IN THE MATTER OF AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

CORN LAKE, LLC,  )  ICDR Case No. 01-15-0002-9938

Claimant,  )

v.  )

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS,  )

Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX OF AUTHORITIES

IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS

RE NEW gTLD APPLICATION FOR .CHARITY

(Pursuant to November 9, 2015 Procedural Order No. 1)

THE IP and TECHNOLOGY LEGAL GROUP, P.C.
John M. Genga,  Contact Information Redacted
Don C. Moody,  Contact Information Redacted
Khurram A. Nizami,  Contact Information Redacted
15260 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1810
Sherman Oaks, California  91403 USA
Telephone: +1 (818) 444-4580
Facsimile: +1 (818) 444-4585
http://newgtlddisputes.com

Attorneys for Claimant
CORN LAKE, LLC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Final Declaration, <em>DotConnectAfrica Trust v. ICANN</em>, ICDR No. 50-2013-00-1083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Final Declaration, <em>Vistaprint Ltd. v. ICANN</em>, ICDR No. 01-14-0000-6505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DATED: December 10, 2015

THE IP and TECHNOLOGY LEGAL GROUP, P.C.

By:______/jmg/______________________

John M. Genga
Attorneys for Claimant
CORN LAKE, LLC
APPENDIX J
FINAL DECLARATION

In the matter of an Independent Review Process (IRP) pursuant to the Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Number’s (ICANN’s) Bylaws, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures (ICDR Rules) and the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR),

Between: DotConnectAfrica Trust;
(“Claimant” or “DCA Trust”)

Represented by Mr. Arif H. Ali, Ms. Meredith Craven, Ms. Erin Yates and Mr. Ricardo Ampudia of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP located at 1300 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 2005, U.S.A.

And

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN);
(“Respondent” or “ICANN”)

Represented by Mr. Jeffrey A. LeVee and Ms. Rachel Zernik of Jones Day, LLP located at 555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071, U.S.A.

Claimant and Respondent will together be referred to as “Parties”.

IRP Panel

Prof. Catherine Kessedjian
Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.)
Babak Barin, President
I. BACKGROUND

1. DCA Trust is non-profit organization established under the laws of the Republic of Mauritius on 15 July 2010 with its registry operation – DCA Registry Services (Kenya) Limited – as its principal place of business in Nairobi, Kenya.

2. DCA Trust was formed with the charitable purpose of, among other things, advancing information technology education in Africa and providing a continental Internet domain name to provide access to internet services for the people of Africa and not for the public good.

3. In March 2012, DCA Trust applied to ICANN for the delegation of the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains (“gTLD”) Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”), an internet resource available for delegation under that program.

4. ICANN is a non-profit corporation established on 30 September 1998 under the laws of the State of California, and headquartered in Marina del Rey, California, U.S.A. According to its Articles of Incorporation, ICANN was established for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, international conventions and local law.

5. On 4 June 2013, the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”) posted a notice that it had decided not to accept DCA Trust’s application.

6. On 19 June 2013, DCA Trust filed a request for reconsideration by the ICANN Board Governance Committee (“BGC”), which denied the request on 1 August 2013.

7. On 19 August 2013, DCA Trust informed ICANN of its intention to seek relief before an Independent Review Panel under ICANN’s Bylaws. Between August and October 2013, DCA Trust and ICANN participated in a Cooperative Engagement Process (“CEP”) to try and resolve the issues relating to DCA Trust’s application. Despite several meetings, no resolution was reached.

8. On 24 October 2013, DCA Trust filed a Notice of Independent Review Process with the ICDR in accordance with Article IV, Section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws.
9. In an effort to safeguard its rights pending the ongoing constitution of the IRP Panel, on 22 January 2014, DCA Trust wrote to ICANN requesting that it immediately cease any further processing of all applications for the delegation of the .AFRICA gTLD, failing which DCA Trust would seek emergency relief under Article 37 of the ICDR Rules.

10. DCA Trust also indicated that it believed it had the right to seek such relief because there was no standing panel as anticipated in the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process (“Supplementary Procedures”), which could otherwise hear requests for emergency relief.

11. In response, on 5 February 2014, ICANN wrote:

Although ICANN typically is refraining from further processing activities in conjunction with pending gTLD applications where a competing applicant has a pending reconsideration request, ICANN does not intend to refrain from further processing of applications that relate in some way to pending independent review proceedings. In this particular instance, ICANN believes that the grounds for DCA’s IRP are exceedingly weak, and that the decision to refrain from the further processing of other applications on the basis of the pending IRP would be unfair to others.

12. In its Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection subsequently submitted on 28 March 2014, DCA Trust pleaded, *inter alia*, that, in an effort to preserve its rights, in January 2014, DCA requested that ICANN suspend its processing of applications for .AFRICA during the pendency of this proceeding. ICANN, however, summarily refused to do so.

13. DCA Trust also submitted that “on 23 March 2014, DCA became aware that ICANN intended to sign an agreement with DCA’s competitor (a South African company called ZACR) on 26 March 2014 in Beijing [...] Immediately upon receiving this information, DCA contacted ICANN and asked it to refrain from signing the agreement with ZACR in light of the fact that this proceeding was still pending. Instead, according to ICANN’s website, ICANN *signed its agreement with ZACR the very next day, two days ahead of plan, on 24 March instead of 26 March.*”

14. According to DCA Trust, that same day, “ICANN then responded to DCA’s request by presenting the execution of the contract as a *fait accompli*, arguing that DCA should have sought to stop ICANN from proceeding with ZACR’s application, as ICANN had already informed DCA of its intention [to] ignore its obligations to participate in this proceeding in good faith.”
15. DCA Trust also submitted that on 25 March 2014, as per ICANN’s email to the ICDR, “ICANN for the first time informed DCA that it would accept the application of Article 37 of the ICDR Rules to this proceeding contrary to the express provisions of the Supplementary Procedures of ICANN has put in place for the IRP Process.”

16. In its Request, DCA Trust argued that it “is entitled to an accountability proceeding with legitimacy and integrity, with the capacity to provide a meaningful remedy. [...] DCA has requested the opportunity to compete for rights to .AFRICA pursuant to the rules that ICANN put into place. Allowing ICANN to delegate .AFRICA to DCA’s only competitor – which took actions that were instrumental in the process leading to ICANN’s decision to reject DCA’s application – would eviscerate the very purpose of this proceeding and deprive DCA of its rights under ICANN’s own constitutive instruments and international law.”

17. Finally, among other things, DCA Trust requested the following interim relief:

   a. An order compelling ICANN to refrain from any further steps toward delegation of the .AFRICA gTLD, including but not limited to execution or assessment of pre-delegation testing, negotiations or discussions relating to delegation with the entity ZACR or any of its officers or agents; [...] 

18. On 24 April and 12 May 2014, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 1, a Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, and a list of questions for the Parties to answer.

19. In its 12 May 2014 Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, the Panel required ICANN to “immediately refrain from any further processing of any application for .AFRICA until [the Panel] heard the merits of DCA Trust’s Notice of Independent Review Process and issued its conclusions regarding the same”.

20. In the Panel’s unanimous view, among other reasons, it would have been “unfair and unjust to deny DCA Trust’s request for interim relief when the need for such a relief...[arose] out of ICANN’s failure to follow its own Bylaws and procedures.” The Panel also reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

21. On 27 May and 4 June 2015, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 2 and a Decision on ICANN’s request for Partial Reconsideration of certain portions of its Decision on Interim Measures of Protection.
22. In its 4 June 2014 Decision on ICANN’s request for Partial Reconsideration, the Panel unanimously concluded that ICANN’s request must be denied. In that Decision, the Panel observed:

9. After careful consideration of the Parties’ respective submissions, the Panel is of the unanimous view that ICANN’s Request must be denied for two reasons.

10. First, there is nothing in ICANN’s Bylaws, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures of the ICDR effective as at 1 June 2009 or the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process that in any way address the Panel’s ability to address ICANN’s Request. The Panel has not been able to find any relevant guidance in this regard in any of the above instruments and ICANN has not pointed to any relevant provision or rule that would support its argument that the Panel has the authority to reconsider its Decision of 12 May 2014.

11. Moreover, ICANN has not pointed to any clerical, typographical or computation error or shortcoming in the Panel’s Decision and it has not requested an interpretation of the Panel’s Decision based on any ambiguity or vagueness. To the contrary, ICANN has asked the Panel to reconsider its prior findings with respect to certain references in its Decision that ICANN disagrees with, on the basis that those references are in ICANN’s view, inaccurate.

12. Second, even if the Panel were to reconsider based on any provision or rule available, its findings with respect to those passages complained of by ICANN as being inaccurate in its Decision – namely paragraphs 29 to 33 – after deliberation, the Panel would still conclude that ICANN has failed to follow its own Bylaws as more specifically explained in the above paragraphs, in the context of addressing which of the Parties should be viewed as responsible for the delays associated with DCA Trust’s Request for Interim Measures of Protection. It is not reasonable to construe the By-law proviso for consideration by a provider-appointed ad hoc panel when a standing panel is not in place as relieving ICANN indefinitely of forming the required standing panel. Instead, the provider appointed panel is properly viewed as an interim procedure to be used before ICANN has a chance to form a standing panel. Here, more than a year has elapsed, and ICANN has offered no explanation why the standing panel has not been formed, nor indeed any indication that formation of that panel is in process, or has begun, or indeed even is planned to begin at some point.

The Panel also reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

23. On 14 August 2014, the Panel issued a Declaration on the IRP Procedure (“2014 Declaration”) pursuant to which it (1) ordered a reasonable documentary exchange, (2) permitted the Parties to benefit from additional filings and supplementary briefing, (3) allowed a video hearing, and (4) permitted both Parties at the hearing to
challenge and test the veracity of any written statements made by witnesses.

The Panel also concluded that its Declaration on the IRP and its future Declaration on the Merits of the case were binding on the Parties. In particular, the Panel decided:

98. Various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures support the conclusion that the Panel’s decisions, opinions and declarations are binding. There is certainly nothing in the Supplementary Rules that renders the decisions, opinions and declarations of the Panel either advisory or non-binding.

[...]

100. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures resembles Article 27 of the ICDR Rules. Whereas Article 27 refers to “Awards”, section 10 refers to “Declarations”. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures, however, is silent on whether Declarations made by the IRP Panel are “final and binding” on the parties.

101. As explained earlier, as per Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 8 of the Bylaws, the Board of Directors of ICANN has given its approval to the ICDR to establish a set of operating rules and procedures for the conduct of the IRP set out in section 3. The operating rules and procedures established by the ICDR are the ICDR Rules as referred to in the preamble of the Supplementary Procedures. These Rules have been supplemented with the Supplementary Procedures.

102. This is clear from two different parts of the Supplementary Procedures. First, in the preamble, where the Supplementary Procedures state that: “These procedures supplement the International Centre for Dispute Resolution’s International Arbitration Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws”.

103. And second, under section 2 entitled (Scope), that states that the “ICDR will apply these Supplementary Procedures, in addition to the INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, in all cases submitted to the ICDR in connection with the Article IV, Section 3(4) of the ICANN Bylaws”. It is therefore clear that ICANN intended the operating rules and procedures for the independent review to be an international set of arbitration rules supplemented by a particular set of additional rules.

104. There is also nothing inconsistent between section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures and Article 27 of the ICDR Rules.

105. One of the hallmarks of international arbitration is the binding and final nature of the decisions made by the adjudicators. Binding arbitration is the essence of what the ICDR Rules, the ICDR itself and its parent, the American Arbitration Association, offer. The selection of the ICDR Rules as the baseline set of procedures for IRP’s, therefore, points to a binding adjudicative process.
106. Furthermore, the process adopted in the Supplementary Procedures is an adversarial one where counsel for the parties present competing evidence and arguments, and a panel decides who prevails, when and in what circumstances. The panellists who adjudicate the parties’ claims are also selected from among experienced arbitrators, whose usual charter is to make binding decisions.

107. The above is further supported by the language and spirit of section 11 of ICANN’s Bylaws. Pursuant to that section, the IRP Panel has the authority to summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious. Surely, such a decision, opinion or declaration on the part of the Panel would not be considered advisory.

[...]

110. ICANN points to the extensive public and expert input that preceded the formulation of the Supplementary Procedures. The Panel would have expected, were a mere advisory decision, opinion or declaration the objective of the IRP, that this intent be clearly articulated somewhere in the Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures. In the Panel’s view, this could have easily been done.

111. The force of the foregoing textual and construction considerations as pointing to the binding effect of the Panel’s decisions and declarations are reinforced by two factors: 1) the exclusive nature of the IRP whereby the non-binding argument would be clearly in contradiction with such a factor; and, 2) the special, unique, and publicly important function of ICANN. As explained before, ICANN is not an ordinary private non-profit entity deciding for its own sake who it wishes to conduct business with, and who it does not. ICANN rather, is the steward of a highly valuable and important international resource.

[...]

115. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it is acceptable for ICANN to adopt a remedial scheme with no teeth, the Panel is of the opinion that, at a minimum, the IRP should forthrightly explain and acknowledge that the process is merely advisory. This would at least let parties know before embarking on a potentially expensive process that a victory before the IRP panel may be ignored by ICANN. And, a straightforward acknowledgment that the IRP process is intended to be merely advisory might lead to a legislative or executive initiative to create a truly independent compulsory process. The Panel seriously doubts that the Senators questioning former ICANN President Stuart Lynn in 2002 would have been satisfied had they understood that a) ICANN had imposed on all applicants a waiver of all judicial remedies, and b) the IRP process touted by ICANN as the “ultimate guarantor” of ICANN accountability was only an advisory process, the benefit of which accrued only to ICANN. [Underlining is from the original decision.]

The Panel also reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.
24. On 5 September and 25 September 2014, the Panel issued Procedural Orders No. 3 and No. 4. In Procedural Order No. 3, the Panel notably required the Parties to complete their respective filing of briefs in accordance with the IRP Procedure Guidelines by 3 November 2014 for DCA Trust and 3 December 2014 for ICANN.

25. In Procedural Order No. 4 dated 25 September 2014, the Panel reached a decision regarding document production issues.

26. On 3 November 2014 and 3 December 2014, the Parties filed their Memorial and Response Memorial on the Merits in accordance with the timetable set out in Procedural Order No. 3.

27. On 26 February 2015, following the passing away of the Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret.) and confirmation by the ICDR of his replacement arbitrator, the Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.), ICANN requested that this Panel consider revisiting the part of this IRP relating to the issue of hearing witnesses addressed in the Panel’s 2014 Declaration.

28. In particular, ICANN submitted that given the replacement of Justice Neal, Article 15.2 of the ICDR Rules together with the Supplementary Procedures permitted this IRP to in its sole discretion, determine “whether all or part” of this IRP should be repeated.

29. According to ICANN, while it was not necessary to repeat all of this IRP, since the Panel here had exceeded its authority under the Supplementary Procedures when it held in its 2014 Declaration that it could order live testimony of witnesses, the Panel should then at a minimum consider revisiting that issue.

30. According to ICANN, panelists derived “their powers and authority from the relevant applicable rules, the parties’ requests, and the contractual provisions agreed to by the Parties (in this instance, ICANN’s Bylaws, which establish the process of independent review). The authority of panelists is limited by such rules, submissions and agreements.”

31. ICANN emphasized that “compliance with the Supplementary Procedures [was] critical to ensure predictability for ICANN, applicants for and objectors to gTLD applications, and the entire ICANN community…”, and while “ICANN [was] committed to fairness and accessibility…ICANN [was] also committed to predictability and the like treatment of all applicants. For this Panel to change the rules
for this single applicant [did] not encourage any of these commitments.”

32. ICANN also pleaded that, DCA specifically agreed to be bound by the Supplementary Procedures when it initially submitted its application, the Supplementary Procedures apply to both ICANN and DCA alike, ICANN is now in the same position when it comes to testing witness declarations and finally, in alternative dispute resolution proceedings where cross examination of witnesses is allowed, parties often waive cross-examination.

33. Finally, ICANN advanced that:

[T]he Independent Review process is an alternative dispute resolution procedure adapted to the specific issues to be addressed pursuant to ICANN’s Bylaws. The process cannot be transformed into a full-fledged trial without amending ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures, which specifically provide for a hearing that includes counsel argument only. Accordingly, ICANN strongly urges the Panel to follow the rules for this proceeding and to declare that the hearing in May will be limited to argument of counsel.

34. On 24 March 2015, the Panel issued its Declaration on ICANN’s Request for Revisiting of the 14 August Declaration on the IRP Procedure following the Replacement of Panel Member. In that Declaration, the newly constituted Panel unanimously concluded that it was not necessary for it to reconsider or revisit its 2014 Declaration.

35. In passing and not at all as a result of any intended or inadvertent reconsideration or revisiting of its 2014 Declaration, the Panel referred to Articles III and IV of ICANN’s Bylaws and concluded:

Under the general heading, Transparency, and title “Purpose”, Section 1 of Article III states: “ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.” Under the general heading, Accountability and Review, and title “Purpose”, Section 1 of Article IV reads: “In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws.” In light of the above, and again in passing only, it is the Panel’s unanimous view, that the filing of fact witness statements (as ICANN has done in this IRP) and limiting telephonic or in-person hearings to argument only is inconsistent with the objectives setout in Articles III and IV setout above.

The Panel again reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.
36. On 24 March and 1 April 2015, the Panel rendered Procedural Orders No. 5 and 6, in which, among other things, the Panel recorded the Parties’ “agreement that there will no cross-examination of any of the witnesses” at the hearing of the merits.

37. On 20 April 2015, the Panel rendered its Third Declaration on the IRP Procedure. In that Declaration, the Panel decided that the hearing of this IRP should be an in-person one in Washington, D.C. and required all three witnesses who had filed witness statements to be present at the hearing.

38. The Panel in particular noted that:

13. […] Article IV, Section 3, and Paragraph 4 of ICANN’s Bylaws (reproduced above) – the Independent Review Process – was designed and set up to offer the Internet community, an accountability process that would ensure that ICANN acted in a manner consistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

14. Both ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Rules require an IRP Panel to examine and decide whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. As ICANN’s Bylaws explicitly put it, an IRP Panel is “charged with comparing contested actions of the Board […]”, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

15. The IRP is the only independent third party process that allows review of board actions to ensure their consistency with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As already explained in this Panel’s 14 August 2014 Declaration on the IRP Procedure (“August 2014 Declaration”), the avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do not include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN’s Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

“Applicant hereby releases ICANN […] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN […] in connection with ICANN’s review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant’s gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM.”

Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, then the only and ultimate “accountability” remedy for an applicant is the IRP.

16. Accountability requires an organization to explain or give reasons for its activities, accept responsibility for them and to disclose the results in a transparent manner.
21. In order to keep the costs and burdens of independent review as low as possible, ICANN’s Bylaws, in Article IV, Section 3 and Paragraph 12, suggests that the IRP Panel conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible, and where necessary the IRP Panel may hold meetings by telephone. Use of the words “should” and “may” versus “shall” are demonstrative of this point. In the same paragraph, however, ICANN’s Bylaws state that, “in the unlikely event that a telephonic or in-person hearing is convened, the hearing shall be limited to argument only; all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in writing in advance.”

22. The Panel finds that this last sentence in Paragraph 12 of ICANN’s Bylaws, unduly and improperly restricts the Panel’s ability to conduct the “independent review” it has been explicitly mandated to carry out in Paragraph 4 of Section 3 in the manner it considers appropriate.

23. How can a Panel compare contested actions of the Board and declare whether or not they are consistent with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, without the ability to fact find and make enquiries concerning those actions in the manner it considers appropriate?

24. How can the Panel for example, determine, if the Board acted without conflict of interest, exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it, or exercised independent judgment in taking decisions, if the Panel cannot ask the questions it needs to, in the manner it needs to or considers fair, just and appropriate in the circumstances?

25. How can the Panel ensure that the parties to this IRP are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case with respect to the mandate the Panel has been given, if as ICANN submits, “ICANN’s Bylaws do not permit any examination of witnesses by the parties or the Panel during the hearing”?

26. The Panel is unanimously of the view that it cannot. The Panel is also of the view that any attempt by ICANN in this case to prevent it from carrying out its independent review of ICANN Board’s actions in the manner that the Panel considers appropriate under the circumstances deprives the accountability and review process set out in the Bylaws of any meaning.

27. ICANN has filed two ‘Declarations’ in this IRP, one signed by Ms. Heather Dryden, a Senior Policy Advisor at the International Telecommunications Policy and Coordination Directorate at Industry Canada, and Chair of ICANN Government Advisory Committee from 2010 to 2013, and the other by Mr. Cherine Chalaby, a member of the Board of Directors of ICANN since 2010. Mr. Chalaby is also, since its inception, one of three members of the Subcommittee on Ethics and Conflicts of ICANN’s Board of Governance Committee.

28. In their respective statements, both individuals have confirmed that they “have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in [their] declaration and [are] competent to testify to these matters if called as a witness.”
29. In his Declaration, Mr. Chalaby states that “all members of the NGPC were asked to and did specifically affirm that they did not have a conflict of interest related to DCA’s application for .AFRICA when they voted on the GAC advice. In addition, the NGPC asked the BGC to look into the issue further, and the BGC referred the matter to the Subcommittee. After investigating the matter, the Subcommittee concluded that Chris Disspain and Mike Silber did not have conflicts of interest with respect to DCA’s application for .AFRICA.”

30. The Panel considers it important and useful for ICANN’s witnesses, and in particular, Mr. Chalaby as well as for Ms. Sophia Bekele Eshete to be present at the hearing of this IRP.

31. While the Panel takes note of ICANN’s position depicted on page 2 of its 8 April 2015 letter, the Panel nonetheless invites ICANN to reconsider its position.

32. The Panel also takes note of ICANN’s offer in that same letter to address written questions to its witnesses before the hearing, and if the Panel needs more information after the hearing to clarify the evidence presented during the hearing. The Panel, however, is unanimously of the view that this approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the requirements in ICANN’s Bylaws for it to act openly, transparently, fairly and with integrity.

33. As already indicated in this Panel’s August 2014 Declaration, analysis of the propriety of ICANN’s decisions in this case will depend at least in part on evidence about the intentions and conduct of ICANN’s top personnel. Even though the Parties have explicitly agreed that neither will have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other in this IRP, the Panel is of the view that ICANN should not be allowed to rely on written statements of its top officers attesting to the propriety of their actions and decisions without an opportunity for the Panel and thereafter DCA Trust’s counsel to ask any follow-up questions arising out of the Panel’s questions of ICANN’s witnesses. The same opportunity of course will be given to ICANN to ask questions of Ms. Bekele Eshete, after the Panel has directed its questions to her.

34. The Parties having agreed that there will be no cross-examination of witnesses in this IRP, the procedure for asking witnesses questions at the hearing shall be as follows:

   a) The Panel shall first have an opportunity to ask any witness any questions it deems necessary or appropriate;
   b) Each Party thereafter, shall have an opportunity to ask any follow-up questions the Panel permits them to ask of any witness.

The Panel again reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

39. On 27 April and 4 May 2015, the Panel issued its Procedural Order No. 7 and 8, and on that last date, it held a prehearing conference call with the Parties as required by the ICDR Rules. In Procedural
Order No. 8, the Panel set out the order of witness and party presentations agreed upon by the Parties.

40. On 18 May 2015, and in response to ZA Central Registry’s (ZACR) request to have two of its representatives along with a representative from the African Union Commission (AUC) attend at the IRP hearing scheduled for 22 and 23 May 2015 in Washington, D.C., the Panel issued its Procedural Order No. 9, denying the requests made by ZACR and AUC to be at the merits hearing of this matter in Washington, D.C.

41. In a letter dated 11 May 2015, ZACR and AUC’s legal representative had submitted that both entities had an interest in this matter and it would be mutually beneficial for the IRP to permit them to attend at the hearing in Washington, D.C.

42. ZACR’s legal representative had also argued that “allowing for interests of a materially affected party such as ZACR, the successful applicant for the dotAfrica gTLD, as well as broader public interests, to be present enhances the legitimacy of the proceedings and therefore the accountability and transparency of ICANN and its dispute resolution procedures.”

43. For the Panel, Article 20 of the ICDR Rules, which applied in this matter, stated that the hearing of this IRP was “private unless the parties agree otherwise”. The Parties in this IRP did not consent to the presence of ZACR and AUC. While ICANN indicated that it had no objection to the presence of ZACR and AUC, DCA Trust was not of the same view. Therefore, ZACR and AUC were not permitted to attend.

44. The in-person hearing of the merits of this IRP took place on 22 and 23 May 2015 at the offices of Jones Day LLP in Washington, D.C. All three individuals who had filed witness statements in this IRP, namely Ms. Sophia Bekele Eshete, representative for DCA Trust, Ms. Heather Dryden and Mr. Cherine Chalaby, representatives for ICANN, attended in person and answered questions put to them by the Panel and subsequently by the legal representatives of both Parties. In attendance at the hearing was also Ms. Amy Stathos, Deputy General Counsel of ICANN.

45. The proceedings of the hearing were reported by Ms. Cindy L. Sebo of TransPerfect Legal Solutions, who is a Registered Merit Real-Time Court Reporter.
46. On the last day of the hearing, DCA Trust was asked by the Panel to clearly and explicitly articulate its prayers for relief. In a document entitled Claimant’s Final Request for Relief which was signed by the Executive Director of DCA Trust, Ms. Sophia Bekele and marked at the hearing as Hearing Exhibit 4, DCA Trust asked the Panel to:

Declare that the Board violated ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and the Applicant Guidebook (AGB) by:

- Discriminating against DCA and wrongfully assisting the AUC and ZACR to obtain rights to the .AFRICA gTLD;
- Failing to apply ICANN’s procedures in a neutral and objective manner, with procedural fairness when it accepted the GAC Objection Advice against DCA; and
- Failing to apply its procedures in a neutral and objective manner, with procedural fairness when it approved the BGC’s recommendation not to reconsider the NGPC’s acceptance of the GAC Objection Advice against DCA;

And to declare that:

- DCA is the prevailing party in this IRP and, consequently, shall be entitled to its costs in this proceeding; and
- DCA is entitled to such other relief as the Panel may find appropriate under the circumstances described herein.

Recommend, as a result of each of these violations, that:

- ICANN cease all preparations to delegate the .AFRICA gTLD to ZACR;
- ICANN permit DCA’s application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process and be granted a period of no less than 18 months to obtain Government support as set out in the AGB and interpreted by the Geographic Names Panel, or accept that the requirement is satisfied as a result of the endorsement of DCA Trust’s application by UNECA; and
- ICANN compensate DCA for the costs it has incurred as a result of ICANN’s violations of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and AGB.

47. In its response to DCA Trust’s Final Request for Relief, ICANN submitted that, “the Panel should find that no action (or inaction) of the ICANN Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws, and accordingly none of DCA’s requested relief is appropriate.”

48. ICANN also submitted that:

DCA urges that the Panel issue a declaration in its favor… and also asks that the Panel declare that DCA is the prevailing party and entitled to its costs. Although ICANN believes that the evidence does not support the
declarations that DCA seeks, ICANN does not object to the form of DCA’s requests.

At the bottom of DCA’s Final Request for Relief, DCA asks that the Panel recommend that ICANN cease all preparations to delegate the .AFRICA gTLD to ZACR, and that ICANN permit DCA’s application to proceed and give DCA no less than 18 additional months from the date of the Panel’s declaration to attempt to obtain the requisite support of the countries in Africa. ICANN objects to that appropriateness of these requested recommendations because they are well outside the Panel’s authority as set forth in the Bylaws.

[...] Because the Panel’s authority is limited to declaring whether the Board’s conduct was inconsistent with the Articles or the Bylaws, the Panel should limit its declaration to that question and refrain from recommending how the Board should then proceed in light of the Panel’s declaration. Pursuant to Paragraph 12 of that same section of the Bylaws, the Board will consider the Panel’s declaration at its next meeting, and if the Panel has declared that the Board’s conduct was inconsistent with the Articles or the Bylaws, the Board will have to determine how to act upon the opinion of the Panel.

By way of example only, if the Panel somehow found that the unanimous NGPC vote on 4 June 2013 was not properly taken, the Board might determine that the vote from that meeting should be set aside and that the NGPC should consider the issue anew. Likewise, if the Panel were to determine that the NGPC did not adequately consider the GAC advice at [the] 4 June 2013 meeting, the Board might require that the NGPC reconsider the GAC advice.

In all events, the Bylaws mandate that the Board has the responsibility of fashioning the appropriate remedy once the Panel has declared whether or not it thinks the Board’s conduct was inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The Bylaws do not provide the Panel with the authority to make any recommendations or declarations in this respect.

49. In response to ICANN’s submissions above, on 15 June 2015, DCA Trust advanced that the Panel had already ruled that its declaration on the merits will be binding on the Parties and that nothing in ICANN’s Bylaws, the Supplementary Procedures or the ICDR Rules applicable in these proceedings prohibits the Panel from making a recommendation to the ICANN Board of Directors regarding an appropriate remedy. DCA Trust also submitted that:

According to ICANN’s Bylaws, the Independent Review Process is designed to provide a remedy for “any” person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board. Further, “in order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board’s alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation. Indeed, the ICANN New gTLD Program Committee, operating under the delegated authority of the ICANN Board, itself suggested that DCA could seek relief through ICANN’s accountability
mechanisms or, in other words, the Reconsideration process and the Independent Review Process. If the IRP mechanism – the mechanism of last resort for gTLD applicants – is intended to provide a remedy for a claimant materially injured or harmed by Board action or inaction, and it serves as the only alternative to litigation, then naturally the IRP Panel may recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress such injury or harm.

50. On 25 June 2015, the Panel issued its Procedural Order No. 10, directing the Parties to by 1 July 2015 simultaneously file their detailed submissions on costs and their allocation in these proceedings.

51. The additional factual background and reasons in the above decisions, procedural orders and declarations rendered by the Panel are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference in this Final Declaration.

52. On 1 and 2 July 2015, the Parties filed their respective positions and submissions on costs.

II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON THE MERITS & REQUEST FOR RELIEF

53. According to DCA Trust and as elaborated on in it’s Memorial on Merits dated 3 November 2014, the central dispute between it and ICANN in this IRP may be summarized as follows:

32. By preventing DCA’S application from proceeding through the new gTLD review process and by coordinating with the AUC and others to ensure that the AUC obtained the rights to .AFRICA, ICANN breached its obligations of independence, transparency and due process contained in its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, including its obligation to conduct itself consistent with its duty of good faith under relevant principles of international law.

54. According to DCA Trust, among other things, “instead of functioning as a disinterested regulator of a fair and transparent gTLD application process, ICANN used its authority and oversight over that process to assist ZACR and to eliminate its only competitor, DCA, from the process.”

55. DCA Trust also advanced that, “as a result, ICANN deprived DCA of the right to compete for .AFRICA in accordance with the rules ICANN established for the new gTLD program, in breach of the Applicant Guidebook (“AGB”) and ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.”
56. In its 3 December 2014 Response to DCA’s Memorial on the Merits, among other things, ICANN submitted that, “ICANN’s conduct with respect to DCA’s application for .AFRICA was fully consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation and the Applicant Guidebook. ICANN also pleaded that it acted through open and transparent processes, evaluated DCA’s application for .AFRICA in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Guidebook, and followed the procedures set forth in its Bylaws in evaluating DCA’s Request for Reconsideration.”

57. ICANN advanced that, “DCA is using this IRP as a mean to challenge the right of African countries to support a specific (and competing) application for .AFRICA, and to rewrite the Guidebook.”

58. ICANN also added that, “ICANN provided assistance to those who requested, cooperated with governmental authorities, and respected the consensus advice issued by the GAC, which speaks on behalf of the governments of the world.”

59. In its Final Request for Relief filed on 23 May 2015, DCA Trust asked this Panel to:

1. Declare that the Board violated ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and the Applicant Guidebook (AGB);
2. Declare that DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP and, consequently entitled to its costs in this proceeding; and
3. Recommend as a result of the Board violations a course of action for the Board to follow going forward.

60. In its response letter of 1 June 2015, ICANN confirmed that it did not object to the form of DCA Trust’s requests above, even though it believes that the evidence does not support the declarations that DCA Trust seeks. ICANN did, however, object to the appropriateness of the request for recommendations on the ground that they are outside of the Panel’s authority as set forth in the Bylaws.

III. THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE PANEL’S DECISION

61. After carefully considering the Parties’ written and oral submissions, perusing the three witness statements filed and hearing viva voce the testimonies of the witnesses at the in-person hearing of this IRP in Washington, D.C., the Panel answers the following four questions put to it as follows:
1. Did the Board act or fail to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

Answer: Yes.

2. Can the IRP Panel recommend a course of action for the Board to follow as a consequence of any declaration that the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook (AGB)?

Answer: Yes.

3. Who is the prevailing party in this IRP?

Answer: DCA Trust

4. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of this IRP and the cost of the IRP Provider?

Answer: ICANN, in full.

**Summary of Panel's Decision**

For reasons explained in more detail below, and pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (c) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel declares that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

Furthermore, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel recommends that ICANN continue to refrain from delegating the .AFRICA gTLD and permit DCA Trust's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

Finally, DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP and ICANN is responsible for bearing, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, Article 11 of Supplementary Procedures and Article 31 of the ICDR Rules, the totality of the costs of this IRP and the totality of the costs of the IRP Provider.

As per the last sentence of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, DCA Trust and ICANN shall each bear their own expenses. The Parties shall also each bear their own legal representation fees.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AND REASONS FOR THE PANEL’S DECISION

1) Did the Board act or fail to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

62. Before answering this question, the Panel considers it necessary to quickly examine and address the issue of “standard of review” as referred to by ICANN in its 3 December 2014 Response to DCA’s Memorial on the Merits or the “law applicable to these proceedings” as pleaded by DCA Trust in its 3 November 2014 Memorial on the Merits.

63. According to DCA Trust:

30. The version of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws in effect at the time DCA filed its Request for IRP applies to these proceedings. [Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (21 November 1998) and Bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (11 April 2013)]. ICANN’s agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications & Information Administration (“NTIA”), the “Affirmation of Commitments,” is also instructive, as it explains ICANN’s obligations in light of its role as regulator of the Domain Name System (“DNS”). The standard of review is a de novo “independent review” of whether the actions of the Board violated the Bylaws, with focus on whether the Board acted without conflict of interest, with due diligence and care, and exercised independent judgment in the best interests of ICANN and its many stakeholders. (Underlining added).

31. All of the obligations enumerated in these documents are to be carried out first in conformity with “relevant principles of international law” and second in conformity with local law. As explained by Dr. Jack Goldsmith in his Expert Report submitted in ICM v. ICANN, the reference to “principles of international law” in ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation should be understood to include both customary international law and general principles of law.

