

**Enhancing ICANN Accountability  
Proposed Solutions from Public Comment**

All comments can be found at <http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/>

Topic	Comment	Commenter
Agreements	ICANN's accountability should be defined in terms of transparent agreements with ICANN stakeholders, defining roles, responsibilities, dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms	NRO
Agreements	The service agreements for delivery of service to the RIRs should be reviewed to define appropriate dispute resolution, escalation and arbitration procedures	NRO
AoC	Previous recommendations from ATRTs should be implemented in a timely fashion	Robin Gross
AoC	The AoC is not an accountability mechanism and tinkering with it will not produce accountability improvements	Milton Mueller
Audit	Require annual outside audit of ICANN, performed by an entity without preexisting contract	Heritage Foundation
Board	At least 1/3 of Board members to devote full time to ICANN, to be "better equipped to assist the Board in reaching rightful decisions"	Spain
Board	Broadcast Board meetings over internet and archive Board materials	Heritage Foundation
Board	Create a mechanism by which the Chair of the Board could be voted off by a defined supermajority in the SOs and Acs	Avri Doria
Board	Create a mechanism by which the entire Board could be voted off	Avri Doria
Board	Create a recall mechanism for any elected Board member by the entity that selected them	Avri Doria
Board	Enhanced accountability process should include consideration of significant alterations of the Board's composition and functions, with accompanying changes to the Bylaws	INTA
Board	GAC to select two to four voting members of the Board that are not officials in any government, people for whom the GAC respects experience in managing public policy issues	Spain
Board	Increase Observer Status Board seats (potentially selected by NomCom) (non-voting)	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Board	Make Board and committee discussions archived for transparency, with limited redaction	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Board	Make Board deliberations transparent through a non-ceremonial open meeting at ICANN's public meeting	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Board	No ICANN officer or voting director should be selected by or represent a governmental or intergovernmental body	Heritage Foundation

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Board	Provide demonstrable links of Board members residence, studies and careers in the country	Spain
Board	Provide means for the public to engage in questions and answers with the ICANN Board, such as convening annually at the IGG	SIIA
Board	Simplify Board selection process to one that is more transparent and direct (with proposals suggested)	Heritage Foundation
Change AoC	A review of the AoC would be timely; the cornerstone commitment of ICANN to remain a not-for-profit corporation headquartered in the United States and organized under U.S. law must be strengthened	COA
Change AoC	ATRT members should have open access to all ICANN internal documentation and be empowered to recommend declassification; embargoed information should have a clear timeline for release	Avri Doria
Change AoC	ATRT should be given the authority to sunset obsolete reviews and create new reviews as it sees fit	BC (Reply)
Change AoC	Board to have no control on selections to review teams	Spain
Change AoC	Broaden the basis of the AoC through additional MoUs, including democratic governments and global INGOs	Avri Doria
Change AoC	Change the AoC membership to be balanced among the ICANN community by implementation of a formula, allow selection of members to be at the discretion of the respective SOs and ACs; invite a past chair or member of each other AoC review team to be an observer to the next ATRT review; experts working on AoC review teams should be at the discretion of the review team, not the Board, staff or GAC	Avri Doria
Change AOC	Commission expert to examine questions of should additional parties be invited to become parties to AoCs, and what other agreements or impacts should be considered as part of the DNS. Should third parties be able to raise grievances based on failures to follow the AoC, and what mechanisms would be used	Google
Change AoC	Community (including governments) should have chance to suggest external experts for participation	Spain
Change AoC	Community should be able to designate representatives on review teams without Board or GAC Chair approval	BC (Reply)
Change AoC	Develop standard text to be signed between ICANN and each government, as well as ICANN and each stakeholder group	European Commission

