely, should we proceed with the renaming scheme that we had already been talking about them, the entire effort would be repeated. So, the sort of the meat of item five here is, we're a little skeptical about trying to do this thing anyway, and then we think it would need to be redone based on other work in process. This is where we'd rename, we would simply be doing it all over again. Is that coherent enough that I got it right? Because like I said, I'm standing on shoulders that are way taller than mine.

DUANE WESSELS: I was in that meeting where we talked about this and I think you've captured the sentiment from that.

GEOFF HUSTON: On the face of it, again, this is kind of a risk analysis. If I was going to react at this point about going is renaming a low likelihood, moderate impact of it, and if the likelihood is so low, considering it seems to be a perennial risk, I'm going to go with it. Is this an excuse, if you will, to defer other topics while we're waiting for something that may never get resolved to be resolved. And I think there is a substance in that discussion. I'm not suggesting there's an outcome at this point, but there is, to my mind, substance in this discussion about whether there is benefit in moving in the current timeframe, noting that renaming is still an open topic. So again, to my mind, that seems to be that there is some substance in having this discussed together to see if there's a view from across that discussion as to whether RZERC should continue to advocate doing this in the current timeframe without a particular timetable or whether that concern about renaming at some point in the future tends to mitigate any motivation to proceed with signing at this point in time. If I summarize those points, Willem?

WILLEM TOORUP: Yes. So the November report, the Implementing RSSAC 28, or RSSAC 28 Implementation Study Report, evaluates different naming schemes and all the naming schemes had issues, basically. Even the current one, though the current one adding DNSSEC does not add new issues, it just

has the issues that are currently already there, except for one naming scheme that had less issues than all the others, which is the one where each boot identifier gets its own TLD. But it seems to me that that is a big operational change with big operational risks, so to say. So to me, I think that the conclusion is already in the RSSAC 28 Implementation Study Report and that we should remain with the current naming scheme.

GEOFF HUSTON: I'm ever so slightly confused, and this is a housekeeping question, Willem. You referenced what you called a November report. The one on my screen, RSSAC 28 Implementation Study Report...

WILLEM TOORUP: September.

GEOFF HUSTON: Oh, September. Okay, so it is the same document. The November 2023 report, which is the one you've referenced in the chat. Okay, thank you very much. Any other comments on this question? I certainly recognize, and this is a charter comment, that I did not believe a priori that the naming scheme sits within RZERC. Now I could be wrong, but it does not seem to me to be a topic that RZERC has the carriage of. It seems to me to be an RSSAC kind of topic. We are concerned with the more narrow question of, if you want to validate those names using DNS security, you know, what is the steps leading to having those names validatable in the

DNSSEC framework? So that's my interpretation. Jeff, do you have a view on this?

JEFF OSBORNE: Well, just that I don't think anybody is saying it's RZERC's bailiwick. Simply that the renaming, should RSSAC undertake it, has an effect on how clever it was to do something once rather than twice.

GEOFF HUSTON: Thank you. Yes, understood. And I think that's a clarifying comment about, it's not, RZERC has a more limited view on this. And the comment from RSSAC is, if renaming is still an active topic and RSSAC says it's not dead, then to sign what we are doing now might involve revisiting this in the future if renaming were to happen. Is that an accurate summation?

JEFF OSBORNE: You know, this is a compelling reason why we should have a thoughtful discussion between the two groups, I think, because we have had no compelling reason to move on this. And you may be offering a compelling reason. And that would give people the opportunity to, what's the polite way to say it, fish or cut bait. You know, so I've been sitting with the idea that someday we may do something. Somebody coming along and saying, I have a clever idea. You can't simply say someday I may do something forever. So I think you have a very good argument to say to us, listen guys, you know, if this is going to happen in 350 years and it's on your to-do list, I'd suggest in the meantime we do this other thing. Because then somebody needs to say, you know what,

okay, you're right. Let's get going on the renaming, see you in a year, and we'll do it then. Or you know, I think it's a very valid point for you to bring something up. There has been no compelling reason to do something I can think of, and you're offering a compelling reason. So that's a change, and you know, change is a good reason to have a discussion. Thank you.

GEOFF HUSTON: Thank you for that. It's a very helpful comment. Thank you. Thank you. Any other comments on item five? I see no other hands. That certainly leads me to the view that I am in favor of having such a joint meeting to discuss this. I assume I'm saying that with the accordance of the RZERC members who are here, if that is not the case, please say so now. And I will ask staff to organize such a meeting, I think initially for an hour, to see how we can work through this. I will work with Jeff Osborne as to how we can do the logistics of going through the topics and managing the meeting, if that's okay, Jeff?

JEFF OSBORNE: Yes. Actually, the way you had it today, where we have five points to discuss, would have been fine if I'd had a deeper bench.

GEOFF HUSTON: Right. So we'll ask the staff to find a time where we can have a deeper bench and have this meeting. In the meantime, as well, I'll do some homework on the point two around the charter and whose role is it to do what. But I think at that point, we have done about as much as we

can today. Any other comments in any other business at this point? Andrew?

ANDREW MCCONACHINE: Yeah, just a quick question. With regards to preparing for the meeting, would it be helpful if I sent to the list to the RZERC list, just links to all of the various documents that get talked about? So we're all kind of all making sure that we're all talking about the same documents because there seems to be some confusion about which report we're talking about, when that kind of thing.

GEOFF HUSTON: I think it would be helpful to both RSSAC and RZERC members that you compile the relevant documents here that give us a history of this. Yes. Thank you very much.

ANDREW MCCONACHINE: Sure. I'll send a bunch of links to both lists.

GEOFF HUSTON: And name them so that when we're talking about them, we have easy names for them. That would be very helpful. I find at some point, wading through ICANN repositories looking for documents It's to be hit and miss with the current search engines. And AI is no substitute. Let me just say that right now, because, you know, AI is no substitute. OK, so if I could ask Dan to work with the RSSAC people and find a convenient time to have a one hour meeting and Jeff and Jeff and Dan

and whoever's looking after RSSAC will effectively publish an agenda for that meeting, probably very much based on the existing one we've done here to go through that. Any other comments?

JEFF OSBORNE: Thanks, I would just like to apologize for us not being able to pull this off. I mean, considering this isn't our day jobs, I'm really always impressed at how many people are willing to show up for things. And this was the case where absolutely everybody had a reason they couldn't do it, including me. So I apologize.

GEOFF HUSTON: Jeff, we're happy to have you. This was effectively a meeting for within us to at least discuss this letter and to work out how we respond to the invitation to have, you know, a more substantive meeting. And I appreciate your willingness to jump in and, you know, shed some RSSAC light on the letter, which has been most helpful. So thanks for making the time to join us. I appreciate it.

JEFF OSBORNE: Thank you. Appreciate it.

GEOFF HUSTON: Okay, if there's no other business, then I will give you back five minutes of your life. Thank you indeed, all. Bye. Bye.

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