64. In response, ICANN submits that:

11. The IRP is a unique process available under ICANN’s Bylaws for persons or entities that claim to have been materially and adversely affected by a decision or action of the ICANN Board, but only to the extent that Board action was inconsistent with ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles. This IRP Panel is tasked with providing its opinion as to whether the challenged Board actions violated ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles. ICANN’s Bylaws specifically identify the deferential standard of review that the IRP Panel must apply when evaluating the actions of the ICANN Board, focusing on:
a. Did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;

b. Did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and

c. Did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

12. DCA disregards the plain language of ICANN’s Bylaws and relies instead on the IRP Panel’s declaration in a prior Independent Review proceeding, *ICM v. ICANN*. However, *ICM* was decided in 2010 under a previous version of ICANN’s Bylaws. In its declaration, the *ICM* Panel explicitly noted that ICANN’s then-current Bylaws “did not specify or imply that the [IRP] process provided for s[had] (or s[had] not) accord deference to the decisions of the ICANN Board.” As DCA acknowledges, the version of ICANN’s Bylaws that apply to this proceeding are the version as amended in April 2013. The current Bylaws provide for the deferential standard of review set forth above. [Underlining is added]

65. For the following reasons, the Panel is of the view that the standard of review is a *de novo*, objective and independent one examining whether the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

66. ICANN is not an ordinary California nonprofit organization. Rather it has a large international purpose and responsibility to coordinate and ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.

67. Indeed, Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation require ICANN to “operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets.” ICANN’s Bylaws also impose duties on it to act in an open, transparent and fair manner with integrity.

68. ICANN’s Bylaws (as amended on 11 April 2013) which both Parties explicitly agree that applies to this IRP, reads in relevant parts as follows:

**ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW**

**Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS**
1. In addition to the reconsideration process described in Section 2 of this Article, ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. 

[...]

4. Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel [...], which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?

b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and

c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

69. Section 8 of the Supplementary Procedures similarly subject the IRP to the standard of review set out in subparagraphs a., b., and c., above, and add:

If a requestor demonstrates that the ICANN Board did not make a reasonable inquiry to determine it had sufficient facts available, ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest in participating in the decision, or the decision was not an exercise in independent judgment, believed by the ICANN Board to be in the best interests of the company, after taking account of the internet community and the global public interest, the requestor will have established proper grounds for review.

70. In the Panel’s view, Article IV, Section 3, and Paragraph 4 of ICANN’s Bylaws (reproduced above) – the Independent Review Process – was designed and set up to offer the Internet community, a *de novo, objective and independent* accountability process that would ensure that ICANN acted in a manner consistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

71. Both ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Rules require an IRP Panel to *examine* and *decide* whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. As ICANN’s Bylaws explicitly put it, an IRP Panel is *charged with* comparing contested actions of the Board [...], and with *declaring* whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.
72. The IRP is the only independent third party process that allows review of board actions to ensure their consistency with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As already explained in this Panel’s 14 August 2014 Declaration on the IRP Procedure (“August 2014 Declaration”), the avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do not include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN’s Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

Applicant hereby releases ICANN [...] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN [...] in connection with ICANN’s review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant’s gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM.

73. Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, then the only and ultimate “accountability” remedy for an applicant is the IRP.

74. As previously decided by this Panel, such accountability requires an organization to explain or give reasons for its activities, accept responsibility for them and to disclose the results in a transparent manner.

75. Such accountability also requires, to use the words of the IRP Panel in the Booking.com B.V. v. ICANN (ICDR Case Number: 50-20-1400-0247), this IRP Panel to “objectively” determine whether or not the Board’s actions are in fact consistent with the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and Guidebook, which this Panel, like the one in Booking.com “understands as requiring that the Board’s conduct be appraised independently, and without any presumption of correctness.”

76. The Panel therefore concludes that the “standard of review” in this IRP is a de novo, objective and independent one, which does not require any presumption of correctness.

77. With the above in mind, the Panel now turns it mind to whether or not the Board in this IRP acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent
with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook.

**DCA Trust’s Position**

78. In its 3 November 2014 Memorial on the Merits, DCA Trust criticizes ICANN for variety of shortcomings and breaches relating to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and Applicant Guidebook. DCA Trust submits:

32. By preventing DCA’s application from proceeding through the new gTLD review process and by coordinating with the AUC and others to ensure that the AUC obtained the rights to .AFRICA, ICANN breached its obligations of independence, transparency and due process contained in its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, including its obligation to conduct itself consistent with its duty of good faith under relevant principles of international law.

79. DCA Trust also pleads that ICANN breached its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by discriminating against DCA Trust and failing to permit competition for the .AFRICA gTLD, ICANN abused it Regulatory authority in its differential treatment of the ZACR and DCA Trust applications, and in contravention of the rules for the New gTLD Program, ICANN colluded with AUC to ensure that the AUC would obtain control over .AFRICA.

80. According to DCA Trust:

34. ICANN discriminated against DCA and abused its regulatory authority over new gTLDs by treating it differently from other new gTLD applicants without justification or any rational basis— particularly relative to DCA’s competitor ZACR—and by applying ICANN’s policies in an unpredictable and inconsistent manner so as to favor DCA’s competitor for .AFRICA. ICANN staff repeatedly disparaged DCA and portrayed it as an illegitimate bidder for .AFRICA, and the Board failed to stop the discriminatory treatment despite protests from DCA.

35. Moreover, ICANN staff worked with InterConnect to ensure that ZACR, but not DCA, would be able to pass the GNP evaluation, even going so far as to draft a letter supporting ZACR for the AUC to submit back to ICANN. While ICANN staff purported to hold DCA to the strict geographic support requirement set forth in the AGB, once DCA was removed from contention for .AFRICA, ICANN staff immediately bypassed these very same rules in order to allow ZACR’s application to pass the GNP evaluation. After DCA’s application was pulled from processing on 7 June 2013, ICANN staff directed InterConnect to equate the AUC’s support for ZACR’s application as support from 100% of African governments. This was a complete change of policy for ICANN, which had insisted (until DCA’s application was no longer being considered) that the AUC endorsement was not material to the geographic requirement.
36. However, none of the AUC statements ZACR submitted were adequate endorsements under the AGB, either. ICANN staff then took the remarkable step of drafting the AUC endorsement letter in order to enable ZACR to pass review. The Director of gTLD Operations, Trang Nguyen, personally composed an endorsement letter corresponding to all the AGB requirements for Commissioner Ibrahim’s signature. Once Commissioner Ibrahim responded with a signed, stamped copy of the letter incorporating minor additions, ICANN staff rushed to pass ZACR’s application just over one week later.

37. In its Response to the GAC Advice rendered against its application, DCA raised concerns that the two .AFRICA applications had been treated differently, though at the time it had no idea of just how far ICANN was going or would go to push ZACR’s application through the process. Apparently the NGPC failed to make any inquiry into those allegations. .AFRICA was discussed at one meeting only, and there is no rationale listed for the NGPC’s decision in the “Approved Resolutions” for the 4 June 2013 meeting. An adequate inquiry into ICANN staff’s treatment of DCA’s and ZACR’s application—even simply asking the Director of gTLD Operations whether there was any merit to DCA’s concerns—would have revealed a pattern of discriminatory behavior against DCA and special treatment by both ICANN staff and the ICANN Board in favor of ZACR’s application.

38. In all of these acts and omissions, ICANN breached the AGB and its own Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, which require it to act in good faith, avoid discriminating against any one party, and ensure open, accurate and unbiased application of its policies. Furthermore, ICANN breached principles of international law by failing to exercise its authority over the application process in good faith and committing an abuse of right by ghost-writing an endorsement letter for ZACR and the AUC, and then decreeing that the letter was all that would be needed for ZACR to pass. Finally, the Board’s failure to inquire into the actions of its staff, even when on notice of the myriad of discriminatory actions, violates its obligation to comply with its Bylaws with appropriate care and diligence.

81. DCA Trust submits that the NGPC breached ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by failing to apply ICANN’s Procedures in a neutral and objective manner with procedural fairness, when it accepted the purported “consensus” GAC Objection Advice against DCA Trust, the NGPC should have investigated questions about the GAC Objection Advice being obtained through consensus, and the NGPC should have consulted with an independent expert about the GAC advice given that the AUC used the GAC to circumvent the AGB’s community objection procedures.

82. According to DCA Trust:

44. The decision of the NGPC, acting pursuant to the delegated authority of the ICANN Board, to accept the purported “consensus” GAC Objection Advice, violated ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Article III § 1 of its Bylaws, requiring transparency, consistency and fairness. ICANN ignored
the serious issues raised by DCA and others with respect to the rendering and consideration of the GAC Objection Advice, breaching its obligation to operate “to the maximum extent possible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.” It also breaches ICANN’s obligation under Article 4 of its Articles of Incorporation to abide by principles of international law, including good faith application of rules and regulations and the prohibition on the abuse of rights.

45. The NGPC gave undue deference to the GAC and failed to investigate the serious procedural irregularities and conflicts of interest raised by DCA and others relating to the GAC’s Objection Advice on .AFRICA. ICANN had a duty under principles of international law to exercise good faith and due diligence in evaluating the GAC advice rather than accepting it wholesale and without question, despite having notice of the irregular manner in which the advice was rendered. Importantly, ICANN was well aware that the AUC was using the GAC to effectively reserve .AFRICA for itself, pursuant to ICANN’s own advice that it should use the GAC for that purpose and contrary to the New gTLD Program objective of enhancing competition for TLDs. The AUC’s very presence on the GAC as a member rather than an observer demonstrates the extraordinary lengths ICANN took to ensure that the AUC was able to reserve .AFRICA for its own use notwithstanding the new gTLD application process then underway.

46. The ICANN Board and staff members had actual knowledge of information calling into question the notion that there was a consensus among the GAC members to issue the advice against DCA’s application, prohibiting the application of the rule in the AGB concerning consensus advice (which creates a “strong presumption” for the Board that a particular application “should not proceed” in the gTLD evaluation process). The irregularities leading to the advice against DCA’s application included proposals offered by Alice Munyua, who no longer represented Kenya as a GAC advisor at the time, and the fact that the genuine Kenya GAC advisor expressly refused to endorse the advice. Redacted - GAC Designated Confidential Information

Finally, the ICANN Board knew very well that the AUC might attempt to use the GAC in an anticompetitive manner, since it was ICANN itself that informed the AUC it could use the GAC to achieve that very goal.

47. At a bare minimum, this information put ICANN Board and staff members on notice that further investigation into the rationale and support for the GAC’s decision was necessary. During the very meeting wherein the NGPC accepted the Objection Advice, the NGPC acknowledged that due diligence required a conversation with the GAC, even where the advice was consensus advice. The evidence shows that ICANN simply decided to push through the AUC’s appointed applicant in order to allow the AUC to control .AFRICA, as it had previously requested.

48. Even if the GAC’s Objection Advice could be characterized as “consensus” advice, the NGPC’s failure to consult with an independent expert about the GAC’s Objection Advice was a breach of ICANN’s duty to act to the “maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner
and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.” The AGB specifically provides that when the Board is considering any form of GAC advice, it “may consult with independent experts, such as those designated to hear objections in the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, in cases where the issues raised in the GAC advice are pertinent to one of the subject matter areas of the objection procedures.”

49. Given the unique circumstances surrounding the applications for .AFRICA—namely that one applicant was the designee of the AUC, which wanted to control .AFRICA without competition—ICANN should not have simply accepted GAC Objection Advice, proposed and pushed through by the AUC. If it was in doubt as to how to handle GAC advice sponsored by DCA’s only competitor for .AFRICA, it could have and should have consulted a third-party expert in order to obtain appropriate guidance. Its failure to do so was, at a minimum, a breach of ICANN’s duty of good faith and the prohibition on abuse of rights under international law. In addition, in light of the multiple warning signs identified by DCA in its Response to the GAC Objection Advice and its multiple complaints to the Board, failure to consult an independent expert was certainly a breach of the Board’s duty to ensure its fair and transparent application of its policies and its duty to promote and protect competition.

83. DCA Trust also submits that the NGPC breached ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by failing to apply its procedures in a neutral and objective manner, with procedural fairness, when it approved the BGC’s recommendation not to reconsider the NGPC’s acceptance of the GAC Objection Advice against DCA.

84. According to DCA Trust:

50. Not only did the NGPC breach ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws by accepting the GAC’s Objection Advice, but the NGPC also breached ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws by approving the BGC’s recommendation not to reconsider the NGPC’s earlier decision to accept the GAC Objection Advice. Not surprisingly, the NGPC concluded that its earlier decision should not be reconsidered.

51. First, the NGPC’s decision not to review its own acceptance of the GAC Objection Advice lacks procedural fairness, because the NGPC literally reviewed its own decision to accept the Objection Advice. It is a well-established general principle of international law that a party cannot be the judge of its own cause. No independent viewpoint entered into the process. In addition, although Mr. Silber recused himself from the vote on .AFRICA, he remained present for the entire discussion of .AFRICA, and Mr. Disspain apparently concluded that he did not feel conflicted, so both participated in the discussion and Mr. Disspain voted on DCA’s RFR.

52. Second, the participation of the BGC did not provide an independent intervention into the NGPC’s decision-making process, because the BGC is primarily a subset of members of the NGPC. At the time the BGC made its recommendation, the majority of BGC members were also members of the NGPC.
53. Finally, the Board did not exercise due diligence and care in accepting the BGC’s recommendation, because the BGC recommendation essentially proffered the NGPC’s inadequate diligence in accepting the GAC Objection Advice in the first place, in order to absolve the NGPC of the responsibility to look into any of DCA’s grievances in the context of the Request for Review. The basis for the BGC’s recommendation to deny was that DCA did not state proper grounds for reconsideration, because failure to follow correct procedure is not a ground for reconsideration, and DCA did not identify the actual information an independent expert would have provided, had the NGPC consulted one. Thus, the BGC essentially found that the NGPC did not fail to take account of material information, because the NGPC did not have before it the material information that would have been provided by an independent expert’s viewpoint. The BGC even claimed that if DCA had wanted the NGPC to exercise due diligence and consult an independent expert, DCA should have made such a suggestion in its Response to the GAC Objection Advice. Applicants should not have to remind the Board to comply with its Bylaws in order for the Board to exercise due diligence and care.

54. ICANN’s acts and omissions with respect to the BGC’s recommendation constitute further breaches of ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, including its duty to carry out its activities in good faith and to refrain from abusing its position as the regulator of the DNS to favor certain applicants over others.

85. Finally, DCA Trust pleads that:

[As] a result of the Board’s breaches of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and general principles of international law, ICANN must halt the process of delegating .AFRICA to ZACR and ZACR should not be permitted to retain the rights to .AFRICA it has procured as a result of the Board’s violations. Because ICANN’s handling of the new gTLD application process for .AFRICA was so flawed and so deeply influenced by ICANN’s relationships with various individuals and organizations purporting to represent “the African community,” DCA believes that any chance it may have had to compete for .AFRICA has been irremediably lost and that DCA’s application could not receive a fair evaluation even if the process were to be re-set from the beginning. Under the circumstances, DCA submits that ICANN should remove ZACR’s application from the process altogether and allow DCA’s application to proceed under the rules of the New gTLD Program, allowing DCA up to 18 months to negotiate with African governments to obtain the necessary endorsements so as to enable the delegation and management of the .AFRICA string.

**ICANN’s Position**

86. In its Response to DCA’s Memorial on the Merits filed on 3 December 2014 (“ICANN Final Memorial”), ICANN submits that:

2. [...] Pursuant to ICANN’s New gTLD Applicant Guidebook (“Guidebook”), applications for strings that represent geographic regions—such as “Africa”—require the support of at least 60% of the respective national governments in the relevant region. As DCA has acknowledged on
multiple occasions, including in its Memorial, DCA does not have the requisite governmental support; indeed, DCA now asks that ICANN be required to provide it with eighteen more months to try to gather the support that it was supposed to have on the day it submitted its application in 2012.

3. DCA is using this IRP as a means to challenge the right of African countries to support a specific (and competing) application for .AFRICA, and to rewrite the Guidebook. The Guidebook provides that countries may endorse multiple applications for the same geographic string. However, in this instance, the countries of Africa chose to endorse only the application submitted by ZA Central Registry (“ZACR”) because ZACR prevailed in the Request for Proposal (“RFP”) process coordinated by the African Union Commission (“AUC”), a process that DCA chose to boycott. There was nothing untoward about the AUC’s decision to conduct an RFP process and select ZACR, nor was there anything inappropriate about the African countries’ decision to endorse only ZACR’s application.

4. Subsequently, as they had every right to do, GAC representatives from Africa urged the GAC to issue advice to the ICANN Board that DCA’s application for .AFRICA not proceed (the “GAC Advice”). One or more countries from Africa—or, for that matter, from any continent—present at the relevant GAC meeting could have opposed the issuance of this GAC Advice, yet not a single country stated that it did not want the GAC to issue advice to the ICANN Board that DCA’s application should not proceed. As a result, under the GAC’s rules, the GAC Advice was “consensus” advice.

5. GAC consensus advice against an application for a new gTLD creates a “strong presumption” for ICANN’s Board that the application should not proceed. In accordance with the Guidebook’s procedures, the Board’s New gTLD Program Committee (the “NGPC”) considered the GAC Advice, considered DCA’s response to the GAC Advice, and properly decided to accept the GAC Advice that DCA’s application should not proceed. As ZACR’s application for .AFRICA subsequently passed all evaluation steps, ICANN and ZACR entered into a registry agreement for the operation of .AFRICA. Following this Panel’s emergency declaration, ICANN has thus far elected not to proceed with the delegation of the .AFRICA TLD into the Internet root zone.

6. DCA’s papers contain much mudslinging and many accusations, which frankly do not belong in these proceedings. According to DCA, the entire ICANN community conspired to prevent DCA from being the successful applicant for .AFRICA. However, the actions that DCA views as nefarious were, in fact, fully consistent with the Guidebook. They also were not actions taken by the Board or the NGPC that in any way violated ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles, the only issue that this IRP Panel is tasked with assessing.

87. ICANN submits that the Board properly advised the African Union’s member states of the Guidebook Rules regarding geographic strings, the NGPC did not violate the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation by accepting the GAC Advice, the AUC and the African GAC members properly supported the .AFRICA applicant chosen through the RFP
process, the GAC issued consensus advice opposing DCA’s application and the NGPC properly accepted the consensus GAC Advice.

88. According to ICANN:

13. DCA’s first purported basis for Independent Review is that ICANN improperly responded to a 21 October 2011 communiqué issued by African ministers in charge of Communication and Information Technologies for their respective countries (“Dakar Communiqué”). In the Dakar Communiqué, the ministers, acting pursuant to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, committed to continued and enhanced participation in ICANN and the GAC, and requested that ICANN’s Board take numerous steps aimed at increasing Africa’s representation in the ICANN community, including that ICANN “include [‘Africa’] and its representation in any other language on the Reserved Names List in order [for those strings] to enjoy [] special legislative protection, so [they could be] managed and operated by the structure that is selected and identified by the African Union.”

14. As DCA acknowledges, in response to the request in the Dakar Communiqué that .AFRICA (and related strings) be reserved for an operator of the African ministers’ own choosing, ICANN advised that .AFRICA and its related strings could not be placed on the Reserved Names List because ICANN was “not able to take actions that would go outside of the community-established and documented guidelines of the program.” Instead, ICANN explained that, pursuant to the Guidebook, “protections exist that would allow the African Union and its member states to play a prominent role in determining the outcome of any application for these top-level domain name strings.”

15. It was completely appropriate for ICANN to point the AU member states to the publicly-stated Guidebook protections for geographic names that were put in place to address precisely the circumstance at issue here—where an application for a string referencing a geographic designation did not appear to have the support of the countries represented by the string. DCA argues that ICANN was giving “instructions . . . as to how to bypass ICANN’s own rules,” but all ICANN was doing was responding to the Dakar Communiqué by explaining the publicly-available rules that ICANN already had in place. This conduct certainly did not violate ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles.

16. In particular, ICANN explained that, pursuant to the Guidebook, “Africa” constitutes a geographic name, and therefore any application for .AFRICA would need: (i) documented support from at least 60% of the national governments in the region; and (ii) no more than one written statement of objection . . . from “relevant governments in the region and/or from public authorities associated with the continent and region.” Next, ICANN explained that the Guidebook provides an opportunity for the GAC, whose members include the AU member states, to provide “Early Warnings” to ICANN regarding specific gTLD applications. Finally, ICANN explained that there are four formal objection processes that can be initiated by the public, including the Community Objection process, which may be filed where there is “substantial opposition to the gTLD application from a significant
portion of the community to which the gTLD string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted. Each of these explanations was factually accurate and based on publicly available information. Notably, ICANN did not mention the possibility of GAC consensus advice against a particular application (and, of course, such advice could not have occurred if even a single country had voiced its disagreement with that advice during the GAC meeting when DCA’s application was discussed).

17. DCA’s objection to ICANN’s response to the Dakar Communiqué reflects nothing more than DCA’s dissatisfaction with the fact that African countries, coordinating themselves through the AUC, opposed DCA’s application. However, the African countries had every right to voice that opposition, and ICANN’s Board acted properly in informing those countries of the avenues the Guidebook provided them to express that opposition.

18. In another attempt to imply that ICANN improperly coordinated with the AUC, DCA insinuates that the AUC joined the GAC at ICANN’s suggestion. ICANN’s response to the Dakar Communiqué does not even mention this possibility. Further, in response to DCA’s document requests, ICANN searched for communications between ICANN and the AUC relating to the AUC becoming a voting member of the GAC, and the search revealed no such communications. This is not surprising given that ICANN has no involvement in, much less control over, whether the GAC grants to any party voting membership status, including the AUC; that decision is within the sole discretion of the GAC. ICANN’s Bylaws provide that membership in the GAC shall be open to “multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, on the invitation of the [GAC] through its Chair.” In any event, whether the AUC was a voting member of the GAC is irrelevant to DCA’s claims. As is explained further below, the AUC alone would not have been able to orchestrate consensus GAC Advice opposing DCA’s application.

19. DCA’s next alleged basis for Independent Review is that ICANN’s NGPC improperly accepted advice from the GAC that DCA’s application should not proceed. However, nearly all of DCA’s Memorial relates to conduct of the AUC, the countries of the African continent, and the GAC. None of these concerns is properly the subject of an Independent Review proceeding because they do not implicate the conduct of the ICANN Board or the NGPC. The only actual decision that the NGPC made was to accept the GAC Advice that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed, and that decision was undoubtedly correct, as explained below.

20. Although the purpose of this proceeding is to test whether ICANN’s Board (or, in this instance, the NGPC) acted in conformance with its Bylaws and Articles, ICANN addresses the conduct of third parties in the next few sections because that additional context demonstrates that the NGPC’s decision to accept the GAC Advice—the only decision reviewable here—was appropriate in all aspects.

21. After DCA’s application was posted for public comment (as are all new gTLD applications), sixteen African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda—submitted GAC Early Warnings regarding DCA’s application.
Early Warnings are intended to “provid[e] [] applicant[s] with an indication that the[ir] application is seen as potentially sensitive or problematic by one or more governments.” These African countries used the Early Warnings to notify DCA that they had requested the AUC to conduct an RFP for .AFRICA, that ZACR had been selected via that RFP, and that they objected to DCA’s application for .AFRICA. They further notified DCA that they did not believe that DCA had the requisite support of 60% of the countries on the African continent.

22. DCA minimizes the import of these Early Warnings by arguing that they did not involve a “permissible reason” for objecting to DCA’s application. But DCA does not explain how any of these reasons was impermissible, and the Guidebook explicitly states that Early Warnings “may be issued for any reason.” DCA demonstrated the same dismissive attitude towards the legitimate concerns of the sixteen governments that issued Early Warnings by arguing to the ICANN Board and the GAC that the objecting governments had been “teleguided (or manipulated).”

23. In response to these Early Warnings, DCA conceded that it did not have the necessary level of support from African governments and asked the Board to “waive th[e] requirement [that applications for geographic names have the support of the relevant countries] because of the confusing role that was played by the African Union.” DCA did not explain how the AUC’s role was “confusing,” and DCA ignored the fact that, pursuant to the Guidebook, the AUC had every right to promote one applicant over another. The AUC’s decision to promote an applicant other than DCA did not convert the AUC’s role from proper to improper or from clear to confusing.

24. Notably, long before the AUC opposed DCA’s application, DCA itself recognized the AUC’s important role in coordinating continent-wide technology initiatives. In 2009, DCA approached the AUC for its endorsement prior to seeking the support of individual African governments. DCA obtained the AUC’s support at that time, including the AUC’s commitment to “assist[] in the coordination of [the] initiative with African Ministers and Governments.”

25. The AUC, however, then had a change of heart (which it was entitled to do, particularly given that the application window for gTLD applications had not yet opened and would not open for almost two more years). On 7 August 2010, African ministers in charge of Communication and Information Technologies for their respective countries signed the Abuja Declaration. In that declaration, the ministers requested that the AUC coordinate various projects aimed at promoting Information and Communication Technologies projects on the African continent. Among those projects was “set[ting] up the structure and modalities for the [i]mplementation of the DotAfrica Project.”

26. Pursuant to that mandate, the AUC launched an open RFP process, seeking applications from private organizations (including DCA) interested in operating the .AFRICA gTLD. The AUC notified DCA that “following consultations with relevant stakeholders . . . [it] no longer endorse[d] individual initiatives [for .AFRICA].” Instead, “in coordination with the Member States . . . the [AUC] w[ould] go through [an] open [selection]
—hardly an inappropriate decision (and not a decision of ICANN or its Board). DCA then refused to participate in the RFP process, thereby setting up an inevitable clash with whatever entity the AUC selected. When DCA submitted its gTLD application in 2012 and attached its 2009 endorsement letter from the AUC, DCA knew full well (but did not disclose) that the AUC had retracted its support.

27. In sum, the objecting governments’ concerns were the result of DCA’s own decision to boycott the AUC’s selection process, resulting in the selection of a different applicant, ZACR, for .AFRICA. Instead of addressing those governments’ concerns, and instead of obtaining the necessary support of 60% of the countries on the African continent, DCA asked ICANN to re-write the Guidebook in DCA’s favor by eliminating the most important feature of any gTLD application related to a geographic region—the support of the countries in that region. ICANN, in accordance with its Bylaws, Articles and Guidebook, properly ignored DCA’s request to change the rules for DCA’s benefit.

28. At its 10 April 2013 meeting in Beijing, the GAC advised ICANN that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed. As noted earlier, the GAC operates on the basis of consensus: if a single GAC member at the 10 April 2013 meeting (from any continent, not just from Africa) had opposed the advice, the advice would not have been considered “consensus.” As such, the fact that the GAC issued consensus GAC Advice against DCA’s application shows that not a single country opposed that advice. Most importantly, this included Kenya: Michael Katundu, the GAC Representative for Kenya, and Kenya’s only official GAC representative, was present at the 10 April 2013 Beijing meeting and did not oppose the issuance of the consensus GAC Advice.

29. DCA attempts to argue that the GAC Advice was not consensus advice and relies solely on the purported email objection of Sammy Buruchara, Kenya’s GAC advisor (as opposed to GAC representative). As a preliminary matter (and as DCA now appears to acknowledge), the GAC’s Operating Principles require that votes on GAC advice be made in person. Operating Principle 19 provides that:

If a Member’s accredited representative, or alternate representative, is not present at a meeting, then it shall be taken that the Member government or organisation is not represented at that meeting. Any decision made by the GAC without the participation of a Member’s accredited representative shall stand and nonetheless be valid.

Similarly, Operating Principle 40 provides:

One third of the representatives of the Current Membership with voting rights shall constitute a quorum at any meeting. A quorum shall only be necessary for any meeting at which a decision or decisions must be made. The GAC may conduct its general business face-to-face or online.

25. DCA argues that Mr. Buruchara objected to the GAC Advice via email, but even if objections could be made via email (which they cannot), Mr. Katundu, Kenya’s GAC representative who was in Beijing at the GAC
meeting, not Mr. Buruchara, Kenya’s GAC advisor, was authorized to speak on Kenya’s behalf. Accordingly, under the GAC rules, Mr. Buruchara’s email exchanges could not have constituted opposition to the GAC Advice.

26. Redacted - GAC Designated Confidential Information

And, tellingly, DCA did not to submit a declaration from Mr. Buruchara, which might have provided context or support for DCA’s argument.

27. Redacted - GAC Designated Confidential Information

28. Notably, immediately prior to becoming Kenya’s GAC advisor, Mr. Buruchara had served as the chairman of DCA’s Strategic Advisory Board. But despite Mr. Buruchara’s close ties with DCA and with Ms. Bekele, the Kenyan government had: (i) endorsed the Abuja Declaration; (ii) supported the AUC’s processes for selecting the proposed registry operator; and (iii) issued an Early Warning objecting to DCA’s application.

In other words, the Kenyan government was officially on record as supporting ZACR’s application and opposing DCA’s application, regardless of what Mr. Buruchara was writing in emails.

29. Furthermore, correspondence produced by DCA in this proceeding (but not referenced in either of DCA’s briefs) shows that, despite Ms. Bekele’s and Mr. Buruchara’s efforts to obtain the support (or at least non-opposition) of the Kenyan government, the Kenyan government had rescinded its earlier support of DCA in favor of ZACR. For example, in February 2013, Ms. Bekele emailed a Kenyan government official asking that Kenya issue an Early Warning regarding ZACR’s application. The official responded that he would have to escalate the matter to the Foreign Ministry because the Kenyan president “was part of the leaders of the AU who endorsed AU to be the custodian of dot Africa.” On 10 April 2013, Ms. Bekele emailed Mr. Buruchara, asking him to make further points objecting to the proposed GAC advice. Mr. Buruchara responded that he was unable to do so because the Kenyan government had been informed (erroneously informed, according to Mr. Buruchara), that Mr. Buruchara was “contradict[ing] the Heads of State agreement in Abuja.” On 8 July 2013,
Mr. Buruchara explained to Ms. Bekele that he “stuck [his] neck out for DCA inspite [sic] of lack of Govt support.”

30. Because DCA did not submit a declaration from Mr. Buruchara (and because Ms. Bekele’s declaration is, of course, limited to her own interpretation of email correspondence drafted by others), the Panel is left with a record demonstrating that: (i) Mr. Buruchara was not authorized by the Kenyan government to oppose the GAC Advice; and (iii) the actual GAC representative from Kenya (Mr. Katundu) attended the 10 April 2013 meeting in Beijing and did not oppose the issuance of the consensus GAC Advice that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed.

31. In short, DCA’s primary argument in support of this Independent Review proceeding—that the GAC should not have issued consensus advice against DCA’s application—is not supported by any evidence and is, instead, fully contradicted by the evidence. And, of course, Independent Review proceedings do not test whether the GAC’s conduct was appropriate (even though in this instance there is no doubt that the GAC appropriately issued consensus advice).

32. As noted above, pursuant to the Guidebook, GAC consensus advice that a particular application should not proceed creates a “strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved.” The ICANN Board would have been required to develop a reasoned and well-supported rationale for not accepting the consensus GAC Advice; no such reason existed at the time the NGPC resolved to accept that GAC Advice (5 June 2013), and no such reason has since been revealed. The consensus GAC Advice against DCA’s application was issued in the ordinary course, it reflected the sentiment of numerous countries on the African continent, and it was never rescinded.

33. DCA’s objection to the Board’s acceptance of the GAC Advice is twofold. First, DCA argues that the NGPC failed to investigate DCA’s allegation that the GAC advice was not consensus advice. Second, DCA argues that the NGPC should have consulted an independent expert prior to accepting the advice. DCA also argued in its IRP Notice that two NGPC members had conflicts of interest when they voted to accept the GAC Advice, but DCA does not pursue that argument in its Memorial (and the facts again demonstrate that DCA’s argument is incorrect).

34. As to the first argument, the Guidebook provides that, when the Board receives GAC advice regarding a particular application, it publishes that advice and notifies the applicant. The applicant is given 21 days from the date of the publication of the advice to submit a response to the Board. Those procedures were followed here. Upon receipt of the GAC Advice, ICANN posted the advice and provided DCA with an opportunity to respond. DCA submitted a lengthy response explaining “[w]hy DCA Trust disagree[d]” with the GAC Advice. A primary theme was that its application had been unfairly blocked by the very countries whose support the Guidebook required DCA to obtain, and that the AUC should not have been allowed to endorse an applicant for .AFRICA. DCA argued that it had been
unfairly “victimized” and “muzzled into insignificance” by the “collective power of the governments represented at ICANN,” and that “the issue of government support [should] be made irrelevant in the process so that both contending applications for .Africa would be allowed to move forward . . . .” In other words, DCA was arguing that the AUC’s input was inappropriate, and DCA was requesting that ICANN change the Guidebook requirement regarding governmental support for geographic names in order to accommodate DCA. ICANN’s NGPC reviewed and appropriately rejected DCA’s arguments.

35. One of DCA’s three “supplementary arguments,” beginning on page 10 of its response to the GAC Advice, was that there had been no consensus GAC advice, in part allegedly evidenced by Mr. Buruchara’s (incomplete) email addressed above. DCA, however, chose not to address the fact that: (i) DCA lacked the requisite support of the African governments; (ii) Mr. Buruchara was not the Kenyan GAC representative; (iii) Mr. Buruchara was not at the Beijing meeting; (iv) the government of Kenya had withdrawn any support it may have previously had for DCA’s application; and (iv) the actual Kenyan GAC representative (Mr. Katundu) was at the ICANN meeting in Beijing and did not oppose the issuance of the GAC Advice against DCA’s application for .AFRICA. All of these facts were well known to DCA at the time of its response to the GAC Advice.

36. The NGPC’s resolution accepting the GAC Advice states that the NGPC considered DCA’s response prior to accepting the GAC Advice, and DCA presents no evidence to the contrary. DCA’s disagreement with the NGPC’s decision does not, of course, demonstrate that the NGPC failed to exercise due diligence in determining to accept the consensus GAC Advice.

37. As to DCA’s suggestion that the NGPC should have consulted an independent expert, the Guidebook provides that it is within the Board’s discretion to decide whether to consult with an independent expert:

ICANN will consider the GAC Advice on New gTLDs as soon as practicable. The Board may consult with independent experts, such as those designated to hear objections in the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, in cases where the issues raised in the GAC advice are pertinent to one of the subject matter areas of the objection procedures.

The NGPC clearly did not violate its Bylaws, Articles or Guidebook in deciding that it did not need to consult any independent expert regarding the GAC Advice. Because DCA’s challenge to the GAC Advice was whether one or more countries actually had opposed the advice, there was no reason for the NGPC to retain an “expert” on that subject, and DCA has never stated what useful information an independent expert possibly could have provided.

89. ICANN also submits that the NGPC properly denied DCA’s request for reconsideration, ICANN’s actions following the acceptance of the GAC Advice are not relevant to the IRP, and in any event they were not improper, the ICANN staff directed the ICC to treat the two
African applications consistently, and ICANN staff did not violate any policy in drafting a template letter at the AUC request.