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Change AoC	Do not enter into multiple bilateral AoCs, as they could be extremely difficult to negotiate and create conflicting obligations	BC (Reply)
Change AoC	Evolution of AoC could take the form of an affirmation into which many more stakeholder communities, including Governments, could enter	NRO
Change AoC	Existing mechanisms for accountability should be preserved and made legally binding, such as through perpetual extension of the Affirmation of Commitments and the reviews that it sets forth	Verizon
Change AoC	Expanding countersignatures on AoC will not satisfy all nations or international bodies	Konrad von Finckenstein
Change AoC	Future review teams should have "proper" representation of governments, with no ex-officio governmental members	Spain
Change AoC	GAC as a whole, not the Chair, should make selections to the review teams	Spain
Change AoC	ICANN to enter into AoC with Internet Freedom Panel, and include terms on freedom of expression (Based upon suggestion that with the anticipated transition, the current AoC will no longer be in effect)	Heritage Foundation
Change AoC	If more AoCs are signed, there should be the inclusion of strong redress mechanism in case of failure in compliance of ICANN's duties, to entities external to ICANN	Spain
Change AOC	Incorporate redress, appeal and enforcement mechanisms into new AoCs	European Commission
Change AoC	Incorporate statement that ICANN endeavors to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles contained in it	Edward Morris
Change AoC	Independent experts not enough; conduct assessments through external entities	Spain
Change AoC	Make review team recommendations binding on ICANN	European Commission
Change AoC	Modify the membership of ATRT for greater organizational parity and for rotating government seats and global INGO seats on the ATRT among the signatories of MoUs	Avri Doria
Change AoC	Provide transparency into review team recommendations - what level of consensus was reached on the recommendation? How were community inputs considered? Which inputs were rejected? Etc.	Spain

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Change AoC	Recommendations of review teams should be given higher priority for implementation; requirement for responding to recommendations should be institutionalized	BC (Reply)
Change AoC	Review process should be every 5 years, not 3, so that ICANN is not in a continuous review cycle without time for implementation of changes	Fiona Asonga
Change AoC	Termination - adopt Board resolution that AoC is binding and will not terminate without supermajority vote	Google
Change AoC	The ATRT Reviews are the foundation on which other accountability mechanisms should be built	Avri Doria
Change AoC	While several values in AoC should be maintained (preserve security, stability and resiliency; promote competition, consumer trust and choice; facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination) but amend to "ensure that ICANN's decisions are fully consistent with human rights standards. ICANN should guarantee that decisions related to the global and technical coordination of the DNS are made in a transparent and accountable manner and crucially 'for the protection and advance of human rights and Internet freedoms' rather than 'in the public interest'"	NCSG
Change Articles of Incorporation	ICANN should change its AoI to require accountability to its stakeholder bodies; no further amendments to this section should be allowed	Brian Carpenter
Change Bylaws	Allow for dissolution of the Board in exceptional circumstances, consistent with the President's Strategy Committee's draft plan for Improving Institutional Confidence	NCSG
Change Bylaws	Bylaws could be amended to reflect the need for the organization to evolve and provide stronger accountability mechanisms to the wider community, such as amended to prohibit ICANN from engaging in regulation of content or conduct in violation of the rights to freedom of expression or privacy.	NCSG
Change Bylaws	For changes to key portions of the Bylaws should require maximum public comment period and even higher than 2/3 threshold	Google
Change Bylaws	In the absence of the IANA Functions Contract reviews, the AoC should become a permanent fixture in ICANN's Bylaws (as modified)	BC (Reply)
Change Bylaws	Incorporate AoC Commitments into the Bylaws	SIIA

