



# COMAR: Classification of Compromised versus Maliciously Registered Domains

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# Plan

- 1. Motivation
- 2. Overview of COMAR
- 3. Results
- 4. Conclusions

# Overview: DNS reputation systems

DNS reputation systems can detect malicious domains using different techniques and at different phases:

- at the registration time (e.g., PREDATOR¹)
- domain activity phase (e.g., EXPOSURE<sup>2</sup>)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Hao, Shuang, et al. "PREDATOR: proactive recognition and elimination of domain abuse at time-of-registration." ACM CCS 2016

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Bilge, Leyla, et al. "EXPOSURE: Finding Malicious Domains Using Passive DNS Analysis." NDSS 2011

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- They classify domains as either malicious or benign.

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## Overview: DNS reputation systems

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- at the registration time (e.g., PREDATOR<sup>1</sup>)
- domain activity phase (e.g., EXPOSURE<sup>2</sup>)
- They classify domains as either malicious or benign.
- They do not consider compromised domains.

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Why we need to consider **compromised** domains (hacked websites)?

Compromised domains have also legitimate traffic we may not want to block

- 1. The mitigation action for compromised domains (websites) is different from malicious domains
  - Should we block/hold/take down the domain?
  - Should we notify the hosting provider?

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
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What can be done to mitigate this abuse?

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Updated Date: 2021-01-13T15:32:36Z
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**Technical abuse** (maliciously registered domain name) and **website content abuse** (illegal/abusive content)

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
Action: Block/hold/take down domain name ...and clean the hosting content Intermediary: DNS service operator (registrar, registry) and hosting provider

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Email or m	obile number	
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	Having trouble logging in?	
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Action: Block/hold/take down domain name and clean the hosting content Intermediary: DNS service operator and hosting provider ...and the website owner/administrator

#### Website structure of compromised vs. malicious



Why we need to consider **compromised** domains?


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
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- 1. The mitigation action for compromised domains is different from malicious domains
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  - Should we notify the hosting provider?
- 2. Creating more effective domain blacklist feed → better insights into attackers' behavior
  - Do current URL blacklists give us the correct insights?




"Eighty percent of phishing sites have SSL encryption enabled to fool victims." [1]

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
Distinguishing between compromised and malicious domains can give better insights into attackers' behavior

[1] Phishing Activity Trends Report APWG – 3rd Quarter 2020 – Published: 24, November 2020


#### Contributions

- We developed COMAR, a machine-learning system to classify domains exhibiting
  malicious behavior as either compromised or maliciously registered by only using
  publicly available and readily accessible resources and achieve 97% accuracy
  with 2.5% of false positives.
- We leverage 38 features to identify the state of a domain, 14 of which are new and have not been used in previous work.
- We introduce a new method to estimate the domain creation time in cases there is no access to WHOIS information, which outperforms standard statistical methods in filling missing values.
- We show that content-based features are the most important ones in representing the domain status.


#### **COMAR Concept**



#### **COMAR System Overview**



COMAR System Overview



### Feature categories

In total we implemented **38** features (**14** of them new) in 7 categories:

- 1. Lexical features
- 2. Ranking system and popularity features
  - Internet archive, Alexa, Majestic, Umbrella, ...
- 3. Passive DNS features (DNSDB)
- 4. Content-based features
  - Internal and external hyperlinks
  - Content length
  - Vulnerable technologies and number of technologies
  - Existence of home page (Is it default or not?)
  - Using redirection techniques
  - ...
- 5. WHOIS and TLD-based features
  - Spamhaus index
  - Domain age
  - ...
- 6. TLS certificate features
- 7. Active DNS features

To make COMAR practical, system uses only **publicly available** and **readily accessible resources**, we removed "passive DNS".

## Missing features

#### What if we can not collect data for some features?

In practice, there are always missing values when it comes to collecting features

If we can not collect data, we can not classify domains or even worse: misclassification

We need to fill the missing values appropriately. For example:

- WHOIS feature:
  - Some TLDs do not provide registration date (e.g., .de, .tk, .ml, ...)
- Content features:
  - We can not fetch the content for any reason (bot detection or host suspension)

### Dataset & Machine Learning

Dataset → manually labeled 2,329 domains as maliciously registered, compromised, subdomain/free service, or false positives

 Number of phishing domain labeled manually: 1,321 (OpenPhish, PhishTank, Anti-Phishing Working Group)

58% maliciously registered - 42% compromised

2. Number of malware domains from URLhaus labeled manually: 1,008

43% maliciously registered - 57% compromised

## Dataset & Machine Learning

#### Machine learning

#### 1. Logistic regression

- Parametric method known for its efficiency
- Low computational resources
- Interpretability

#### 2. Random forest

- Non-parametric
- training a non-linear model
- No feature transformation

Overall results for both classifiers and comparison with method used in Global Phishing Surveys.

#### Domain is malicious if:

- it is reported "very short time after registration", or
- contains a brand name or misleading string, or
- registered in batch (challenging after GDPR)


Method	DB	Acc	Precision	Recall	F1	MCC
RF	Phish	97%	95%	97%	96%	0.93
LR	Phish	96.5%	96.59%	95%	95.7%	0.92
APWG	Phish	85%	82%	93%	88%	0.69
RF	Mal	96%	97%	96%	97%	0.92
LR	Mal	94.5%	95.6%	95.2%	95.4%	0.89

False positive rate: COMAR  $\rightarrow$  2.5% APWG  $\rightarrow$  26%

False positive: maliciously registered domains classified as compromised


Risk of false negatives

False negative: classifying compromised domains as maliciously registered



Partial cumulative distribution of the compromised domains after registration

Applying logistic regression on the phishing and malware dataset by removing one feature-set at a time.





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Phishing dataset

Malware dataset

Distribution of the 'internal hyperlinks' (logarithmic scales) and 'TLD maliciousness index'






<sup>1</sup>https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds

# New anti-phishing evasion technique


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


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


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
# New anti-phishing evasion technique

http://circlecityflyers.com



New anti-phishing evasion technique: Google CAPTCHA to hide the real content of the malicious page

http://circlecityflyers.com/lokako/newicn/cust0mers...



#### Conclusion

COMAR leverages publicly available data and makes classification decisions based on the extracted features

Registries, registrars, and hosting providers can use it to decide on appropriate mitigation actions for each domain with malicious content

It can also serve as an effective tool for creating domain blacklists from the existing URL ones

We showed that the content-based features are the most effective in capturing the 'amount of beingness' of domains during their life cycles

Relatively hard to evade features

#### Conclusion

"COMAR: Classification of Compromised versus Maliciously Registered Domains", Sourena Maroofi, Maciej Korczynski, Cristian Hesselman, Benoit Ampeau and Andrzej Duda, IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P 2020), September 2020 (Acceptance rate: 14,6%)

"Are You Human? Resilience of Phishing Detection to Evasion Techniques Based on Human Verification", Sourena Maroofi, Maciej Korczynski, and Andrzej Duda, ACM IMC 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, October 2020 (Acceptance rate: 24,5%)

https://comar-project.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/

# Acknowledgments

This work has been carried out in the framework of the COMAR project funded by SIDN, the .NL Registry and AFNIC, the .FR Registry.

We thank: Anti-Phishing Working Group, OpenPhish, PhishTank, URLhaus for providing access to their URL blacklists;

Farsight Security for sharing DNSDB, and the DNSDB data contributors

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#### Thank you for your attention!

#### **Contact:**

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