90. According to ICANN:

38. DCA argues that the NGPC improperly denied DCA’s Reconsideration Request, which sought reconsideration of the NGPC’s acceptance of the GAC Advice. Reconsideration is an accountability mechanism available under ICANN’s Bylaws and administered by ICANN’s Board Governance Committee (“BGC”). DCA’s Reconsideration Request asked that the NGPC’s acceptance of the GAC Advice be rescinded and that DCA’s application be reinstated. Pursuant to the Bylaws, reconsideration of a Board (or in this case NGPC) action is appropriate only where the NGPC took an action “without consideration of material information” or in “reliance on false or inaccurate material information.”

39. In its Reconsideration Request, DCA argued (as it does here) that the NGPC failed to consider material information by failing to consult with an independent expert prior to accepting the GAC Advice. The BGC noted that DCA had not identified any material information that the NGPC had not considered, and that DCA had not identified what advice an independent expert could have provided to the NGPC or how such advice might have altered the NGPC’s decision to accept the GAC Advice. The BGC further noted that, as discussed above, the Guidebook is clear that the decision to consult an independent expert is at the discretion of the NGPC.

40. DCA does not identify any Bylaws or Articles provision that the NGPC violated in denying the Reconsideration Request. Instead, DCA simply disagrees with the NGPC’s determination that DCA had not identified any material information on which the NGPC failed to rely. That disagreement is not a proper basis for a Reconsideration Request or an IRP. DCA also argues (again without citing to the Bylaws or Articles) that, because the NGPC accepted the GAC Advice, the NGPC could not properly consider DCA’s Reconsideration Request. In fact, the DCA’s Reconsideration Request was handled exactly in the manner prescribed by ICANN’s Bylaws: the BGC—a separate Board committee charged with considering Reconsideration Requests—reviewed the material and provided a recommendation to the NGPC. The NGPC then reviewed the BGC’s recommendation and voted to accept it. In short, the various Board committees conducted themselves exactly as ICANN’s Bylaws require.

41. The NGPC accepted the GAC Advice on 4 June 2013. As a result, DCA’s application for .AFRICA did not proceed. In its Memorial, DCA attempts to cast aspersions on ICANN’s evaluation of ZACR’s application, but that evaluation has no bearing on whether the NGPC acted consistently with its Bylaws and Articles in handling the GAC advice related to DCA’s application. Indeed, the evaluation of ZACR’s application did not involve any action by ICANN’s Board (or NGPC), and is therefore not a proper basis for Independent Review. Although the actions of ICANN’s staff are not relevant to this proceeding, ICANN addresses DCA’s allegations for the sake of thoroughness and because the record demonstrates that ZACR’s application was evaluated fully in conformance with the Guidebook requirements.
42. DCA alleges that “ICANN staff worked with [the ICC] to ensure that ZACR, but not DCA, would be able to pass the GNP evaluation.” DCA’s argument is based on false and unsupported characterizations of the ICC’s evaluation of the two .AFRICA applications.

43. First, DCA claims (without relevant citation) that ICANN determined that the AUC’s endorsement would count as an endorsement from each of the AU’s member states only after ICANN had stopped processing DCA’s application. In fact, the record indicates that ICANN accepted the ICC’s recommendation that the AUC’s endorsement would qualify as an endorsement from each of the AU’s member states while DCA’s application was still in contention, at a time when the recommendation had the potential to benefit both applicants for .AFRICA (had DCA also in fact received the AUC’s support).

44. The Guidebook provides that the Geographic Names Panel is responsible for “verifying the relevance and authenticity of supporting documentation.” Accordingly, it was the ICC’s responsibility to evaluate how the AUC’s endorsement should be treated. The ICC recommended that the AUC’s endorsement should count as an endorsement from each of the AU’s member states. The ICC’s analysis was based on the Abuja Declaration, which the ICC interpreted as “instruct[ing] the [AUC] to pursue the DotAfrica project, and in [the ICC’s] independent opinion, provide[d] suitable evidence of support from relevant governments or public authorities.” The evidence shows that ICANN accepted the ICC’s recommendation before the NGPC accepted the GAC Advice regarding DCA’s application— in a 26 April 2013 email discussing the preparation of clarifying questions regarding the AUC’s letters of support, ICANN explained to the ICC that “if the applicant(s) is/are unable to obtain a revised letter of support from the AU [ ], they may be able to fulfill the requirements by approaching the individual governments.”

45. DCA also claims that ICANN determined that endorsements from the UNECA would not be taken into account for geographic evaluations. This simply is not true. Pursuant to the ICC’s advice, the UNECA’s endorsement was taken into account. Like the AUC, the UNECA had signed letters of support for both DCA and ZACR. The ICC advised that because the UNECA was specifically named in the Abuja Declaration, it too should be treated as a relevant public authority. ICANN accepted the ICC’s advice.

46. DCA argues that, after ICANN had stopped processing DCA’s application, ICANN staff improperly assisted the AUC in drafting a support letter for ZACR. As is reflected in the clarifying questions the ICC drafted regarding the endorsement letters submitted on behalf of each of the two .AFRICA applications, the Guidebook contains specific requirements for letters of support from governments and public authorities. In addition to “clearly express[ing] the government’s or public authority’s support for or non- objection to the applicant’s application,” letters must “demonstrate the government’s or public authority’s understanding of the string being requested and its intended use” and that “the string is being sought through the gTLD application process and that the applicant is willing to accept the conditions under which the string will be available, i.e., entry into a registry agreement with ICANN . . . ”. In light of these specific requirements, the Guidebook even includes a sample letter of support.
47. The first letter of support that the AUC submitted for ZACR’s application did not follow the correct format and resulted in a clarifying question from the ICC. As a result, the AUC requested ICANN staff’s assistance in drafting a letter that conformed to the Guidebook’s requirements. ICANN staff drafted a template based on the sample letter of support in the Guidebook, and the AUC then made significant edits to that template. DCA paints this cooperation as nefarious, but there was absolutely nothing wrong with ICANN staff assisting the AUC, assistance that DCA would certainly have welcomed, and which ICANN would have provided, had the AUC been supporting DCA instead of ZACR.

91. Finally, ICANN submits:

50. ICANN’s conduct with respect to DCA’s application for .AFRICA was fully consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation and the Applicant Guidebook. ICANN acted through open and transparent processes, evaluated DCA’s application for .AFRICA in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Guidebook, and followed the procedures set forth in its Bylaws in evaluating DCA’s Request for Reconsideration. ICANN provided assistance to those who requested, cooperated with governmental authorities, and respected the consensus advice issued by the GAC, which speaks on behalf of the governments of the world.

51. DCA knew, as did all applicants for new gTLDs, that some of the applications would be rejected. There can only be one registry operator for each gTLD string, and in the case of strings that relate to geographic regions, no application can succeed without the significant support of the countries in that region. There is no justification whatsoever for DCA’s repeated urging that the support (or lack thereof) of the countries on the African continent be made irrelevant to the process.

52. Ultimately, the majority of the countries in Africa chose to support another application for the .AFRICA gTLD, and decided to oppose DCA’s application. At a critical time, no country stood up to defend DCA’s application. These countries—and the AUC—had every right to take a stand and to support the applicant of their choice. In this instance, that choice resulted in the GAC issuing consensus advice, which the GAC had every right to do. Nothing in ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles, or in the Guidebook, required ICANN to challenge that decision, to ignore that decision, or to change the rules so that the input of the AUC, much less the GAC, would become irrelevant. To the contrary, the AUC’s role with respect to the African community is critical, and it was DCA’s decision to pursue a path at odds with the AUC that placed its application in jeopardy, not anything that ICANN (or ICANN’s Board or the NGPC) did. The NGPC did exactly what it was supposed to do in this circumstance, and ICANN urges this IRP Panel to find as such. Such a finding would allow the countries of Africa to soon provide their citizens with what all parties involved believe to be a very important step for Africa – access to .AFRICA on the internet.
The Panel’s Decision

92. The Panel in this IRP, has been asked to determine whether, in the case of the application of DCA Trust for the delegation of the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains (“gTLD”) Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”), the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

93. After reviewing the documentation filed in this IRP, reading the Parties’ respective written submissions, reading the written statements and listening to the testimony of the three witnesses brought forward, listening to the oral presentations of the Parties’ legal representatives at the hearing in Washington, D.C., reading the transcript of the hearing, and deliberating, the Panel is of the unanimous view that certain actions and inactions of the ICANN Board (as described below) with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

94. ICANN is bound by its own Articles of Incorporation to act fairly, neutrally, non-discriminatorily and to enable competition. Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation sets this out explicitly:

4. The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations.

95. ICANN is also bound by its own Bylaws to act and make decisions “neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.”

96. These obligations and others are explicitly set out in a number of provisions in ICANN’s Bylaws:

ARTICLE I: MISSION AND CORE (Council of Registrars) VALUES

Section 2. CORE (Council of Registrars) VALUES

In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers):
1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

[...]

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers)'s effectiveness.

11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments’ or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

ARTICLE II: POWERS

Section 1. GENERAL POWERS

Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, the powers of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) shall be exercised by, and its property controlled and its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of, the Board.

Section 3. NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by
substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

ARTICLE III: TRANSPARENCY

Section 1. PURPOSE

ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. [Underlining and bold is that of the Panel]

97. As set out in Article IV (Accountability and Review) of ICANN’s Bylaws, in carrying out its mission as set out in its Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of the Bylaws.

98. As set out in Section 3 (Independent Review of Board Actions) of Article IV, “any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and casually connected to the Board’s alleged violation of the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board’s action.”

99. In this IRP, among the allegations advanced by DCA Trust against ICANN, is that the ICANN Board, and its constituent body, the GAC, breached their obligation to act transparently and in conformity with procedures that ensured fairness. In particular, DCA Trust criticizes the ICANN Board here, for allowing itself to be guided by the GAC, a body “with apparently no distinct rules, limited public records, fluid definitions of membership and quorums” and unfair procedures in dealing with the issues before it.

100. According to DCA Trust, ICANN itself asserts that the GAC is a “constituent body.” The exchange between the Panel and counsel for ICANN at the in-person hearing in Washington, D.C. is a living proof of that point.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Are you saying we should only look at what the Board does? The reason I’m asking is that your -- the Bylaws say that ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate, to the maximum extent feasible, in an open and transparent manner. Does the constituent bodies include, I don’t know,
GAC or anything? What is "constituent bodies"?

MR. LEVEE:

Yeah. What I'll talk to you about tomorrow in closing when I lay out what an IRP Panel is supposed to address, the Bylaws are very clear. Independent Review Proceedings are for the purpose of testing conduct or inaction of the ICANN Board. They don't apply to the GAC. They don't apply to supporting organizations. They don't apply to Staff.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

So you think that the situation is a -- we shouldn't be looking at what the constituent -- whatever the constituent bodies are, even though that's part of your Bylaws?

MR. LEVEE:

Well, when I say not -- when you say not looking, part of DCA's claims that the GAC did something wrong and that ICANN knew that.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

So is GAC a constituent body?

MR. LEVEE:

It is a constituent body, to be clear –

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Yeah.

MR. LEVEE:

-- whether -- I don't think an IRP Panel -- if the only thing that happened here was that the GAC did something wrong --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Right.

MR. LEVEE:

-- an IRP Panel would not be -- an Independent Review Proceeding is not supposed to address that, whether the GAC did something wrong.

Now, if ICANN knew -- the Board knew that the GAC did something wrong, and that's how they link it, they say, Look, the GAC did something wrong, and ICANN knew it, the Board -- if the Board actually knew it, then we're dealing with Board conduct.

The Board knew that the GAC did not, in fact, issue consensus advice. That's the allegation. So it's fair to look at the GAC's conduct.
101. The Panel is unanimously of the view that the GAC is a constituent body of ICANN. This is not only clear from the above exchange between the Panel and counsel for ICANN, but also from Article XI (Advisory Committees) of ICANN’s Bylaws and the Operating Principles of the GAC. Section 1 (General) of Article XI of ICANN’s Bylaws states:

The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board.

Section 2, under the heading, Specific Advisory Committees states:

There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:

1. Governmental Advisory Committee

a. The Governmental Advisory Committee should consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers)'s policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues. [Underlining is that of the Panel]

Section 6 of the preamble of GAC’s Operating Principles is also relevant. That Section reads as follows:

The GAC commits itself to implement efficient procedures in support of ICANN and to provide thorough and timely advice and analysis on relevant matters of concern with regard to government and public interests.

102. According to DCA Trust, based on the above, and in particular, Article III (Transparency), Section 1 of ICANN’s Bylaws, therefore, the GAC was bound to the transparency and fairness obligations of that provision to “operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness”, but as ICANN’s own witness, Ms. Heather Dryden acknowledged during the hearing, the GAC did not act with transparency or in a manner designed to insure fairness.

Mr. ALI:

Q. But what was the purpose of the discussion at the Prague meeting with respect to AUC? If there really is no difference or distinction between voting/nonvoting, observer or whatever might be the opposite of observer,
or the proper terminology, what was -- what was the point?

THE WITNESS:

A. I didn't say there was no difference. The issue is that there isn't GAC agreement about what are the -- the rights, if you will, of -- of entities like the AUC. And there might be in some limited circumstances, but it's also an extremely sensitive issue. And so not all countries have a shared view about what those -- those entities, like the AUC, should be able to do.

Q. So not all countries share the same view as to what entities, such as the AUC, should be able to do. Is that what you said? I'm sorry. I didn't --

A. Right, because that would only get clarified if there is a circumstance where that link is forced. In our business, we talk about creative ambiguity. We leave things unclear so we don't have conflict.

103. As explained by ICANN in its Closing Presentation at the hearing, ICANN's witness, Ms. Heather Dryden also asserted that the GAC Advice was meaningless until the Board acted upon it. This last point is also clear from examining Article I, Principle 2 and 5 of ICANN GAC's Operating Principles. Principle 2 states that “the GAC is not a decision making body” and Principle 5 states that “the GAC shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN”.

MR. ALI:

Q. I would like to know what it is that you, as the GAC Chair, understand to be the consequences of the actions that the GAC will take --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

The GAC will take?

MR. ALI:

Q. -- the GAC will take -- the consequences of the actions taken by the GAC, such as consensus advice?

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

There you go.

THE WITNESS:

That isn't my concern as the Chair. It's really for the Board to interpret the outputs coming from the GAC.

104. Ms. Dryden also stated that the GAC made its decision without providing any rationale and primarily based on politics and not on potential violations of national laws and sensitivities.
ARBITRATOR KESEDJIAN:

So, basically, you're telling us that the GAC takes a decision to object to an applicant, and no reasons, no rationale, no discussion of the concepts that are in the rules?

THE WITNESS:

I'm telling you the GAC did not provide a rationale. And that was not a requirement for issuing a GAC --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

But you also want to check to see if the countries are following the right -- following the rules, if there are reasons for rejecting this or it falls within the three things that my colleague's talking about.

THE WITNESS:

The practice among governments is that governments can express their view, whatever it may be. And so there's a deference to that.

That's certainly the case here as well.

105. ICANN was bound by its Bylaws to conduct adequate diligence to ensure that it was applying its procedures fairly. Section 1 of Article III of ICANN's Bylaws, require it and its constituent bodies to “operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. The Board must also as per Article IV, Section 3, Paragraph 4 exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it.

106. In this case, on 4 June 2013, the NGPC accepted the GAC Objection Advice to stop processing DCA Trust’s application. On 1 August 2013, the BGC recommended to the NGPC that it deny DCA Trust’s Request for Reconsideration of the NGPC’s 4 June 2013 decision, and on 13 August 2013, the NGPC accepted the BGC’s recommendation (i.e., the NGPC declined to reconsider its own decision) without any further consideration.

107. In this case, ICANN through the BGC was bound to conduct a meaningful review of the NGPC’s decision. According to ICANN’s Bylaws, Article IV, Section 2, the Board has designated the Board Governance Committee to review and consider any such Reconsideration Requests. The [BGC] shall have the authority to, among other things, conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate, and request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from others.
108. Finally, the NGPC was not bound by – nor was it required to give deference to – the decision of the BGC.

109. The above, combined with the fact that DCA Trust was never given any notice or an opportunity in Beijing or elsewhere to make its position known or defend its own interests before the GAC reached consensus on the GAC Objection Advice, and that the Board of ICANN did not take any steps to address this issue, leads this Panel to conclude that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were not procedures designed to insure the fairness required by Article III, Sec. 1 above, and are therefore inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

110. The following excerpt of exchanges between the Panel and one of ICANN’s witnesses, Ms. Heather Dryden, the then Chair of the GAC, provides a useful background for the decisions reached in this IRP:

PRESIDENT BARIN:

But be specific in this case. Is that what happened in the .AFRICA case?

THE WITNESS:

The decision was very quick, and --

PRESIDENT BARIN:

But what about the consultations prior? In other words, were -- were you privy to --

THE WITNESS:

No. If -- if colleagues are talking among themselves, then that's not something that the GAC, as a whole, is -- is tracking or -- or involved in. It's really those interested countries that are.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Understood. But I assume -- I also heard you say, as the Chair, you never want to be surprised with something that comes up. So you are aware of -- or you were aware of exactly what was happening?

THE WITNESS:

No. No. You do want to have a good sense of where the problems are, what's going to come unresolved back to the full GAC meeting, but that's -- that's the extent of it.
And that's the nature of -- of the political process.

Redacted - GAC Designated Confidential Information

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

-- that question was addressed via having that meeting.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And what's your understanding of what -- what the consequence of that decision is or was when you took it? So what happens from that moment on?

THE WITNESS:

It's conveyed to the Board, so all the results, the agreed language coming out of GAC is conveyed to the Board, as was the case with the communiqué from the Beijing meeting.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And how is that conveyed to the Board?

THE WITNESS:

Well, it's a written document, and usually Support Staff are forwarding it to Board Staff.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

Could you speak a little bit louder? I don't know whether I am tired, but I --

THE WITNESS:
Okay. So as I was saying, the document is conveyed to the Board once it's concluded.

PRESIDENT BARIN:
When you say "the document", are you referring to the communiqué?

THE WITNESS:
Yes.

PRESIDENT BARIN:
Okay. And there are no other documents?

THE WITNESS:
The communiqué --

PRESIDENT BARIN:
In relation to .AFRICA. I'm not interested in any other.

THE WITNESS:
Yes, it's the communiqué.

PRESIDENT BARIN:
And it's prepared by your staff? You look at it?

THE WITNESS:
Right --

PRESIDENT BARIN:
And then it's sent over to --

THE WITNESS:
-- right, it's agreed by the GAC in full, the contents.

PRESIDENT BARIN:
And then sent over to the Board?

THE WITNESS:
And then sent, yes.

PRESIDENT BARIN:
And what happens to that communiqué? Does the Board receive that and say, Ms. Dryden, we have some questions for you on this, or --

THE WITNESS:

Not really. If they have questions for clarification, they can certainly ask that in a meeting. But it is for them to receive that and then interpret it and -- and prepare the Board for discussion or decision.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Okay. And in this case, you weren't asked any questions or anything?

THE WITNESS:

I don't believe so. I don't recall.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Any follow-ups, right?

THE WITNESS:

Right.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And in the subsequent meeting, I guess the issue was tabled. The Board meeting that it was tabled, were you there?

THE WITNESS:

Yes. I don't particularly recall the meeting, but yes.

[...]

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

Can I turn your attention to Paragraph 5 of your declaration?

Here, you basically repeat what is in the ICANN Guidebook literature, whatever. These are the exact words, actually, that you use in your declaration in terms of why there could be an objection to an applicant -- to a specific applicant. And you use three criteria: problematic, potentially violating national law, and raise sensitivities.

Now, I'd like you to, for us -- for our benefit, to explain precisely, as concrete as you can be, what those three concepts -- how those three concepts translate in the DCA case. Because this must have been discussed in order to get this very quick decision that you are mentioning. So I'd like to understand, you know, because these are the criteria -- these are the three criteria; is that correct?
THE WITNESS:

That is what the witness statement says, but the link to the GAC and the role that I played in terms of the GAC discussion did not involve me interpreting those three things. In fact, the GAC did not provide rationale for the consensus objection.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

No.

But, I mean, look, the GAC is taking a decision which -- very quickly -- I'm using your words, "very quickly" -- erases years and years and years of work, a lot of effort that have been put by a single applicant. And the way I understand the rules is that the -- the GAC advice -- consensus advice against that applicant are -- is based on those three criteria. Am I wrong in that analysis?

THE WITNESS:

I'm saying that the GAC did not identify a rationale for those governments that put forward a string or an application for consensus objection. They might have identified their reasons, but there was not GAC agreement about those reasons or -- or -- or -- or rationale for that. We had some discussion earlier about Early Warnings. So Early Warnings were issued by individual countries, and they indicated their rationale. But, again, that's not a GAC view.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

So, basically, you're telling us that the GAC takes a decision to object to an applicant, and no reasons, no rationale, no discussion of the concepts that are in the rules?

THE WITNESS:

I'm telling you the GAC did not provide a rationale. And that was not a requirement for issuing a GAC --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

But you also want to check to see if the countries are following the right -- following the rules, if there are reasons for rejecting this or it falls within the three things that my colleague's talking about.

THE WITNESS:

The practice among governments is that governments can express their view, whatever it may be. And so there's [...] deference to that. That's certainly the case here as well. The -- if a country tells -- tells the GAC or says it has a concern, that's not really something that -- that's evaluated, in the sense you mean, by the other governments. That's not the way governments work with each other.
HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

So you don't go into the reasons at all with them?

THE WITNESS:

To issue a consensus objection, no.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Okay. ---

[...] 

PRESIDENT BARIN:

I have one question for you. We spent, now, a bit of time or a considerable amount of time talking to you about the process, or the procedure leading to the consensus decision.

Can you tell me what your understanding is of why the GAC consensus objection was made finally?

[...] 

But in terms of the .AFRICA, the decision -- the issue came up, the agenda -- the issue came up, and you made a decision, correct?

THE WITNESS:

The GAC made a decision.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Right. When I say "you", I mean the GAC.

Do you know -- are you able to express to us what your understanding of the substance behind that decision was? I mean, in other words, we've spent a bit of time dealing with the process.

Can you tell us why the decision happened?

THE WITNESS:

The sum of the GAC’s advice is reflected in its written advice in the communiqué. That is the view to GAC. That's -- that's --

[...] 

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

I just want to come back to the point that I was making earlier. To your Paragraph 5, you said -- you answered to me saying that is my declaration, but it was not exactly what's going on. Now, we are here to --
at least the way I understand the Panel's mandate, to make sure that the rules have been obeyed by, basically. I'm synthesizing. So I don't understand how, as the Chair of the GAC, you can tell us that, basically, the rules do not matter -- again, I'm rephrasing what you said, but I'd like to give you another opportunity to explain to us why you are mentioning those criteria in your written declaration, but, now, you're telling us this doesn't matter.

If you want to read again what you wrote, or supposedly wrote, it's Paragraph 5.

THE WITNESS:

I don't need to read again my declaration. Thank you. The header for the GAC's discussions throughout was to refer to strings or applications that were controversial or sensitive. That's very broad. And –

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

I'm sorry. You say the rules say problematic, potentially violate national law, raise sensitivities. These are precise concepts.

THE WITNESS:

Problematic, violate national law -- there are a lot of laws -- and sensitivities does strike me as being quite broad.

[...]

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

Okay. So we are left with what? No rules?

THE WITNESS:

No rationale with the consensus objections.

That's the -- the effect.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

I'm done.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

I'm done.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

So am I.
111. The Panel understands that the GAC provides advice to the ICANN Board on matters of public policy, especially in cases where ICANN activities and policies may interact with national laws or international agreements. The Panel also understands that GAC advice is developed through consensus among member nations. Finally, the Panel understands that although the ICANN Board is required to consider GAC advice and recommendations, it is not obligated to follow those recommendations.

112. Paragraph IV of ICANN’s Beijing, People’s Republic of China 11 April 2013 Communiqué [Exhibit C-43] under the heading “GAC Advice to the ICANN Board” states:

IV. GAC Advice to the ICANN Board
   1. New gTLDs
      a. GAC Objections to the Specific Applications
         i. The GAC Advises the ICANN Board that:

            i. The GAC has reached consensus on GAC Objection Advice according to Module 3.1 part I of the Applicant Guidebook on the following applications:

               1. The application for .africa (Application number 1-1165-42560)

         [...]  

Footnote 3 to Paragraph IV.1. (a)(i)(i) above in the original text adds, “Module 3.1: The GAC advises ICANN that it is the consensus of the GAC that a particular application should not proceed. This will create a strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved.” A similar statement in this regard can be found in paragraph 5 of Ms. Dryden’s 7 February 2014 witness statement.

113. In light of the clear “Transparency” obligation provisions found in ICANN’s Bylaws, the Panel would have expected the ICANN Board to, at a minimum, investigate the matter further before rejecting DCA Trust’s application.

114. The Panel would have had a similar expectation with respect to the NGPC Response to the GAC Advice regarding .AFRICA which was expressed in ANNEX 1 to NGPC Resolution No. 2013.06.04.NG01 [Exhibit C-45]. In that document, in response to DCA Trust’s application, the NGPC stipulated:
The NGPC accepts this advice. The AGB provides that “if GAC advised ICANN that it is the consensus of the GAC that a particular application should not proceed. This will create a strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved. The NGPC directs staff that pursuant to the GAC advice and Section 3.1 of the Applicant Guidebook, Application number 1-1165-42560 for .africa will not be approved. In accordance with the AGB the applicant may withdraw [...] or seek relief according to ICANN’s accountability mechanisms (see ICANN’s Bylaws, Articles IV and V) subject to the appropriate standing and procedural requirements.

115. Based on the foregoing, after having carefully reviewed the Parties' written submissions, listened to the testimony of the three witness, listened to the oral submissions of the Parties in various telephone conference calls and at the in-person hearing of this IRP in Washington, D.C. on 22 and 23 May 2015, and finally after much deliberation, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (c) of ICANN’s Bylaws, the Panel declares that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

116. As indicated above, there are perhaps a number of other instances, including certain decisions made by ICANN, that did not proceed in the manner and spirit in which they should have under the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

117. DCA Trust has criticized ICANN for its various actions and decisions throughout this IRP and ICANN has responded to each of these criticisms in detail. However, the Panel, having carefully considered these criticisms and decided that the above is dispositive of this IRP, it does not find it necessary to determine who was right, to what extent and for what reasons in respect to the other criticisms and other alleged shortcomings of the ICANN Board identified by DCA Trust.

2) Can the IRP Panel recommend a course of action for the Board to follow as a consequence of any declaration that the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

118. In the conclusion of its Memorial on the Merits filed with the Panel on 3 November 2014, DCA Trust submitted that ICANN should remove ZACR’s application from the process altogether and allow DCA’s application to proceed under the rules of the New gTLD Program, allowing DCA up to 18 months to negotiate with African governments.
to obtain the necessary endorsements so as to enable the delegation and management of the .AFRICA string.

119. In its Final Request for Relief filed with the Panel on 23 May 2015, DCA Trust requested that this Panel recommend to the ICANN Board that it cease all preparations to delegate the .AFRICA gTLD to ZACR and recommend that ICANN permit DCA’s application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process and be granted a period of no less than 18 months to obtain Government support as set out in the AGB and interpreted by the Geographic Names Panel, or accept that the requirement is satisfied as a result of the endorsement of DCA Trust’s application by UNECA.

120. DCA Trust also requested that this Panel recommend to ICANN that it compensate DCA Trust for the costs it has incurred as a result of ICANN’s violations of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and AGB.

121. In its response to DCA Trust’s request for the recommendations set out in DCA Trust’s Memorial on the Merits, ICANN submitted that this Panel does not have the authority to grant the affirmative relief that DCA Trust had requested.

122. According to ICANN:

48. DCA’s request should be denied in its entirety, including its request for relief. DCA requests that this IRP Panel issue a declaration requiring ICANN to “rescind its contract with ZACR” and to “permit DCA’s application to proceed through the remainder of the application process.” Acknowledging that it currently lacks the requisite governmental support for its application, DCA also requests that it receive “18 months to negotiate with African governments to obtain the necessary endorsements.” In sum, DCA requests not only that this Panel remove DCA’s rival for .AFRICA from contention (requiring ICANN to repudiate its contract with ZACR), but also that it rewrite the Guidebook’s rules in DCA’s favor.

49. IRP Panels do not have authority to award affirmative relief. Rather, an IRP Panel is limited to stating its opinion as to “whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws” and recommending (as this IRP Panel has done previously) that the Board stay any action or decision, or take any interim action until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP Panel. The Board will, of course, give extremely serious consideration to the Panel’s recommendations.

123. In its response to DCA Trust’s amended request for recommendations filed on 23 May 2015, ICANN argued that because the Panel’s authority is limited to declaring whether the Board’s conduct was inconsistent with the Articles or the Bylaws, the Panel should limit its declaration to that question and refrain from
recommending how the Board should then proceed in light of the Panel’s declaration.

124. In response, DCA Trust submitted that according to ICANN’s Bylaws, the Independent Review Process is designed to provide a remedy for “any” person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board. Further, “in order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board’s alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation.

125. According to ICANN, “indeed, the ICANN New gTLD Program Committee, operating under the delegated authority of the ICANN Board, itself [suggests] that DCA could seek relief through ICANN’s accountability mechanisms or, in other words, the Reconsideration process and the Independent Review Process.” Furthermore:

If the IRP mechanism – the mechanism of last resort for gTLD applicants – is intended to provide a remedy for a claimant materially injured or harmed by Board action or inaction, and it serves as the only alternative to litigation, then naturally the IRP Panel may recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress such injury or harm.

126. After considering the Parties’ respective submissions in this regard, the Panel is of the view that it does have the power to recommend a course of action for the Board to follow as a consequence of any declaration that the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook.

127. Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN’s Bylaws states:

**ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW**

Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS

11. The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:

   d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.

128. The Panel finds that both the language and spirit of the above section gives it authority to recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress injury or harm that is directly related and causally connected to the Board’s violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation.

129. As DCA Trust correctly points out, with which statement the Panel agrees, “if the IRP mechanism – the mechanism of last resort for
gTLD applicants – is intended to provide a remedy for a claimant materially injured or harmed by Board action or inaction, and it serves as the only alternative to litigation, then naturally the IRP Panel may recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress such injury or harm.”

130. Use of the imperative language in Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN’s Bylaws, is clearly supportive of this point. That provision clearly states that the IRP Panel has the authority to recommend a course of action until such time as the Board considers the opinion of the IRP and acts upon it.

131. Furthermore, use of the word “opinion”, which means the formal statement by a judicial authority, court, arbitrator or “Panel” of the reasoning and the principles of law used in reaching a decision of a case, is demonstrative of the point that the Panel has the authority to recommend affirmative relief. Otherwise, like in section 7 of the Supplementary Procedures, the last sentence in paragraph 11 would have simply referred to the “declaration of the IRP”. Section 7 under the heading “Interim Measures of Protection” says in part, that an “IRP PANEL may recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the IRP declaration.”

132. The scope of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN’s Bylaws is clearly broader than Section 7 of the Supplementary Procedures.

133. Pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN’s Bylaws, therefore, the Panel recommends that ICANN continue to refrain from delegating the .AFRICA gTLD and permit DCA Trust’s application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

3) Who is the prevailing party in this IRP?

134. In its letter of 1 July 2015, ICANN submits that, “ICANN believes that the Panel should and will determine that ICANN is the prevailing party. Even so, ICANN does not seek in this instance the putative effect that would result if DCA were required to reimburse ICANN for all of the costs that ICANN incurred. This IRP was much longer [than] anticipated (in part due to the passing of one of the panelists last summer), and the Panelists’ fees were far greater than an ordinary IRP, particularly because the Panel elected to conduct a live hearing.”
135. DCA Trust on the other hand, submits that, “should it prevail in this IRP, ICANN should be responsible for all of the costs of this IRP, including the interim measures proceeding.” In particular, DCA Trust writes:

On March 23, 2014, DCA learned via email from a supporter of ZA Central Registry (“ZACR”), DCA’s competitor for .AFRICA, that ZACR would sign a registry agreement with ICANN in three days’ time (March 26) to be the registry operator for .AFRICA. The very same day, we sent a letter on behalf of DCA to ICANN’s counsel asking ICANN to refrain from executing the registry agreement with ZACR in light of the pending IRP proceedings. See DCA’s Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, Annex I (28 Mar. 2014). Instead, ICANN entered into the registry agreement with ZACR the very next day—two days ahead of schedule. […] Later that same day, ICANN responded to DCA’s request by treating the execution of the contract as a fait accompli and, for the first time, informed DCA that it would accept the application of Rule 37 of the 2010 [ICDR Rules], which provides for emergency measures of protection, even though ICANN’s Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process expressly provide that Rule 37 does not apply to IRPs. A few days later, on March 28, 2014, DCA filed a Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection with the ICDR. ICANN responded to DCA’s request on April 4, 2014. An emergency arbitrator was appointed by the ICDR; however, the following week, the original panel was fully constituted and the parties’ respective submissions were submitted to the Panel for its review on April 13, 2014. After a teleconference with the parties on April 22 and a telephonic hearing on May 5, the Panel ruled that “ICANN must immediately refrain from any further processing of any application for .AFRICA” during the pendency of the IRP. Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, ¶ 51 (12 May 2014).

136. A review of the various procedural orders, decisions, and declarations in this IRP clearly indicates that DCA Trust prevailed in many of the questions and issues raised.

137. In its letter of 1 July 2015, DCA Trust refers to several instances in which ICANN was not successful in its position before this Panel. According to DCA Trust, the following are some examples, “ICANN’s Request for Partial Reconsideration, ICANN’s request for the Panel to rehear the proceedings, and the evidentiary treatment of ICANN’s written witness testimony in the event it refused to make its witnesses available for questioning during the merits hearing.”

138. The Panel has no doubt, as ICANN writes in its letter of 1 July 2015, that the Parties’ respective positions in this IRP “were asserted in good faith.” According to ICANN, “although those positions were in many instances diametrically opposed, ICANN does not doubt that DCA believed in the credibility of the positions that it took, and
[ICANN believes] that DCA feels the same about the positions ICANN took.”

139. The above said, after reading the Parties’ written submissions concerning the issue of costs and deliberation, the Panel is unanimously of the view that DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP.

4) Who is responsible for bearing the costs of this IRP and the cost of the IRP Provider?

140. DCA Trust submits that ICANN should be responsible for all costs of this IRP, including the interim measures proceeding. Among other arguments, DCA Trust submits:

This is consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures, which together provide that in ordinary circumstances, the party not prevailing shall be responsible for all costs of the proceeding. Although ICANN’s Supplementary Procedures do not explain what is meant by “all costs of the proceeding,” the ICDR Rules that apply to this IRP provide that “costs” include the following:

(a) the fees and expenses of the arbitrators;

(b) the costs of assistance required by the tribunal, including its experts;

(c) the fees and expenses of the administrator;

(d) the reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party; and

(e) any such costs incurred in connection with an application for interim or emergency relief pursuant to Article 21.