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Change Bylaws	Incorporate AoC into the Bylaws	Edward Morris
Change Bylaws	Incorporate ATRT review into the Bylaws (subject to heightened threshold for change), and broaden to allow the sunseting or launch of other reviews; also supports continuation of other AoC reviews and inclusion in the Bylaws	USCIB
Change Bylaws	Incorporate freedom of expression, discourse and assembly into Bylaws	Heritage Foundation
Change Bylaws	Raise threshold for changes to Bylaws provisions essential to ICANN's mission, accountability, transparency, and review to 2/3	USCIB
Change Bylaws	Raise threshold for changes to Bylaws to 2/3	Google
Change Bylaws	Require 4/5 vote of Board for major decisions (including Bylaws revisions and Articles of Incorporation), as well as for the GNSO	Heritage foundation
Change Bylaws	Require higher threshold for changes to Bylaws on Accountability and review	SIIA
Change Bylaws	Require supermajority of Board, based on significant community input, to make changes to core obligations in Bylaws	MPAA
Change Bylaws	Require supermajority or unanimity to change location of ICANN incorporation or not-for-profit status; also require 2/3 majority vote of ICANN multistakeholder community	USCIB
Change Bylaws	Strengthen Bylaws to require a high threshold of support for any proposed change in policy that impacts ICANN's central mission	Verizon
Clerk or Parliamentarian	Independent staff position to help guide community through ICANN's complex processes - focus on uniformity/predictability	Google
Complaint mechanisms	Inquiry and complain channels should be established to receive user complaints and suggestions	Internet Society of China
Complaint mechanisms	Response mechanisms should be set up to give feedback on each complaint channel and boost the improvement	Internet Society of China
Component Entities	All supporting organizations and affiliate organizations to put in place accountability and transparency mechanisms similar or aligned to those of ICANN	Edward Morris
Component Entities	Create a recall mechanism for SO Council and ALAC members selected by the NomCom, or the entities that selected them	Avri Doria
Component Entities	Have Transparency International conduct an audit of all SOs and Acs	Edward Morris

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Conflicts of Interest	Potential revenue implications from ICANN proposals should be routinely disclosed	SIIA
Consequences	ICANN should be subject to losing control of the contents of the root zone if the relevant stakeholder group is dissatisfied	Brian Carpenter
Contracts	ICANN bylaws should prohibit entering of agreements that impose conditions unrelated to DNS management; contracts should not be subject to ICANN unilateral change, and should be subject to US Courts	Heritage Foundation
Contractual Compliance	Maintain routine, rigorous reporting on contractual compliance	MPAA
Data	ICANN needs to develop good base data (society, economics, infrastructure, etc.) on 200-250 countries and 2.7 billion Internet users	Kilnam Chon
DIDP	Accountability body to ensure that community has complete and timely access to all materials relevant to ICANN decision-making process; may request and publish policy documents/brings/memos/emails	MPAA
DIDP	Consider holding a public consultation on stakeholder experiences with DIDP	SIIA
DIDP	Create independent body to sit in appeal over decisions of production - could be community comprised, but people independent of ICANN	CIS
DIDP	Create more robust FOIA type process, potentially through administration by a third party	USCIB
DIDP	Exceptions to disclosure should be finite and time bound	CIS
DIDP	Explore options for increasing transparency	Edward Morris
DIDP	Incorporate a sunset period for information classified as non-discloseable	Edward Morris
DIDP	Institute punitive measure for unreasonable, unexplained or illegitimate denials of information	CIS
DIDP	Make broader and provide appeal through an independent dispute resolution process	Heritage Foundation
DIDP	Provide public statistics on how many requests are made and denied	SIIA
DIDP	Remove ability to cite "legal disclaimers, confidentiality clauses or NDAs" in requests for information so that ICANN must consider transparency when engaging outside services	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy

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DIDP	Review Defined Conditions for Nondisclosure to make more SIIA information available to stakeholders without constraining operations; include possibility of disclosure of intra-ICANN communications	
DIDP	Strengthen the response and appeal measures, including designated, publicly identified members of staff be responsible for coordination of response	CIS
Direct Relationship	ICANN should host pictures from meetings on its own servers, not on services like Flickr or other corporate websites for which participants would have to agree to other terms of service re marketing, etc.	DeeDee Halleck
Disclosures	All members of the ICANN Board and others in leadership positions at ICANN should disclose monies earned or other benefit procured as a result of affiliation with ICANN	Edward Morris
Diversity	ICANN should consider diversity of opinions and advice brought by global community	Internet Society of China
External Supervision	ICANN needs to form a more sufficient and effective external supervision mechanism to develop a credible accountability on policy making and operation	CNNIC
Fees	Require supermajority of Board to approve changes in fees	Heritage Foundation
Finances	Complete budget of ICANN should be online, including income, travel expenses and consultancies	DeeDee Halleck
Finances	ICANN needs to not only describe what it is going to accomplish and note whether it was accomplished, but also "what did it cost and was that cost worth it?" to measure the return on scarce resources	DNA
Globalization	ICANN increasing visibility to stakeholders all around the world	Fiona Asonga
Globalization	ICANN should exert efforts to further substantiate the full function and working capacity of its globalization efforts	CNNIC
Globalization	ICANN's incorporation gives the impression that it is under the control of one single government, which is inconsistent with ICANN's intention to be responsible for global multistakeholders and is an impediment to ICANN's deepening globalization	Internet Society of China
Globalization	Promote greater engagement of stakeholders from across the world and outside the ICANN community	European Commission

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Governance balance	Design ICANN with separation of powers thoughts in mind - Board and executive accountable for the policies and actions of entire organization, community as the collective house/legislature, and reconsideration/ombudsman as more independent internal Judicial Organ	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Governance balance	Modify ICANN's governance structure so that Board members are accountable to external groups, to allow for increased representation of direct users, but don't allow governmental seat	TPI
Government Engagement	ICANN maintaining/establishing engagement with all governments whether or not they have been involved with ICANN, welcoming involvement alongside non-governmental stakeholders	Fiona Asonga
Human Rights	Accounting for how ICANN's policies impact the basic human rights of Internet users and ongoing mechanisms to ensure ICANN's policies do not circumvent the rights of Internet users should be in place	Robin Gross
Implement ATRT Recommendations	Complete implementation of ATRT recommendations	NCSG
Implement ATRT Recommendations	The first requirement for improved accountability is the full implementation of the recommendations of the completed current AoC reviews, with current and future work not being used as a reason against open recommendations; items where Board or staff feel a recommendation cannot be implemented should be brought back for further conversation	Avri Doria
Inclusiveness	ICANN should reach out to non-traditional ICANN stakeholders	SIIA
Independent Audit	Along with the technical audits, there should be new mechanism to address transparency, decision-making processes and organizational issues	Spain
Independent Audit	Independent Audit of ICANN's performance in meeting specific performance goals, such as adherence to AOC, Bylaws and Aol. Includes recommendation implementation, ability for complaints on non-compliance. Outcomes should include detailed explanations of ICANN's failures to comply	Google
Inspector General	Create a new inspector general with "full access to ICANN", issuing a report not subject to ICANN approval	Heritage Foundation



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Internal Controls	Strengthen internal controls and provide language on how ICANN would do that	USCIB
Internal Controls	Subject internal controls , internal and external audit to review by a third party	USCIB
Jurisdiction	"Consideration should be given to broadening the scope of issues that can be taken up before the local courts, in particular issues relating to the right to freedom of expression and the rights to privacy and personal security."	NCSG
Jurisdiction	"Include a unilateral option clause that would enable a choice between the local courts or arbitration proceedings"	NCSG
Jurisdiction	California law provides confidence that ICANN will be held accountable for violations of bylaws/special duties of directors; ICANN leaving jurisdiction should be undertaken "only if there is a demonstrable benefit that clearly outweighs costs", and prepare an in-depth research report including judicial redress opportunities in new mechanisms	USCIB
Jurisdiction	Defined dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms should be binding and implementable on ICANN regardless of locale	NRO
Jurisdiction	Find ways to ensure that any decisions regarding ICANN's location do not undermine the applicability of California law to its operations, including the obligations applicable to nonprofits	Verizon
Jurisdiction	ICANN should explore incorporation as an international organization under international law to add confidence to serve stakeholders uniformly across the globe	NRO
Jurisdiction	ICANN's commitment to operating under the rule of law in jurisdictions that support effective redress should be codified as part of process	MPAA
Jurisdiction	Prior to ICANN leaving California, it must issue a response explaining why a move is warranted and the legal consequences of the move; conduct a consultation on the proposal	SIIA
Jurisdiction	Require ICANN, through Bylaws change, to remain subject to US Court jurisdiction	Heritage Foundation
Jurisdiction	Require supermajority Board support for a move out of California	SIIA

