Minutes: Day 1 of first meeting of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG)

Viscount Suite, Hilton London Metropole
Thursday 17 July 2014

Meeting agenda and documents

London attendees:
Mohamed El Bashir, ALAC
Jean-Jacques Subrenat, ALAC
Hartmut Glaser, ASO
Mary Uduma, ccNSO
Martin Boyle, ccNSO
Wolf-Ulrich Knoben, GNSO
Milton Mueller, GNSO
James Bladel, GNSO
Keith Drazek, gTLD Registries
Joseph Alhadeff, ICC/BASIS
Russ Housley, IAB
Lynn St Amour, IAB
Jari Arkko, IETF
Alissa Cooper, IETF (interim ICG Chair)
Demi Getschko, ISOC
Adiel Akplogan, NRO
Paul Wilson, NRO
Daniel Karrenberg, RSSAC
Kuo-Wei Wu, ICANN Board Liaison
Elise Gerich, IANA Staff Expert

Remote attendees:
Keith Davidson, ccNSO
Heather Dryden (Interim Member), GAC
Narelle Clark, ISOC
Russ Mundy, SSAC
Jon Nevett, gTLD Registries

Apologies:
Patrik Fälström, SSAC
Tracy Hackshaw (Interim Member), GAC
Lars-Johan Liman, RSSAC

ICANN staff:
Theresa Swinehart
Jim Trengrove
Ergys Ramaj
Alice Jansen
Luna Madi

Nancy Lupiano

Non-ICANN staff support:
Samantha Dickinson

[Live streaming of Day 1 began at 9:16 am British Summer Time/8:16 am UTC.]

1. Introduction and level-setting

Cooper recapped why the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) had been created. ICG members agreed to let the meeting be streamed live.

Swinehart provided a quick overview of ICANN's support mechanisms for the ICG's first meeting, and noted that non-ICANN staff support, Samantha Dickinson was also available for the ICG to call upon during its first meeting.

After discussion amongst the ICG members, it was decided that Dickinson would support the meeting by taking minutes and providing a low level of tweeting during the meeting. Mueller noted that he intended to tweet the meeting and that remote observers following the meeting online were also likely to use social media to comment on the meeting.

Cooper explained that ICG members present in the room could be placed in line to speak by raising their nameplate. Lupiano explained that the five ICG members joining remotely would let Trengrove know when they had wanted to speak, and would be able to speak to the room via their phones.

Agenda bashing:

- Subrenat asked for some time to be allotted to discussing some of the non-technical considerations of the transition of IANA stewardship. Cooper suggested that this be added to the agenda for lunch on Day 2 of the ICG's first meeting.
- Wilson requested a new item be added to the end of Day 2 for developing a statement about the ICG's first meeting.

Cooper reported that the ICANN staff had been asked why there was not chat function in the Adobe Connect virtual meeting room. She noted that the ICG had envisioned the meeting to be a working session and hadn't really intended to be interacting with the public. She asked how other ICG members felt about requests from the community to add the chat function to the room. Alhadeff, St Amour and Wilson supported adding the chat function, noting that given the community already was able to watch and listen to the ICG's meeting, it would be useful to be able to see the community's reactions to the discussions. Wilson suggested that it be made clear, however, that there was no guarantee that ICG members would be able to respond to questions posed in the chat room. ICANN staff were then asked to open the chat room in the virtual chat room.

2. Introductions

The members of the ICG introduced themselves. A matrix of the details provided by the members is included as Annex A to the minutes of the first meeting. *(Please note that the matrix also contains some additional information supplied by members of the ICG following the meeting.)*

Bladel suggested that ICG members each submit a statement of interest to be added to a community wiki.

3. Charter of the CG

Arkko introduced the topic of the charter, explaining that the charter the Coordination Group was not an issue to be decided by ICANN, but that many aspects of the charter had been discussed as part of the general community comments in the April/May comment period and during the ICANN 50 meeting.

Arkko noted that the general community feeling appeared to be that the group should limit itself to coordination while it should be the role of the community to develop the substance of the transition proposal.

Arkko also noted that there had been some initial discussion about the group's charter on the group's mailing list, with two proposed versions being posted:

1. [Version 1](#) submitted by Arkko, on 13 July
   Part of the rationale for this version was the recognition that all customers of IANA have to agree to the final proposal. The version also attempted to address how the Coordination Group makes the decision that this is ready to move forward with the final stewardship proposal and suggests rough consensus be used.
2. [A revised version](#) by Mueller, on 16 July.
   This version attempted to cater for the fact that not all communities associated with the different IANA functions may want the same thing from the post-NTIA stewardship framework.

Arkko also noted that there was a DIFF file that showed the differences between the two files.

There was general discussion on the charter as well as specific discussion on the four functions in the proposed charter by Mueller. There was general agreement amongst the ICG members present that the proposed charter texts were in a healthy state, with relatively few changes needed.

For the sake of easier understanding of the issues discussed, these discussions have been grouped by issue below, rather than documented in the order in which they were discussed.

There was discussion about the two proposals in general:

- Mundy expressed concern that neither of the proposals seemed to require IANA communities of interest to identify, as part of their proposal, how IANA, and in particular the NTIA function associated with the IANA activities, had an impact on their community. Mundy stated that being able to evaluate this information would help the Coordination Group perform more consistent evaluation of all submitted proposals.
- Gerich suggested that Mueller's proposal should have a title of "IANA stewardship transition coordination group" (the current title omits the word "stewardship")
- Alhadeff expressed concern that he had used the term "customers of IANA" used in discussions about the charter. However, as well as the direct customers of IANA, there were also less direct beneficiaries who were also important stakeholders in the

stewardship process. These less direct beneficiaries included end users and companies and a wide range of other actors. Alhadeff suggested that it was important that the charter be careful to specifically include these less direct, but still very important stakeholders, in the charter. He also noted that these stakeholders would have different roles in the process, and wouldn't be necessarily creating formal inputs, along the same lines as the communities of interest, into the processes. However, the less direct beneficiaries could have comments on the input of those communities of interest.