Specifically, these costs include all of the fees and expenses paid and owed to the [ICDR], including the filing fees DCA paid to the ICDR (totaling $4,750), all panelist fees and expenses, including for the emergency arbitrator, incurred between the inception of this IRP and its final resolution, legal costs incurred in the course of the IRP, and all expenses related to conducting the merits hearing (e.g., renting the audiovisual equipment for the hearing, printing hearing materials, shipping hard copies of the exhibits to the members of the Panel).

Although in “extraordinary” circumstances, the Panel may allocate up to half of the costs to the prevailing party, DCA submits that the circumstances of this IRP do not warrant allocating costs to DCA should it prevail. The reasonableness of DCA’s positions, as well as the meaningful contribution this IRP has made to the public dialogue about both ICANN’s accountability mechanisms and the appropriate deference owed by ICANN to its Governmental Advisory Committee, support a full award of costs to
To the best of DCA’s knowledge, this IRP was the first to be commenced against ICANN under the new rules, and as a result there was little guidance as to how these proceedings should be conducted. Indeed, at the very outset there was controversy about the applicable version of the Supplemental Rules as well as the form to be filed to initiate a proceeding. From the very outset, ICANN adopted positions on a variety of procedural issues that have increased the costs of these proceedings. In DCA’s respectful submission, ICANN’s positions throughout these proceedings are inconsistent with ICANN’s obligations of transparency and the overall objectives of the IRP process, which is the only independent accountability mechanism available to parties such as DCA.

141. DCA Trust also submits that ICANN’s conduct in this IRP increased the duration and expense of this IRP. For example, ICANN failed to appoint a standing panel, it entered into a registry agreement with DCA’s competitor for .AFRICA during the pendency of this IRP, thereby forcing DCA Trust to request for interim measures of protection in order to preserve its right to a meaningful remedy, ICANN attempted to appeal declarations of the Panel on procedural matters where no appeal mechanism was provided for under the applicable procedures and rules, and finally, ICANN refused only a couple of months prior to the merits hearing, to make its witnesses available for viva voce questioning at the hearing.

142. ICANN in response submits that, “both the Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures provide that, in the ordinary course, costs shall be allocated to the prevailing party. These costs include the Panel’s fees and the ICDR’s fees, [they] would also include the costs of the transcript.”

143. ICANN explains on the other hand that this case was extraordinary and this Panel should exercise its discretion to have each side bear its own costs as this IRP “was in many senses a first of its kind.” According to ICANN, among other things:

This IRP was the first associated with the Board’s acceptance of GAC advice that resulted in the blocking of an application for a new gTLD under the new gTLD Program;

This was the first IRP associated with a claim that one or more ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest with a Board vote; and

This was the first (and still only) IRP related to the New gTLD Program that involved a live hearing, with a considerable amount of debate associated with whether to have a hearing.
144. After reading the Parties’ written submissions concerning the issue of costs and their allocation, and deliberation, the Panel is unanimous in deciding that DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP and ICANN shall bear, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, Article 11 of Supplementary Procedures and Article 31 of the ICDR Rules, the totality of the costs of this IRP and the totality of the costs of the IRP Provider.

145. As per the last sentence of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, however, DCA Trust and ICANN shall each bear their own expenses, and they shall also each bear their own legal representation fees.

146. For the avoidance of any doubt therefore, the Panel concludes that ICANN shall be responsible for paying the following costs and expenses:

   a) the fees and expenses of the panelists;
   b) the fees and expenses of the administrator, the ICDR;
   c) the fees and expenses of the emergency panelist incurred in connection with the application for interim emergency relief sought pursuant to the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules; and
   d) the fees and expenses of the reporter associated with the hearing on 22 and 23 May 2015 in Washington, D.C.

147. The above amounts are easily quantifiable and the Parties are invited to cooperate with one another and the ICDR to deal with this part of this Final Declaration.

V. Declaration of the Panel

148. Based on the foregoing, after having carefully reviewed the Parties’ written submissions, listened to the testimony of the three witness, listened to the oral submissions of the Parties in various telephone conference calls and at the in-person hearing of this IRP in Washington, D.C. on 22 and 23 May 2015, and finally after much deliberation, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (c) of ICANN’s Bylaws, the Panel declares that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

149. Furthermore, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN’s Bylaws, the Panel recommends that ICANN continue to
refrain from delegating the .AFRICA gTLD and permit DCA Trust’s application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

150. The Panel declares DCA Trust to be the prevailing party in this IRP and further declares that ICANN is to bear, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, Article 11 of Supplementary Procedures and Article 31 of the ICDR Rules, the totality of the costs of this IRP and the totality of the costs of the IRP Provider as follows:

a) the fees and expenses of the panelists;
b) the fees and expenses of the administrator, the ICDR;
c) the fees and expenses of the emergency panelist incurred in connection with the application for interim emergency relief sought pursuant to the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules; and
d) the fees and expenses of the reporter associated with the hearing on 22 and 23 May 2015 in Washington, D.C.
e) As a result of the above, the administrative fees of the ICDR totaling US$4,600 and the Panelists’ compensation and expenses totaling US$403,467.08 shall be born entirely by ICANN, therefore, ICANN shall reimburse DCA Trust the sum of US$198,046.04

151. As per the last sentence of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, DCA Trust and ICANN shall each bear their own expenses. The Parties shall also each bear their own legal representation fees.
The Panel finally would like to take this opportunity to fondly remember its collaboration with the Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret. and now Deceased) and to congratulate both Parties' legal teams for their hard work, civility and responsiveness during the entire proceedings. The Panel was extremely impressed with the quality of the written work presented to it and oral advocacy skills of the Parties' legal representatives.

This Final Declaration has sixty-three (63) pages.

Date: Thursday, 9 July 2015.

Place of the IRP, Los Angeles, California.

Professor Catherine Kessedjian

Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.)

Babak Barn, President
APPENDIX K
IN THE MATTER OF AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Between: )

Vistaprint Limited )

Claimant )
v. )

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR )
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS )

Respondent )

___________________________________ )

ICDR Case No. 01-14-0000-6505

FINAL DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL

IRP Panel:

Geert Glas
Siegfried H. Elsing
Christopher S. Gibson (Chair)
I. Introduction

1. This Final Declaration ("Declaration") is issued in this Independent Review Process ("IRP") pursuant to Article IV, § 3 of the Bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("Bylaws"; "ICANN"). In accordance with the Bylaws, the conduct of this IPR is governed by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution’s ("ICDR") International Dispute Resolution Procedures, amended and effective June 1, 2014 ("ICDR Rules"), as supplemented by the Supplementary Procedures for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Independent Review Process, dated December 21, 2011 ("Supplementary Procedures").

2. Claimant, Vistaprint Limited ("Vistaprint"), is a limited company established under the laws of Bermuda. Vistaprint describes itself as “an Intellectual Property holding company of the publicly traded company, Vistaprint NV, a large online supplier of printed and promotional material as well as marketing services to micro businesses and consumers. It offers business and consumer marketing and identity products and services worldwide.”

3. Respondent, ICANN, is a California not-for-profit public benefit corporation. As stated in its Bylaws, ICANN’s mission “is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s system of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.” In its online Glossary, ICANN describes itself as “an internationally organized, non-profit corporation that has responsibility for Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation, protocol identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root server system management functions.”

4. As part of this mission, ICANN’s responsibilities include introducing new top-level domains ("TLDs") to promote consumer choice and competition, while maintaining the stability and security of the domain name system ("DNS"). ICANN has gradually expanded the DNS from the original six generic top-level domains ("gTLDs") to include 22 gTLDs and over 250 country-code TLDs. However, in June 2008, in a significant step ICANN’s Board of Directors ("Board") adopted recommendations developed by one of its policy development bodies, the Generic Names Supporting Organization ("GNSO"), for

---

5 The original six gTLDs consisted of .com; .edu; .gov; .mil; .net; and .org.
6 Request, ¶ 14.
introducing additional new gTLDs. Following further work, ICANN’s Board in June 2011 approved the “New gTLD Program” and a corresponding set of guidelines for implementing the Program – the gTLD Applicant Guidebook (“Guidebook”). ICANN states that “[t]he New gTLD Program constitutes by far ICANN’s most ambitious expansion of the Internet’s naming system.” The Guidebook is a foundational document providing the terms and conditions for new gTLD applicants, as well as step-by-step instructions and setting out the basis for ICANN’s evaluation of these gTLD applications. As described below, it also provides dispute resolution processes for objections relating to new gTLD applications, including the String Confusion Objection procedure (“String Confusion Objection” or “SCO”). The window for submitting new gTLD applications opened on January 12, 2012 and closed on May 30, 2012, with ICANN receiving 1930 new gTLD applications. The final version of the Guidebook was made available on June 4, 2012.

5. This dispute concerns alleged conduct by ICANN’s Board in relation to Vistaprint’s two applications for a new gTLD string, “.WEBS”, which were submitted to ICANN under the New gTLD Program. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board, through its acts or omissions in relation to Vistaprint’s applications, acted in a manner inconsistent with applicable policies, procedures and rules as set out in ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation (“Articles”) and Bylaws, both of which should be interpreted in light of the Affirmation of Commitments between ICANN and the United States Department of Commerce (“Affirmation of Commitments”). Vistaprint also states that because ICANN’s Bylaws require ICANN to apply established policies neutrally and fairly, the Panel must consider other ICANN policies relevant to the dispute, in particular, the policies in Module 3 of the Guidebook regarding ICANN’s SCO procedures, which Vistaprint claims were violated.

6. Vistaprint requests that the IRP Panel provide the following relief:

- Find that ICANN breached its Articles, Bylaws, and the Guidebook;
- Require that ICANN reject the determination of the Third Expert in the String

---

9 Response, ¶ 16.
10 Response, ¶ 16.
11 The Guidebook is organized into Modules. Module 3 (Objection Procedures) is of primary relevance to this IRP case.
13 gTLD Applicant Guidebook, Version 2012-06-04.
14 Affirmation of Commitments.
15 Request, ¶ 58; Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 34.
Confusion Objection proceedings involving Vistaprint (“Vistaprint SCO”)\(^{16}\), which found that the two proposed gTLD strings – .WEBS and .WEB – are confusingly similar, disregard the resulting “Contention Set”, and allow Vistaprint’s applications for .WEBS to proceed on their own merits;

- In the alternative, require that ICANN reject the Vistaprint SCO determination and organize a new independent and impartial SCO procedure, according to which a three-member panel re-evaluates the Expert Determination in the Vistaprint SCO taking into account (i) the ICANN Board’s resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs\(^{17}\), as well as the Board’s resolutions on the DERCars SCO Determination, the United TLD Determination, and the Onlineshopping SCO Determination\(^{18}\), and (ii) ICANN’s decisions to delegate the .CAR and .CARS gTLDs, the .AUTO and .AUTOS gTLDs, the .ACCOUNTANT and ACCOUNTANTS gTLDs, the .FAN and .FANS gTLDs, the .GIFT and .GIFTS gTLDs, the .LOAN and .LOANS gTLDs, the .NEW and .NEWS gTLDs and the .WORK and .WORKS gTLDs;
  - Award Vistaprint its costs in this proceeding; and
  - Award such other relief as the Panel may find appropriate or Vistaprint may request.

7. ICANN, on the other hand, contends that it followed its policies and processes at every turn in regards to Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications, which is all that it is required to do. ICANN states its conduct with respect to Vistaprint’s applications was fully consistent with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws, and it also followed the procedures in the Guidebook. ICANN stresses that Vistaprint’s IRP Request should be denied.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

8. This section summarizes basic factual and procedural background in this case, while leaving additional treatment of the facts, arguments and analysis to be addressed in sections III (ICANN’s Articles, Bylaws, and Affirmation of Commitments), IV (Summary of Parties’ Contentions) and V (Analysis and Findings).

A. Vistaprint’s Application for .WEBS and the String Confusion Objection

9. Vistaprint’s submitted two applications for the .WEBS gTLD string, one a standard application and the other a community-based application.\(^{19}\) Vistaprint states that it applied to operate the .WEBS gTLD with a view to reinforcing the reputation of its website


\(^{17}\) ICANN Board Resolution 2013.06.25.NG07.

\(^{18}\) ICANN Board Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02.

\(^{19}\) Request, Annex 1 (Application IDs: 1-1033-22687 and 1-1033-73917). A community-based gTLD is a gTLD that is operated for the benefit of a clearly delineated community. An applicant designating its application as community-based must be prepared to substantiate its status as representative of the community it names in the application. A standard application is one that has not been designated as community-based. Response, ¶ 22 n. 22; see also Glossary of commonly used terms in the Guidebook, at http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/glossary (last accessed on Sept. 13, 2015).
creation tools and hosting services, known under the identifier “Webs”, and to represent the “Webs” community. The .WEBS gTLD would identify Vistaprint as the Registry Operator, and the products and services under the .WEBS gTLD would be offered by and for the Webs community.

10. Seven other applicants applied for the .WEB gTLD string. Solely from the perspective of spelling, Vistaprint’s proposed .WEBS string differs by the addition of the letter “s” from the .WEB string chosen by these other applicants. On March 13, 2013, one of these applicants, Web.com Group, Inc. (the “Objector”), filed two identical String Confusion Objections as permitted under the Guidebook against Vistaprint’s two applications. The Objector was the only .WEB applicant to file a SCO against Vistaprint’s applications. The Objector argued that the .WEBS and .WEB strings were confusingly similar from a visual, aural and conceptual perspective. Vistaprint claims that the Objector’s “sole motive in filing the objection was to prevent a potential competitor from entering the gTLD market.”

11. As noted above, Module 3 of the Guidebook is relevant to this IRP because it provides the objection procedures for new gTLD applications. Module 3 describes “the purpose of the objection and dispute resolution mechanisms, the grounds for lodging a formal objection to a gTLD application, the general procedures for filing or responding to an objection, and the manner in which dispute resolution proceedings are conducted.” The module also discusses the guiding principles, or standards, that each dispute resolution panel will apply in reaching its expert determination. The Module states that

“All applicants should be aware of the possibility that a formal objection may be filed against any application, and of the procedures and options available in the event of such an objection.”

12. Module 3, § 3.2 (Public Objection and Dispute Resolution Process) provides that

“In filing an application for a gTLD, the applicant agrees to accept the applicability of this gTLD dispute resolution process. Similarly, an objector accepts the applicability of this gTLD dispute resolution process by filing its objection.

13. A formal objection may be filed on any one of four grounds, of which the SCO procedure is relevant to this case:

String Confusion Objection – The applied-for gTLD string is confusingly similar to an existing TLD

---

20 Request, ¶ 5.
21 Request, ¶ 17. Vistaprint states that the Webs community is predominantly comprised of non-US clients (54% non-US, 46% US).
22 Request, ¶ 5.
23 Request, ¶ 32.
24 Request, ¶ 32.
25 Request, ¶ 80.
26 Guidebook, Module 3, p. 3-2. Module 3 also contains an attachment, the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (“New gTLD Objections Procedure”), which sets out the procedural rules for String Confusion Objections.
27 Guidebook, Module 3, p. 3-2.
14. According to the Guidebook, the ICDR agreed to serve as the dispute resolution service provider (“DRSP”) to hear String Confusion Objections. On May 6, 2013, the ICDR consolidated the handling of the two SCOs filed by the Objector against Vistaprint’s two .WEBS applications.

15. Section 3.5 (Dispute Resolution Principles) of the Guidebook provides that the “objector bears the burden of proof in each case” and sets out the relevant evaluation criteria to be applied to SCOs:

3.5.1 String Confusion Objection

A DRSP panel hearing a string confusion objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.


17. On June 28, 2013, the ICDR appointed Steve Y. Koh as the expert to consider the Objections (the “First Expert”). In this IRP Vistaprint objects that this appointment was untimely.

18. On 19 July 2013, the Objector submitted an unsolicited supplemental filing replying to Vistaprint’s response, to which Vistaprint objected. Vistaprint claims that the supplemental submission should not have been accepted by the First Expert as it did not comply the New gTLD Objections Procedure. The First Expert accepted the Objector’s submission and permitted Vistaprint to submit a sur-reply, which Vistaprint claims was subject to unfair conditions imposed by the First Expert. Vistaprint filed its sur-reply on

---

28 Guidebook, § 3.2.1.
29 Guidebook, § 3.2.3.
30 Request, ¶ 23, n. 24. The ICDR consolidated the handling of cases nos. 50 504 T 00221 13 and 50 504 T 00246 13. The Guidebook provides in § 3.4.2 that “[o]nce the DRSP receives and processes all objections, at its discretion the DRSP may elect to consolidate certain objections.”
31 Guidebook, § 3.5. This standard is repeated in Article 20 of the Objection Procedure, which provides that “[t]he Objector bears the burden of proving that its Objection should be sustained in accordance with the applicable standards.”
32 Request, ¶ 33.
33 Response, ¶ 26.
34 Request, ¶ 42. Article 17 provides that “[t]he Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response.” Article 18 states that “[i]n order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost, procedures for the production of documents shall be limited. In exceptional cases, the Panel may require a party to provide additional evidence.”
35 Vistaprint states that “this surreply was not to exceed 5 pages and was to be submitted within 29 days. This page limit and deadline are in stark contrast with the 58 day period taken by [the Objector] to submit a 6-page (Continued...)"
August 29, 2013.

19. On September 18, 2013, the ICDR informed the parties that the expert determination for the SCO case would be issued on or about October 4, 2013.\footnote{Request, Annex 14.} Vistaprint claims that this extension imposed an unjustified delay beyond the 45-day deadline for rendering a determination.\footnote{Response, ¶ 33; see New Objections Procedure, Art. 21(a).}

20. On October 1, 2013, the ICDR removed the First Expert due to a conflict that arose. On October 14, 2013, the ICDR appointed Bruce W. Belding as the new expert (the “Second Expert”).\footnote{Response, ¶ 27; Request, Annexes 15 and 16.} Vistaprint claims that the New gTLD Objections Procedure was violated when the First Expert did not maintain his independence and impartiality and the ICDR failed to react to Vistaprint’s concerns in this regard.\footnote{Request, ¶¶ 36 and 43. New Objections Procedure, Art. 13(c).}

21. On October 24, 2013, the Objector challenged the appointment of the Second Expert, to which Vistaprint responded on October 30, 2013. The challenge was based on the fact that the Second Expert had served as the expert in an unrelated prior string confusion objection, which Vistaprint maintained was not a reason for doubting the impartiality or independence of the Second Expert or accepting the challenge his appointment.\footnote{Response, ¶ 28; Request, ¶ 39, Annex 19.} On November 4, 2013, the ICDR removed the Second Expert in response to the Objector’s challenge.\footnote{Response, ¶ 28; Request, ¶ 39, Annex 22.} On November 5, 2013, Vistaprint requested that the ICDR reconsider its decision to accept the challenge to the appointment of the Second Expert. On November 8, 2013, the ICDR denied this request.\footnote{Request, ¶ 39, Annex 21.} Vistaprint claims that the unfounded acceptance of the challenge to the Second Expert was a violation of the New gTLD Objections Procedure and the ICDR’s rules. The challenge was either unfounded and the ICDR should have rejected it, or it was founded, which would mean that the ICDR appointed the Second Expert knowing that justifiable doubts existed as to the Expert’s impartiality and independence.\footnote{Request, ¶¶ 37-40. Vistaprint states that the Objector’s challenge was “based solely on the fact that Mr. Belding had served as the Panel in an unrelated string confusion objection” administered by ICDR. Request, ¶ 37. ICDR “was necessarily aware” that Mr. Belding had served as the Panel in the string confusion objection proceedings. “If [ICDR] was of the opinion that the fact that Mr. Belding served as the Panel in previous proceedings could give rise to justifiable doubts as to the impartiality and independence of the Panel, it should never have appointed him in the case between Web.com and Vistaprint.”}

22. On November 20, 2013, the ICDR appointed Professor Ilhyung Lee to serve as the expert (the “Third Expert”) to consider the Objector’s string confusion objection. No party objected to the appointment of Professor Lee.\footnote{Request, ¶ 42.}
23. On 24 January 2014, the Third Expert issued its determination in favor of the Objector, deciding that the String Confusion Objection should be sustained.\(^{45}\) The Expert concluded that

> “the \(<.webs>\) string so nearly resembles \(<.web>\) – visually, aurally and in meaning – that it is likely to cause confusion. A contrary conclusion, the Panel is simply unable to reach.”\(^{46}\)

24. Moreover, the Expert found that

> “given the similarity of \(<.webs>\) and \(<.web>\)..., it is probable, and not merely possible, that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. This is not a case of ‘mere association’.”\(^{47}\)

25. Vistaprint claims that the Third Expert failed to comply with ICANN’s policies by (i) unjustifiably accepting additional submissions without making an independent assessment, (ii) making an incorrect application of the burden of proof, and (iii) making an incorrect application of the substantive standard set by ICANN for String Confusion Objections.\(^{48}\) In particular, Vistaprint claims that ICANN has set a high standard for a finding of confusing similarity between two gTLD strings, and the Third Expert’s determination did not apply this standard and was arbitrary and baseless.\(^{49}\)

26. Vistaprint concludes that “[i]n sum, the cursory nature of the Decision and the arbitrary and selective discussion of the parties’ arguments by the [Third Expert] show a lack of either independence and impartiality or appropriate qualification.”\(^{50}\) Vistaprint further states that it took 216 days for the Third Expert to render a decision in a procedure that should have taken a maximum of 45 days.\(^{51}\)

27. The Guidebook § 3.4.6 provides that:

> The findings of the panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process.\(^{52}\)

28. Vistaprint objects that ICANN simply accepted the Third Expert’s ruling on the String Confusion Objection, without performing any analysis as to whether the ICDR and the Third Expert complied with ICANN’s policies and fundamental principles, and without

---

\(^{45}\) Request, ¶ 39, Annex 24 (Expert Determination, Web.com Group, Inc. v. Vistaprint Limited, ICDR Case Nos. 50 504 221 13 and 50 504 246 13 (Consolidated) (Jan. 24, 2014)..
\(^{46}\) Request, Annex 24, p. 10.
\(^{47}\) Request, Annex 24, p. 11.
\(^{48}\) Request, ¶¶ 44-49.
\(^{49}\) Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶¶ 1-2.
\(^{50}\) Request, ¶ 49.
\(^{51}\) Request, ¶ 41; see New gTLD Objections Procedure, Art. 21(a).
\(^{52}\) Guidebook, § 3.4.6. The New gTLD Objections Procedure further provides in Article 2(d) that:

> The ‘Expert Determination’ is the decision upon the merits of the Objection that is rendered by a Panel in a proceeding conducted under this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).
29. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board remains its ultimate decision-making body and that the Board should have intervened and “cannot blindly accept advice by third parties or expert determinations.” In this respect, Vistaprint highlights the Guidebook, which provides in Module 5 (Transition to Delegation) § 1 that:

*ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application. For example, the Board might individually consider an application as a result of the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism.*

[Underlining added]

30. As a result of the Third Expert sustaining the Objector’s SCO, Vistaprint’s application was placed in a “Contention Set”. The Guidebook in § 3.2.2.1 explains this result:

*In the case where a gTLD applicant successfully asserts string confusion with another applicant, the only possible outcome is for both applicants to be placed in a contention set and to be referred to a contention resolution procedure (refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures). If an objection by one gTLD applicant to another gTLD application is unsuccessful, the applicants may both move forward in the process without being considered in direct contention with one another.*

B. Request for Reconsideration and Cooperative Engagement Process

31. On February 6, 2014 Vistaprint filed a Request for Reconsideration (“Request for Reconsideration” or “RFR”). According to ICANN’s Bylaws, a RFR is an accountability mechanism which involves a review conducted by the Board Governance Committee (“BGC”), a sub-committee designated by ICANN’s Board to review and consider Reconsideration Requests. A RFR can be submitted by a person or entity that has been “adversely affected” by one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policies.

32. Article IV, §2.15 of ICANN’s Bylaws sets forth the BGC’s authority and powers for handling Reconsideration Requests. The BGC, at its own option, may make a final determination on the RFR or it may make a recommendation to ICANN’s Board for

---

53 Request, ¶ 50.
54 Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶¶ 29-30.
55 Guidebook, § 5.1.
56 Guidebook, § 3.2.2.1. Module 4 (String Contention Procedures) provides that “Contention sets are groups of applications containing identical or similar applied-for gTLD strings.” Guidebook, § 4.1.1. Parties that are identified as being in contention are encouraged to reach settlement among. Guidebook, § 4.1.3. It is expected that most cases of contention will be resolved through voluntary agreement among the involved applicants or by the community priority evaluation mechanism. Conducting an auction is a tie-breaker mechanism of last resort for resolving string contention, if the contention has not been resolved by other means. Guidebook, § 4.3.
57 Request, Annex 25.
58 Response, ¶ 29; Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.
59 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2.a.
For all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction, the Board Governance Committee shall be delegated the authority by the Board of Directors to make a final determination and recommendation on the matter. Board consideration of the recommendation is not required. As the Board Governance Committee deems necessary, it may make recommendation to the Board for consideration and action. The Board Governance Committee’s determination on staff action or inaction shall be posted on the Website. The Board Governance Committee’s determination is final and establishes precedential value.

33. ICANN has determined that the reconsideration process can be invoked for challenges to expert determinations rendered by panels formed by third party dispute resolution service providers, such as the ICDR, where it can be stated that the panel failed to follow the established policies or processes in reaching the expert determination, or that staff failed to follow its policies or processes in accepting that determination.60

34. In its RFR, Vistaprint asked ICANN to reject the Third Expert’s decision and to instruct a new expert panel to issue a new decision “that applies the standards defined by ICANN.”61 Vistaprint sought reconsideration of the “various actions and inactions of ICANN staff related to the Expert Determination,” claiming that “the decision fails to follow ICANN process for determining string confusion in many aspects.”62 In particular, Vistaprint asserted that the ICDR and the Third Expert violated the applicable New gTLD Objection Procedures concerning:

(i) the timely appointment of an expert panel;
(ii) the acceptance of additional written submissions;
(iii) the timely issuance of an expert determination;
(iv) an expert’s duty to remain impartial and independent;
(v) challenges to experts;
(vi) the Objector’s burden of proof; and
(vii) the standards governing the evaluation of a String Confusion Objection.

35. Vistaprint also argued that the decision was unfair, and accepting it creates disparate treatment without justified cause.63

36. The Bylaws provide in Article IV, § 2.3, that the BGC “shall have the authority to”:

a. evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;
b. summarily dismiss insufficient requests;
c. evaluate requests for urgent consideration;
d. conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;
e. request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties;
f. make a final determination on Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without

61 Request, ¶ 51; Annex 25, p.7.
63 Request, Annex 25, p.6.
reference to the Board of Directors; and

g. make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request, as necessary.

37. On February 27, 2014 the BGC issued its detailed Recommendation on Reconsideration Request, in which it denied Vistaprint’s reconsideration request finding “no indication that the ICDR or the [Third Expert] violated any policy or process in reaching the Determination.” The BGC concluded that:

With respect to each claim asserted by the Requester concerning the ICDR’s alleged violations of applicable ICDR procedures concerning experts, there is no evidence that the ICDR deviated from the standards set forth in the Applicant Guidebook, the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, or the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections (Rules). The Requester has likewise failed to demonstrate that the Panel applied the wrong standard in contravention of established policy or procedure. Therefore, the BGC concludes that Request 14-5 be denied.

38. The BGC explained what it considered to be the scope of its review:

In the context of the New gTLD Program, the reconsideration process does not call for the BGC to perform a substantive review of expert determinations. Accordingly, the BGC is not to evaluate the Panel’s substantive conclusion that the Requester’s applications for .WEBS are confusingly similar to the Requester’s application for .WEB. Rather, the BGC’s review is limited to whether the Panel violated any established policy or process in reaching that Determination.

39. The BGC also stated that its determination on Vistaprint’s RFR was final:

In accordance with Article IV, Section 2.15 of the Bylaws, the BGC’s determination on Request 14-5 shall be final and does not require Board (or NGPC) consideration. The Bylaws provide that the BGC is authorized to make a final determination for all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction and that the BGC’s determination on such matters is final. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.15.) As discussed above, Request 14-5 seeks reconsideration of a staff action or inaction. After consideration of this Request, the BGC concludes that this determination is final and that no further consideration by the Board is warranted.

40. On March 17, 2014, Vistaprint filed a request for a Cooperative Engagement Process

---

64 BGC Determination, p. 18, Request, Annex 26.
67 The “NGPC” refers to the New gTLD Program Committee, which is a sub-committee of the Board and “has all the powers of the Board.” See New gTLD Program Committee Charter | As Approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on 10 April 2012, at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/charter-2012-04-12-en (last accessed Sept. 15, 2015).
68 BGC Determination, p. 19, Request, Annex 26. As noted, the BGC concluded that its determination on Vistaprint’s RFR was final and made no recommendation to ICANN’s Board for consideration and action. Article IV, §2.17 of ICANN’s Bylaws sets out the scope of the Board’s authority for matters in which the BGC decides to make a recommendation to ICANN’s Board:

The Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations of the Board Governance Committee. The final decision of the Board shall be made public as part of the preliminary report and minutes of the Board meeting at which action is taken. The Board shall issue its decision on the recommendation of the Board Governance Committee within 60 days of receipt of the Reconsideration Request or as soon thereafter as feasible. Any circumstances that delay the Board from acting within this timeframe must be identified and posted on ICANN’s website. The Board’s decision on the recommendation is final.
(“CEP”) with ICANN. Vistaprint stated in its letter:

\[ \text{Vistaprint is of the opinion that the Board of Governance Committee’s rejection of Reconsideration Request 14-5 is in violation of various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. In particular, Vistaprint considers this is in violation of Articles I, II(3), III and IV of the ICANN Bylaws as well as Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation. In addition, Vistaprint considers that ICANN has acted in violation of Articles 3, 7 and 9 of ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitment.} \]

41. The CEP did not lead to a resolution and Vistaprint thereafter commenced this IRP. In this regard, Module 6.6 of the Guidebook provides that an applicant for a new gTLD:

\[ \text{MAY UTILIZE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM SET FORTH IN ICANN’S BYLAWS FOR PURPOSES OF CHALLENGING ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION.} \]

C. Procedures in this Case


43. On January 13, 2015, the ICDR confirmed that there were no objections to the constitution of the present IRP Panel ("IRP Panel" or “Panel”). The Panel convened a telephonic preliminary hearing with the parties on January 26, 2015 to discuss background and organizational matters in the case. Having heard the parties, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 1 permitting an additional round of submissions from the parties. The Panel received Vistaprint’s additional submission on March 2, 2015 (Vistaprint’s “First Additional Submission”) and ICANN’s response on April 2, 2015 (ICANN’s “First Additional Response”).

44. The Panel then received further email correspondence from the parties. In particular, Vistaprint requested that the case be suspended pending an upcoming meeting of ICANN’s Board of Directors, which Vistaprint contended would be addressing matters informative for this IRP. Vistaprint also requested that it be permitted to respond to arguments and information submitted by ICANN in ICANN’s First Additional Response. In particular, Vistaprint stated that ICANN had referenced the Final Declaration of March 3, 2015 in the IRP case involving Booking.com B.V. v. ICANN (the “Booking.com Final Declaration”). The Booking.com Final Declaration was issued one day after Vistaprint had submitted its First Additional Submission in this case. ICANN objected to Vistaprint’s requests, urging that there was no need for additional briefing and no justification for suspending the case.

\[ 69 \text{Request, Annex 27.} \]

\[ 70 \text{Request, Annex 27.} \]

\[ 71 \text{Guidebook, § 6.6.} \]

45. On April 19, 2015, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 2, which denied Vistaprint’s request that the case be suspended and permitted Vistaprint and ICANN to submit another round of supplemental submissions. Procedural Order No. 2 also proposed two dates for a telephonic hearing with the parties on the substantive issues and the date of May 13, 2015 was subsequently selected. The Panel received Vistaprint’s second additional submission on April 24, 2015 (Vistaprint’s “Second Additional Submission”) and ICANN’s response to that submission on May 1, 2015 (ICANN’s “Second Additional Response”).

46. The Panel then received a letter from Vistaprint dated April 30, 2015 and ICANN’s reply of the same date. In its letter, Vistaprint referred to two new developments that it stated were relevant for this IRP case: (i) the Third Declaration on the IRP Procedure, issued April 20, 2015, in the IRP involving DotConnectAfrica Trust v. ICANN\(^{73}\), and (ii) the ICANN Board of Director’s resolution of April 26, 2015 concerning the Booking.com Final Declaration. Vistaprint requested that more time be permitted to consider and respond to these new developments, while ICANN responded that the proceedings should not be delayed.

47. Following further communications with the parties, May 28, 2015 was confirmed as the date for a telephonic hearing to receive the parties’ oral submissions on the substantive issues in this case. On that date, counsel for the parties were provided with the opportunity to make extensive oral submissions in connection with all of the facts and issues raised in this case and to answer questions from the Panel.\(^{74}\)

48. Following the May 28, 2015 hearing, the Panel held deliberations to consider the issues in this IRP, with further deliberations taking place on subsequent dates. This Final Declaration was provided to the ICDR in draft form on October 5, 2015 for non-substantive comments on the text; it was returned to the Panel on October 8, 2015.

III. ICANN’s Articles, Bylaws, and Affirmation of Commitments

49. Vistaprint states that the applicable law for these IRP proceedings is found in ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. Both Vistaprint and ICANN make numerous references to these instruments. This section sets out a number of the key provisions of

---


\(^{74}\) The Panel conducted these IRP proceedings relying on email and telephonic communications, with no objections to this approach from either party and in view of ICANN’s Bylaws, Article IV, § 3.12 (“In order to keep the costs and burdens of independent review as low as possible, the IRP Panel should conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible. Where necessary, the IRP Panel may hold meetings by telephone.”).
the Articles and the Bylaws, as they are relied upon by the parties in this IRP. Vistaprint also references the Affirmation of Commitments – relevant provisions of this document are also provided below.

A. Articles of Incorporation

50. Vistaprint refers to the Articles of Incorporation, highlighting Article IV’s references to “relevant principles of international law” and “open and transparent processes”. Article 4 of the Articles provides in relevant part:

The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets.

[Underlining added]

51. Vistaprint states that general principles of international law – and in particular the obligation of good faith – serve as a prism through which the various obligations imposed on ICANN under its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws must be interpreted. The general principle of good faith is one of the most basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, and rules involving transparency, fairness and non-discrimination arise from it. Vistaprint also emphasizes that the principle of good faith includes an obligation to ensure procedural fairness by adhering to substantive and procedural rules, avoiding arbitrary action, and recognizing legitimate expectations. The core elements of transparency include clarity of procedures, the publication and notification of guidelines and applicable rules, and the duty to provide reasons for actions taken.