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Metrics	Establish clear metrics and benchmarks to measure improvements in accountability and transparency, published periodically	USCIB
Metrics	ICANN should report regularly on compliance with the accountability function	SIIA
Mission	ICANN's management and board should be more strictly confined to ICANN's technical mission	BC (Reply)
Multilingualism	ICANN needs to stick to the principle of multilingualism in its work and related affairs, so as to greatly facilitate even higher participation from non-English speaking communities	Internet Society of China
Ombudsman	Consider granting Ombudsman ability to refer a matter to the external body if created	NCSG
Ombudsman	Consider granting powers to set Board decisions or policies aside. However, if external body is put into place, consider if Ombudsman still serves a useful person.	NCSG
Ombudsman	Delegate the duty of selecting and retaining the ICANN Ombudsman to the NomCom	Edward Morris
Ombudsman	Grant clear authority to investigate any complaint brought by an employee that is related to ICANN accountability	NCSG
Organization Size	ICANN's organizational growth should be limited in order to restrict mission creep and unnecessary bureaucracy	TPI
Outreach	ICANN should organize regional meetings (and subregional meetings) in each content on globalization, multistakeholder models, etc.	Kilnam Choi
Policy Development	ICANN policy development is prone to be made exclusive by "closed clubs", leading to decision capture. Transparency needs to be part of the bottom up model	CNNIC
Policy Development	ICANN should follow the principle of user-first during its whole policy-making process	Internet Society of China
Policy Development	Move policy development from separate SOs to a broader community process to achieve rough community consensus across the community prior to Board action - achieve through multistakeholder house creation for meeting at ICANN meetings, with a place for experts as well	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Policy Separation	Maintain structural separation of IANA Functions Dept. employees from policy activities relating to those functions	Google
Policy Separation	Separate between names/numbering and the IANA functions	USCIB

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Policy Separation	Separate IANA functions from policy making	Milton Mueller
Policy Separation	Separate the IANA Functions from ICANN, with policy function within ICANN now overseen by "Internet Freedom Panel" - a private sector board with no government members with the power to veto "proposed changes to the DNS deemed to threaten the freedom, stability, or security of the Internet."	Heritage Foundation
Public Comment	As carefully considered and substantiated comments are not accurately reflected in staff summaries, the ATRT2 recommendation for a process for changes to summary reports is endorsed	BC (Reply)
Public Comment	Consider changing deadlines for comment processes if a majority of stakeholder groups request changes	SIIA
Public Comment	ICANN should analyze inputs from stakeholders, not just list them, and describe why stakeholder recommendations were/not adopted	SIIA
Reconsideration & Independent Review	"The full review process should account for errors as well as NCSG ethical lapses"	
Reconsideration & Independent Review	A core issue for strengthening ICANN accountability is a better appeals process, not to undermine the policy development process, but for the circumstances where the Board or the staff makes serious mistakes that call into question the fairness of its process or the level of community support for a declared consensus	Milton Mueller
Reconsideration & Independent Review	A new third-party mechanism for accountability and redress should be created, with independence from ICANN and a meaningful scope of authority	Verizon
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Allow independent review for situations where Board's decision on reconsideration was arbitrary and capricious	Google
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Allow reconsideration when Board or staff acts "arbitrarily or capriciously" (import from administrative procedures - clear error of judgment); allow for further appeal from reconsideration to independent arbitrators selected jointly	Google
Reconsideration & Independent Review	ATRT recommendation on reviewing the Independent Review mechanisms should be initiated as soon as possible, with a minimal goal to create and external appeals mechanism that could produce binding decisions as allowed under California and other applicable law	Avri Doria