- o Arkko noted that it was never his intention to ignore these other stakeholders and recognized that less direct beneficiaries were an important part of the process. Wilson also supported a more inclusive view of affected communities, and supported soliciting views from more than just the directly affected communities on their expectations and requirements of the post-NTIA stewardship of IANA.
- o Alhadeff suggest that perhaps one way to reframe the understanding of stakeholder groups would be to refer to directly affected communities as "operational communities of interest". It would be these operational communities of interest that the ICG would be formally requesting proposals from. The broader stakeholders affected by IANA could provide general inputs on issues such as operational processes and transparency, but wouldn't be expected to develop proposals themselves.
- Alhadeff also expressed concern that neither proposal contained sufficient definition of scope and principles of operation, such as "first, do no harm". He also suggested including a clear set of objectives and processes in the charter, including a section on what the Group meant by "transparency".
  - o In response, Arkko noted that he was conflicted about including scope, as there was already scope documentation by NTIA and ICANN, and some people were very concerned about trying to put boundaries on the scope.
  - o Mueller also expressed concern about including anything more than an extremely generic scope definition in the charter, noting that from his experience, attempts to define scope tended to become attempts to limit or control outcomes. Mueller stated that he would support—but was not convinced that this was necessary—declaring that accountability of ICANN's policy process was out of scope for the process of developing a post-NTIA model of IANA stewardship and that what was in scope was accountability of the IANA in the absence of the NTIA.
    - ▪ Alhadeff responded that he believed further definition of scope was necessary because there was still some confusion about what was happening as part of the ICANN accountability process and what was happening as part of the post-NTIA IANA stewardship process.
  - o Dryden supported having more clarity on scope in the charter.
- Alhadeff noted that it was important to consider that many communities had different requirements in terms of creating responses to public consultation periods, and that the Coordination Group should keep this in mind when developing timelines for public consultations.
- Wilson stated that references to the deliverable of a proposal "regarding the transition" of NTIA's stewardship was extremely vague and needed to be qualified. Similarly, references to "transition plans" in both proposed versions of the charter were too vague. Wilson proposed concentrating on a "new model" or "new set of

arrangements" instead of just referring to the "transition" away from NTIA stewardship. He also suggested that the discussion in the following item on the agenda, Transition scope and expectations about work in the communities, would help the Coordination Group refine the contents of the charter.

- Arkko cautioned that while it was important to take input from all stakeholders in IANA's functions—not just the communities of interest—it was important to ensure that the Coordination Group not become the focal point for coordinating input from all stakeholders into the function-specific proposals. Instead, less directly affected stakeholders should feed their input directly into each specific community of interest. For example, governments with feedback on ccTLDs and IANA should direct that input into the process developing the proposal for post-NTIA stewardship for the ccTLD function of the IANA.
- Dryden noted that given the drafts of the charter were very new, she had not had time to consult with her GAC colleagues, but she could comment on some topics raised in the charter that had previously been discussed within the GAC:
  - Regarding the iterative development of the final stewardship proposal, the GAC has identified the need for the opportunity for it to be able to comment on any final draft proposal that come out of the Coordination Group before it goes to the public comment working period.
    - In response, Cooper stated that she wasn't sure if Dryden was expressing a desire for a GAC or government-specific process, but she believed that there shouldn't be separate processes for different groups as this would lead to too many processes, too many groups, and not enough time to get them all done. She stated that she believed that the final comment period was the time when anyone could comment, including governments. She also expressed a hope that governments and the GAC would be engaged would be engaged in all community processes up to that final comment period as well.
- Drazek noted that while the ICG was not looking at ICANN accountability, there was a clear link between the parallel processes of IANA stewardship transition and ICANN accountability. He suggested there was a need to establish a mechanism or process that allowed both processes to remain informed on developments in each other's processes.
  - Arkko agreed that accountability mechanisms would be a necessary prerequisite for some communities of interest to be able to agree to a post-NTIA stewardship model
- Akplogan suggested that there should be an opportunity for people outside the main communities of interest to provide input before the final proposal is compiled. He suggested perhaps having a comment period after the individual proposals are received to allow the public to comment on them.
  - Arkko noted that one of the tasks in both versions of the proposed charter was about "informing" (task (i)). In terms of people outside specific communities of interest having the opportunity to comment on individual proposals under development, it would be the ICG's job to let the rest of the world know what's happening. After proposals are submitted to the ICG, it would, once again, be the ICG's task to let everyone be aware of the existence of the proposals.
  - Wilson expressed a concern that too much openness for inputs at all possible stages could result in out-of-scope inputs. He suggested being clear when outlining what sort of input was being sought and to be clear about what was

necessary for the transition to take place and what was part of a "nice to have" wish list that was not essential for the transition, but could be addressed elsewhere after the transition.

There was specific discussion on the four functions in the proposed charter by Mueller:

(i) Act as liaison to the three communities of interest (names, numbers, protocols)
- Davidson suggested that there are potentially four communities of interest, as the gTLD and ccTLD communities are two separate communities, with separate support organizations under the ICANN structure. The gTLD community are bound by contract to ICANN, use ICANN as its policy development process and are bound by ICANN policies. In contrast, ccTLDs are independent from ICANN, create policies within the ccNSO, and can involve issues of subsidiarity and national sovereignty.
  - Arkko noted that Davidson's comment had been raised previously on the Coordination Group mailing list, and that there had been some agreement amongst Group members that this was a reasonable point of view.
  - Wilson and Karrenberg also supported the view that there were more than three distinct communities of interest.
  - Mueller asked why it was important to separate gTLDs and ccTLDs as distinct communities of interest, requesting to know if the differences between these communities would or could affect the operation and accountability of the IANA. He stated that from his point of view, there were only policy differences between gTLDs and ccTLDs, but that at the DNS Root, gTLDs and ccTLDs were no different. Wu had similar concerns.
    - Davidson explained that gTLDs are contracted parties to ICANN and are subject to ICANN's contractual obligations. In contrast, ccTLDs are responsible to the communities they serve—not to ICANN—and are therefore subject to re-delegation. Re-delegation is not an issue for ICANN or IANA to decide, but a matter for local Internet communities to assess and decide.
    - Drazek further explained that because gTLDs developed policy within ICANN, they had a specific interest in ICANN's general accountability.
- Gerich suggested that the reference to "three" communities of interest be deleted, and just state "communities of interest", without a numerical value.
  - El Bashir supported removing this number, and including a referent to both direct and indirectly affected communities.
- Cooper suggested that it was important to clearly identify the total number of communities of interest, whether that number is two, three or four. Including this number would help manage expectations about how many components there would be for the final proposal to be presented to the NTIA.
  - Mueller supported clearly identifying the number of communities of interest in the charter.
- Boyle noted that in addition to separate processes for ccTLDs and gTLDs, there was a new cross-community working group (CCWG), also working on its own charter, to look at the stewardship of the names function from across the naming community. He suggested that the Coordination Group consider shaping that discussion and creating links between the CCWG and its own work as early on in the process as practicable. Boyle also stated that there needed to be some sort of linkages between the different communities of interest, so there could be a broad understanding of what were best