B. Bylaws

a. Directives to ICANN and its Board

52. The Bylaws contain provisions that address the role, core values and accountability of ICANN and its Board.

53. Article IV, § 3.2 specifies the right of “any person materially affected” to seek independent review (through the IRP) of a Board action alleged to be a violation of the

---

75 ICANN’s Articles are available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/articles-en (last accessed on Sept. 15, 2015). ICANN’s Bylaws are available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en (last accessed on Sept. 15, 2015).
76 Request, ¶ 55. Vistaprint also states that “U.S. and California law, like almost all jurisdictions, recognize obligations to act in good faith and ensure procedural fairness. The requirement of procedural fairness has been an established part of the California common law since before the turn of the 19th century.” Request, ¶ 60, n.8.
77 Request, ¶ 59.
78 Request, ¶ 60.
79 Request, ¶ 66.
Articles or Bylaws:

*Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board's action.*

54. Vistaprint has relied on certain of ICANN’s core values set forth in Article I, § 2 (Core Values) of the Bylaws. The sub-sections underlined below are invoked by Vistaprint as they relate to principles of promoting competition and innovation (Article I § 2.2, 2.5 and 2.6); openness and transparency (Article I § 2.7); neutrality, fairness, integrity and non-discrimination (Article I § 2.8); and accountability (Article I § 2.10). Article I § 2 provides in full:

Section 2. Core Values

In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN:

1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination.

3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties.

4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.

5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment.

6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.  

9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.

Vistaprint states that “[t]his requirement is also found in applicable California law, which requires that decisions be made according to procedures that are ‘fair and applied uniformly’, and not in an ‘arbitrary and capricious manner.’” Request, ¶ 62, n.9.
11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments’ or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

55. Vistaprint refers to Article II, § 3 in support of its arguments that the Board failed to act fairly and without discrimination as it considered Vistaprint’s two .WEBS applications and the outcome of the Vistaprint SCO case. Article II, § 3 provides:

Section 3 (Non-Discriminatory Treatment)

ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

56. Vistaprint refers to Article III (Transparency), § 1 of the Bylaws in reference to the principle of transparency:

Section 1. PURPOSE

ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.

57. Vistaprint also refers Article IV (Accountability and Review), § 1 as it relates to ICANN’s accountability and core values, providing in relevant part:

In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws.

b. Directives for the IRP Panel

58. ICANN’s Bylaws also contain provisions that speak directly to the role and authority of the Panel in this IRP case. In particular, Articles IV of the Bylaws creates the IRP as an accountability mechanism, along with two others mechanisms: (i) the RFR process, described above and on which Vistaprint relied, and (ii) an unrelated periodic review of
ICANN’s structure and procedures.  

59. Article IV, § 1 of the Bylaws emphasizes that the IRP is a mechanism designed to ensure ICANN’s accountability:

_The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of Article III and the Board and other selection mechanisms set forth throughout these Bylaws._

[Underlining added]

60. In this respect, the IRP Panel provides an independent review and accountability mechanism for ICANN and its Board. Vistaprint urges that IRP is the only method established by ICANN for holding itself accountable through independent third-party review of its decisions.  

The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.1 provides:

_In addition to the reconsideration process described in Section 2 of this Article, ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws._

61. ICANN states in its Response that “[t]he IRP Panel is tasked with determining whether the Board’s actions are consistent with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws.” ICANN also maintains that while the IRP is intended to address challenges to conduct undertaken by ICANN’s Board, it is not available as a mechanism to challenge the actions or inactions of ICANN staff or third parties that may be involved with ICANN’s activities.

62. In line with ICANN’s statement, the Bylaws provide in Article IV, § 3.4, that:

_Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel (“IRP Panel”), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws._

[Underlining added]

63. The Bylaws also include a standard of review in Article IV, § 3.4, providing that the Panel:

---

81 Note that Article V (Ombudsman) of the Bylaws also establishes the Office of Ombudsman to facilitate the fair, impartial, and timely resolution of problems and complaints for those matters where the procedures of the RFR or the IRP have not been invoked.

82 Request, ¶ 57.

83 Response, ¶ 33.

84 Response, ¶ 4.

85 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4. The reference to “actions” of ICANN’s Board should be read to refer to both “actions or inactions” of the Board. See Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11(c) (“The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:…(c) declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws”); see also Supplementary Procedures, which define “Independent Review” as referring “to the procedure that takes place upon the filing of a request to review ICANN Board actions or inactions alleged to be inconsistent with ICANN's Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation.
“must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;  
b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and  
c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?”

64. The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.11 set out the IRP Panel’s authority in terms of alternative actions that it may take once it is has an IRP case before it:

The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:

a. summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious;  
b. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties;  
c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and  
d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;  
e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar; and  
f. determine the timing for each proceeding.

65. Further, the Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.18 state that

“[If] the IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party.”

[Underlining added]

66. The Bylaws address the steps to be taken after the Panel issues a determination in the IRP. Article IV, § 3.21 states that “declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value”:

Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting. The declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.

[Underlining added]

C. Affirmation of Commitments

67. Vistaprint claims that ICANN violated the ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments, in particular Articles 3, 7 and 9. This Affirmation of Commitments is instructive, as it explains ICANN’s obligations in light of its role as regulator of the DNS. Article 3, 7 and 9 are set forth below in relevant part:

86 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4.  
87 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11.  
88 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.18.  
89 This section was added by the amendments to the Bylaws on April 11, 2013.
3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.

* * * *

7. ICANN commits to adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting processes, fact-based policy development, cross-community deliberations, and responsive consultation procedures that provide detailed explanations of the basis for decisions, including how comments have influenced the development of policy consideration, and to publish each year an annual report that sets out ICANN's progress against ICANN's bylaws, responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans. In addition, ICANN commits to provide a thorough and reasoned explanation of decisions taken, the rationale thereof and the sources of data and information on which ICANN relied.

9. Recognizing that ICANN will evolve and adapt to fulfill its limited, but important technical mission of coordinating the DNS, ICANN further commits to take the following specific actions together with ongoing commitment reviews specified below:

9.1 Ensuring accountability, transparency and the interests of global Internet users: ICANN commits to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders by: (a) continually assessing and improving ICANN Board of Directors (Board) governance which shall include an ongoing evaluation of Board performance, the Board selection process, the extent to which Board composition meets ICANN's present and future needs, and the consideration of an appeal mechanism for Board decisions; (b) assessing the role and effectiveness of the GAC and its interaction with the Board and making recommendations for improvement to ensure effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the DNS; (c) continually assessing and improving the processes by which ICANN receives public input (including adequate explanation of decisions taken and the rationale thereof); (d) continually assessing the extent to which ICANN's decisions are embraced, supported and accepted by the public and the Internet community; and (e) assessing the policy development process to facilitate enhanced cross community deliberations, and effective and timely policy development. ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above commitments no less frequently than every three years, .... Each of the foregoing reviews shall consider the extent to which the assessments and actions undertaken by ICANN have been successful in ensuring that ICANN is acting transparently, is accountable for its decision-making, and acts in the public interest. Integral to the foregoing reviews will be assessments of the extent to which the Board and staff have implemented the recommendations arising out of the other commitment reviews enumerated below.

* * * *

9.3 Promoting competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice: ICANN will ensure that as it contemplates expanding the top-level domain space, the various issues that are involved (including competition, consumer protection, security, stability and resiliency, malicious abuse issues, sovereignty concerns, and rights protection) will be adequately addressed prior to implementation. If and when new gTLDs (whether in ASCII or other language character sets) have been in operation for one year, ICANN will organize a review that will examine the extent to which the introduction or expansion of gTLDs has promoted competition, consumer trust and consumer choice, as well as effectiveness of (a) the application and evaluation process, and (b) safeguards put in place to mitigate issues involved in the introduction or expansion. ICANN will organize a further review of its execution of the above commitments two years after the first review, and then no less frequently than every four years. Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations.

[Underlining added]
IV. Summary of Parties’ Contentions

68. This presentation of the parties’ contentions is intended to provide a summary to aid in understanding this Final Declaration. It is not an exhaustive recitation of the entirety of the parties’ allegations and arguments. Additional references to the parties’ assertions are included in sections II (Factual and Procedural Background), III (ICANN’s Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments) and V (Analysis and Findings).

69. The IRP Panel has organized the parties’ contentions into three categories, based on the areas of claim and dispute that have emerged through the exchange of three rounds of submissions between the parties and the Panel. The first section relates to the authority of the Panel, while the second and third sections address the allegations asserted by Vistaprint, which fall into two general areas of claim. In this regard, Vistaprint claims that the ICDR and Third Expert made numerous errors of procedure and substance during the String Confusion Objection proceedings, which resulted in Vistaprint being denied a fair hearing and due process. As a result of the flawed SCO proceedings, Vistaprint alleged that ICANN through its Board (and the BGC), in turn: (i) violated its Articles, Bylaws and the Guidebook (e.g., failed to act in good faith, fairly, non-arbitrarily, with accountability, due diligence, and independent judgment) by accepting the determination in the Vistaprint SCO and failing to redress and remedy the numerous alleged process and substantive errors in the SCO proceedings, and (ii) discriminated against Vistaprint, in violation of its Articles and Bylaws, by delaying Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications and putting them into a Contention Set, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation, or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

70. Thus, the three primary areas of contention between the parties are as follows:

- **IRP Panel’ Authority:** The parties have focused on the authority of the IRP Panel, including the standard of review to be applied by the Panel, whether the Panel’s IRP declaration is binding or non-binding on ICANN, and, on a very closely related point, whether the Panel has authority to award any affirmative relief (as compared to issuing only a declaration as to whether or not ICANN has acted in a manner that is consistent or not with its Articles and Bylaws).

- **SCO Proceedings Claim:** Vistaprint claims ICANN’s failed to comply with the obligations under its Articles and Bylaws by accepting the Third Expert’s SCO determination and failing to provide a remedy or redress in response to numerous alleged errors of process and substance in the Vistaprint SCO proceedings. As noted above, Vistaprint claims there were process and substantive violations, which resulted in Vistaprint not being accorded a fair hearing and due process. Vistaprint states that because ICANN’s Bylaws require ICANN to apply established policies neutrally and fairly, therefore, the Panel should also consider the policies in Module 3 of the
Guidebook concerning the String Confusion Objection procedures. Vistaprint objects to the policies themselves as well as their implementation through the ICDR and the Third Expert. Vistaprint claims that ICANN’s Board, acting through the BGC or otherwise, should have acted to address these deficiencies and its choice not to intervene violated the Articles and Bylaws.

- **Disparate Treatment Claim:** Vistaprint claims ICANN discriminated against Vistaprint through ICANN’s (and the BGC’s) acceptance of the Third Expert’s allegedly baseless and arbitrary determination in *Vistaprint SCO*, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation, or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

A. **Vistaprint’s Position**

   a. **IRP Panel’s Authority**

51. **Standard of review:** Vistaprint emphasizes that ICANN is accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with the Article and Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of the Bylaws. To achieve this required accountability, the IRP Panel is “charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.”

90 Vistaprint states that the IRP Panel’s fulfillment of this core obligation is crucial to ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The IRP is the only method established by ICANN for holding itself accountable through third-party review of its decisions.

72. Vistaprint contends that ICANN is wrong in stating (in its Response) that a deferential standard of review applies in this case. No such specification is made in ICANN’s Bylaws or elsewhere, and a restrictive interpretation of the standard of review would be inappropriate. It would fail to ensure accountability on the part of ICANN and would be incompatible with ICANN’s commitment to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability, as required by Article 9.1 of ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments and ICANN’s core values, which require ICANN to “remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness.”

73. Vistaprint states further that the most recent version of ICANN’s Bylaws, amended on

---

90 Request, ¶ 55-56 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, §§1 & 3.4).
91 Request, ¶ 57.
92 Response, ¶ 33.
93 Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 36.
94 Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶¶ 36-37; Request, ¶ 57.
April 11, 2013, require that the IRP Panel focus on whether ICANN’s Board was free from conflicts of interest and exercised an appropriate level of due diligence and independent judgment in its decision making.\textsuperscript{95} Vistaprint asserts, however, that these issues are mentioned by way of example only. The Bylaws do not restrict the IRP Panel’s remit to these issues alone, as the Panel’s fundamental task is to determine whether the Board has acted consistently with the Articles and Bylaws\textsuperscript{96}

74. IRP declaration binding or non-binding: Vistaprint contends that the outcome of this IRP is binding on ICANN and that any other outcome “would be incompatible with ICANN’s obligation to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability.”\textsuperscript{97}

75. Vistaprint states that since ICANN’s amendment of its Bylaws, IRP declarations have precedential value.\textsuperscript{98} Vistaprint asserts the precedential value – and binding force – of IRP declarations was confirmed in a recent IRP panel declaration,\textsuperscript{99} which itself has precedential value for this case. Vistaprint argues that any other outcome would effectively grant the ICANN Board arbitrary and unfettered discretion, something which was never intended and would be incompatible with ICANN’s obligation to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability.\textsuperscript{100}

76. Vistaprint contends that the IRP is not a mere "corporate accountability mechanism" aimed at ICANN's internal stakeholders.\textsuperscript{101} The IRP is open to any person materially affected by a decision or action of the Board\textsuperscript{102} and is specifically available to new gTLD applicants, as stated in the Guidebook, Module 6.4. Vistaprint claims that \textit{internally}, towards its stakeholders, ICANN might be able to argue that its Board retains ultimate decision-making power, subject to its governing principles. \textit{Externally}, however, the ICANN Board's discretionary power is limited, and ICANN and its Board must offer redress when its decisions or actions harm third parties.\textsuperscript{103}

77. Vistaprint argues further that the IRP has all the characteristics of an international arbitration.\textsuperscript{104} The IRP is conducted pursuant to a set of independently developed

\textsuperscript{95}Bylaws, Article IV, § 3.4.  
\textsuperscript{96}Vistaprint’s First Additional submission, ¶ 35.  
\textsuperscript{97}Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 37.  
\textsuperscript{98}Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 37 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV § 3.21).  
\textsuperscript{99}See DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure, ¶ 131 (the panel ruled that “[b]ased on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel concludes that this Declaration and its future Declaration on the Merits of this case are binding on the Parties”).  
\textsuperscript{100}Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 37.  
\textsuperscript{101}Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 29.  
\textsuperscript{102}Bylaws, Article IV § 3.2 (“Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action.”).  
\textsuperscript{103}Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 15.  
\textsuperscript{104}Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 27.
international arbitration rules: the ICDR Rules, as modified by the Supplementary Procedures. The IRP is administered by the ICDR, which is a provider of international arbitration services. The decision-maker is not ICANN, but a panel of neutral individuals selected by the parties in consultation with the ICDR, and appointed pursuant to the ICDR Rules.

78. Vistaprint provides further detailed argument in its Second Additional Submission that the IRP is binding in view of ICANN’s Bylaws, the ICDR Rules and the Supplementary Procedures, and that any ambiguity on this issue should weigh against ICANN as the drafter and architect of the IRP:

31. As mentioned in Vistaprint’s Reply, a previous IRP panel ruled that “various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures support the conclusion that the [IRP] Panel’s decisions, opinions and declarations are binding” and that “there is certainly nothing in the Supplementary Rules that renders the decisions, opinions and declarations of the [IRP] Panel either advisory or non-binding” (RM 32, para 98).105

32. Indeed, as per Article IV(3)(8) of the ICANN Bylaws, the ICANN Board has given its approval to the ICDR to establish a set of operating rules and procedures for the conduct of the IRP. The operating rules and procedures established by the ICDR are the ICDR Rules as referred to in the preamble of the Supplementary Procedures (RM 32, para. 101). The Supplementary Procedures supplement the ICDR Rules (Supplementary Procedures, Preamble and Section 2). The preamble of the ICDR Rules provides that “a dispute can be submitted to an arbitral tribunal for a final and binding decision”. Article 30 of the ICDR Rules specifies that “awards shall be made in writing by the arbitral tribunal and shall be final and binding on the parties”. No provision in the Supplementary Procedures deviates from the rule that the Panel’s decisions are binding. On the contrary, Section 1 of the Supplementary Procedures defines an IRP Declaration as a decision/opinion of the IRP Panel. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures requires that IRP Declarations i) are made in writing, and ii) specifically designate the prevailing party. Where a decision must specifically designate the prevailing party, it is inherently binding. Moreover the binding nature of IRP Declarations is further supported by the language and spirit of Section 6 of the Supplementary Procedures and Article IV(3)(11)(a) of the ICANN Bylaws. Pursuant to these provisions, the IRP Panel has the authority to summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious. Surely, such a decision, opinion or declaration on the part of the IRP Panel would not be considered advisory (RM 32, para. 107).

33. Finally, even if ICANN’s Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures are ambiguous - quod non - on the question of whether or not an IRP Declaration is binding, this ambiguity would weigh against ICANN. The relationship between ICANN and Vistaprint is clearly an adhesive one. In such a situation, the rule of contra proferentem applies. As the drafter and architect of the IRP Procedure, it was possible for ICANN, and clearly within its power, to adopt a procedure that expressly and clearly announced that the decisions, opinions and declarations of IRP Panels were advisory only. ICANN did not adopt such a procedure (RM 32, paras. 108-109).

79. Finally, Vistaprint contends that ICANN conceived of the IRP as an alternative to dispute

---

105 Citing DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure, ¶ 98.
resolution by the courts. To submit a new gTLD application, Vistaprint had to agree to terms and conditions including a waiver of its right to challenge ICANN's decisions on Vistaprint's applications in a court, provided that as an applicant, Vistaprint could use the accountability mechanisms set forth in ICANN's Bylaws. Vistaprint quotes the *DCA Third Declaration on Procedure*, in which the IRP panel stated:

> assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, the ultimate 'accountability' remedy for [Vistaprint] is the IRP.\(^{106}\)

### 80. Authority to award affirmative relief:

Vistaprint makes similar arguments in support of its claim that the IRP Panel has authority to grant affirmative relief. Vistaprint quotes the *Interim Declaration on Emergency Request for Interim Measures of Protection in Gulf Cooperation Council v. ICANN* (“GCC Interim IRP Declaration”),\(^{107}\) where that panel stated that the right to an independent review is

> a significant and meaningful one under the ICANN's Bylaws. This is so particularly in light of the importance of ICANN's global work in overseeing the DNS for the Internet and also the weight attached by ICANN itself to the principles of accountability and review which underpin the IRP process.

### 81. Accordingly, Vistaprint argues that the IRP Panel's authority is not limited to declare that ICANN breached its obligations under the Articles, Bylaws and the Guidebook. To offer effective redress to gTLD applicants, the Panel may indicate what action ICANN must take to cease violating these obligations. The point is all the stronger here, as ICANN conceived the IRP to be the sole independent dispute resolution mechanism available to new gTLD applicants.\(^{108}\)

#### b. SCO Proceedings Claim

### 82. Vistaprint states that this case relates to ICANN’s handling of the determination in the *Vistaprint SCO* proceedings following String Confusion Objections to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, but does not relate to the merits of that SCO determination.\(^{109}\)

### 83. Vistaprint’s basic claim here is that given the errors of process and substance in those proceedings, Vistaprint was not given a fair opportunity to present its case. Vistaprint was deprived of procedural fairness and the opportunity to be heard by an independent panel applying the appropriate rules. Further, Vistaprint was not given any meaningful opportunity for remedy or redress once the decision was made, and in this way ICANN’s Board allegedly violated its Articles and Bylaws.\(^{110}\)

---

\(^{106}\) *DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure*, ¶ 40.

\(^{107}\) *Interim Declaration on Emergency Request for Interim Measures of Protection in Gulf Cooperation Council v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 01-14-0002-1065, ¶ 59 (February 12, 2015) (“GCC Interim IRP Declaration”).

\(^{108}\) Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 24.

\(^{109}\) Request, ¶ 4.

\(^{110}\) Request, ¶ 71.
84. Although Vistaprint challenged the SCO decision through ICANN’s Request for Reconsideration process, ICANN refused to reconsider the substance of the challenged decision, or to take any action to remedy the lack of due process. In doing so, Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to act in a fair and non-arbitrary manner, with good faith, accountability, due diligence and independent judgment, as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles. ICANN’s acceptance of the SCO determination and refusal to reverse this decision was an abdication of responsibility and contrary to the evaluation policies ICANN had established in the Guidebook.

85. A number of Vistaprint’s contentions regarding the alleged violations of process and substance in SCO proceedings are described in part II.A above addressing Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications and the SCO proceedings. Vistaprint’s alleges as follows:

   (i) ICDR’s appointment of the First Expert was untimely, in violation of Article 13(a) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
   (ii) the First Expert (and Third Expert) improperly accepted and considered unsolicited supplemental filings, violating Articles 17 and 18 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
   (iii) ICDR violated Article 21 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure by failing to ensure the timely issuance of an expert determination in the SCO;
   (iv) the First Expert failed to maintain independence and impartiality, in violation of Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
   (v) ICDR unjustifiably accepted a challenge to the Second Expert (or created the circumstances for such a challenge), in violation of Article 2 of the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections (Rules);
   (vi) the Determination of the Third Expert was untimely, in violation of Article 21(a) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
   (vii) the Third Expert incorrectly applied the Objector’s burden of proof, in violation of section 3.5 of the Guidebook and Article 20(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, which place the burden of proof on the Objector; and

---

111 Request, ¶ 71.
112 Request, ¶ 8.
113 Article 13(a) of the Procedure provides: “The DRSP shall select and appoint the Panel of Expert(s) within thirty (30) days after receiving the Response.”
114 Request, ¶ 42. Article 17 provides that “[t]he Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response.” Article 18 states that “[i]n order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost, procedures for the production of documents shall be limited. In exceptional cases, the Panel may require a party to provide additional evidence.”
115 Article 21(a) of the Procedure provides that “[t]he DRSRP and the Panel shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the Expert Determination is rendered within forty-five (45) days of the constitution of the Panel.”
116 Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure provides that “[a]ll Experts acting under this Procedure shall be impartial and independent of the parties.” Section 3.4.4 of the Guidebook provides that the ICDR will “follow its adopted procedures for requiring such independence, including procedures for challenging and replacing an expert for lack of independence.”
the Third Expert incorrectly applied ICANN’s substantive standard for evaluation of String Confusion Objections, as set out in Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook, in particular the standards governing the evaluation of a string confusion objection.

86. Based on these alleged errors in process and substance, Vistaprint concludes in its Request:

49. In sum, the cursory nature of the Decision and the arbitrary and selective discussion of the parties’ arguments by the Panel show a lack of either independence and impartiality or appropriate qualification on the fact of the Panel. The former is contrary to Article 13 of the Procedure; the latter is contrary to the Applicant Guidebook, Module 3-16, which requires that a panel (ruling on a string confusion or other objection) must consist of “appropriately qualified experts appointed to each proceeding by the designated DRSP.”

87. Vistaprint states that ICANN’s Board disregarded these accumulated infringements and turned a blind eye to the Third Expert’s lack of independence and impartiality. Vistaprint asserts that ICANN is not entitled to blindly accept expert determinations from SCO cases; it must verify whether or not, by accepting the expert determination and advice, it is acting consistent with its obligations under its Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments. Vistaprint further claims ICANN would be in violation of these obligations if it were to accept an expert determination or advice in circumstances where the ICDR and/or the expert had failed to comply with the New gTLD Objections Procedure and/or the ICDR Rules for SCOs, or where a panel – even if it had been correctly appointed – had failed to correctly apply the standard set by ICANN.

88. Vistaprint states that following ICANN’s decision to accept the Vistaprint SCO determination, Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request detailing how ICANN’s acceptance of the Third Expert’s determination was inconsistent with ICANN’s policy and obligations under its Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments. Background on the RFR procedure is provided above in part II.B. Despite this, Vistaprint states that ICANN refused to reverse its decision.

89. The IRP Panel has summarized as follows Vistaprint’s SCO Proceedings Claim concerning ICANN’s alleged breaches of its obligations under the Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments:

(1) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article 4 of the Articles and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws to act in good faith with due diligence and independent judgment by failing to provide due process to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications. Good faith encompasses the obligation to ensure procedural fairness and due process, including equal and fair treatment of the parties, fair notice, and a fair opportunity to present one’s case. These are more than just formalistic procedural requirements. The opportunity must be meaningful: the party must be given adequate notice of the relevant

117 Request, ¶ 49.
118 Request, ¶ 6.
119 Request, ¶ 6.
120 Request, ¶¶ 69-71.
rules and be given a full and fair opportunity to present its case. And the mechanisms for redress must be both timely and effective.

Vistaprint claims that it was not given a fair opportunity to present its case; was deprived of procedural fairness and the opportunity to be heard by an independent panel applying the appropriate rules; and was not given any meaningful opportunity for remedy or redress once the SCO determination was made, even in the RFR procedure. Thus, ICANN’s Board failed to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and to act in good faith as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles.

(2) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article I § 2.8 to neutrally, objectively and fairly apply documented policies as established in the Guidebook and Bylaws.\(^{121}\) Vistaprint argues that there is no probability of user confusion if both .WEBS and .WEB were delegated as gTLD strings. Vistaprint states expert evidence confirms that there is no risk that Internet users will be confused and the Third Expert could not have reasonably found that the average reasonable Internet user is likely to be confused between the two strings. As confirmed by the Objector,\(^{122}\) the average reasonable Internet user is used to distinguishing between words (and non-words) that are much more similar than the strings, .WEBS and .WEB. Since these strings cannot be perceived confusingly similar by the average reasonable Internet user, the Vistaprint SCO determination that they are confusingly similar is contradictory to ICANN’s policy as established in the Guidebook.

(3) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to act fairly and with due diligence and independent judgment as called for under Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation, Articles I § 2.8 and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws by accepting the SCO determination made by the Third Expert, who was allegedly not independent and impartial.\(^{123}\) Vistaprint claims that the Third Expert was not independent and impartial and/or is not appropriately qualified. However, Vistaprint claims this did not prevent ICANN from accepting the determination by the Third Expert, without even investigating the dependence and partiality of the Expert when serious concerns were raised to the ICANN Board in the RFR. This is a failure of ICANN to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and to act in good faith as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles.

(4) ICANN failed to comply with its obligations under the Article 4 of the Articles, and Article I §§ 2.7 and 2.8 and Article III § 1 of the Bylaws (and Article 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) to act fairly and transparently by failing to disclose/perform any efforts to optimize the service that the ICDR provides in the New gTLD Program.\(^{124}\) Vistaprint contends that the BGC’s determination on Vistaprint’s RFR shows that the BGC made no investigation into Vistaprint’s fundamental questions about the Panel’s arbitrariness, lack of independence, partiality, inappropriate

---

\(^{121}\) Request, ¶ 72.

\(^{122}\) Request, Annex 10.

\(^{123}\) Request, ¶ 73.

\(^{124}\) Request, §§ 52 and 77.
qualification. In addition, rather than identifying the nature of the conflict that forced the First Expert to step down, the BGC focused on developing hypotheses of reasons that could have led to this expert to stepping down. According to Vistaprint, this shows that the BGC did not exercise due diligence in making its determination and was looking for unsubstantiated reasons to reject Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request rather than making a fair determination.

In addition, as it is ICANN’s responsibility to ensure that its policies and fundamental principles are respected by its third party vendors, ICANN had agreed with the ICDR that they were going to “communicate regularly with each other and seek to optimize the service that the ICDR provides as a DRSP in the New gTLD Program” and that ICANN was going to support the ICDR “to perform its duties…in a timely and efficient manner”.125 However, ICANN has failed to show that it sought in any way to optimize the ICRD’s service vis-à-vis Vistaprint or that it performed any due diligence in addressing the concerns raised by Vistaprint. Instead, the BGC denied Vistaprint’s RFR without conducting any investigation.

(5) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to remain accountable under Articles I § 2.10 and IV § 1 of the Bylaws (and Articles 3(a) and 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) by failing to provide any remedy for its mistreatment of Vistaprint’s gTLD applications.126 Vistaprint claims that because of ICANN’s unique history, role and responsibilities, its constituent documents require that it operate with complete accountability. In contrast to this obligation, throughout its treatment of Vistaprint’s applications for .WEBS, ICANN has acted as if it and the ICDR are entitled to act with impunity. ICANN adopted the Third Expert’s determination without examining whether it was made in accordance with ICANN’s policy and fundamental principles under its Articles and Bylaws. When confronted with process violations, ICANN sought to escape its responsibilities by relying on unrealistic hypotheses rather than on facts that should have been verified. Additionally, ICANN has not created any general process for challenging the substance of SCO expert determinations, while acknowledging the need for such a process by taking steps to develop a review process mechanism for certain individual cases involving SCO objections.

(6) ICANN failed to promote competition and innovation under Articles I § 2.2 (and Article 3(c) of the Affirmation of Commitments) by accepting the Third Expert’s determination.127 Vistaprint’s argues that the Objector’s sole motive in filing the SCO against Vistaprint was to prevent a potential competitor from entering the gTLD market. This motive is contrary to the purpose of ICANN’s New gTLD Program. The Board’s acceptance of the determination in the Vistaprint SCO, which was filed with an intent contrary to the interests of both competition and consumers, was contrary to ICANN’s Bylaws.

c. Disparate Treatment Claim

125 Request,¶ 52.
126 Request,¶¶ 78-79.
127 Request,¶ 80.
90. Vistaprint claims that ICANN’s Board discriminated against Vistaprint through the Board’s (and the BGC’s) acceptance of the Third Expert’s allegedly baseless and arbitrary determination in the Vistaprint SCO, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation, or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

91. Vistaprint states that the “IRP Panel’s mandate includes a review as to whether or not ICANN’s Board discriminates in its interventions on SCO expert determinations,” and contends that “[d]iscriminating between applicants in its interventions on SCO expert determinations is exactly what the Board has done with respect to Vistaprint’s applications.” 128

92. Vistaprint asserts that in contrast to the handling of other RFRs, the BGC did not give the full ICANN Board the opportunity to consider the Vistaprint SCO matter and did not provide detailed minutes of the meeting in which the BGC’s decision was taken. 129 Vistaprint states this is all the more striking as, in other matters related to handling of SCOs with no concerns about the impartiality and independence of the expert or the procedure, the Board considered potential paths forward to address perceived inconsistencies in expert determinations in the SCO process, including implementing a review mechanism. The Board also directed ICANN’s President and CEO, or his designee, to publish this proposed review mechanism for public comment. 130 Vistaprint emphasizes that ICANN’s Board took this decision the day before Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request regarding the Vistaprint SCO. However, this did not prevent the BGC from rejecting Vistaprint’s RFR without considering whether such a review mechanism might also be appropriate for dealing with the allegedly unfair and erroneous treatment of the SCO related to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications. 131

93. The core of Vistaprint’s discrimination and disparate treatment claims is stated in its First Additional Submission:

7. Other applicants have equally criticized SCO proceedings. In a letter to ICANN’s CEO, United TLD Holdco, Ltd. denounced the process flaws in the SCO proceedings involving the strings .com and .cam. DERCars, LCC filed an RFR, challenging the expert determination in the SCO proceedings relating to the strings .car and .cars. Amazon EU S.a.r.l. filed an RFR, challenging the expert determination in the SCO proceedings relating to the strings .shop and .通販 (which means ‘online shopping’ in Japanese). The ICANN Board took action in each of these matters.

- With respect to the Expert Determination finding .cam confusingly similar to .com, the ICANN Board ordered that an appeals process be developed to address the “perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determination”.
- With regard to the Expert Determination finding .cars confusingly similar to .car, the ICANN Board ordered its staff to propose a review mechanism. DERCars decided to withdraw its

128 Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 20-21.
129 Request, ¶ 52.
130 Request, ¶ 52 (referencing NGPC Resolution 2014.02.05.NG02).
131 Request, ¶ 52.
application for .cars before the review mechanism was implemented. As a result, it was no longer necessary for the ICANN Board to further consider the proposed review process.

- With regard to the Expert Determination finding .通販 confusingly similar to .shop, the ICANN Board ordered that an appeals process be developed to address the “perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determination”.

8. While the ICANN Board took action in the above-mentioned matters, it did not do so with respect to the .webs / .web determination. However, the .webs / .web determination was equally unreasonable, and at least equally serious substantive and procedural errors were made in these SCO proceedings. There is no reason for ICANN to treat the .webs / .web determination differently.

* * * *

12. When there are clear violations of the process and the outcome is highly objectionable (all as listed in detail in the request for IRP), the ICANN Board must intervene, as it has done with regard to other applications. The ICANN Board cannot justify why it intervenes in certain cases (.cars / .car, .cam / .com and .通販 / .shop), but refuses to do so in another case (.webs / .web). This is a clear violation of its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. The Panel in the current IRP has authority to order that ICANN must comply with its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation and must disregard the expert determination in relation to Vistaprint’s .webs applications.132

* * * *

31. When the ICANN Board individually considers an application, it must make sure that it does not treat applicants inequitably and that it does not discriminate among applicants. Article II, Section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws provides that “ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition”. However, with regard to the SCO proceedings, the ICANN Board has done the exact opposite. It created the opportunity for some aggrieved applicants to participate in an appeals process, while denying others.

32. As explained above, there is no justification for this disparate treatment, and the ICANN Board has not given any substantial and reasonable cause that would justify this discrimination.

94. Vistaprint also contends that ICANN cannot justify the disparate treatment:

22. ICANN’s attempt to justify the disparate treatment of Vistaprint’s applications is without merit. ICANN argues that its Board only intervened with respect to specific expert determinations because there had been several expert determinations regarding the same strings that were seemingly inconsistent (fn. omitted). Vistaprint recognizes that the ICANN Board intervened to address "perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determinations” (fn. omitted). However, ICANN fails to explain why the SCO Expert Determination on Vistaprint’s .webs applications was not just as unreasonable as the SCO Expert Determinations involving .cars/.car, .cam/.com and .通販 / .shop. Indeed, the determination concerning Vistaprint’s .webs applications expressly relies on the determination concerning .cars/.car, that was considered inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable by the ICANN Board that rejected the reasoning applied in the two other .cars/.car expert determinations (fn. omitted).

23. Therefore, Vistaprint requests the IRP Panel to exercise its control over the ICANN Board and to declare that ICANN discriminated Vistaprint’s applications.

95. Timing: Vistaprint contends that the objections it raises in this IRP concerning the Third Expert’s SCO determination and the Guidebook and its application are timely.133 While

132 Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 12.
133 Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶¶ 8-12.
ICANN argues that the time for Vistaprint to object to the SCO procedures as established in the Guidebook has long passed.\textsuperscript{134} Vistaprint responds that the opportunity to challenge the erroneous application of the Guidebook in violation of ICANN’s fundamental principles only arose when the flaws in ICANN's implementation of the Guidebook became apparent. At the time of the adoption of the Guidebook, Vistaprint was effectively barred from challenging it by the fact that it could not – at that time – show any harm. Further, to raise an issue at that time would have required Vistaprint to reveal that it was contemplating making an application for a new gTLD string, which might have encouraged opportunistic applications by others seeking to extract monetary value from Vistaprint. Although the IRP panel in the \textit{Booking.com v. ICANN} IRP raised similar timing concerns, it did not draw the distinction between the adoption of the general principles and their subsequent implementation.

