Root KSK Protection and Key Ceremonies

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The Root Key Signing Key

• As part of its root zone related functions, the IANA services team manages the key signing key, used to secure the DNS with the DNSSEC protocol.

• The key signing key is the trust anchor for the DNS, making its role especially unique.

• An auditable process of performing key signing ceremonies to use this key is conducted using members of the community as key participants.
The DNSSEC root key is stored in a device known as a **hardware security module (HSM)** whose sole purpose is to securely store cryptographic keys. The device is designed to be tamper proof. If there is an attempt to open it, the contents will self-destruct.
Seven smart cards exist that can turn on each device. The device is configured such that **3 of the 7** smart cards must be present to make it useable.
Each smart card is given to a different ICANN community member, known as a **trusted community representative**. To access the key signing key, therefore, at least three of these TCRs need to be present.
The HSM is stored inside a high-security safe, which can only be opened by a designated person, the **safe security controller**. The safe is monitored with seismic and other sensors.
The safes are stored in a secure room which can only be opened jointly by two designated persons, the **ceremony administrator** and the **internal witness**. The room is monitored with intrusion and motion sensors.
The safe room is located within a larger room where ceremonies are performed involving the TCRs and other persons. Ceremonies are recorded on video, witnessed by the participants and others, and audited by a third party audit firm. Access to the room needs to be granted by another designated person, the **physical access control manager**, who is not on-site.
The ceremony rooms, known as **key management facilities**, are located within two guarded facilities, one each on the US West and East coasts.
The ceremonies

• Approximately four times a year, the TCRs and others meet to use the HSMs to sign keys to be used for the root zone.

• The process is streamed and recorded, with external witnesses watching every step. All materials (videos, code, scripts, etc.) are posted online at iana.org/dnssec

• The purpose is to ensure trust in the process. DNSSEC only provides security if the community is confident the HSMs have not been compromised.
What happens in a ceremony?

- The HSMs and other equipment are retrieved from the safes.
- Three months of ZSK signatures that have been provided by Verisign are signed. (These are used in day-to-day root publication.)
- The **chain of custody** of all the elements is verified throughout the process.
The future

- Current efforts are supporting the key rollover process.
- Ceremony procedures and facility security is regularly enhanced based on experience, community feedback and monitoring of security threats.
- We are enhancing community participation by calling for new trusted community representatives for the first time since 2010.
Resources

- TCR criteria and application
  http://iana.org/tcr

- IANA DNSSEC resources
  http://iana.org/dnssec

- Key ceremony primer
  http://kim.id.au/key-ceremony-primer

- Contact for further information
  kim.davies@iana.org