practices across all communities, and what threats and risks were being faced across different communities of interest. Being able to identify these risks would enable the Group to better assess whether the final proposal was addressing real problems or not.

- o Dryden agreed that the flexibility of the two naming communities to work both as standalone communities of interest as well as together via the CCWG was useful, and would make it less cumbersome for the GAC to follow developments and provide input on proposals under development.
- o The GAC and governments place a lot of importance on the ccTLD part of the naming function of IANA, and would like to work closely with the ccNSO and ccTLD operators on the public policy-related implications of the transition of IANA stewardship away from the NTIA. Dryden also noted that it was generally accepted that governments do not have a role to play in the day-to-day operational matters.

- Karrenberg suggested using language that would not exclude proposals being submitted by others outside the defined communities of interest if other stakeholders felt they needed to submit such input.
- Wilson asked what would be the authoritative channel of communication between the ICG and each of its constituent communities. For example, would the representatives of each community be the authoritative channels of communication between themselves and their communities and be responsible for receiving inputs from their communities.
  - o Arkko agreed that this was a reasonable process to document in the charter.

(ii) Assess the outputs of the three communities of interest for workability, compatibility and consensus

- Karrenberg stated that he believed the Coordination Group had no role in assessing the process used by any community of interest to develop their proposal at this stage of the overall proposal development process. Instead, the Coordination Group should only assess community support for each of the IANA function communities when collating the final proposal. At that time, the ability to be able to demonstrate that all elements of the proposal had the consensus support of all communities would be essential for the NTIA to be able to accept the final proposal.
  - o Arkko supported Karrenberg's position, stating that it was not appropriate to "second guess" the consensus evaluation of another community at this stage of the proposal development process. The reason for this position is that some of these IANA function communities have complex processes and community structure that it would be difficult for the Coordination Group to be able to evaluate in trying to verify consensus.
  - o Gerich supported the position expressed by Karrenberg and Arkko that the consensus evaluation text be removed from the proposed charter.
  - o Mueller stated that he was not entirely comfortable with the idea that, for example, only three members of the Coordination Group representing a specific community of interest could state that their community's proposal had reached consensus amongst that entire community without the ability to verify that consensus.
  - o Boyle acknowledged the concerns about not second guessing communities' assessment of consensus, but asked at what stage it would be appropriate to conduct wider consultations on each of the community of interest proposals.
    - ▪ In response, Arkko stated that it was clear that the Group couldn't use a Waterfall model of development, but would need to use an iterative

process to address such concerns. Arkko acknowledged that the current proposed charters did not address this issue.

- o Cooper suggested that a possible compromise on the assessing consensus issue was to ask each community to describe the consensus level for themselves when submitting their proposals to the Coordination Group. As an example, she noted that the IETF uses this process. She also noted that it wouldn't be appropriate for the Group to make judgments based on those descriptions, however, but they should be used to help NTIA identify sufficient levels of consensus amongst each community.
  - ▪ Mueller supported this as a workable solution as long as there was the opportunity via the later public comment period (defined in step (iii) of the draft charter) for people to raise any disagreements they may have with the way a community of interest declared consensus on the proposal forwarded to the Correspondence Group.
- Cooper expressed about the use of the term "workability", as it was too imprecise to provide useful guidance on how to assess such a criterion. She suggested removing the word completely.
  - o Mueller disagreed with this, explaining that while it could be reasonably assumed that all proposals forwarded to the Correspondence Group were developed with a goal of workability in mind, it wouldn't hurt for the Correspondence Group to check that the proposals were, indeed, workable. For example, he suggested that given the political complexities surrounding the DNS, it was possible that compromises made to respond to these complexities could result in some workability issues being overlooked.
  - o Karrenberg supported removing "workability" as an item for the ICG to assess, but agreed the ICG should ask communities of interest to provide information supporting the workability of their proposals when submitting their proposals to the ICG.
    - ▪ Cooper supported this proposal.
- El Bashir noted that the words "groups" and "communities" were being used interchangeably, but that the correct word to use was "communities". He also noted that, to help the Correspondence Group, it could be useful if the communities of interest included a description of the processes used to develop their proposals when submitting their proposals to the Correspondence Group.
- Karrenberg supported the inclusion of "compatibility" and "interoperability" in the proposed charter.
  - o Akplogan supported this, noting that the ICG's final task was to ideally propose single mechanism to NTIA to replace its current stewardship role that would meet the needs of all the different communities of interest. To achieve this, the ICG would need to identify what is common across the different community proposals and allow people to comment on this. This would also entail thorough assessments of the workability and practicality of the different proposals.

(iii) Assemble a complete proposal for the transition
- Housley expressed concern about the proposed ability for the Coordination Group to make changes to the communities' proposals following public comment periods launched by the Coordination Group. His concern was that a proposal could be changed by the group without sufficient coordination with the community source of that proposal. Instead, Housely suggested that the Coordination Group should only

assess whether there is the broad Internet community support for the proposal to go forward.