B. ICANN’s Position

a. IRP Panel’s Authority

96. \textbf{Standard of review:} ICANN describes the IRP as a unique mechanism available under ICANN’s Bylaws.\textsuperscript{135} The IRP Panel is tasked with determining whether the Board’s actions are consistent with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws. ICANN states that its Bylaws specifically identify a deferential standard of review that the IRP Panel must apply when evaluating the actions of the ICANN Board, and the rules are clear that the IRP Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board.\textsuperscript{136} In particular, ICANN cites to Article IV, § 3.4 of the Bylaws indicating the IRP Panel is to apply a defined standard of review to the IRP Request, focusing on:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;
  \item[b.] did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and
  \item[c.] did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?
\end{itemize}

97. Further, ICANN states that the IRP addresses challenges to conduct undertaken by ICANN’s Board of Directors; it is not a mechanism to challenge the actions or inactions of ICANN staff or third parties that may be involved with ICANN’s activities.\textsuperscript{137} The IRP is also not an appropriate forum to challenge the BGC’s ruling on a Reconsideration Request in the absence of some violation by the BGC of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws.\textsuperscript{138}

98. \textbf{IRP Declaration binding or non-binding:} ICANN states that the IRP “is conducted pursuant to Article IV, section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws, which creates a non-binding method

\begin{footnotes}
\item[134] ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶¶ 28-29.
\item[135] Response, ¶ 32.
\item[136] Response, ¶ 33; ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 10.
\item[137] Response, ¶ 4.
\item[138] Response, ¶ 12.
\end{footnotes}
of evaluating certain actions of ICANN’s Board. The Panel has one responsibility – to “declar[e] whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of [ICANN’s] Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.” The IRP is not an arbitration process, but rather a means by which entities that participate in ICANN’s processes can seek an independent review of decisions made by ICANN’s Board.

99. ICANN states that the language of the IRP provisions set forth in Article IV, section 3 of the Bylaws, as well as the drafting history of the development of the IRP provisions, make clear that IRP panel declarations are not binding on ICANN. ICANN explains as follows in its First Additional Response:

35. First, the Bylaws charge an IRP panel with "comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws." The Board is then obligated to "review[ ]" and "consider" an IRP panel's declaration at the Board's next meeting "where feasible." The direction to "review" and "consider" an IRP panel's declaration means that the Board has discretion as to whether it should adopt that declaration and whether it should take any action in response to that declaration; if the declaration were binding, there would be nothing to review or consider, only a binding order to implement.

100. ICANN contends that the IRP Panel’s declaration is not binding because the Board is not permitted to outsource its decision-making authority. However, the Board will, of course, give serious consideration to the IRP Panel’s declaration and, “where feasible,” shall consider the IRP Panel’s declaration at the Board’s next meeting.

101. As to the drafting process, ICANN provides the following background in its First Additional Response:

36. Second, the lengthy drafting history of ICANN's independent review process confirms that IRP panel declarations are not binding. Specifically, the Draft Principles for Independent Review, drafted in 1999, state that "the ICANN Board should retain ultimate authority over ICANN's affairs – after all, it is the Board...that will be chosen by (and is directly accountable to) the membership and supporting organizations (fn. omitted). And when, in 2001, the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform (ERC) recommended the creation of an independent review process, it called for the creation of "a process to require non-binding arbitration by an international arbitration body to review any allegation that the Board has acted in conflict with ICANN's Bylaws" (fn. omitted). The individuals who actively participated in the process also agreed that the review process would not be binding. As one participant stated: IRP "decisions will be nonbinding, because the Board will retain final decision-making authority" (fn. omitted).

139 Response, ¶ 2.
140 Response, ¶ 2 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4).
141 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 34.
142 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 35 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11.d).
143 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 35 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.21).
144 Response, ¶ 35.
145 Response, ¶ 35 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.21).
37. In February 2010, the first IRP panel to issue a final declaration, the ICM IRP Panel, unanimously rejected the assertion that IRP panel declarations are binding146 and recognized that an IRP panel's declaration "is not binding, but rather advisory in effect." Nothing has occurred since the issuance of the ICM IRP Panel's declaration that changes the fact that IRP panel declarations are not binding. To the contrary, in April 2013, following the ICM IRP, in order to clarify even further that IRPs are not binding, all references in the Bylaws to the term "arbitration" were removed as part of the Bylaws revisions. ICM had argued in the IRP that the use of the word "arbitration" in the portion of the Bylaws related to Independent Review indicated that IRPs were binding, and while the ICM IRP Panel rejected that argument, to avoid any lingering doubt, ICANN removed the word "arbitration" in conjunction with the amendments to the Bylaws.

38. The amendments to the Bylaws, which occurred following a community process on proposed IRP revisions, added, among other things, a sentence stating that "declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value" (fn. omitted). Vistaprint argues that this new language, which does not actually use the word "binding," nevertheless provides that IRP panel declarations are binding, trumping years of drafting history, the sworn testimony of those who participated in the drafting process, and the plain text of the Bylaws. This argument is meritless.

39. First, relying on the use of the terms "final" and "precedential" is unavailing – a declaration clearly can be both non-binding and also final and precedential:

40. Second, the language Vistaprint references was added to ICANN's Bylaws to meet recommendations made by ICANN's Accountability Structures Expert Panel (ASEP). The ASEP was comprised of three world-renowned experts on issues of corporate governance, accountability, and international dispute resolution, and was charged with evaluating ICANN's accountability mechanisms, including the Independent Review process. The ASEP recommended, among other things, that an IRP should not be permitted to proceed on the same issues as presented in a prior IRP. The ASEP's recommendations in this regard were raised in light of the second IRP constituted under ICANN's Bylaws, where the claimant presented claims that would have required the IRP Panel to reevaluate the declaration of the IRP Panel in the ICM IRP. To prevent claimants from challenging Board action taken in direct response to a prior IRP panel declaration, the ASEP recommended that "[t]he declarations of the IRP, and ICANN's subsequent actions on those declarations, should have precedential value" (fn. omitted).

41. The ASEP’s recommendations in this regard did not convert IRP panel declarations into binding decisions (fn. omitted). One of the important considerations underlying the ASEP's work was the fact that ICANN, while it operates internationally, is a California non-profit public benefit corporation subject to the statutory law of California as determined by United States courts. As Graham McDonald, one of the three ASEP experts, explained, because California law requires that the board "retain responsibility for decision-making," the Board has "final word" on "any recommendation that ... arises out of [an IRP]" (fn. omitted). The ASEP's recommendations were therefore premised on the understanding that the declaration of an IRP panel is not "binding" on the Board.

102. Authority to award affirmative relief: ICANN contends that any request that the IRP Panel grant affirmative relief goes beyond the Panel’s authority.147 The Panel does not have the authority to award affirmative relief or to require ICANN to undertake specific

146 Declaration of IRP Panel, ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, ¶ 133 (Feb. 19, 2010) (“ICM Registry Final Declaration”).
147 Response, ¶ 78.
conduct. The Panel is limited to declaring whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles or Bylaws, and recommending that the Board stay any action or decision, or take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the Panel.\textsuperscript{148} ICANN adds that the IRP panel in \textit{ICM Registry Declaration} found that “\textit{[t]he IRP cannot ‘order’ interim measures but do no more than ‘recommend’ them, and this until the Board ‘reviews’ and ‘acts upon the opinion’ of the IRP.}”\textsuperscript{149}

\textbf{b. SCO Proceedings Claim}

103. ICANN states that Vistaprint is using this IRP as a means to challenge the merits of the Third Expert’s determination in the \textit{Vistaprint SCO}.\textsuperscript{150} As ICANN states in its Response:

\textit{12. Ultimately, Vistaprint has initiated this IRP because Vistaprint disagrees with the Expert Panel’s Determination and the BGC’s finding on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request. ICANN understands Vistaprint’s disappointment, but IRPs are not a vehicle by which an Expert Panel’s determination may be challenged because neither the determination, nor ICANN accepting the determination, constitutes an ICANN Board action. Nor is an IRP the appropriate forum to challenge a BGC ruling on a Reconsideration Request in the absence of some violation by the BGC of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws. Here, ICANN followed its policies and processes at every turn with respect to Vistaprint, which is all it is required to do.}

104. ICANN states that the IRP Panel has one chief responsibility – to “determine whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of [ICANN’s] Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.”\textsuperscript{151} With respect to Vistaprint’s claim that ICANN’s Board violated its Articles and Bylaws by “blindly accepting” the Third Expert’s SCO determination without reviewing its analysis or result, ICANN responds that there is no requirement for the Board to conduct such an analysis. “Accepting” or “reviewing” the Expert’s determination is not something the Board was tasked with doing or not doing. Per the Guidebook, the “findings of the panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process.”\textsuperscript{152} The Guidebook further provides that “\textit{[i]n a case where a gTLD applicant successfully asserts string confusion with another applicant, the only possible outcome is for both applicants to be placed in a contention set and to be referred to a contention resolution procedure (refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures).}”\textsuperscript{153} This step is a result not of any ICANN Board action, but a straightforward application of Guidebook provisions for SCO determinations.

105. ICANN states the Board thus took no action with respect to the Third Expert’s determination upon its initial issuance, because the Guidebook does not call for the Board to take any action and it is not required by any Article or Bylaw provision. Accordingly, it cannot be a violation of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws for the Board to not conduct a

\textsuperscript{148} ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 33 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, §§ 3.4 and 3.11(d)).
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{ICM Registry Final Declaration}, ¶ 133.
\textsuperscript{150} Response, ¶ 12; ICANN’s First Additional submission, ¶ 4.
\textsuperscript{151} Response, ¶ 2 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4).
\textsuperscript{152} Response, ¶ 9 (citing Guidebook, § 3.4.6).
\textsuperscript{153} Response, ¶ 9 (citing Guidebook, § 3.2.2.1).
substantive review of an expert’s SCO determination. And as such, there is no Board action in this regard for the IRP Panel to review.

106. ICANN states that “the sole Board action that Vistaprint has identified in this case is the BGC’s rejection of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request. However, ICANN maintains that nothing about the BGC’s handling of the RFR violated ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws.”154

107. In this regard, ICANN states that the BGC was not required, as Vistaprint contends, to refer Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request to the entire ICANN Board.155 The Bylaws provide that the BGC has the authority to “make a final determination of Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without reference to the Board of Directors.”156 Because Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request was a challenge to alleged staff action, the BGC was within its authority, and in compliance with the Bylaws, when it denied Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request without making a referral to the full Board.

108. ICANN states that the BGC did what it was supposed to do in reviewing Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request – it reviewed the Third Expert’s and ICANN staff’s compliance with policies and procedures, rather than the substance of the Third Expert’s SCO determination, and found no policy or process violations.157 ICANN urges that Vistaprint seeks to use the IRP to challenge the substantive decision of the Third Expert in the Vistaprint SCO. However, this IRP may only be used to challenge ICANN Board actions on the grounds that they do not comply with the Articles or Bylaws, neither of which is present here.

109. ICANN nevertheless responds to Vistaprint’s allegations regarding errors of process and substance in the SCO proceedings, and contends that the BGC properly handled its review of the Vistaprint SCO. ICANN’s specific responses on these points are as follows:

(i) As to Vistaprint’s claim that the ICDR’s appointment of the First Expert was untimely, missing the deadline by 5 days, ICANN states that the BGC determined that Vistaprint failed to provide any evidence that it contemporaneously challenged the timeliness of the ICDR’s appointment of the First Expert, and that a Reconsideration Request was not the appropriate mechanism to raise the issue for the first time. In addition, the BGC concluded that Vistaprint had failed to show that it was “materially” and “adversely” affected by the brief delay in appointing the First Expert, rendering reconsideration inappropriate.

(ii) Regarding Vistaprint’s claim that the First Expert (and Third Expert) improperly accepted and considered unsolicited supplemental filings, violating Articles 17 and 18 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, ICANN states that Article 17 provides the

154 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 4.
155 Response, ¶ 43.
156 Response, ¶ 44 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.3(f)).
157 Response, ¶ 11.
expert panel with the discretion to accept such a filing. "The Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response, and it shall fix time limits for such submissions." Thus, as the BGC correctly found, it was not the BGC’s place to second-guess the First (or Third) Expert’s exercise of permitted discretion.

(iii) As to Vistaprint’s claim that the ICDR violated Article 21 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure by failing to ensure the timely issuance of an expert SCO determination, ICANN contends that the BGC properly determined that Vistaprint’s claims in this regard did not support reconsideration for two reasons. First, on October 1, 2013, before the determination was supposed to be issued by the First Expert, the ICDR removed that expert. The BGC therefore could not evaluate whether the First Expert rendered an untimely determination in violation of the Procedure. Second, the BGC correctly noted that 45-day timeline applies to an expert’s submission of the determination “in draft form to the [ICDR’s] scrutiny as to form before it is signed” and the ICDR and the Expert are merely required to exercise “reasonable efforts” to issue a determination within 45 days of the constitution of the Panel.

(iv) Regarding Vistaprint’s claim that the First Expert failed to maintain independence and impartiality, in violation of Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, ICANN argues this claim is unsupported. As the BGC noted, Vistaprint provided no evidence demonstrating that the First Expert failed to follow the applicable ICDR procedures for independence and impartiality. Rather, all indications are that the First Expert and the ICDR complied with these rules as to this “new conflict,” which resulted in a removal of the First Expert. Further, Vistaprint presented no evidence of being materially and adversely affected by the First Expert’s removal, which is another justification for the BGC’s denial of the Reconsideration Request.

(v) Vistaprint claimed that the ICDR unjustifiably accepted a challenge to the Second Expert (or created the circumstances for such a challenge), in violation of Article 2 of the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections. ICANN contends that the BGC properly determined that this claim did not support reconsideration. The ICRD Rules for SCOs make clear that the ICDR had the “sole discretion” to review and decide challenges to the appointment of expert panelists. While Vistaprint may disagree with the ICDR’s decision to accept the Objector’s challenge, it is not the BGC’s role to second guess the ICDR’s discretion, and it was

158 Response, ¶ 50.
159 New gTLD Objections Procedure, Art. 17.
160 Response, ¶ 53, citing New gTLD Objections Procedure, Art. 21(a)-(b).
161 Response, ¶¶ 54-56.
162 Article 2, § 3 of the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections provides that:

Upon review of the challenge the DRSP in its sole discretion shall make the decision on the challenge and advise the parties of its decision.
[Underlining added]
not a violation of the Articles or Bylaws for the BGC to deny reconsideration on this ground.

(vi) Vistaprint claimed that the determination of the Third Expert was untimely, in violation of Article 21(a) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure. ICANN claims that the BGC properly held that this claim did not support reconsideration. On November 20, 2013, the ICDR appointed the Third Expert. Vistaprint claimed in its Reconsideration Request that pursuant to Article 21, the determination therefore “should have been rendered by January 4, 2014,” which was forty-five (45) days after the Panel was constituted. Because “it took this Panel until January 24, 2014 to render the Decision,” Vistaprint contended that the determination was untimely because it was twenty days late. ICANN states that, according to the Procedure, the Expert must exercise “reasonable efforts” to ensure that it submits its determination “in draft form to the DRSP’s scrutiny as to form before it is signed” within forty-five (45) days of the Expert Panel being constituted. As the BGC noted, there is no evidence that the Third Expert failed to comply with this Procedure, and reconsideration was therefore unwarranted on this ground.

(vii) ICANN responded to Vistaprint’s claim that the Third Expert incorrectly applied the Objector’s burden of proof, in violation of section 3.5 of the Guidebook and Article 20(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure (which place the burden on the Objector). Vistaprint claimed that the Third Expert contravened ICANN’s process because the Expert did not give an analysis showing that the Objector had met the burden of proof. ICANN states that the BGC found the Expert extensively detailed support for the conclusion that the .WEBS string so nearly resembles .WEB – visually, aurally and in meaning – that it is likely to cause confusion. The BGC noted that the Expert had adhered to the procedures and standards set forth in the Guidebook relevant to determining string confusion and reconsideration was not warranted on this basis.

(viii) Finally, as to Vistaprint’s claim that the Third Expert incorrectly applied ICANN’s substantive standard for evaluation of String Confusion Objections (as set out in Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook), ICANN contends the BGC properly found that reconsideration was not appropriate. Vistaprint contended that the Expert failed to apply the appropriate high standard for assessing likelihood of confusion. ICANN states that Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook provides that

“[f]or the likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user.”

ICANN claims that disagreement as to whether this standard should have resulted in a finding in favor of Vistaprint does not mean that the Third Expert violated any policy or process in reaching his decision. Vistaprint also claimed that the Third

---

163 Response, ¶¶ 61-62.
164 Response, ¶¶ 63-64.
165 Response, ¶¶ 65-68.
166 Request, ¶ 47.
Expert “failed to apply the burden of proof and the standards imposed by ICANN” because the Expert questioned whether the co-existence between Vistaprint’s domain name, <webs.com>, and the Objector’s domain name, <web.com> for many years without evidence of actual confusion is relevant to his determination. ICANN states that, as the BGC noted, the relevant consideration for the Expert is whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion, not whether there is confusion between second-level domain names. Vistaprint does not cite any provision of the Guidebook, the Procedure, or the Rules that have been contravened in this regard.

110. In sum, ICANN contends that the BGC did its job, which did not include evaluating the merits of Third Expert’s determination, and the BGC followed applicable policies and procedures in considering the RFR. 167

111. Regarding Vistaprint’s claims of ICANN’s breach of various Articles and Bylaws, ICANN responds as follows in its Response:

71. First, Vistaprint contends that ICANN failed to comply with the general principle of “good faith.” But the only reason Vistaprint asserts ICANN failed to act in good faith is in “refus[ing] to reconsider the substance” of the Determination or to “act with independent judgment” (fn. omitted). The absence of an appeal mechanism by which Vistaprint might challenge the Determination does not form the basis for an IRP because there is nothing in ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation requiring ICANN to provide one.

72. Second, Vistaprint contends that ICANN failed to apply its policies in a neutral manner. Here, Vistaprint complains that other panels let other applications proceed without being placed into a contention set, even though they, in Vistaprint’s opinion, presented “at least equally serious string similarity concerns” as .WEBS/.WEB (fn. omitted). Vistaprint’s claims about ICDR’s treatment of other string similarity disputes cannot be resolved by IRP, as they are even further removed from Board conduct. Different outcomes by different expert panels related to different gTLDs are to be expected. Claiming that other applicants have not suffered adverse determinations does not convert the Expert Panel’s Determination into a “discriminatory ICANN Board act.”

73. Third, Vistaprint contends that the ICANN Board violated its obligation to act transparently for not investigating the “impartiality and independence” of the Expert Panel and thereby “did not seek to communicate with [ICDR] to optimize [its] service” (fn. omitted). Aside from the disconnect between the particular Bylaws provision invoked by Vistaprint requiring ICANN’s transparency, and the complaint that the ICDR did not act transparently, Vistaprint fails to identify any procedural deficiency in the ICDR’s actions regarding the removal of the First Expert, as set forth above. Moreover, Vistaprint cites no obligation in the Articles or Bylaws that the ICANN Board affirmatively investigate the impartiality of an Expert Panel, outside of the requirement that the ICDR follow its policies on conflicts, which the ICDR did.

74. Fourth, Vistaprint contends that ICANN “has not created any general process for challenging the substance of the so-called expert determination,” and thus has “brashly flouted” its obligation to remain accountable (fn. omitted). But again, Vistaprint does not identify any provision of the Articles or Bylaws that requires ICANN to provide such an appeals process.

75. Fifth, Vistaprint “concludes” that the ICANN Board neglected its duty to promote competition and innovation (fn. omitted) when it failed to overturn the Expert Panel’s Determination. Vistaprint claims that the Objector’s “motive in filing the objection was to prevent a potential competitor from entering

167 Response, ¶ 69.
the gTLD market” and therefore ICANN’s “acceptance” of the objection purportedly contravenes ICANN’s core value of promoting competition. But every objection to a gTLD application by an applicant for the same string seeks to hinder a competitor’s application. By Vistaprint’s logic, ICANN’s commitment to promoting competition requires that no objections ever be sustained and every applicant obtains the gTLD it requests. There is no provision in the Articles or Bylaws that require such an unworkable system.

76. All in all, Vistaprint’s attempt to frame its disappointment with the Expert Panel’s decision as the ICANN Board’s dereliction of duties does not withstand scrutiny.

c. Disparate Treatment Claim

112. ICANN states that Vistaprint objects to the Board’s exercise of its independent judgement in determining not to intervene further (beyond the review of the BGC) with respect to the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, as the Board did with respect to expert determinations on String Confusion Objections regarding the strings (1) .COM/.CAM, (2) .CAR/.CARS, and (3) .SHOP/.通販 (online shopping in Japanese).168

113. ICANN states that the Guidebook provides that in “exceptional circumstances,” such as when accountability mechanisms like RFR or IRP are invoked, “the Board might individually consider an application”169 and that is precisely what occurred in Vistaprint’s case. Because Vistaprint sought reconsideration, the BGC considered Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request and concluded that the ICDR and Third Expert had not violated any relevant policy or procedure in rendering the Expert’s determination.

114. ICANN states that the ICANN Board only intervened with respect to these other expert determinations because there had been several independent expert determinations regarding the same strings that were seemingly inconsistent with one another. That is not the case with respect to Vistaprint’s applications – no other expert determinations were issued regarding the similarity of .WEB and .WEBS.170 “Unlike .WEB/.WEBS, the COM/.CAM, .CAR/.CARS, and .SHOP/.通販 strings were all the subject of several, seemingly inconsistent determinations on string confusion objections by different expert panels. So, for example, while one expert upheld a string confusion objection asserting that .CAM was confusingly similar to .COM, another expert overruled a separate string confusion objection asserting precisely the same thing.”171

115. Further, ICANN explains that

16. Given what were viewed by some as inconsistent determinations, the BGC requested that ICANN staff draft a report for the ICANN Board’s New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC"), "setting out

168 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 14.
169 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 5 (citing Guidebook, § 5.1). ICANN quotes the Booking.com Final Declaration, where the IRP Panel stated in relation to § 5.1 “the fact that the ICANN Board enjoys such discretion [to individually consider an application for a New gTLD] and may choose to exercise it at any time does not mean that it is bound to exercise it, let alone at the time and in the manner demanded by Booking.com.”
170 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 5.
171 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 15.
options for dealing with differing outcomes of the String Confusion Objection Dispute Resolution process in similar disputes...” 172 The NGPC subsequently considered potential approaches to addressing perceived inconsistent determinations on string confusion objections, including possibly implementing a new review mechanism. 173 ICANN staff initiated a public comment period regarding framework principles of a potential such review mechanism. 174 Ultimately, having considered the report drafted by ICANN staff, the public comments received, and the string confusion objection process set forth in the Guidebook, the NGPC determined that the inconsistent expert determinations regarding .COM/.CAM and .SHOP/.通販 were "not[] in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community" and directed ICANN staff to establish a process whereby the ICDR would appoint a three-member panel to re-evaluate those expert determinations. 175

116. ICANN contends that Vistaprint has identified no Articles or Bylaws provision violated by the Board in exercising its independent judgment to intervene with respect to inconsistent determinations in certain SCO cases, but not with respect to the single expert SCO determination regarding .WEBS/.WEB. The Board was justified in exercising its discretion to intervene with respect to the inconsistent expert determinations regarding .COM/.CAM, .CAR/.CARS and .SHOP/.通販 - the Board acted to bring certainty to multiple and differing expert determinations on String Confusion Objections regarding the same strings. 176 That justification was not present with respect to the single Vistaprint SCO determination at issue here. Thus, ICANN contends Vistaprint was not treated differently than other similarly-situated gTLD applicants.

117. Timing: Finally, ICANN also states that the time for Vistaprint to challenge the Guidebook and its standards has past. The current version of the Guidebook was published on June 4, 2012 following an extensive review process, including public comment on multiple drafts. 177 Despite having ample opportunity, Vistaprint did not object to the Guidebook at the time it was implemented. If Vistaprint had concerns related to the issues it now raises, it should have pursued them at the time, not years later and only after receiving the determination in the Vistaprint SCO. ICANN quotes the Booking.com Final Declaration, where the IRP stated,

"the time has long since passed for Booking.com or any other interested party to ask an IRP panel to review the actions of the ICANN Board in relation to the establishment of the string similarity review process, including Booking.com's claims that specific elements of the process and the Board decisions to implement those elements are inconsistent with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws. Any such claims, even if they had any merit, are long since time-barred by the 30-day limitation period set out in Article IV, Section 3(3) of the Bylaws." 178

118. ICANN states that while the Guidebook process at issue in this case is different for the
process at issue in the Booking.com IRP – the SCO process rather than the string similarity review process – the Booking.com IRP panel’s reasoning applies equally. ICANN argues that because both processes were developed years ago, as part of the development of the Guidebook, challenges to both are time-barred.179

V. Analysis and Findings

a. IRP Panel’s Authority

119. Standard of Review: The IRP Panel has benefited from the parties submissions on this issue, noting their agreement as to the Panel’s primary task: comparing contested actions (or inactions)180 of ICANN’s Board to its Articles and Bylaws and declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with them. Yet when considering this Panel’s comparative task, the parties disagree as to the level of deference to be accorded by the Panel in assessing the Board’s actions or inactions.

120. Vistaprint has sought independent review through this IRP, claiming that is has been “harmed” (i.e., its .WEBS application has not been allowed to proceed and has been placed in a Contention Set) by the Board’s alleged violation of the Articles and Bylaws. In accordance with Article IV, § 3.2 of the Bylaws:

Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board’s alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board’s action.

121. As noted above, Article IV, § 1 of the Bylaws emphasizes that the IRP is an accountability mechanism:

The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws.

122. The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.4 detail the IRP Panel’s charge and issues to be considered in a defined standard of review:

Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel (“IRP Panel”), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?

b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?

179 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 28.
180 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11(c) (“The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:...(c) declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws” (underlining added).
123. The Bylaws state the IRP Panel is “charged” with “comparing” contested actions of the Board to the Articles and Bylaws and “declaring” whether the Board has acted consistently with them. The Panel is to focus, in particular, on whether the Board acted without conflict of interest, exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it, and exercised independent judgment in taking a decision believed to be in the best interests of ICANN. In the IRP Panel’s view this more detailed listing of a defined standard cannot be read to remove from the Panel’s remit the fundamental task of comparing actions or inactions of the Board with the Articles and Bylaws and declaring whether the Board has acted consistently or not. Instead, the defined standard provides a list of questions that can be asked, but not to the exclusion of other potential questions that might arise in a particular case as the Panel goes about its comparative work. For example, the particular circumstances may raise questions whether the Board acted in a transparent or non-discriminatory manner. In this regard, the ICANN Board’s discretion is limited by the Articles and Bylaws, and it is against the provisions of these instruments that the Board’s conduct must be measured.

124. The Panel agrees with ICANN’s statement that the Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board. However, this does not fundamentally alter the lens through which the Panel must view its comparative task. As Vistaprint has urged, the IRP is the only accountability mechanism by which ICANN holds itself accountable through independent third-party review of its actions or inactions. Nothing in the Bylaws specifies that the IRP Panel’s review must be founded on a deferential standard, as ICANN has asserted. Such a standard would undermine the Panel’s primary goal of ensuring accountability on the part of ICANN and its Board, and would be incompatible with ICANN’s commitment to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability, as required by ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments, Bylaws and core values.

181 The Supplementary Rules provide similarly in section 1 that the IRP is designed “to review ICANN Board actions or inactions alleged to be inconsistent with ICANN's Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation” with the standard of review set forth in section 8:

8. Standard of Review

The IRP is subject to the following standard of review: (i) did the ICANN Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision; (ii) did the ICANN Board exercise due diligence and care in having sufficient facts in front of them; (iii) did the ICANN Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

If a requestor demonstrates that the ICANN Board did not make a reasonable inquiry to determine it had sufficient facts available, ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest in participating in the decision, or the decision was not an exercise in independent judgment, believed by the ICANN Board to be in the best interests of the company, after taking account of the Internet community and the global public interest, the requestor will have established proper grounds for review.
125. The IRP Panel is aware that three other IRP panels have considered this issue of standard of review and degree of deference to be accorded, if any, when assessing the conduct of ICANN’s Board. All of them have reached the same conclusion: the Board’s conduct is to be reviewed and appraised by the IRP Panel using an objective and independent standard, without any presumption of correctness. As the IRP Panel reasoned in the ICM Registry Final Declaration:

ICANN is no ordinary non-profit California corporation. The Government of the United States vested regulatory authority of vast dimension and pervasive global reach in ICANN. In “recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization” – including ICANN – ICANN is charged with “promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet...” ICANN “shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law...” Thus, while a California corporation, it is governed particularly by the terms of its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, as the law of California allows. Those Articles and Bylaws, which require ICANN to carry out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, do not specify or imply that the International Review Process provided for shall (or shall not) accord deference to the decisions of the ICANN Board. The fact that the Board is empowered to exercise its judgment in the application of ICANN’s sometimes competing core values does not necessarily import that that judgment must be treated deferentially by the IRP. In the view of the Panel, the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be reviewed and appraised by the Panel objectively, not deferentially. The business judgment rule of the law of California, applicable to directors of California corporations, profit and nonprofit, in the case of ICANN is to be treated as a default rule that might be called upon in the absence of relevant provisions of ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws and of specific representations of ICANN...that bear on the propriety of its conduct. In the instant case, it is those Articles and Bylaws, and those representations, measured against the facts as the Panel finds them, which are determinative.

126. The IRP Panel here agrees with this analysis. Moreover, Article IV, §3.21 of the Bylaws provides that “declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value” (underlining added). The IRP Panel recognizes that there is unanimity on the issue of degree of deference, as found by the three IRP panels that have previously considered it. The declarations of those panels have precedential value. The Panel considers that the question on this issue is now settled. Therefore, in this IRP the ICANN Board’s conduct is to be reviewed and appraised by this Panel objectively and independently, without any presumption of correctness.

127. On a related point as to the scope of the IRP Panel’s review, the Panel agrees with ICANN’s point of emphasis that, because the Panel’s review is limited to addressing challenges to conduct by ICANN’s Board, the Panel is not tasked with reviewing the

---

182 ICM Registry Final Declaration, ¶ 136 (“the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be reviewed and appraised by the Panel objectively, not deferentially”); Booking.com final Declaration, ¶ 111 (“the IRP Panel is charged with ‘objectively’ determining whether or not the Board’s actions are in fact consistent with the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook, which the Panel understands as requiring that the Board’s conduct be appraised independently, and without any presumption of correctness.”); Final Declaration of the IRP Panel in DotConnectAfrica Trust v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50-2013-001083, ¶ 76 (July 9, 2015) (“DCA Final Declaration”), at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-declaration-2-redacted-09jul15-en.pdf (last accessed on Sept. 15, 2015) (“The Panel therefore concludes that the “standard of review” in this IRP is a de novo, objective and independent one, which does not require any presumption of correctness”).

183 ICM Registry Final Declaration, ¶ 136.
actions or decisions of ICANN staff or other third parties who may be involved in ICANN activities or provide services to ICANN (such as the ICDR or the experts in the *Vistaprint SCO*). With this in mind, and with the focus on the Board, the only affirmative action of the Board in relation to Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD application was through the BGC, which denied Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request. ICANN states that “the sole Board action that Vistaprint has identified in this case is the Board Governance Committee’s (‘BGC’) rejection of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request, which sought reconsideration of the Expert Determination.” It appears that ICANN’s focus in this statement is on affirmative action taken by the BGC in rejecting Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request; however, this does not eliminate the IRP Panel’s consideration of whether, in the circumstances, inaction (or omission) by the BGC or the full ICANN Board in relation to the issues raised by Vistaprint’s application would be considered a potential violation of the Articles or Bylaws.

128. As discussed below, the Panel considers that a significant question in this IRP concerns one of “omission” – the ICANN Board, through the BGC or otherwise, did not provide relief to Vistaprint in the form of an additional review mechanism, as it did to certain other parties who were the subject of an adverse SCO determination.

129. **IRP declaration binding or non-binding:** As noted above, Vistaprint contends that the outcome of this IRP is binding on ICANN, and that any other result would be incompatible with ICANN’s obligation to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability. ICANN, on the other hand, contends that the IRP Panel’s declaration is intended to be advisory and non-binding.

130. In analyzing this issue, the IRP Panel has carefully reviewed the three charter instruments that give the Panel its authority to act in this case: the Bylaws, the Supplementary Procedures, and the ICDR Rules. The Panel views that it is important to distinguish between (i) the findings of the Panel on the question of whether the ICANN Board’s conduct is consistent (or not) with the Articles and Bylaws, and (ii) any consequent remedial measures to be considered as a result of those findings, at least insofar as those

---

184 The BGC is a committee of the Board established pursuant to Article XII, § 1 of the Bylaws. Article IV, § 2.3 of the Bylaws provide for the delegation of the Board’s authority to the BGC to consider Requests for Reconsideration and indicate that the BGC shall have the authority to:
- evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;
- summarily dismiss insufficient requests;
- evaluate requests for urgent consideration;
- conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;
- request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties;
- make a final determination on Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without reference to the Board of Directors; and
- make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request, as necessary.

The BGC has discretion to decide whether to issue a final decision or make a recommendation to ICANN’s Board. In this case, the BGC decided to make a final determination on Vistaprint’s RFR.

185 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 4. By contrast to the IRP Panel’s focus on the Board’s conduct, the BGC in its decision on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration request considered the action or inaction of ICANN staff and third parties providing services to ICANN (i.e., the ICDR and SCO experts).
measures would direct the Board to take or not take any action or decision. The Panel considers that, as to the first point, the findings of the Panel on whether the Board has acted in a manner that is consistent (or not) with the Articles or Bylaws is akin to a finding of breach/liability by a court in a contested legal case. This determination by the Panel is “binding” in the sense that ICANN’s Board cannot overrule the Panel’s declaration on this point or later decide for itself that it disagrees with the Panel and that there was no inconsistency with (or violation of) the Articles and Bylaws. However, when it comes to the question of whether or not the IRP Panel can require that ICANN’s Board implement any form of redress based on a finding of violation, here, the Panel believes that it can only raise remedial measures to be considered by the Board in an advisory, non-binding manner. The Panel concludes that this distinction – between a “binding” declaration on the violation question and a “non-binding” declaration when it comes to recommending that the Board stay or take any action – is most consistent with the terms and spirit of the charter instruments upon which the Panel’s jurisdiction is based, and avoids conflating these two aspects of the Panel’s role.

131. The IRP Panel shares some of Vistaprint’s concerns about the efficacy of the IRP as an accountability mechanism if any affirmative relief that might be considered appropriate by the Panel is considered non-binding on ICANN’s Board (see discussion below); nevertheless, the Panel determines on the basis of the charter instruments, as well as the drafting history of those documents, that its declaration is binding only with respect to the finding of compliance or not with the Articles and Bylaws, and non-binding with respect to any measures that the Panel might recommend the Board take or refrain from taking. The Panel’s Declaration will have “precedential value” and will possibly be made publicly available on ICANN’s website.\(^\text{186}\) Thus, the declaration of violation (or not), even without the ability to order binding relief vis-à-vis ICANN’s Board, will carry more weight than would be the case if the IRP was a confidential procedure with decisions that carried no precedential value.

