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Resources

Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC)

Fast Flux Hosting

Final Report of the GNSO Fast Flux Hosting Working Group [PDF

Attacks Against Domain Registration Services

Phishers Are Casting Nets for Your Domain Names & DNS [HTML]

Avoid Falling Victim to a Registrar Phishing Attack [HTML]

Measures to protect (University) domain registrations and DNS against attacks [HTML]

How To Protect Yourself Against Domain Name Hijackers [HTML]

Add "Protect Domain Name" To The Security Checklist [HTML]

DNS Pharming [HTML]

Domain Hijacking Takes ICANN Spotlight [HTML]

Attacks against the DNS (Name resolution)

Before You Consider DNS Blocking First Do No Harm [HTML]

Blocking DNS [HTML]
(also appears as) COICA and Secure DNS [HTML]

Taking Back the DNS [HTML]

Anycast, Unicast or Both? [HTML] On Mandated Content Blocking in the DNS [HTML] Using Domain Filtering to Effect IP Address Filtering [HTML] Domain Names Without Dots [HTML] DNS Migration: How to Minimize Problems When Switching DNS Providers [HTML] In Defense of BIND Open Source DNS Software Yields Better Breed Secure Product [HTML]

"What DNS is Not," Paul Vixie, ACMQueue, November 5, 2009 [HTML]

Is Your Caching Resolver Polluting the Internet? [HTML]

Measurements and Laboratory Simulations of the Upper DNS Hierarchy [HTML]

DNS Denial of Service Attacks

BCP 38, RFC 2827, Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing [HTML]

Firewall Best Practices - Egress Traffic Filtering [HTML]

Anatomy of a DNS DDoS Amplification Attack [HTML

Worrisome Threat of DNS DDoS Attacks [PDF

Multilingual support in TLD labels

"Multilingual Internet" has many dimensions [HTML]

Alternative Registries and Roots

Putting Multiple Root Nameserver Issue to Rest [HTML]

DNS Security

Three Reasons Why It Makes Sense to Deploy DNSSEC Now [HTML]

DNSSEC Deployment Reaching Critical Mass [HTML]

Attacking the Internet's Core [HTML]

Internet Measurement Data Management Challenges [PDF]

Protect IP Technical Whitepaper [PDF]

Operational Implications of the DNS Control Plane [PDF]

DNSSEC Explained (ICANN SSAC Workshop, Marrakech, MA 25 June 2006) [PDF]

DNS Security Extensions [HTML]

It’s Time For Enterprises To Take On DNS Security [HTML]

The Power of Ideas: Internet Governance in a Global Multi- Stakeholder Environment, Chapter 4: Security of the Domain Name System [PDF]

IP version 6 (IPv6)

Don't Use Firewalls as an Excuse to Ignore IPv6 [HTML]

Eight Security Considerations for IPv6 Deployment [HTML]

IPV4 Address Space Consumption [HTML]

Are commercial firewalls ready for IP version 6 [PDF]

Domain Name System
Internationalized Domain Name ,IDN,"IDNs are domain names that include characters used in the local representation of languages that are not written with the twenty-six letters of the basic Latin alphabet ""a-z"". An IDN can contain Latin letters with diacritical marks, as required by many European languages, or may consist of characters from non-Latin scripts such as Arabic or Chinese. Many languages also use other types of digits than the European ""0-9"". The basic Latin alphabet together with the European-Arabic digits are, for the purpose of domain names, termed ""ASCII characters"" (ASCII = American Standard Code for Information Interchange). These are also included in the broader range of ""Unicode characters"" that provides the basis for IDNs. The ""hostname rule"" requires that all domain names of the type under consideration here are stored in the DNS using only the ASCII characters listed above, with the one further addition of the hyphen ""-"". The Unicode form of an IDN therefore requires special encoding before it is entered into the DNS. The following terminology is used when distinguishing between these forms: A domain name consists of a series of ""labels"" (separated by ""dots""). The ASCII form of an IDN label is termed an ""A-label"". All operations defined in the DNS protocol use A-labels exclusively. The Unicode form, which a user expects to be displayed, is termed a ""U-label"". The difference may be illustrated with the Hindi word for ""test"" — परीका — appearing here as a U-label would (in the Devanagari script). A special form of ""ASCII compatible encoding"" (abbreviated ACE) is applied to this to produce the corresponding A-label: xn--11b5bs1di. A domain name that only includes ASCII letters, digits, and hyphens is termed an ""LDH label"". Although the definitions of A-labels and LDH-labels overlap, a name consisting exclusively of LDH labels, such as""icann.org"" is not an IDN."