- Gerich asked the Coordination Group to clarify whether the reference to "meet the intended criteria" in this section would be better part of the "Assessment" section in part (ii). In particular, should the Coordination Group wait until it assembles the final proposal to assess whether individual community of interest proposals meet the criteria, or whether this should be done earlier in the process.
- Cooper suggested that the Coordination Group should strive for rough consensus to identify when the final draft proposal was ready rather than full unanimity. Knoben also agreed that rough consensus was the appropriate consensus.
- Cooper suggested that the proposed charter contain a statement that the Coordination Group would not be choosing among separate proposals that cover the same function.

(iv) Information sharing and public communication
- Knoben noted that communities of interest might have their own methods for including the public in their processes to develop proposals. So like public comments and so on as the GNSO is used to do so in that. So we have to take that into consideration in our concept, how we are going to approach and to communicate to the outside world.

Arkko summarized what he had heard from the discussions. He noted that he had identified around ten issues that needed to be fine-tuned for the next draft of the charter. He commented that his biggest concern had been around the area of defining scope, but that the discussion between Alhadeff and Mueller seemed to have found an acceptable way forward for both sides of the issue. He also noted that it was rather clear that ICG members wanted to be careful not to interfere in the communities' processes for developing their own proposals. He also noted that he had heard many express a need to be mindful of how the ICG identified customers of the IANA and to be clearer about how communication channels would work in practice.

He suggested that a few members of the ICG develop a new version of the draft charter that would address the concerns expressed in the meeting.

He asked if anyone disagreed with the summary. There were no objections.

Arkko noted that he would work with Mueller and any other interested ICG members on producing a new version of the proposed summary on the morning of 18 July, before Day 2 of the first meeting of the ICG began.

Action item ICG-01: Arkko to lead a small drafting group to develop a new version of the proposed charter for the ICG.

[Lunch break]

4. Transition scope and expectations about work in the communities
Wilson explained that the purpose of this item of the agenda was to the ICG's understanding of the scope of the work of the transition, what the communities need to produce, and how areas of overlap between such processes should be handled. If agreement could be reached, this information would be communicated this publicly.

Discussion on scope:

- Wu believed that scope covered 1) the IANA contract between the NTIA and ICANN, 2) the IANA function in terms of levels of service to its customers and whether there are improvements that need to be made, and 3) the body or institution that may need to be developed to perform the stewardship function, including how that body would be accountable to the whole community.
- Mueller read out a paragraph, intended to define scope:
    o "The IANA stewardship transition process is taking place alongside a separate but related process on enhancing ICANN accountability. While maintaining the accountability of Internet identifier governance is central to both processes, this group's scope is limited to filling the accountability gaps created by the end of the NTIA's role as principal in the IANA contract, whereas the other process focuses on enhancing the accountability of ICANN's policy development process. Nevertheless, the two processes are interrelated and the ICG must assess proposed solutions in the light of the findings and outcomes of the other accountability process."
- Alhadeff supported Mueller's proposed text in general, with the exception of the end, which he felt implied that the only time there would be coordination between the processes was when the accountability process was concluding. Instead, it was important to have ongoing coordination between the two processes. In addition, rather than "assess" the outcomes of the accountability process, the ICG should be engaging in "mutual cooperation" with the accountability process.
    o Karrenberg supported Alhadeff's reading and suggested deleting the words "findings and outcomes" from Mueller's text.
    o Knoben stated that the way Mueller's text was currently written, it implied that the accountability process must conclude before the IANA process could conclude, but this was not necessarily what needed to happen.
    o Mueller reported he had sent his proposed text to the mailing list so people could edit it.
    o Wilson stated that he did not like what seemed to be an exclusive focus on filling accountability gaps in Mueller's text as it excluded other aspects of the transition and could potentially add to confusion between the IANA stewardship and separate accountability process. He submitted some proposed amended text to the mailing list to address his concerns.
        ▪ St Amour supported Wilson's amended text.
    o Nevett believed that the text about accountability needed to be more specific, as it currently didn't mention accountability related to decisions ICANN made that were not related to policy development processes.
    o Subrenat questioned whether there was any need to establish a link between the IANA stewardship process and the accountability process in the scope at all.
        ▪ Alhadeff stated that the purpose of the scope was to help community members who are not "the usual suspects" understand the differences between the two processes. It was important for the charter and scope to stand on their own two feet, and not need to be cross-referenced with other documents for them to be properly understood by the community.
- Cooper also supported Mueller's proposed text in general. She also supported Wu's suggestion that the NTIA contract be examined. In particular, she noted that much of

what was in the current contract did not seem necessary to her and it might be useful to examine whether all elements of the contract needed to be replaced, or whether there could be changes when moving to the post-NTIA scenario. Cooper stated that she believed that focusing on the accountability aspect, rather than the entire IANA contract, was the correct way forward.

- o Nevett supported Cooper's belief that not everything in the current NTIA contract needed to move forward to a post-NTIA scenario. Part of the challenge in developing the transition proposal would be to decide what would and would not be included.
- Mueller stated that the NCSG and probably most of the GNSO stakeholder groups would not accept a statement of scope that did not specifically mention accountability. He stated that the NTIA contract was the only major form of external accountability for ICANN and that removing that contract meant that the community had to address how to keep IANA accountable.
- El Bashir supported including accountability in the scope text as from the wider political context of Internet governance, there had been many concerns raised about accountability.
- Cooper noted that she believed that the issues that Wilson wanted reflected in the scope—such as services received, the specific service levels, the adherence to policies, and dispute resolution—were a part of accountability, and perhaps there was just a need to find appropriate terms that suited both their readings of what was needed.
- Wilson noted that "accountability" was a very overloaded term and it could be worth drilling down to explain exactly what it meant in relation to the IANA stewardship function.
- o Bladel supported this view of "accountability" and wondered if "oversight" might be a better term. However, Wilson believed this was a similarly overloaded word.
- Gerich expressed concern that adding words like "sufficient" to the scope was complicating, rather than clarifying things.
- Bladel noted that he had heard "Service Level Agreement" being mentioned and wondered who would be on the other side of an SLA, given ICANN could not enter into an arrangement with itself over the IANA function.
- Mundy expressed concern that, with the way the scope was evolving, it could look like the ICG itself was developing the elements of the IANA stewardship proposal instead of the communities.
- o Cooper tried to clarify the purpose of the scope: it was to define the scope of what the ICG would be asking of the communities, not what the ICG itself would be carrying out.
- o Mueller reminded members that elsewhere in the draft charter, it was clear that the ICG would be asking communities to do this work and that the ICG shouldn't overload the scope text with a mini-summary of the rest of the charter document.
- ▪ Alhadeff supported this view and proposed structuring the text in such a way that it defined what the ICG is meant to do, what the scope of ICG work is in relation to other groups, and finally the processes of the ICG. Wilson asked Alhadeff if he could provide some text that would achieve this.
- o Wu noted that accountability in relation to the change in IANA stewardship was a little different to ICANN accountability because when NTIA relinquishes