132. To the extent that there is ambiguity on the nature of the IRP Panel’s declaration (which perhaps could have been avoided in the first place), it is because there is ambiguity and an apparent contradiction created by some of the key terms of the three charter instruments – the Bylaws, the Supplementary Procedures, and the ICDR Rules. In terms of a potential interpretive hierarchy for these documents – to the extent that such hierarchy is relevant – the Bylaws can be said to have created the IRP and its terms of reference: the IRP is established as an accountability mechanism pursuant to the Bylaws, Article IV, § 3 (Independent Review of Board Actions). Article IV, § 3.8 of the Bylaws, in turn, delegates to the “IRP Provider” the task of establishing rules and procedures that are supposed to be consistent with Article IV, § 3:

Subject to the approval of the Board, the IRP Provider shall establish operating rules and procedures.

\(^{186}\) The Panel observes the final declarations in all previous IRPs that have gone to decision, as well as declarations concerning procedure and interim relief, have been posted on ICANN’s website. In this respect, Supplementary Procedures, Rule 10(c) provides that a “Declaration may be made public only with the consent of all parties or as required by law”. However, ICANN has also agreed in Rule 10(c) that subject to the redaction of confidential information or unforeseen circumstances, “ICANN will consent to publication of a Declaration if the other party so requests.”
133. Thus, the Supplementary Procedures and ICDR Rules were established pursuant to Article IV, § 3.8 of the Bylaws; however, the requirement of consistency as between the texts was imperfectly implemented, at least with respect to the ICDR Rules, as discussed below. As between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, the Supplementary Procedures will control, as provided in Supplementary Rule 2:

In the event there is any inconsistency between these Supplementary Procedures and the Rules, these Supplementary Procedures will govern.

134. The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.4 provide that the Panel shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles and Bylaws, and with “declaring” whether the Board has acted consistently with the Articles. The IRP panel in the ICM Registry Final Declaration stressed that the IRP panel’s task is “to ‘declare’, not to ‘decide’ or to ‘determine’,”187 However, the word “declare”, alone, does not conclusively answer the question of whether the IRP’s declaration (or any part of it) is binding or not. “To declare” means “to announce or express something clearly and publicly, especially officially.”188 Declarations can and do serve as the predicate for binding or non-binding consequences in different contexts. For example, a declaratory relief action – in which a court resolves legal uncertainty by determining the rights of parties under a contract or statute without ordering anything be done or awarding damages – can have a binding result because it may later preclude a lawsuit by one of the parties to the declaratory lawsuit. Further, in a non-legal context, “declaring” a state of emergency in a particular state or country can have binding consequences. Thus, the word “declare,” in itself, does not answer the issue.

135. Moreover, nothing in the Bylaws, Supplementary Procedures or ICDR Rules suggests that the IRP Panel’s declaration is non-binding with respect to the Panel’s core task of deciding whether the Board did, or did not, comply the Articles or Bylaws. There is no provision that states the ICANN Board can reconsider this independent and important declaration. To the contrary, the ICDR Rules, which apply to the IRP proceedings, can be read to suggest that both the Panel’s finding of compliance (or not) by ICANN’s Board, and the Panel’s possible reference to any remedial measures, are binding on ICANN. As Vistaprint indicates, the preamble of the ICDR Rules provide that “[a] dispute can be submitted to an arbitral tribunal for a final and binding decision,” and Article 30(1) of those Rules specifies that “[a]wards shall be made in writing by the arbitral tribunal and shall be final and binding on the parties” (emphasis added).

136. However, these terms in the ICDR Rules arguably contradict specific provisions of the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures, at least to the extent that they are read to cover any measures that the IRP Panel would direct the ICANN Board to take or not take. In this way, if there is a contradiction between the texts, the Bylaws and Supplemental rules would govern. However, focusing on the relief that the Panel is authorized to grant

187 ICM Registry Final Declaration, ¶ 133.
188 Cambridge English Online Dictionary (United States version).
provides a decisive clue as to the question of whether the IRP declaration, or any part of it, is binding or non-binding, and produces a faithful and harmonized reading of all the texts. While the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures say nothing to limit the binding effect of the IRP Panel’s “liability” declaration, they both contain provisions that expressly indicate the Panel may only “recommend” that the Board stay or take any action or decision. In particular, the Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.11 sets out the IRP Panel’s authority in terms of alternative actions that it may take once it is has an IRP case before it:

The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:

- summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious;
- request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties;
- declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and
- recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;
- consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar; and
- determine the timing for each proceeding.

137. Article IV, § 3.11(a) provides that the Panel may summarily dismiss an IRP request in certain circumstances. A fair reading of this term is that an IRP panel’s dismissal of a case pursuant to § 3.11(a) would be a binding decision, both for the party who brought the IRP request and for ICANN. In other words, ICANN could not require that the IRP panel take-up the case again once it has been dismissed by the panel. Further, the IRP panel can “request additional written submissions” from the parties (including the Board) or certain third parties. Here again, a fair reading of this term is that it is not subject to any review by ICANN Board before it can be implemented and is therefore binding on those who receive such a request.

138. By comparison, any form of relief whereby the IRP Panel would direct the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision, as specified in § 3.11(d), must be “recommend[ed]” to the Board, which then “reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.” The Panel’s authority is thus limited (and in this sense non-binding) when it

---

189 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11.
190 Supplementary Rule 6 provides similarly that:

An IRP Panel may summarily dismiss any request for Independent Review where the requestor has not demonstrated that it meets the standing requirements for initiating the Independent Review.

Summary dismissal of a request for Independent Review is also appropriate where a prior IRP on the same issue has concluded through Declaration.

An IRP Panel may also dismiss a querulous, frivolous or vexatious request for Independent Review.

191 Supplementary Rule 7 provides similarly (as regards interim measures of protection) that:

An IRP Panel may recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the IRP declaration. Where the IRP (Continued...)
comes to providing ICANN’s Board with potential courses of action or inaction in view of Board’s non-compliance with the Articles or Bylaws.192

139. Several other provisions of the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures can be fairly read to relate to decisions of the IRP panel that would be considered binding, even as to ICANN’s Board. Article IV, § 3.18 provides “[t]he IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party.” There is no mechanism for the Board to overrule the IRP panel’s designation as to which party is the prevailing party. Article IV, § 3.20 provides “[t]he IRP Panel may, in its discretion, grant a party’s request to keep certain information confidential, such as trade secrets.” A fair reading of this provision is that the IRP panel’s decision concerning such questions of confidentiality would be binding on all parties (including ICANN) in the IRP procedure. Consolidating IRP requests and determining the timing for each IRP proceeding are also decisions of the panel that are binding and not subject to review. Finally, Supplemental Procedures, Rule 11, directs that “[t]he IRP Panel shall fix costs in its Declaration.” Here too, this decision of the IRP panel can be fairly read to be binding on the parties, including the Board.

140. Thus, the IRP Panel’s authority to render binding or non-binding decisions, orders or relief can be considered in relation to four basic areas:

(i) **summary dismissals** by the IRP Panel (for different reasons as stated in the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures) are final and binding on the parties. There is no mechanism for appeal of such dismissals and they have precedential value.

(ii) the **designation of prevailing party, fixing costs for the IRP, and other orders in support of the IRP proceedings** (e.g., timing of proceedings, confidentiality, requests for additional submissions, consolidation of IRP cases) are binding decisions of the IRP Panel, with no review by the Board or any other body.

(iii) the IRP Panel’s declaration of whether or not the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles and Bylaws is final and binding, in the sense that there is no appeal on this point to ICANN’s Board or any other body; it is a final determination and has precedential value.

(iv) any form of relief in which the IRP Panel would direct the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision is only a recommendation to the Board. In this sense, __Panel is not yet comprised, the Chair of the standing panel may provide a recommendation on the stay of any action or decision__

192 The word “recommend” is also not free of ambiguity. For example, Article 47 of the ICSID Convention (concerning investor-State arbitration) provides in relevant part that “the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, **recommend** any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party” (emphasis added). The use of the word “recommend” in this context may refer to an order of the Tribunal that is intended to be binding on the parties. Nevertheless, in the context of the IRP, the Panel considers that use of the word “recommend” conveys that the Panel’s direction of any action or inaction on the part of the Board is a non-binding reference.
such a recommendation is not binding on the Board. The Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures provide specific and detailed guidance in this key area – i.e., relief that would require the Board to take or refraining from taking any action or decision – where the IRP Panel’s decisions would not be binding on the Board, but would serve only as a recommendation to be reviewed and acted upon by the Board.

141. The other decisions of the IRP panel, as outlined above and including the declaration of whether or not the Board violated the Articles and Bylaws, would be binding, consistent with the Bylaws, Supplementary Procedures and ICDR Rule Article 30(1). This approach provides a reading that harmonizes the terms of the three charter instruments. It also provides interpretive context for Article IV, § 3.21 of the Bylaws, providing that “[w]here feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting.” The IRP panel in the ICM Registry Final Declaration stated that “[t]his relaxed temporal proviso to do no more than ‘consider’ the IRP declaration, and to do so at the next meeting of the Board ‘where feasible’, emphasizes that it is not binding.”193 However, consistent with the analysis above, the IRP Panel here reads this statement in the ICM Registry Final Declaration to relate only to an IRP panel’s decision to “recommend” that the Board take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision. It does not relate to the other decisions or duties of the IRP panel, as explained above.

142. Vistaprint contends that the second sentence in Article IV, § 3.21 – providing “[t]he declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value” – which was added in April 2013 after the issuance of ICM Registry Final Declaration, was a change that supports the view that the IRP panel’s outcome, including any references to remedial relief, is binding. However, the Panel agrees with ICANN’s view that “a declaration clearly can be both non-binding and also final and precedential.”194 Further, the preparatory work and drafting history for the relevant provisions of the Bylaws relating to the IRP procedure indicate the intention for a non-binding procedure with respect to the Panel’s authority to advise the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision. As summarized in ICANN’s contentions above, ICANN has submitted evidence that those who were initially involved in establishing the IRP considered that it should be an advisory, non-binding procedure in relation to any policies that the Board might be requested to consider and implement by the IRP panel.195

143. Thus, the Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures draw a line: when the measures that an IRP panel might consider as a result of its core task require that the Board take or refrain from taking any action or decision, the panel may only “recommend” this course of action. On the other hand, if the IRP panel decides that the Board had violated its Articles or Bylaws, or if the panel decides to dismiss the IRP request, designate a prevailing party,
set conditions for confidentiality, consolidate IRP requests, request additional written submissions or fix costs, a fair reading of the Bylaws, Supplementary Procedures and ICDR Rules relevant to these determinations would be that the IRP panel’s decisions on these matters are binding on both parties, including ICANN.

144. Finally, in view of Article IV, § 3.21 providing that the declarations of IRP panels are final and have precedential value, the IRP Panel here recognizes that, in addition to the ICM Registry Final Declaration, two other IRP panels have considered the question of the IRP panel’s authority. In the Booking.com Final Declaration, the IRP panel focused on the independent and objective standard of review to be applied to the panel’s core task of assessing whether the Board’s actions were consistent with the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook.196 However, the IRP panel in Booking.com, as ICANN acknowledges in its Second Additional Response, did not directly address whether an IRP panel may issue a binding declaration (although ICANN contends that the panel implicitly acknowledged that it cannot).197

145. In the DCA Final Declaration, the IRP panel addressed directly the question of whether or not the panel’s declaration was binding. The panel ruled that its declarations, both as to the procedure and the merits of the case, were binding. The IRP panel in that case raised some of the same concerns that Vistaprint has raised here198:

110. ICANN points to the extensive public and expert input that preceded the formulation of the Supplementary Procedures. The Panel would have expected, were a mere advisory decision, opinion or declaration the objective of the IRP, that this intent be clearly articulated somewhere in the Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures. In the Panel’s view, this could have easily been done.

111. The force of the foregoing textual and construction considerations as pointing to the binding effect of the Panel’s decisions and declarations are reinforced by two factors: 1) the exclusive nature of the IRP whereby the non-binding argument would be clearly in contradiction with such a factor; and, 2) the special, unique, and publicly important function of ICANN. As explained before, ICANN is not an ordinary private non-profit entity deciding for its own sake who it wishes to conduct business with, and who it does not. ICANN rather, is the steward of a highly valuable and important international resource.

[...]

115. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it is acceptable for ICANN to adopt a remedial scheme with no teeth, the Panel is of the opinion that, at a minimum, the IRP should forthrightly explain and acknowledge that the process is merely advisory. This would at least let parties know before embarking on a potentially expensive process that a victory before the IRP panel may be ignored by ICANN. And, a straightforward acknowledgment that the IRP process is intended to be merely advisory might lead to a legislative or executive initiative to create a truly independent compulsory process.

146. The IRP panel in the DCA Final Declaration also emphasized that, according to the terms of the Guidebook, applicants for a new gTLD string waive their right to resort to the courts

196 Booking.com Final Declaration, ¶¶ 104-115.
197 ICANN’s Second Additional Response, ¶ 29.
198 DCA Final Declaration, ¶ 23 (quoting DCA Declaration on the IRP Procedure (Aug. 14, 2014)).
and therefore the IRP serves as the ultimate accountability mechanism for them:199

15. The IRP is the only independent third party process that allows review of board actions to ensure their consistency with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As already explained in this Panel’s 14 August 2014 Declaration on the IRP Procedure (“August 2014 Declaration”), the avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do not include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN’s Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

“Applicant hereby releases ICANN [...] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN [...] in connection with ICANN’s review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant’s gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM.”

Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, then the only and ultimate “accountability” remedy for an applicant is the IRP.

147. The IRP Panel in this case considers that the IRP panel in the DCA Final Declaration, and Vistaprint, have made several forceful arguments in favor of why the outcome of the IRP should be considered binding, especially to ensure the efficacy of the IRP as an accountability mechanism. Vistaprint has also urged that the IRP, at least with respect to applicants for new gTLD strings, is not merely a corporate accountability mechanism aimed at internal stakeholders, but operates to assess ICANN’s responsibilities in relation to external third parties. And the outcome of the IRP is binding on these third parties, even if it is not binding on ICANN and its Board. In similar circumstances, it would not be uncommon that individuals, companies or even governments, would agree to participate in dispute resolution processes with third parties that are binding, at least inter partes.

148. However, as explained above, the IRP Panel concludes that the distinction between a “binding” declaration on the violation/liability question (and certain other matters as discussed above), on the one hand, and a “non-binding” declaration when it comes to recommending that the Board take or refrain from taking any action or decision, on the other hand, is most faithful to the terms and spirit of the charter instruments upon which the Panel’s jurisdiction is based. To the extent that there is any disagreement with this approach, it is for ICANN to consider additional steps to address any ambiguities that might remain concerning the authority of the IRP panel and the legal effect of the IRP declaration.

149. Authority to award affirmative relief: The IRP Panel’s analysis on this issue is closely related to, and dependent upon, its analysis of the binding vs. non-binding issue

---

199 DCA Final Declaration, ¶ 38 (quoting DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure).
immediately above. To the extent that the IRP Panel renders any form of relief whereby
the Panel would direct the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision,
that relief must be “recommend[ed]” to the Board, which then “reviews and acts upon the
opinion of the IRP,” as specified in § 3.11(d) of the Bylaws. Relatedly, Supplementary
Rule 7 provides that an “IRP Panel may recommend that the Board stay any action or
decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews
and acts upon the IRP declaration.” Consequently, the IRP Panel finds that it does not
have authority to render affirmative relief requiring ICANN’s Board to take, or refrain
from taking, any action or decision.

b. SCO Proceedings Claim

150. The IRP Panel has carefully reviewed Vistaprint’s arguments concerning ICANN’s
alleged violation of its Articles and Bylaws in relation to this SCO Proceedings Claim.
However, as stated above, the IRP Panel does not review the actions or inactions of
ICANN’s staff or any third parties, such as the ICDR or SCO experts, who provided
services to ICANN. Instead, the IRP Panel’s focus is on ICANN’s Board and the BGC,
which was delegated responsibility from the full Board to consider Vistaprint’s Request
for Reconsideration.200

151. The core of Vistaprint SCO Proceedings Claim is that ICANN’s Board improperly
disregarded accumulated errors made by the ICDR and the SCO experts (especially the
Third Expert) during the Vistaprint SCO proceedings, and in this way ICANN violated
Article IV of the Articles of Incorporation and certain provisions of the Bylaws, as well as
the Guidebook.

152. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board must verify whether or not, by accepting the
SCO expert determination, it is acting consistent with its obligations under its Articles,
Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments,201 and that ICANN would be in violation of
these obligations if it were to blindly accept an expert determination in circumstances
where the ICDR and/or the expert had failed to comply with the Guidebook and the New
gTLD Objections Procedure and/or the ICDR Rules for SCOs, or where a panel had failed
to correctly apply the standard set by ICANN.202

153. The IRP Panel disagrees with Vistaprint’s contention on this point. Although the
Guidebook provides in § 5.1 that ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility
for the New gTLD Program, there is no affirmative duty stated in the Articles, Bylaws or

200 Article IV, §2.15 of ICANN’s Bylaws provides that:

   For all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction, the Board Governance
   Committee shall be delegated the authority by the Board of Directors to make a final determination and
   recommendation on the matter. Board consideration of the recommendation is not required. As the Board
   Governance Committee deems necessary, it may make recommendation to the Board for consideration and
   action. The Board Governance Committee’s determination on staff action or inaction shall be posted on the
   Website. The Board Governance Committee’s determination is final and establishes precedential value.

201 Request, ¶ 6.

202 Request, ¶ 6.
Guidebook that the Board must to review the result in each and every SCO case. Instead, the Guidebook § 3.4.6 provides that:

The findings of the [SCO] panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process. [Underlining added]

154. In the case of an adverse SCO determination, the applicant for a new gTLD string is not left without any recourse. Module 6.6 of the Guidebook provides that an applicant “MAY UTILIZE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM SET FORTH IN ICANN’S BYLAWS FOR PURPOSES OF CHALLENGING ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION” (no emphasis added).

155. The Reconsideration Request is an “accountability mechanism” that can be invoked by a gTLD applicant, as it was used by Vistaprint, to challenge the result in SCO proceedings. Article IV, § 2.2 of the Bylaws provides that:

Any person or entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction (“Reconsideration Request”) to the extent that he, she, or it have been adversely affected by:

a. one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or

b. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act; or

c. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that are taken as a result of the Board’s reliance on false or inaccurate material information.

156. In line with Article IV, § 2.2 of the Bylaws, Vistaprint submitted its Reconsideration Request to challenge actions of the ICDR and SCO experts, claiming their conduct contradicted ICANN policies. While Guidebook, § 5.1 permits ICANN’s Board to individually consider new gTLD applications, such as through the RFR mechanism, it does not require that the Board do so in each and every case, sua sponte. The Guidebook, § 5.1, provides in relevant part that:

ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application. For example, the Board might individually consider an application as a result … the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism.

157. The IRP Panel determines that in the absence of a party’s recourse to an accountability

---

203 Guidebook, § 3.4.6. The New gTLD Objections Procedure further provides in Article 2(d) that:

The ‘Expert Determination’ is the decision upon the merits of the Objection that is rendered by a Panel in a proceeding conducted under this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).

204 Guidebook, § 6.6.

205 Guidebook, § 5.1.
mechanism such as the RFR, the ICANN Board has no affirmative duty to review the result in any particular SCO case.

158. In this case, Vistaprint did submit a Reconsideration Request and the BGC did engage in a detailed review of the alleged errors in process and procedures raised by Vistaprint. The BGC explained what it considered to be the scope of its review, which is consistent with the mandate in Article IV, § 2.2 of the Bylaws for review of “staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policies”:

In the context of the New gTLD Program, the reconsideration process does not call for the BGC to perform a substantive review of expert determinations. Accordingly, the BGC is not to evaluate the Panel’s substantive conclusion that the Requester’s applications for .WEBS are confusingly similar to the Requester’s application for .WEB. Rather, the BGC’s review is limited to whether the Panel violated any established policy or process in reaching that Determination.

159. In contrast to Vistaprint’s claim that the BGC failed to perform its task properly and “turned a blind eye to the appointed Panel’s lack of independence and impartiality”, the IRP Panel finds that the BGC provided in its 19-page decision a detailed analysis of (i) the allegations concerning whether the ICDR violated its processes or procedures governing the SCO proceedings and the appointment of, and challenges to, the experts, and (ii) the questions regarding whether the Third Expert properly applied the burden of proof and the substantive standard for evaluating a String Confusion Objection. On these points, the IRP Panel finds that the BGC’s analysis shows serious consideration of the issues raised by Vistaprint and, to an important degree, reflects the IRP Panel’s own analysis.

160. For example, in relation to Vistaprint’s contention that the First Expert failed to maintain independence and impartiality, in violation of Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, the BGC reasoned:

The only evidence the [Vistaprint] cites in support of its argument that Mr. Koh failed to maintain his independence during the proceeding is the ICDR’s statement that it had decided to remove Mr. Koh “due to a new conflict.” (Request, Section 10, Pgs. 9-10.) The ICDR did not provide any further information as to the nature of the conflict. Conflicts can take many forms, such as scheduling or personal conflicts unrelated to the proceedings. There is no evidence that the conflict that inflicted

207 Vistaprint also asserted that based on the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, the Third Expert lacked impartiality and independence, or alternatively lacked qualification. On a complete review of the entire record in this case, including the SCO proceedings and the Reconsideration Request before the BGC, the IRP Panel has found no foundation for these allegations against the Third Expert, and no violation of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws in the manner in which the BGC handled these assertions. The BGC found that these assertions were insufficient to merit reconsideration, as stated in its RFR decision, in footnote 10:

[Vistaprint] concludes with the following claim: “The cursory nature of the Decision and the arbitrary and selective discussion of the parties’ arguments by the Panel show the lack of either the Panel’s independence and impartiality or the Panel’s appropriate qualifications.” (Request, Section 10, Pg. 23.) [Vistaprint’s] assertion is not accompanied by any discussion or further explanation for how ICANN processes were purportedly violated. [Vistaprint’s] summary conclusions are without merit and insufficient to warrant reconsideration. Furthermore, [Vistaprint’s] claim that the Determination was “cursory” and only contained “selective discussion of the parties’ arguments” is unsupported. The Determination was eighteen pages long and contained more than six pages of discussion of the parties’ arguments and evidence.
Mr. Koh was related to the instant proceedings or otherwise impacted Mr. Koh’s ability to remain impartial and independent.

Furthermore, [Vistaprint] neither claims to have been, nor presents any evidence of being, materially and adversely affected by Mr. Koh’s removal. Indeed, had [Vistaprint] successfully challenged Mr. Koh for lack of independence at the time he was removed, the remedy under the applicable ICDR procedures would have been the removal of Mr. Koh, which was the result here. 208

161. The BGC concluded that Vistaprint provided no evidence of being materially and adversely affected by the First Expert’s removal. Moreover, to the extent that there was an impact due to the First Expert stepping down, this conduct was attributable to the First Expert, not to the ICDR. As the BGC states, had there been a concern about the First Expert’s lack of independence, the remedy under the applicable ICDR procedures would have been the removal of that expert, which is what actually occurred.

162. Vistaprint also argued that the BGC conducted no investigation as to the nature of the new conflict that confronted the First Expert and instead “developed baseless hypotheses for the other reasons that could have led to this Panel stepping down.” 209 In this respect, perhaps the BGC could have sought to develop evidence on this issue by inquiring with the ICDR about the circumstances concerning the First Expert. Article IV, § 2.13 of the Bylaws provides the BGC “may also request information relevant to the request from third parties,” but it does not require that the BGC do so. However, it would not have changed the outcome, as noted above. It is also noteworthy that Article IV, § 2.2(b) of the Bylaws provides that a party may submit a Reconsideration Request to the extent that the party has been adversely affected by:

\[
\text{one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act.}
\]

163. Here, there was no showing that Vistaprint attempted to develop information concerning how the removal of the First Expert might have had a material and adverse impact on Vistaprint, or information concerning the reasons for the First Expert stepping down.

164. Vistaprint also alleged that the ICDR unjustifiably accepted a challenge to the Second Expert, or created the circumstances for such a challenge. As the BGC noted, the procedure governing challenges to experts is set forth in Article 2 § 3 of the ICDR’s New gTLD Objections Procedure, which provides:

\[
\text{Upon review of the challenge the DRSP in its sole discretion shall make the decision on the challenge and advise the parties of its decision.}
\]

165. The BGC reasoned that while Vistaprint may disagree with the ICDR’s decision to accept the challenge to the Second Expert, that decision was in the “sole discretion” of the ICDR and it was not the BGC’s role to second guess the ICDR’s discretion in this regard. 210 The IRP Panel finds that the BGC violated no Article, Bylaw or the Guidebook by taking this

209 Request, ¶ 77.
view. However, it does appear that the ICDR might have avoided the challenge situation in the first place by appointing someone other than the Second Expert – who had served as the expert panel in previous SCO case administered by the ICDR – given that the basis for the challenge against him, which the ICDR accepted, was his involvement in the previous case.

166. Vistaprint also claimed that the Third Expert incorrectly applied both the burden of proof and the substantive criteria for evaluating the String Confusion Objection. The BGC rejected these contentions and the IRP Panel agrees. The BGC’s decision looked closely at the standard to be applied in String Confusion Objection proceedings, as well as how the Third Expert extensively detailed the support for his conclusion that the .WEBS string so nearly resembles .WEB – visually, aurally and in meaning – that it is likely to cause confusion. In this respect, the BGC did not violate ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws by determining that the Third Expert properly applied the relevant Guidebook policy for String Confusion Objections. As the BGC noted,

The Requester’s disagreement as to whether the standards should have resulted in a finding in favor of Requester’s application does not mean that the panel violated any policy or process in reaching the decision.

167. The Guidebook provides that the following evaluation standard is be applied in String Confusion Objection proceedings:

3.5.1 String Confusion Objection

A DRSP panel hearing a string confusion objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

168. Vistaprint in its Request emphasized that ICANN has indicated that the SCO test sets a high bar:

22. At various times, ICANN has indicated that the string confusion test sets a high bar:

- “[T]he standard indicates that confusion must be probable, not merely possible, in order for this sort of harm to arise. Consumers also benefit from competition. For new gTLDs, the similarity test is a high bar, as indicated by the wording of the standard [...]. Therefore, while the objection and dispute resolution process is intended to address all types of similarity, the process is not intended to hobble competition or reserve a broad set of string [sic] for a first mover.” (fn. omitted)

- “Policy discussions indicate that the most important reason to disallow similar strings as top-level domain names is to protect Internet users from the increased exposure to fraud and other risks that could ensue from confusion of one string for another. This reasoning must be balanced against unreasonable exclusion of top-level labels and denial of applications where considerable investment

213 Request, ¶¶ 22-23.
has already been made. As the top-level grows in number of registrations, drawing too large a circle of “similarity protection” around each existing string will quickly result in the unnecessary depletion of available names. The unnecessary exclusion of names would also tend to stifle the opportunity of community representation at the top-level and innovation.” (fn. omitted)

23. ICANN’s high standard for dealing with string confusion objections has been explicitly confirmed by the NGPC, which states that in the Applicant Guidebook ‘similar’ means:

“strings so similar that they create a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated into the root zone. During the policy development and implementation design phases of the New gTLD Program, aural and conceptual string similarities were considered. These types of similarity were discussed at length, yet ultimately not agreed to be used as a basis for the analysis of the string similarity panels’ consideration because on balance, this could have unanticipated results in limiting the expansion of the DNS as well as the reach and utility of the Internet. […] The NGPC reflected on existing string similarity in the DNS and considered the positive and negative impacts. The NGPC observed that numerous examples of similar strings, including singulars and plurals exist within the DNS at the second level. Many of these are not registered to or operated by the same registrant. There are thousands of examples […]” (NGPC Resolution 2014.02.056. NG02).

169. The passages quoted by Vistaprint, referencing ICANN materials and a resolution of the NGPC, arguably provide useful context in applying the test for String Confusion Objections. After citing these passages, however, Vistaprint contends in its Request that

“[a]s a result, two strings should only be placed in a contention set if they are so similar that they would create a probability of user confusion were both to be delegated into the root zone, and the finding of confusing similarity must be balanced against the risk of unreasonable exclusion of top-level labels and the denial of applications” (no underlining added).\(^{214}\)

170. However, the problem with the test as posited by Vistaprint is that it would add a balancing element that is not in the Guidebook’s standard: according to Vistaprint the finding of confusing similarity must be balanced against the risk of unreasonable exclusion of top-level labels and the denial of applications. This part of the standard (as advanced by Vistaprint) is not in the Guidebook, although the concerns it represents were reflected in the other ICANN materials. The Guidebook standard is as follows:

String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

171. There is no reference in this standard to balancing the likelihood of confusion against the needs to promote competition and to guard against the unreasonable exclusion of top-level strings. While it might be advisable to consider whether the standard for String Confusion Objections should be revised to incorporate such a balancing test, these elements were not in the policy that was applied by the Third Expert. Nor was there a violation, by the BGC or the ICANN Board, of any Articles or Bylaws in formulating the SCO standard as it was formulated (based on community input), and in determining that the Third Expert properly applied this policy.

\(^{214}\) Request, ¶ 24.
172. ICANN has argued that the time for Vistaprint to have objected to the Guidebook and its SCO policy has long since passed. Vistaprint has responded that it contests the implementation of the Guidebook and its policies, not just the policies themselves. Even assuming that the Guidebook’s policies could be challenged at this point, the IRP Panel finds that the relevant policies, such as the standard for evaluating String Confusion Objections, do not violate any of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws reflecting principles such as good faith, fairness, transparency and accountability. However, the Panel does agree with ICANN that the time for challenging the Guidebook’s standard for evaluating String Confusion Objections – which was developed in an open process and with extensive input – has passed.

173. Vistaprint has also complained that it was not provided with the opportunity to appeal the Third Expert’s decision on the merits, such that the BGC or some other entity would re-evaluate the Expert’s string confusion determination. As noted above, the BGC’s review focused on whether the ICDR and the Third Expert properly applied the relevant rules and policies, not on whether the BGC, if it had considered the matter de novo, would have found string confusion as between the .WEBS and .WEB strings.

174. The IRP Panel finds that the lack of an appeal mechanism to contest the merits of the Third Expert’s SCO determination is not, in itself, a violation of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws. ICANN’s commitment through its Articles and Bylaws to act in good faith and with accountability and transparency, and to apply documented policies neutrally, objectively and fairly, does not require that it must have designed the SCO mechanism so that the result of a string confusion determination would be subject to a right of appeal. Other significant dispute resolution systems – such as the international legal regime for commercial arbitration regarding awards as final and binding215 – do not normally provide for a right of appeal on the merits.

175. In respect of Vistaprint’s SCO Proceedings Claim, the IRP Panel denies each of Vistaprint’s claims concerning ICANN’s alleged breaches of obligations under the Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments, as follows:

(1) Vistaprint claims that ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article 4 of the Articles and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws to act in good faith with due diligence and independent judgment by failing to provide due process to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications.216 The IRP Panel denies Vistaprint’s claim that Vistaprint was not given a fair opportunity to present its case; was deprived of procedural fairness and the opportunity to be heard by an independent panel applying the appropriate rules; and was not given any meaningful opportunity for remedy or redress once the SCO determination was made, even in the RFR procedure.

(2) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article I § 2.8 to neutrally, objectively and fairly apply documented policies as established in the

216 Request, ¶¶ 69-71.
Guidebook and Bylaws. As discussed above, the IRP Panel rejects Vistaprint’s claim that the Vistaprint SCO determination – finding that the .WEBS and .WEB gTLD strings are confusingly similar – is contradictory to ICANN’s policy for String Confusion Objections as established in the Guidebook.

(3) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to act fairly and with due diligence and independent judgment as called for under Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation, Articles I § 2.8 and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws by accepting the SCO determination made by the Third Expert, who was allegedly not independent and impartial. As noted above, the IRP Panel finds that there was no failure of the BGC to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and to act in good faith as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles, when it determined that Vistaprint’s claim – that the Third Expert was not independent and impartial and/or was not appropriately qualified – did not merit reconsideration.

(4) Vistaprint claims that ICANN failed to comply with its obligations under the Article 4 of the Articles, and Article I §§ 2.7 and 2.8 and Article III § 1 of the Bylaws (and Article 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) to act fairly and transparently by failing to disclose/perform any efforts to optimize the service that the ICDR provides in the New gTLD Program. The IRP Panel rejects Vistaprint’s contention that the BGC’s Reconsideration determination shows that the BGC made no investigation into Vistaprint’s fundamental questions about the Third Expert’s arbitrariness, lack of independence, partiality, inappropriate qualification, or that the BGC did not exercise due diligence in making its determination on this issue.

(5) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to remain accountable under Articles I § 2.10 and IV § 1 of the Bylaws (and Articles 3(a) and 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) by failing to provide any remedy for its mistreatment of Vistaprint’s gTLD applications. The IRP Panel disagrees with Vistaprint’s claim that ICANN’s Board and the BGC adopted the Third Expert’s SCO determination without examining whether it was made in accordance with ICANN’s policy and fundamental principles under its Articles and Bylaws. In particular, as described above, the IRP Panel rejects Vistaprint’s claim that the Vistaprint SCO determination is contradictory to ICANN’s policy as established in the Guidebook and agrees with the BGC’s analysis on this issue. Regarding Vistaprint’s contention that ICANN should have created a review mechanism for challenging the substance of SCO expert determinations, as discussed above, the IRP Panel finds that the lack of such a general appeal mechanism creates no inconsistency with ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws.

(6) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to promote competition and innovation under Articles I § 2.2 (and Article 3(c) of the Affirmation of Commitments) by accepting the Third

---

217 Request, ¶ 72.
218 Request, ¶ 73.
219 Request, ¶¶ 52 and 77.
220 Request, ¶¶ 78-79.
Finally, the IRP Panel disagrees with Vistaprint’s contention that the Board’s acceptance of the determination in the Vistaprint SCO was contrary to ICANN’s Bylaws because it was contrary to the interests of competition and consumers.

c. Disparate Treatment Claim

176. Vistaprint’s final claim is one that raises a close question for this IRP Panel. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board discriminated against Vistaprint through the Board’s (and the BGC’s) acceptance of the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation\(^{222}\), or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

177. The IRP Panel agrees with Vistaprint’s statement that the “IRP Panel’s mandate includes a review as to whether or not ICANN’s Board discriminates in its interventions on SCO expert determinations.”\(^{223}\) As discussed above, in the Guidebook, § 5.1, ICANN has reserved the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community:

> ...The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application....

