Security and Stability Advisory Committee

Public Forum Presentation
Mar del Plata
April 6, 2005

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Topics

- Structure
- Activities
- DNSSEC
- Domain Name Hijacking
Structure

- Committee of roughly 20 experts
  - All volunteers
  - All technical
  - Broad participation across component constituencies

- Board committee
  - Advised both the board and the overall community
Activities

- DNSSEC
- Domain Name Hijacking
- Add Storm
- Phishing
- etc
DNS Security
DNSSEC is...

- "DNS Security" Protocol
- protection against tampering
  - domain name and address are tied together
- an extension to the DNS protocol
- a twelve year technical development
- finally published by the IETF
  - RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035
- ready for deployment
DNSSEC Deployment is...

- ... the transition from specs to operation
- ... a multinational effort
- ... a complex process
- ... a project that needs your help
ICANN and DNSSEC

- **ICANN**
  - IANA signs the root
  - Coordination with the TLDs
  - Community Leadership

- **Many other participants**
  - Governments
  - ISPs, DNS operators
  - Enterprises
  - Software Vendors
What’s Happening Now?

- Roadmap Development
- Workshops and Test Beds
- Software Development
- Early adopters
- Preparation for signing and deploying root
- Top level domains
- Selected applications
What’s the Schedule?

- 2005
  - Specs published (RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035)
  - Road map
    - Root signing
    - Early TLD operation
    - Larger consortium
    - Luxembourg and Vancouver workshops
- 2006
  - Early applications
  - General availability of software
- 2007 ...
Domain Name Hijacking
Headlines

- Panix.com was hijacked on 15 Jan 2005
  - action returned it after 48 hours
- Gaining Registrar and Reseller at fault
- The problem is (also) systemic
- Other hijackings
  - hz.com is an equally compelling story
- Room for improvement
Tentative Recommendations

- Campaign for public awareness
  - Domain name risks and management of credentials
  - Domain name lock and auth-info mechanisms
  - Levels of service (contact hours, authentication techniques)
- Require Losing Registrar to send notification to the Registrant, in addition to Gaining registrar getting authorisation
  - Currently it’s optional
  - Refinement of existing policy, not a reversal
- Development of emergency action channels
- Development of more visible enforcement
- Emergency “UnDo” procedure being pushed