stewardship, it won't be the ICG's body to make IANA accountable. Instead, it is the ICG's responsibility to define the criteria for accountability that NTIA can use when accepting a replacement for its role in IANA stewardship.

- o Wilson asked if some of the ICG members would be prepared to work on bringing together the various bits of text on scope together to it could be reviewed in its entirety on day two.

Discussion on expectations about work in the communities:

- Wilson asked if ICG members believed ICG should be asking for the same types of elements from each of the different communities.
- To assist the discussion, Arkko made a presentation on what the IETF was beginning to think about in terms of the work they believed would be needed to develop a proposal.
  - o In response to the presentation, Drazek noted that oversight was an important element, but equally important was the question of how to ensure the relationships between policy development and implementation functions could be enforced. For example, while the IETF had the ability to move its protocol parameters function away from IANA, there was not a similar enforcement stick/carrot for the naming communities.
    - ▪ Cooper suggested that not only was it important to identify who would have such an enforcement role, but to also identify how that enforcement body was accountable to the community. In the case of the IETF, which is overseen by the IAB, the IAB members are nominated and recalled by the wider community.
  - o Gerich clarified that, because IANA is a part of ICANN, IANA has no independent contracts. Any relationships between the IANA function and IANA customers are actually formalized between ICANN and those customers. For example, the IETF has an MoU with ICANN, not IANA itself.
  - o Wilson stated that Arkko's presentation suggested how the ICG might be able to develop a set of questions for each of the communities of interest to consider regarding who is responsible for policy oversight and implementation, both now and preferred model for the future.
- Wilson noted that it was important not to forget the four requirements the NTIA had placed on the final proposal to be presented to them. He suggested it might be up to the ICG to document how the final proposal meets those four criteria, but it might equally be useful to have the communities of interest consider those criteria as they develop their individual proposals.
- Alhadeff stated that it was important to remember that while the members of the ICG may be well aware of the context in which the stewardship transition was taking place, it would be useful to document today's accountability processes clearly to enable less entrenched members of the community to understand the current environment, which would assist in developing better informed proposals for the transition. In particular, by providing people with information about what is happening now, it may reduce some of the fear that people have about the amount of change needed to move away from NTIA stewardship.
  - o Karrenberg supported this approach.

- o Arkko agreed, stating not only did the ICG have to worry about the design of the future IANA stewardship model, but also the problem of education and communication.
- Cooper summarized what she had heard from the discussions in this session and related discussions earlier in the day:
  - o The ICG could develop a set of questions to be presented to communities to provide answers to in their proposals.
  - o The ICG would request proposals to include an assessment of the workability of the proposal
  - o The ICG would request proposals to be accompanied by a statement of consensus support.
- Cooper asked the ICG members for their views on whom within each community should be asked to provide this information.
  - o Drazek suggested that the CCWG that had been established within ICANN would be one place to direct these questions.
  - o St Amour asked if another related exercise was needed to identify any other communities outside the four communities of interest that the ICG might expect to receive some sort of formal input or proposal from. For example, the GAC.
    - ▪ Arkko stated that of course the ICG should be open to input from anyone who wanted to submit input, but a key question was whether the ICG had identified all communities from who input was essential.
    - ▪ Akplogan suggested that to be transparent and fair to everyone, the contribution period should be open to all and open to all for the same period of time. He also said that as the process was not an ICANN process, it was important to ensure that input by non-ICANN community members could be accommodated by the ICG.
    - ▪ Davidson noted that in the ccTLD community, about 150 were members of the ccNSO, leaving around 100 ccTLDs who had no contact with ICANN apart from their entry in the IANA database. While the ccNSO will actively work to include these non-ccNSO ccTLDs in the development of the ccTLD proposal via the ccNSO, the non-ccNSO ccTLDs may want to submit their own contributions to the overall process.
    - ▪ Cooper expressed concern about the practicality of the ICG accepting proposals from multiple sources that cover the same function as it would put the ICG in the position of having to choose from amongst competing proposals. She stated that she preferred to ask for one proposal from each community of interest and rely on each community of interest to be open to everyone who wished to participate in a stewardship proposal for any of the IANA functions.
    - ▪ Wilson noted that there were three different sources of possible contributions: the direct IANA customer communities, the communities represented in the ICG, and other communities not represented in the ICG. He suggested that it was important to at least accept and record proposals that come from almost any source. However, all proposals, no matter what their source, should follow a format defined by the ICG.
    - ▪ Arkko suggested that as well as accepting proposals from anywhere, the ICG should strongly recommend that anyone interested in contributing on any of the specific IANA functions should participate directly in the

relevant community of interest as early as possible rather than expect the ICG to coordinate separate inputs at the end of the process.

- Wilson and El Bashir supported this approach.
- Mundy suggested that if the ICG received conflicting proposals on the same IANA function, the proposals should be sent to the relevant community to sort out.
- Karrenberg stated that it was better to encourage input from a wide variety of sources as early as possible in the process to avoid last minute input being received that could have the potential to derail the process.

o Wilson requested some of the ICG members to work on draft some text on expectations about work in the communities before Day 2 of the meeting. Davidson and Knoben volunteered.

Action item ICG-02: Wilson to lead a small drafting group to move forward the draft text on scope of work and expectations about work in the communities based on input received during Day 1 deliberations.