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Reconsideration & Independent Review	Baseline of new version should be reviewing ICANN Board adherence to Bylaws and providing meaningful redress in instances of violation	MPAA
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Create a new external, multistakeholder and independent body that would review the Board's decisions and actions and respond to appeals subject to rules on standing and applicable grounds for review, to be defined in this process. No ICANN Board or staff member should be able to sit on it to safeguard "independence"; Consider whether the body should include those elected by SO/AC	NCSG
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Deadlines for filing reconsideration need to be longer than 15 days	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Declarations of BGC or IRP panel should be given more weight; should not be able to be rejected by simple majority	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Develop a permanent IRP, with the authority to impose consequences on ICANN for failure to implement IRP rulings	BC (Reply)
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Develop permanent cross community working group with role to impose external accountability on ICANN, with representation from each GNSO constituency plus ccNSO, ALAC, GAC, SSAC, RSSAC, IETF, ASO and NRO, with powers including naming representatives to AoC review teams, invoking the IRP, defining the process for appointing members to the IRP, reviewing and approving ICANN budgets, approving changes to ICANN's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, and trigger recall of ICANN's Board and immediate selection of new members	BC (Reply)
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Expand composition of Board Governance Committee to allow non-members to bring fresh perspective for Reconsideration matters	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Expand grounds for challenging decisions deemed "inconsistent with ICANN procedures, ill-advised and potentially harmful for the requestor's interests or, in the case of governments, public interests"	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Expand Independent Review to address "all matters relating to ICANN's operation."	Heritage Foundation

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Reconsideration & Independent Review	ICANN should bear at least 50% of costs of Independent Review to make more affordable	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	ICANN should establish an independent Inspector General function with dedicated funding mechanism, with authority to investigate and ensure compliance with the Bylaw, procedures for decision-making, and potential conflicts of interest	SIIA
Reconsideration & Independent Review	ICANN should permanently fund the IRP	BC (Reply)
Reconsideration & Independent Review	IRP decisions should be binding and contain rationale, and always be made public	NCSG
Reconsideration & Independent Review	IRP panels should be obliged to issue declaration within six months of filing, not just "strive"	SIIA
Reconsideration & Independent Review	IRP provider should not be designated - it should be a matter for agreement between ICANN and each requester and the IRP panelists	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	IRP reviews should be invoked by community concerns about actions taken by ICANN management and Board, through the development of a structural element of representatives of each constituency and stakeholder group	BC (Reply)
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Lower threshold conditions to succeed in processes; current requirements are too narrow	Spain
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Make the Cooperative Engagement process open and transparent	Edward Morris
Reconsideration & Independent Review	New body should be autonomous and self-governing and not be altered or swayed by Board vote; funding mechanism should be established	MPAA
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Once established, changes to any new body should require supermajority vote of Board based upon significant input	MPAA
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Remove the loser pays model of the IRP, and implement a sliding scale for fees	Edward Morris

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Reconsideration & Independent Review	Reverse the Bylaws changes that limit redress under the IRP	Edward Morris
Reconsideration & Independent Review	Strengthen the Office of the Ombudsman into a separate judicial function, including community leaders and judicial experts	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Reconsideration & Independent Review	The CEP process needs transparency, including providing records of discussion and advance notice of a clear process applying to all parties	Robin Gross
Reconsideration & Independent Review	The Reconsideration process need to be more responsive to community concerns and less protective of decisions made by ICANN, therefore we endorse the ATRT2 recommendation to explore options for restructuring	BC (Reply)
Reporting	Develop a process to review the subsequent implementation of recommendations by ICANN management, potentially through future ATRT reviews	BC
Reporting	ICANN can assure the community that it is meeting its accountability commitments through open reporting of periodic reviews	Brian Carpenter
Reporting	Post-project reviews, not just lessons-learned documents, need to be formalized to introduce systemic follow-up	DNA
Reporting	There should be mechanisms for measuring, evaluating and reporting on ICANN's compliance with its obligations to improve accountability	Verizon
Representation	Full spectrum of GNSO Stakeholders should be represented in ICANN deliberations	SIIA
Representation	ICANN needs to increase representation of domain name registrants and consumers/internet users, and diminish the presence and voices of those with profit-motives at stake in ICANN decisions, workings and outcomes	Domain Mondo
Representation	ICANN should recognize fully the important voices of businesses in any evolving ecosystem	Verizon
Representation	ICANN structure needs to be representative	Seun Ojedeji
Representation	There is a need to assure that the role and voice of the business sector is heard as it will be integral to ensure governmental support of any new ICANN framework resulting from the accountability process	INTA
Resources	ICANN staff for SOs and ACs, while they have done a great job, may have independence issues in their work; each constituency should fund a coordinating role for its community	CENTR