5. Coordination group participation

St Amour asked ICG members if they felt that the group had adequate representation from communities affected by the transition of IANA stewardship, and in particular, representation of governments.

Discussion:

- Bladel noted that registrars had suggested that each group should determine its own number of representatives on the ICG and not have external limits imposed on each group, while also encouraging groups to keep their number of representatives small and manageable.
- Subrenat noted that to enable diverse geographic representation, five representatives for a group would be good, but that this would increase the number of ICG members substantially, so maintaining a more modest limit for each stakeholder group seemed wise.
- Knoben reported that this issue had been discussed in the GNSO Commercial Stakeholder Group. A concern that had been expressed there was that adding more members of one group could lead to other groups also requesting more representatives on the ICG.
    o Cooper also was concerned about this possibility.
- In addition, Knoben stated that given it was clear that the ICG would not vote on issues, but would work on the basis of consensus, arguments about the number of representatives needed from each community were on less solid ground.
    o Arkko agreed that any group believing that expanding their representation on the ICG would increase "voting power" should be informed about how the ICG worked on the basis of consensus, not voting.
- Mueller reported that the GNSO Noncommercial Stakeholder Group had also discussed the issue, and the GAC request for five seats in particular. The general feeling was that civil society was not as strongly represented on the ICG as it could have been, but that the Noncommercial Stakeholder Group could accept the current composition of the

ICG. Discussions on the issue of GAC numbers had resulted in community positions softening to the point that the NCSG could accept having five GAC members as long as they act as liaisons to governments in each of the five regions rather than as representatives of the GAC. In addition, it should be clarified that the GAC is not looking to have five seats because it views the ICG has a decision-making body.

- Alhadeff stated that for business, the current composition of the ICG was acceptable. If the group were to be opened up for more members, it could become unwieldy. He suggested that one option that could be useful for all communities, given the pressure of so many Internet governance meetings on the calendar, would be to allow the concept of "alternates" who could attend if the main representatives had prior commitments. In addition, Alhadeff noted that if the ICG were to operate on the basis of rough consensus, then the aim should be to have rough consensus amongst groups represented on the ICG rather than amongst individual members of the ICG.
  - o Cooper agreed with Alhadeff that rough consensus should be achieved between groups represented on the ICG and not between individual members of the ICG.
- Noting that the issue of representation hadn't been discussed within RSSAC, Karrenberg stated that if adding more representatives from specific stakeholder groups would increase engagement and reduce resistance to the process and the eventual result, he would support more representatives from the GAC. He also noted that the NTIA hadn't said that there should be no governmental influence in the process, just that the solution should not be intergovernmental in form.
- Boyle noted that the ccNSO had not discussed this issue, but from a personal point of view, he supported five GAC members as it could help bring governments on board and help them understand the issues better.
  - o Drazek expressed this view, noting that if the ICG did its job well, and simply facilitated the development of proposals by the communities themselves, the ICG should be a boring place to be, with all the excitement should be happening in the community processes.
  - o El Bashir also supported this view, noting that at the ITU WCIT in Dubai in 2012, there were many misconceptions about ICANN and NTIA amongst governments.
  - o Uduma also expressed a similar view to Boyle.
- Cooper proposed a possible middle ground: for groups that felt they wanted more representatives on the ICG, perhaps there could be expansions of various group numbers at specific points of the ICG process. For example, if a specific issue required more participation of a specific group, that group's numbers could be expanded for a particular meeting of the ICG.
- Wilson stated that although the RIRs hadn't discussed the issue of representation numbers on the ICG, after discussing the issue with Akplogan, they could both support the GAC's request for five representatives and wouldn't want to exclude consideration of similar requests from other groups in future. He noted that the RIRs wouldn't be asking for more representatives to be included on the ICG.
- Subrenat drew the other ICG members' attention to the At-Large ad hoc Working Group on the Transition of the US Government Stewardship of the IANA function, which included representation from all five of ICANN's geographic regions. This WG, like the consideration of GAC's request for five representatives from each of ICANN's five regions, had to consider the trade-off between efficiency and representation. Subrenat believed that adding another three GAC members to the ICG would be manageable.

- Dryden responded to comments from other members of the ICG, noting that the proposal to have five GAC members was a result of the need to reflect how the GAC organized itself. She noted that she didn't know where the number of two GAC representatives for the ICG came from and was problematic for the GAC. Either one representative (a Chair or single liaison, which has precedent within the GAC) or four (Chair and three Co-chairs) or five representatives (geographic representation) would be good, but other numbers would be problematic. She noted that she was a bit concerned that parts of the Internet technical community and other parts of ICANN seemed to be making judgments about how the GAC organized itself and how it determined the best way to participate in the IANA stewardship process. She thanked the other members of the ICG for giving her the opportunity to give some more information about the GAC's reasons for requesting an addition three seats.
    o St Amour responded that there was no attempt by the non-GAC members of the ICG to dictate anything to the GAC.
- Mueller took the opportunity to report that the ICANN CCWG on the IANA stewardship transition had invited the GAC to participate in the CCWG, but that the GAC had not responded to the invitation yet.
- Mueller noted that governments, in one sense, are not stakeholders, but an alternative system of governance. There is always a danger that an intergovernmental system of governance could be put in place, and that danger results in some wariness towards governments within other stakeholder groups.
- St Amour summarized the discussion, noting that adding extra GAC members to the ICG pivoted on the following assumptions:
    o That the GAC understands the role of the ICG is merely coordination and not decision-making or voting
    o That rough consensus in the ICG would consist of rough consensus between stakeholder groups and not between individual members of the ICG.
    o That extra GAC members would help in liaising with governments beyond the usual GAC processes
    o That the ICG would benefit from the input of governments early in the proposal process
    o That the ICG needed explicit assurance from the GAC that it understands that the work of developing proposals will be happening not in the ICG but in the communities and that increased GAC participation in the ICG does not replace the need for the GAC's participation in community processes to develop proposals, including the work of the ICANN CCWG on IANA stewardship.
- Subrenat suggested that in recording the ICG's decision to add three more GAC members, it would be prudent to note that the decision was being made in response to the GAC's request. This would prevent any perceptions that the ICG had spontaneously decided to increase the number of GAC members.
- Cooper suggested that the points as summarized by St Amour should be clearly communicated to the GAC.
- Wilson asked if there had been any requests from groups other than the GAC to increase their numbers in the ICG. Drazek relayed information from Swinehart that there had not been any other requests.
- In response to a query by Mundy about whether the GAC could perhaps only have one representative on the ICG, since Dryden had said that one, four or five seats would be acceptable, St Amour surveyed the ICG members. There was no support for reducing the GAC representation on the ICG to one seat.