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Review	Subject ICANN to external review of accountability and transparency procedures	Edward Morris
Role of Governments	Reaffirm advisory role of GAC	Heritage Foundation
Role of Governments	Revise Bylaws to require consensus for GAC advice	Heritage Foundation
Separation	If transition results with ICANN having a strong role with respect to the IANA functions, those functions and the ICANN functions should be subject to a clear separation that is monitored by an independent third party	Verizon
Staff	Though current supporting staff for SO/AC have been doing an "exceptional job", they lack the independence to provide unbiased advise; communities should consider putting in place a dedicated resource who could, on behalf of the particular community, take on the advisory or coordination role. This would be funded by the respective communities, not ICANN	LACTLD
Staff	Consult NomCom for the appointment of ICANN Executives and global staff positions, with a broad, long-term directive for regional and/or geographic balance	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy
Stakeholder Participation	All supporting organizations and affiliate organizations to put in place accountability and transparency mechanisms similar or aligned to those of ICANN	Fiona Asonga
Structure	As outlined in the Tunis Agenda, states are responsible for public policy issues	Just Net Coalition
Structure	Direct democracy principles should be considered; democratic vote as the ultimate decision maker will be a powerful tool to counter any attempt by governments or international institutions to take over ICANN; this could potentially be done through registrars and WHOIS, with eligibility requirements set out	Konrad von Finckenstein
Structure	Envision structural separation for some of the IANA functions - a Swiss non-profit association requesting immunity - to perform the root zone management function. Members of this association would be domain name registries (gTLD and ccTLD) and would fund; ICANN would be the interface between gTLD registries and the new entity	Just Net Coalition

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Structure	ICANN should become a membership organization, with the membership having ultimate decision-making authority. The membership would elect the Board and could override any decision of the Board. The membership would consist of all registrants of domain names controlled by ICANN (gTLDs)	Just Net Coalition
Structure	ICANN should switch to a public benefits corporation with members, the structure of which can and should be based on the current community structures, with provisions made for inclusion of groups not yet involved in the ICANN community	Edward Morris
Term Limits	Mandate senior officers to have a maximum 9 years in office, with a supermajority vote for confidence every 3 years	Heritage Foundation
Transparency	Board meetings should be regularly audio-cast on the web and archived, as are GNSO Council meetings	Robin Gross
Transparency	Board minutes should be more detailed, with minority opinions and diversity of opinions expressed more fully incorporated	Robin Gross
Transparency	Enhance transparency into ICANN's policymaking and technical processes, including through use of a FOIA-like process	Verizon
Transparency	Greater public notice should be provided regarding the agenda of Board meetings	Robin Gross
Transparency	ICANN should implement its functions of management and coordination of Internet resources in a more transparent way	Internet Society of China
Transparency	ICANN should increase the transparency of Board deliberations and meetings, with at least one open meeting with a substantive agenda at each ICANN meeting	BC (Reply)
Transparency	Maintain an open/transparent/accessible website	DeeDee Halleck
Transparency	Make clear to readers when policy questions are implicated in documents	SIIA
Transparency	The activities and deliberations of the GAC needs to be strengthened; the public has a right to know how its governmental representative are performing and policy positions they are taking in the GAC	Robin Gross