- St Amour asked the room if they were willing to accept a total of five GAC members on the ICG. There was consensus to accept the additional three GAC members.

Action item ICG-03: St Amour to lead a small drafting group to write a note to the GAC confirming that the ICG had accepted the GAC's request to have five seats on the ICG.

[Coffee break]

6. Self-organization

Alhadeff asked ICG members to consider the sorts of roles that members may need to assume: chair, co-chairs, subcommittees, agenda development, presentation of items on the agenda, meeting coordination, a liaison to the ICANN accountability working group, etc. The group would also need to consider how to build and declare consensus. He also asked ICG members to consider how to formalize the notion of a secretariat to support the group's work.

General discussion:

o Arkko noted that some of the tasks Alhadeff had listed had both ICG and secretariat components to them. For example, in liaising with the media, it would be the job of the ICG to talk to the media, but the secretariat could help with the logistics of connecting media and ICG members.

Finding a balance between defining and over-defining roles and tasks:

o Arkko suggested not making the role and task divisions too complicated.
  o Boyle also expressed a concern about not over-complicating the division of roles, suggesting that perhaps roles could be filled as needed, in an ad hoc way.
o Karrenberg suggested that overloading the administrative role of a Chair with responsibility for decisions such as content development and consensus calling would not be useful.
o Clark also expressed concern about over-defining roles, noting that this first meeting of the ICG had been effective without having formal chairs.
  o Cooper explained that she had put together a draft agenda for this first meeting with the help of IETF and IAB participants because she had known that she was being appointed to the group before ICANN 50 had announced the dates of the first meeting. She suggested that it would be a mistake to rely on volunteers to create an agenda for each time, given everyone on the ICG had a very busy life.

ICG liaisons to other processes:

o Boyle asked if, in addition to an ICG liaison to the ICANN accountability working group, there was also a need for a liaison to the ICANN CCWG on IANA stewardship.
o Karrenberg suggested waiting until the CCWG had matured a bit to see whether a liaison was need and what form it should take.

Media and press relations:

- o Cooper asked if Alhadeff had considered the task of fielding external communications requests. Alhadeff replied that he had included that task under the title of "press liaison/external relations".
- o Subrenat asked whether the task of "public communication" identified by Alhadeff was about press relations, or more regular communications by the ICG pushed out to the wider community, including statements released in conjunction with the ICG's meetings.
    - o Alhadeff agreed that it would be good to make regular statements, including at the end of the current meeting. He noted that the role of the secretariat could be to provide the ICG with outline text to assist the ICG in developing its communications. But more immediately, he was concerned with how the ICG should handle interview requests and whether ICG members should conduct interviews as representatives of the entire ICG, as representatives of their stakeholder group or as individual participants.
- o St Amour noted that as well as press liaison, ICG had a larger responsibility to conduct outreach amongst their communities. As part of that outreach, there was a question about how much of a role the secretariat could play in supporting those activities, such as keeping the website up to date.
- o Karrenberg noted that one of the traditional roles of a Chair was to represent the group to external entities and the media. However, he felt that the structure of the ICG did not lend itself to having a spokesperson for the group and that, instead, all members should take on that role and talk to the press based on agreed IGC statements and individual perceptions of what happens in IGC deliberations. The secretariat could assist in helping ICG members adjust any issues that may arise in the way the media is being handled by reporting regularly on ICG-related news items that appear in the media.
- o Akplogan expressed concern about all ICG members being able to speak to the media. He suggested that while it would be reasonable for representatives of a community to speak on behalf of that community, but speaking on behalf of the ICG would be a very tricky task, particularly as the media could ask difficult questions and then put a very different spin on what a person being interviewed meant to convey.
    - o Arkko supported the need to identify who could speak if media wanted to speak to anyone in the ICG.
- o Cooper expressed concern that while the ISU may be able to manage outgoing media contact, it would be more difficult to handle incoming media requests because journalists usually worked to tight deadlines. She suggested it would be useful to identify a member of the ICG who could respond to such requests if nobody else was available. Otherwise, she said that media queries risked going unanswered.

Developing agendas and calling for consensus:

- o Cooper explained that in the IETF context, it was the Co-chairs' responsibility to develop agendas and call consensus.
    - o Knoben noted that Chairs and Co-chairs in the GNSO context performed a similar role.
- o Alhadeff noted that he thought it was important for ICG members to consider the issue of how consensus would be called given the diversity of the group: what level would be considered rough consensus, for example.

- o Cooper suggested having multiple people able to fulfill the role of calling consensus would allow for backups and teamwork to ensure that consensus calls were more consistent. She noted that sometimes, it was beneficial to have completely neutral people calling consensus, but given everyone in the ICG had opinions, a reasonable compromise was to get the Co-chairs the role.
- o Housley stated that he did not think that there was any need to develop a complicated consensus procedure. He cited the ease with which the ICG had been able to reach consensus on the inclusion of five GAC members on the IGC. The hard part would be in determining how "rough" the "rough consensus" could be if any objections were raised.
- o Akplogan noted that responsibility for calling consensus should fall to the chair and vice chairs and that part of the criteria for selecting people for those positions should be an understanding and ability to implement consensus processes.

Chair and vice chairs, subcommittees, executive committee or no hierarchy at all:

- o Drazek suggested creating sub-teams that could be based on the three categories of names, numbers and protocol parameters. These sub-teams could to outreach to the respective communities of interest and report back to the whole ICG.
    - o Arkko was sympathetic to the idea of such sub-groups, but suggested not forming them until they were actually needed.
- o Housley noted that when work needed to be done, it often helped to have someone with the title of "Chair" doing the nudging.
- o Subrenat asked if the ICG preferred to have a more low-key way to manage the group, perhaps via an executive committee, or a more traditional approach of designating a chair and vice chairs. He also suggested that it could be useful to make use of a person with a strong legal sense and understanding of process who could call out any occasions where consensus processes were inconsistent. Ideally, this role would be performed by the chair or vice chairs, but often people in these roles didn't have enough time to perform procedure checks as well.
    - o Karrenberg responded that such a procedural role would only be useful if there were rules to be followed, but it seemed that the ICG was consciously avoiding such rules.
- o Mundy suggested that it often helped in groups that had significant divergences of opinion to have an odd number, often 3, of chair and vice chairs. This allowed there to be a majority decision.
    - o Akplogan supported this proposal.
- o Arkko stated that he would hate to lose the ability to have session leaders for specific agenda items, as had been used in this first meeting of the ICG, but did believe that some structure, perhaps in the form of co-chairs, would be useful. However, he did not believe that the group was big enough to warrant a steering committee.

Alhadeff summarized the discussion so far:

- o Don't over-complicate the self-organization.
- o There was a suggestion to consider a strategic approach to external relations, which nobody objected to.
- o Three is the "magic number" for chairs/vice chairs/co chairs.

- o Responding to Alhadeff, Wilson stated that he thought it would make sense to have three equal co-chairs who are collectively responsible for calling for consensus.
- o Any liaison duties are to be performed as needed.
- o The issue of how to call consensus still needs to be discussed some more. There has been general agreement that consensus should evolve organically and that the progression of discussion will indicate to the group when a consensus call is likely to produce results. If the group runs into problems, then the group could consider how to help the consensus process run more formally. Others, though, prefer the idea of a chair calling for consensus.
- o The issue of who can be a spokesperson for the group is also undecided. One issue is that if the group does agree to content that can be communicated to the media, and then the media asks questions outside that content, it could make it difficult for group members to respond to.
  - o Wilson stated that he thought all members of the group should be able to speak to the media, but in their individual capacity and not on behalf of the group. No group spokesperson was necessary.
  - o Alhadeff suggested a compromise: that everyone can be a spokesperson, but if a call is made to the secretariat asking to interview someone, the secretariat can direct the media to one of the co-chairs unless the journalist wants a specific view, such as the African view on ICG discussions.
  - o Akplogan expressed concern about group members being able to speak in their individual capacity as the group had a collective responsibility over the coordination of the IANA stewardship transition process. Talking about this process from a personal point of view could interfere with the group's work. For example, if talking as an RIR representative, Akplogan could be expressing a different point of view to the direction being taken by the ICG as a whole.
    - ▪ Alhadeff responded, saying that with the group's discussions being recorded and archived, any differences of opinion within the group would not be kept private and may actually enhance the group's ability to communicate with communities who have issues with the direction of the discussion. He suggested that if group members made it clear that they were representing their constituency, and not the whole group, that should not be a problem.
    - ▪ Subrenat agreed with Karrenberg's earlier suggestion that ICG members should be able to represent their communities when talking about ICG matters. However, if the media did want an ICG-wide comment, then perhaps the three co-chairs could be responsible for handling that communication or directing the request to the appropriate person.
    - ▪ Karrenberg suggested that the best way forward could be to have the secretariat relay the ICG's public statements to the media and provide the media with a list of ICG members that they could select from to interview. He expressed concern about the potential for having a spokesperson for the whole group: if the spokesperson said something that not all of the group thought was correct, it could result in others feeling it necessary to make clarifying statements, the conflict of which the media could latch onto.
    - ▪ Bladel thought that the media issue was becoming overly complicated and that it would be simpler to let all group members speak either as

themselves or as representatives of their communities and have no single voice of the ICG unless it comes in written form or through group consensus.

- Wu suggested that the ICG produce short statements of its meetings that can be published. ICG members, who place trust in the co-chairs by electing them in the first place, could trust the co-chairs to handle any enquiries by the media for further detail.

Alhadeff summarized the discussion on media and consensus that had resulted from his previous summary:

- While there was not yet complete consensus on the issue of speaking to the media, there did seem to be movement towards agreement to allow all ICG members to speak as individuals as well as some support for having the ICG co-chairs have a role in media relations. He suggested that media relations was possibly a process that could evolve over time, as the group gained better experience at what types of media interest there were in the group's work.
- There is still not consensus on how to judge consensus, but there is a compromise solution where ICG members try to organically evolve consensus, and where that does not work, the co-chairs can lead the process.
- From discussion, there appeared to be agreement to have three equal co-chairs rather than one chair and two co-chairs. How these roles would be filled would be part of Day 2's discussions.
  - St Amour suggested that ICG members begin submitting their names if they were interested. Cooper suggested that a message be sent to the mailing list overnight to encourage submissions.

Action item ICG-04: Alhadeff to send an email to the internal-cg mailing list encouraging ICG members to nominate for one of the ICG three co-chair positions.

7. Parking Lot
Cooper noted that the minute taker had asked for a quick review of action items. (See end of minutes)

Cooper also presented a preview of the agenda for Day 2, which would include returning to discussions on the ICG's charter and self-organization and new items on internal/external communications needs and a timeline of the overall IANA proposal process as well as the ICG's own work plan.

[Day 1 closed 6:07 pm]

Summary of Action Items
Action item ICG-01: Arkko to lead a small drafting group to develop a new version of the proposed charter for the ICG.

Action item ICG-02: Wilson to lead a small drafting group to move forward the draft text on scope of work and expectations about work in the communities based on input received during Day 1 deliberations.

Action item ICG-03: St Amour to lead a small drafting group to write a note to the GAC confirming that the ICG had accepted the GAC's request to have five seats on the ICG.

Action item ICG-04: Alhadeff to send an email to the internal-cg mailing list encouraging ICG members to nominate for one of the ICG three co-chair positions.