178. However, as a counterbalance against this reserved power to individually consider new gTLD applications, the ICANN Board must also comply with Article II, § 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws, providing for non-discriminatory treatment:

> Section 3 (Non-Discriminatory Treatment)

> ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

179. As Vistaprint maintains in its First Additional Submission, “[w]hen the ICANN Board individually considers an application, it must make sure that it does not treat applicants inequitably and that it does not discriminate among applicants.”\(^{225}\)

180. As discussed above in relation to standard of review, the IRP Panel considers that the Board’s actions or omissions in this area of alleged non-discriminatory treatment bear the scrutiny of independent and objective review, without any presumption of correctness. Moreover, ICANN’s Bylaws in Article I, § 2 set out its core values that should guide the

---

\(^{221}\) Request, ¶ 80.

\(^{222}\) ICANN has permitted the delegation of the .car and .cars gTLDs, the .auto and .autos gTLDs, the .accountant and .accountants gTLDs, the .fan and .fans gTLDs, the .gift and .gifts gTLDs, the .loan and .loans gTLDs, the .new and .news gTLDs and the .work and .works gTLDs.

\(^{223}\) Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 20.

\(^{224}\) Guidebook, § 5.1.

\(^{225}\) Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 31.
decisions and actions of ICANN, including the requirement, when balancing among competing core values, to exercise judgment to determine which core values are the most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances at hand. Of particular relevance to Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim are the core values set out in §§ 2.8 and 2.9:

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

* * * *

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

181. Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim is based on the following allegations:

- On June 25, 2013, the NGPC, a sub-committee of ICANN’s Board, determined in Resolution 2013.06.25.NG07 that no changes were needed to the existing mechanisms in the Guidebook to address potential consumer confusion from allowing singular and plural versions of the same gTLD string. The NGPC had addressed this issue in response to advice from the ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (“GAC”) that due to potential consumer confusion, the Board should "reconsider its decision to allow singular and plural version of the same strings."

- On February 5, 2014, the day before Vistaprint submitted its Reconsideration Request to the BGC on February 6, 2014, the NGPC approved Resolution 2014.02.05.NG02, which directed ICANN’s President to initiate a public comment period on framework principles of a potential review mechanism to address perceived inconsistent String Confusion Objection expert determinations. The NGPC resolution provides in relevant part:

  * Whereas, on 10 October 2013 the Board Governance Committee (BGC) requested staff to draft a report for the NGPC on String Confusion Objections "setting out options for dealing with the situation raised within this Request, namely the differing outcomes of the String Confusion Objection Dispute Resolution process in similar disputes involving Amazon’s Applied-for String and TLDH’s Applied-for String."

  * Whereas, the NGPC is considering potential paths forward to address the perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations from the New gTLD Program String Confusion Objections process, including implementing a review mechanism. The review will be limited to the String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations for .CAR/.CARS and .CAM/.COM.

  * Whereas, the proposed review mechanism, if implemented, would constitute a change to the current String Confusion Objection process in the New gTLD Applicant Guidebook.

  * Whereas, the NGPC is undertaking this action pursuant to the authority granted to it by the
Board on 10 April 2012, to exercise the ICANN Board's authority for any and all issues that may arise relating to the New gTLD Program.

Resolved (2014.02.05.NG02), the NGPC directs the President and CEO, or his designee, to publish for public comment the proposed review mechanism for addressing perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations from the New gTLD Program String Confusion Objections process.

- Vistaprint emphasizes that ICANN’s Board (through the NGPC) took this decision the day before Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request; however, this did not prevent the BGC from denying Vistaprint’s RFR less than one month later without considering whether such a review mechanism might also be appropriate for dealing with the SCO determination involving .WEBS/.WEB.  

- Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request and the BGC’s decision on that Request rendered on February 27, 2014 contain no reference to the concerns that had been raised both by the BGC (on October 10, 2013 in a prior RFR determination) and the NGPC in its February 5, 2014 resolution concerning inconsistent expert SCO determinations, some of which involved plural and singular versions of the same gTLD string. Neither Vistaprint nor the BGC raised any discussion of disparate treatment at that time. The BGC’s determined that its decision on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request “shall be final and does not require Board (or NGPC) consideration.”

- On October 12, 2014, approximately 8 months after the BGC’s decision on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request, and after Vistaprint had filed its Request in this IRP (in June 2014), the NGPC approved Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02, in which it identified certain SCO expert determinations “as not being in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community,” and directed ICANN’s President to establish processes and procedures to re-evaluate certain previous SCO expert determinations. Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02 also stated in its rationale:

  The NGPC also considered whether there was a reasonable basis for certain perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations to exist, and particularly why the identified Expert Determinations should be sent back to the ICDR while other Expert Determinations should not. The NGPC notes that while on their face some of the Expert Determinations may appear inconsistent, including other SCO Expert Determinations, and Expert Determinations of the Limited Public Interest and Community Objection processes, there are reasonable explanations for these seeming discrepancies, both procedurally and substantively.

  First, on a procedural level, each expert panel generally rests its Expert Determination on materials presented to it by the parties to that particular objection, and the objector bears the burden of proof. Two panels confronting identical issues could – and if appropriate should – reach different determinations, based on the strength of the materials presented.

  Second, on a substantive level, certain Expert Determinations highlighted by the community that purportedly resulted in “inconsistent” or “unreasonable” results, presented nuanced distinctions

---

226 Request, ¶ 52.
relevant to the particular objection. These nuances should not be ignored simply because a party to the dispute disagrees with the end result. Further, the standard guiding the expert panels involves some degree of subjectivity, and thus independent expert panels would not be expected to reach the same conclusions on every occasion. However, for the identified Expert Determinations, a reasonable explanation for the seeming discrepancies is not as apparent, even taking into account all of the previous explanations about why reasonably "discrepancies" may exist. To allow these Expert Determinations to stand would not be in the best interests of the Internet community.

The NGPC considered whether it was appropriate, as suggested by some commenters, to expand the scope of the proposed review mechanism to include other Expert Determinations, such as some resulting from Community and Limited Public Objections, as well as other String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations, and possibly singular and plural versions of the same string. The NGPC determined that to promote the goals of predictability and fairness, establishing a review mechanism more broadly may be more appropriate as part of future community discussions about subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program. Applicants have already taken action in reliance on many of the Expert Determinations, including signing Registry Agreements, transitioning to delegation, withdrawing their applications, and requesting refunds. Allowing these actions to be undone now would not only delay consideration of all applications, but would raise issues of unfairness for those that have already acted in reliance on the Applicant Guidebook.

It should also be noted that in response to advice from the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), the NGPC previously considered the question of whether consumer confusion may result from allowing singular and plural versions of the same strings. On 25 June 2013, the NGPC adopted a resolution resolving "that no changes [were] needed to the existing mechanisms in the Applicant Guidebook to address potential consumer confusion resulting from allowing singular and plural versions of the same string" http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-new-gtld-25jun13-en.htm#2.d. The NGPC again notes that the topic of singular and plural versions of the same string also may be the subject of further community discussion as it relates to future rounds of the New gTLD Program.

The NGPC considered community correspondence on this issue in addition to comments from the community expressed at the ICANN meetings. The concerns raised in the ICANN meetings and in correspondence have been factored into the deliberations on this matter.

- In view of the NGPC’s Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02, Vistaprint describes its disparate treatment claim in its First Additional Submission as follows:

13  

Since the filing of Vistaprint’s request for IRP, the ICANN Board clarified how the string similarity standard must be applied. In its resolutions of 12 October 2014, the ICANN Board identified certain SCO determinations “as not being in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community” and set out the rules for a re-evaluation of these SCO determinations (fn. omitted):

- A first SCO determination that needed re-evaluation is the SCO determination in which ICDR’s expert accepted Verisign Inc.’s objection to United TLD Holdco Ltd. ("United TLD")’s application for .cam. We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘United TLD Determination’. In the United TLD Determination, ICDR’s appointed expert found United TLD’s application for .cam confusingly similar to Verisign Inc. (‘Verisign’)’s .com gTLD (RM 23). The ICANN Board decided that (i) the United TLD Determination was not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community and (ii) a new three-member panel must be established to re-evaluate the United TLD Determination (fn. omitted).

Verisign had also raised a SCO on the basis of its .com gTLD against the application for .cam by Dot Agency Limited and the application for .cam by AC Webconnecting Holding B.V. In both cases, the appointed experts determined that no confusing similarity existed between the .cam and .com strings (fn. omitted). We refer to these SCO determinations as the ‘Related .cam/.com Determinations’. The ICANN Board decided that the Related .cam/.com Determinations need no
re-evaluation. In addition, the ICANN Board recommended that the three-member panel charged with re-evaluating the United TLD Determination must review the Related .cam/.com Determinations as background (fn. omitted).

- Another SCO determination that needed re-evaluation is the determination in which ICDR’s appointed expert accepted Commercial Connect LLC’s objection to Amazon EU S.à.r.l. (‘Amazon’)’s application for .通販 (which means .onlineshopping in Japanese) (fn. omitted). We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘Onlineshopping Determination’. ICDR’s appointed expert found in the Onlineshopping Determination that Amazon’s application for .通販 was confusingly similar to Commercial Connect LLC’s application for .shop. Commercial Connect LLC also invoked its application for .shop in a SCO against Top Level Domain Holdings Limited’s application .购物 (which means ‘shop’ in Chinese). ICDR’s appointed expert rejected the latter SCO (fn. omitted). We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘Related shop/.shop Determination’. The ICANN Board decided that a three-member panel needs to re-evaluate the Onlineshopping Determination and that no re-evaluation is needed for the Related shop/.shop Determination. The ICANN Board decided that the Related shop/.shop Determination must be reviewed as background by the three-member panel that is charged with re-evaluating the Onlineshopping Determination (fn. omitted).

14. The ICANN Board’s recommendations to the three-member panels charged with the re-evaluation of the United TLD Determination and the Onlineshopping Determination are clear. Related determinations – involving the same gTLD string(s) and finding that there is no confusing similarity – will not be re-evaluated and must be taken into account in the re-evaluations.

15. Upon instigation of the ICANN Board, ICANN had developed the same process for re-evaluating the SCO determination in which ICDR’s appointed expert accepted Charleston Road Registry Inc. (‘CRR’)’s objection to DERCars, LLC’s application for .cars. We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘DERCars Determination’. In the DERCars Determination, ICDR’s appointed expert found DERCars, LLC’s application for .cars confusingly similar to CRR’s application for .car. CRR had also objected to the applications for .cars by Uniregistry, Corp. and Koko Castle, LLC, claiming confusing similarity with CRR’s application for .car. The latter objections by CRR were not successful. ICANN decided that DERCars, LLC should be given the option of having the DERCars Determination reviewed. ICANN was not allowing a review of the other SCO determinations involving .car and .cars (fn. omitted).

16. The above shows that ICANN and its Board have always decided in favor of co-existence of ‘similar’ strings. The ICANN Board explicitly allowed singular and plural gTLD strings to co-exist (fn. omitted). To support this view, the ICANN Board referred to the existence of thousands of examples of singular and plurals within the DNS at second level, which are not registered to or operated by the same registrant. The ICANN Board inter alia referred to the co-existing car.com and cars.com (fn. omitted).

17. Why did the ICANN Board intervene in the DERCars determination – involving the strings .car and .cars – but refused to intervene in the SCO Determination involving .web and .webs? In view of the small number of SCO Determinations finding confusing similarity between two strings (fn. omitted), it is a true mystery why the ICANN Board intervened in some matters, but refused to do so in the SCO determinations on Vistaprint’s applications for .webs.

18. If anything, the .webs/.web string pair is less similar than the .cars/.car string pair. Cars is commonly used as the plural for car. Web, however, commonly refers to the world wide web, and as such, it is not normally a word where the plural form would be used.

182. Vistaprint contends that ICANN cannot justify the disparate treatment described above. While Vistaprint recognizes that ICANN’s Board intervened to address perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO expert determinations, ICANN failed to explain why the SCO determination on Vistaprint's .WEBS applications was not just as unreasonable as the SCO expert determinations involving .cars/.car, .cam/.com, and 通販
In response to Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim, ICANN contends that ICANN’s Board only intervened with respect to certain SCO expert determinations because there had been several independent expert determinations regarding the same strings that were seemingly inconsistent with one another. ICANN states that is not the case with respect to Vistaprint's applications, as no other expert determinations were issued regarding the similarity of .WEB and .WEBS. ICANN further urges that the Board was justified in exercising its discretion to intervene with respect to the inconsistent SCO expert determinations regarding .COM/.CAM, .CAR/.CARS and .SHOP/.通販, because the Board acted to bring certainty to differing SCO expert determinations regarding the same strings. However, this justification was not present with respect to the single Vistaprint SCO.

Finally, ICANN stated that “Vistaprint has identified no Articles or Bylaws provision violated by the ICANN Board in exercising its independent judgment to intervene with respect to certain inconsistent expert determinations on string confusion objections unrelated to this matter, but not with respect to the single Expert Determination regarding .WEB/.WEBS” (italics added).

The IRP Panel has considered carefully the parties’ contentions regarding Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim. The Panel finds that, contrary to what ICANN has stated above, ICANN’s Board did not have an opportunity to “exercise its independent judgment” – in particular, in view of its decisions to implement an additional review mechanism for certain other inconsistent SCO expert determinations – to consider specifically whether it should intervene with respect to the adverse SCO expert determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications.

It is clear that ICANN’s Board, through the BGC and the NGPC, was aware of the concerns involving inconsistent decisions in SCO proceedings when it decided Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request in February 2014. The NGPC, on the day (February 5, 2014) before Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request and in response to a request from the BGC, initiated a public comment period on framework principles for a potential review mechanism to address perceived inconsistent SCO expert determinations. However, the BGC’s decision on the Reconsideration Request rendered on February 27, 2014 made no mention of these issues. By comparison, there is no evidence that

---

228 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 5.
229 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 18.
230 ICANN’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 21.
231 In this regard, the IRP panel in the Booking.com final Declaration (¶ 119) quoted Mr. Sadowsky, a member of the Board’s NGPC committee, commenting on the Reconsideration process as follows:

*The reconsideration process is a very narrowly focused instrument, relying solely upon investigating deviations from established and agreed upon process. As such, it can be useful, but it is limited in scope. In particular, it does not address situations where process has in fact been followed, but the results of such process have been regarded, sometimes quite widely, as being contrary to what might be best for significant or all segments of the...community and/or Internet users in general.*
Vistaprint was aware of these issues at the time it filed its Reconsideration Request on February 6, 2014. Vistaprint has raised them for the first time in a timely manner during the pendency of this IRP.

187. In accordance with Article 1, § 2 of the Bylaws, the Board shall exercise its judgment to determine which competing core values are most relevant and how they apply to arrive at a defensible balance among those values in relation to the case at hand. Given the timing of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request, and the timing of ICANN’s consultation process for potential review mechanisms to address inconsistent SCO expert determinations, this exercise of judgment by the Board has not yet occurred in the case of Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications.

188. Here, ICANN is subject to the requirements of Article II, § 3 of its Bylaws regarding non-discriminatory treatment, providing that it shall not apply its “standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause.” ICANN has provided additional relief to certain gTLD applicants who were subject to adverse decisions in String Confusion Objection cases. In those cases, the differences in the gTLD strings at issue were not too dissimilar from the .WEBS/.WEB gTLD strings. One of the cases in which ICANN agreed to provide an additional mechanism for review involved a string confusion objection for the .CAR/.CARS strings, which involve the singular vs. plural of the same string. Meanwhile, many other singular and plural variations of the same gTLD strings have been permitted to proceed to delegation, including AUTO and .AUTOS; .ACCOUNTANT and ACCOUNTANTS; .FAN and .FANS; .GIFT and .GIFTS; .LOAN and .LOANS; .NEW and .NEWS; and .WORK and .WORKS.

189. This IRP Panel, among its three members, could not agree – in regards to the specific circumstances of Vistaprint’s gTLD applications – whether the reasons offered by ICANN in its Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02 for refusing the “to expand the scope of the proposed review mechanism to include other [SCO] Expert Determinations” would meet the standard of non-discrimination imposed by Article II, § 3 of the Bylaws, as well as the relevant core values in Article 1, § 2 of the Bylaws (e.g., applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness). For instance, one view is that limiting the additional review mechanism to only those SCO cases in which there were inconsistent decisions is a sufficient reason for intervening in these cases, but not in other SCO cases involving similar singular vs. plural gTLD strings were the applicant received an adverse decision. On the other hand, another view is that the real focus should be on the developments involving single vs. plural gTLDs strings, including the inconsistency of decisions and the offering of additional review mechanism in certain cases, and the delegation of so many other single/plural variations of the same gTLD strings, which are, at least in this way, similarly situated to the circumstances of the .WEBS/.WEB strings.232

232 Regarding inconsistent decisions, Vistaprint quoted the statement dated October 8, 2014, of ICANN’s former Chief Strategy Officer and Senior Vice President of Stakeholders Relations, Kurt Pritz, who had apparently been leading the introduction of the New gTLD Program, concerning ICANN’s objection procedure:

(Continued...)
The IRP Panel is mindful that it should not substitute its judgment for that of ICANN’s Board. The Board has not yet considered Vistaprint’s claim of disparate treatment, and the arguments that ICANN makes through its counsel in this IRP do not serve as a substitute for the exercise of independent judgment by the Board. Without the exercise of judgment by ICANN’s Board on this question of whether there is any inequitable or disparate treatment regarding Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications, the Board would risk violating its Bylaws, including its core values. As the Emergency IRP Panel found in the GCC Interim IRP Declaration:

The ICANN Board does not have an unfettered discretion in making decisions. In bringing its judgment to bear on an issue for decision, it must assess the applicability of different potentially conflicting core values and identify those which are most important, most relevant to the question to be decided. The balancing of the competing values must be seen as “defensible”, that is it should be justified and supported by a reasoned analysis. The decision or action should be based on a reasoned judgment of the Board, not on an arbitrary exercise of discretion.

This obligation of the ICANN Board in its decision making is reinforced by the standard of review for the IRP process under Article IV, Section 3.4 of the Bylaws, quoted at paragraph 42 b. above, when the action of the Board is compared to the requirements under the Articles and Bylaws. The standard of review includes a consideration of whether the Board exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts before them and also whether the Board exercised its own independent judgment. 233

Here, the IRP Panel finds that due to the timing and scope of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request (and this IRP proceeding), and the timing of ICANN’s consultation process and subsequent NGPC resolution authorizing an additional review mechanism for certain gTLD applications that were the subject of adverse SCO decisions, the ICANN Board has not had the opportunity to exercise its judgment on the question of whether, in view of ICANN’s Bylaw concerning non-discriminatory treatment and based on the particular

There is no doubt that the New gTLD Program objection results are inconsistent, and not predictable. The fact is most easily demonstrated in the ‘string confusion,’ objections where challenges to exactly the same strings yielded different results. […] With globally diverse, multiple panelists invoking untried standards and questions of first impression in an industry with which they were not familiar and had little training, the panelists were bound to deliver inconsistent, unpredictable results. ICANN put no mechanism put [sic] into place to rationalize or normalize the answers. […] It is my opinion that ICANN, having proven in the initial evaluation context that it could do so, should have implemented measures to create as much consistency as possible on the merits in the objection rulings, requiring DRSPs to educate and train their experts as to the specific (and only) standards to employ, and to review and correct aberrant results. The failure to do so resulted in violation of the overarching policy articulated by the GNSO and adopted by the Board at the outset of the new gTLD Program, as well as policies stated in the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation concerning on discrimination, application of document policies neutrally, objectively and fairly, promotion of competition, and accountability.” (fn. omitted).

233 See GCC Interim IRP Declaration, ¶¶ 76-77 (“Upon completion of the various procedures for evaluation and for objections under the Guidebook, the question of the approval of the applied for domain still went back to the NGPC, representing the ICANN Board, to make the decision to approve, without being bound by recommendation of the GAC, the Independent Objector or even the Expert Determination. Such a decision would appear to be caught by the requirements of Article 1, Section 2 of the Bylaws requiring the Board or the NGPC to consider and apply the competing values to the facts and to arrive at a defensible balance among those values” ¶ 90 (underlining added).
circumstances and developments noted above, such an additional review mechanism is appropriate following the SCO expert determination involving Vistaprint’s WEBS applications. Accordingly, it follows that in response to Vistaprint’s contentions of disparate treatment in this IRP, ICANN’s Board – and not this Panel – should exercise its independent judgment on this issue, in light of all of the foregoing considerations.

VI. Prevailing Party; Costs

192. Article IV, § 3.18 of ICANN’s Bylaws requires that the IRP Panel "specifically designate the prevailing party." This designation is relevant to the allocation of costs, given that the same section of the Bylaws provides that the “party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider.”

193. Article IV, § 3.18 of the Bylaws also states that "in an extraordinary case the IRP Panel may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses.”

194. Similarly, the Supplementary Procedures provide in Rule 11:

The IRP Panel shall fix costs in its Declaration. The party not prevailing in an IRP shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the proceedings, but under extraordinary circumstances the IRP Panel may allocate up to half of the costs to the prevailing party, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their contribution to the public interest.

In the event the Requestor has not availed itself, in good faith, of the cooperative engagement or conciliation process, and the requestor is not successful in the Independent Review, the IRP Panel must award ICANN all reasonable fees and costs incurred by ICANN in the IRP, including legal fees.

195. Here, Vistaprint engaged in the Cooperative Engagement Process, although the process did not resolve the issues between the parties. The "IRP Provider" is the ICDR, and, in accordance with the ICDR Rules, the costs to be allocated between the parties – what the

---

234 The IRP Panel observes that the NGPC, in its Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02, sought to address the issue of why certain SCO expert determinations should be sent back to the ICDR while others should not. In that resolution, the NGPC determined that to promote the goals of predictability and fairness, establishing a review mechanism more broadly may be appropriate as part of future rounds in the New gTLD Program. The NGPC stated that applicants may have already taken action in reliance on SCO expert determinations, including signing Registry Agreements, transitioning to delegation, withdrawing their applications, and requesting refunds. However, in this case Vistaprint does not fall within the category of applicants who have taken such actions in reliance. Instead, it is still asserting its claims in this IRP proceeding. In accordance with the Bylaws, Vistaprint is entitled to an exercise of the Board’s independent judgment to determine, based on the facts of the case at hand and in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning non-discriminatory treatment and core values, whether Vistaprint should be entitled to the additional review mechanism that was made available to certain other gTLD applicants.
Bylaws call the "costs of the IRP Provider", and the Supplementary Procedures call the “costs of the proceedings” – include the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and of the ICDR.

196. ICANN is the prevailing party in this IRP. This designation is confirmed by the Panel’s decisions concerning Vistaprint’s requests for relief in this IRP:

- Vistaprint requests that the Panel find ICANN breached its Articles, Bylaws, and the Guidebook. The Panel declares that ICANN’s Board (including the BGC) did not violate the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook.
- Vistaprint requests that the Panel require ICANN to reject the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, disregard the resulting “Contention Set”, and allow Vistaprint’s applications for .WEBS to proceed on their merits. The Panel determines that it does not have authority to order the relief requested by Vistaprint. In addition, the Panel declares that the Board (through the BGC) did not violate the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook in regards to the BGC’s handling of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request.
- Vistaprint requests, in the alternative, that the Panel require ICANN to reject the Vistaprint SCO determination and organize a new procedure, in which a three-member panel would re-evaluate the Third Expert’s decision taking into account (i) the ICANN Board’s resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, as well as the Board’s resolutions on the DERCars SCO Determination, the United TLD Determination, and the Onlineshopping SCO Determination, and (ii) ICANN’s decisions to delegate the following gTLDs: .CAR and .CARS; .AUTO and .AUTOS; .ACCOUNTANT and ACCOUNTANTS; .FAN and .FAMS; .GIFT and .GIFTS; .LOAN and .LOANS; .NEW and .NEWS; and .WORK and .WORKS. The Panel determines that it does not have authority to order the relief requested by Vistaprint. In addition, the Panel recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings.

197. The IRP Panel also recognizes that Vistaprint, through its Request and submissions, raised certain complex and significant issues and contributed to the “public interest” involving the New gTLD Program and the Independent Review Process. It is therefore appropriate and reasonable to divide the IRP costs over the parties in a 60% (Vistaprint) / 40% (ICANN) proportion.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the IRP Panel hereby:

(1) Declares that Vistaprint’s IRP Request is denied;
(2) Designates ICANN as the prevailing party;
(3) Recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings;

(4) In view of the circumstances, Vistaprint shall bear 60% and ICANN shall bear 40% of the costs of the IRP Provider, including the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and the fees and expenses of the ICDR. The administrative fees and expenses of the ICDR, totaling US$4,600.00 as well as the compensation and expenses of the Panelists totaling US$229,167.70 are to be borne US$140,260.62 by Vistaprint Limited and US$93,507.08 by ICANN. Therefore, Vistaprint Limited shall pay to ICANN the amount of US$21,076.76 representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by ICANN upon demonstration that these incurred fees and costs have been paid; and

(5) This Final Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final Declaration of this IRP Panel.

______________________________    ______________________________
Siegfried H. Elsing     Geert Glas
Date:       Date:

______________________________
Christopher Gibson
Chair of the IRP Panel
Date: 9 Oct. 2015
(3) Recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings;

(4) In view of the circumstances, Vistaprint shall bear 60% and ICANN shall bear 40% of the costs of the IRP Provider, including the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and the fees and expenses of the ICDR. The administrative fees and expenses of the ICDR, totaling US$4,600.00 as well as the compensation and expenses of the Panelists totaling US$229,167.70 are to be borne US$140,260.62 by Vistaprint Limited and US$93,507.08 by ICANN. Therefore, Vistaprint Limited shall pay to ICANN the amount of US$21,076.76 representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by ICANN upon demonstration that these incurred fees and costs have been paid; and

(5) This Final Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final Declaration of this IRP Panel.

Siegfried H. Elsing
Date: 9 October 2015

Geert Glas
Date:

Christopher Gibson
Chair of the IRP Panel
Date:
(3) Recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings;

(4) In view of the circumstances, Vistaprint shall bear 60% and ICANN shall bear 40% of the costs of the IRP Provider, including the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and the fees and expenses of the ICDR. The administrative fees and expenses of the ICDR, totaling US$4,600.00 as well as the compensation and expenses of the Panelists totaling US$229,167.70 are to be borne US$140,260.62 by Vistaprint Limited and US$93,507.08 by ICANN. Therefore, Vistaprint Limited shall pay to ICANN the amount of US$21,076.76 representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by ICANN upon demonstration that these incurred fees and costs have been paid; and

(5) This Final Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final Declaration of this IRP Panel.

Siegfried H. Elsing  
Date:

Geert Glas  
Date: 9 October 2015

Christopher Gibson  
Chair of the IRP Panel  
Date: 9 Oct. 2015
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

ICDR Case Number: 01-15-0003-3822

VeriSign, Inc., Objector

-and-

United TLD Holdco Ltd., Applicant

REPORT OF THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL

Final Review Panel:

Sandra J. Franklin, Esq.
Mark C. Morril, Esq. (Chair)
L. Donald Prutzman, Esq.

August 26, 2015
Table of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>String Confusion Objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEP</td>
<td>Original Expert Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPED</td>
<td>Original Expert Panel Determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRP</td>
<td>Final Review Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSCO</td>
<td>Related String Confusion Objection (WebConnect and dot Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPD</td>
<td>Expert Panel Determination in RSCO Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICDR</td>
<td>International Centre for Dispute Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGB</td>
<td>Applicant Guidebook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicant</td>
<td>United TLD Holdco, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objector</td>
<td>VeriSign, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gTLD</td>
<td>generic Top Level Domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGPC</td>
<td>ICANN New gTLD Program Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGC</td>
<td>ICANN Board Governance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objection</td>
<td>VeriSign, Inc. v. United TLD Holdco, Ltd., String Confusion Objection to .CAM string, dated 13 March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Response dated 24 May 2013 of United TLD Holdco, Ltd. to the Objection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1

II. Background 1
   A. Parties 1
   B. ICANN's New gTLD Program 1
   C. String Similarity 2
      1. ICANN Initial Evaluation 2
      2. Standard for String Confusion 2
      3. The String Confusion Objection ("SCO") Process 3
   D. Applications for .CAM as a New gTLD 3
      1. The Applications 3
      2. Objections to the Applications for .CAM 4
      3. The Original Expert Panel Determination 4
      4. The Related SCO Expert Determinations 4
   E. ICANN's Determination to Create a New Review Mechanism 4
   F. The Final Review Procedures 5

III. The Record for Final Review 6

IV. The Original Expert Panel's Determination 7
   A. The OEP's Determination 7
      1. Contemporary Internet Usage 7
      2. Expert Linguistic Evidence 7
      3. Expert Survey Evidence 8
      4. Length of the Strings 9
      5. Marketing Channels 10
   B. The Related SCO Expert Panel Determinations 10

V. Analysis 11
   A. Issue To Be Determined 11
   B. Scope of Review 11
   C. Summary 12
      1. The FRP's Principal Findings 12
      2. The FRP's Finding in Regard to Marketing Channels 12
   D. Discussion 12
      1. Contemporary Internet Usage 12
      2. Linguistic Evidence 13
      3. Survey Evidence 14
      4. Length of the String and Impact of Second Level Domain Names 17
      5. Marketing Channels 18
      6. Fame of .COM TLD 19
      7. The NGPC's Finding in Regard to the Best Interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet Community 19
   E. Conclusion 19
I. Introduction

The Final Review Panel ("FRP") issues this Report pursuant to the International Centre for Dispute Resolution’s ("ICDR") Procedures for Final Review of Perceived Inconsistent or Unreasonable String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations ("Final Review Procedures.") The Final Review Procedures implement the 2014 decision of the Internet Corporation for Names and Numbers ("ICANN") to create a new final review mechanism in relation to its New gTLD Program.

At issue before the FRP is a String Confusion Objection ("SCO") lodged by VeriSign, Inc. ("Objector"), against the application of United TLD Holdco Ltd. ("Applicant") to register .CAM as a new gTLD. For the reasons stated below, the FRP has determined to reverse the Original Expert Panel’s Determination ("OEPD"), which upheld the SCO. The FRP concurrently is issuing a New Final Determination on the SCO.

II. Background

A. Parties

1. Objector, a Delaware Corporation, is the existing operator of the ".COM" generic Top Level Domain or gTLD.\(^1\) The .COM gTLD was established in 1985 and was one of six original gTLDs. Today, it has over 100 million registered names and is the largest and best known of all gTLDs. Objector operates the .COM gTLD as an "open registry," i.e., one that is globally available to all registrants.\(^2\) It is uncontested that Objector has operated the .COM registry with an excellent record of security and stability for more than 20 years.

2. Applicant United TLD Holdco, Ltd. ("Applicant") is incorporated in the Cayman Islands. It has applied to register .CAM as a gTLD pursuant to ICANN’s New gTLD Program. Applicant has stated its intention to operate .CAM as an open registry.

B. ICANN’s New gTLD Program

1. In 2011, after several years of policy development work, ICANN’s board took action to create a New gTLD Program which would provide an application and evaluation process for the purpose of significantly increasing the number of registered gTLD’s available to

---

\(^1\) Generic Top Level Domains ("gTLDs") are the string of letters following the rightmost dot in domain names.

\(^2\) Restricted gTLDs (versus open gTLD’s) are those that require registrants to meet certain defined criteria to register a domain name within their registry.
the public. The Preamble to ICANN’s New gTLD Applicant Guidebook (“AGB”), first issued in 2011, noted that:

“New gTLDs have been in the forefront of ICANN’s agenda since its creation. The new gTLD program will open up the top level of the Internet’s namespace to foster diversity, encourage competition, and enhance the utility of the [Domain Name System].”

2. ICANN’s Board delegated authority to its New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”) to manage “any and all issues that may arise relating to the New gTLD Program,” including the administration of applications to register New gTLDs. The AGB is a detailed handbook, which sets out policies and procedures to guide applicants seeking to register new gTLDs.

C. String Similarity

1. ICANN Initial Evaluation
Applying procedures set out in Module 2, Section 2 of the AGB, ICANN conducts an Initial Evaluation of all applied-for gTLD’s for several potential issues. Included in the Initial Evaluation is a review to test “whether the applied-for gTLD string is so similar to other strings that it would create a probability of user confusion.” This “String Similarity Review” “involves cross-checking between each applied-for string and the lists of existing gTLD strings and Reserved Names to determine whether two strings are so similar to one another that they create a probability of user confusion.” The String Similarity Review is informed in part by application of ICANN’s “SWORD” algorithm, which scores applied-for strings against other existing and applied-for TLDs and reserved names. SWORD scores increase with the algorithm’s prediction of increasing likelihood of visual confusion between two strings.

2. Standard For String Confusion
The standard of review for String Confusion is set forth in AGB 3.5.1:

“String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.”
3. The String Confusion Objection ("SCO") Process

a. An application that passes the String Similarity Review is still subject to a string confusion objection by an existing gTLD operator or by another gTLD applicant. While the standard to determine string confusion ICANN applies during its Initial Evaluation of new gTLD strings is limited to visual similarity, a string confusion objection lodged by an existing TLD operator or by another gTLD applicant may argue any type of similarity, including visual, aural or similarity of meaning. See AGB, Module 2, Section 2.

b. The Objector bears the burden of proof in each case. AGB 3.5. ICANN has elaborated the burden of proof with guidance stating that there is “a presumption generally in favor of granting new gTLDs to applicants who can satisfy the requirements for obtaining a gTLD....” See Comment Summary and Analysis to AGB v3 at 67 (Feb. 15, 2010), https://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/summary-analysis-agv3-15feb10-en.pdf

c. The AGB provides for all objections to be referred to a “Panel of Experts,” which issues an Expert Determination resolving the objection. The ICDR administers the SCO resolution process pursuant to its Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program, effective 8 May 2012. In the case of SCOs, the “Panel of Experts” is comprised of one Expert. AGB, Attachment to Module 3: New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure.

D. Applications for .CAM as a New gTLD

1. The Applications

ICANN received three applications to register .CAM as a gTLD. Applicant applied to register .CAM as an open gTLD. AC Webconnecting Holding B.V. applied to register .CAM as a restricted registry, limited to camera-related uses. Dot Agency Limited applied to register .CAM to the “niche” market of camera users.\(^3\) The Expert Determinations on the AC Webconnecting and Dot Agency gTLD applications are referred to herein and in the Final Review Procedures as the “Related SCO Expert Panel Determinations” or “RSCO EPDs.”

---

\(^3\) The FRP has not had access to the pleadings and evidence filed in the RSCOs and is relying solely on the RSCO EPDs in characterizing the two applications at issue there as providing for a restricted registry or niche marketing.
2. Objections to the Applications for .CAM
The Objector filed objections to all three applications for the .CAM string. Each Applicant filed a response. Based on the FRP’s review of the Related SCO Expert Determinations, it appears that Objector relied on substantially the same arguments and the same expert evidence in all three objections.

3. The Original Expert Panel Determination
On August 12, 2013, the OEP issued its Expert Determination sustaining the objection. The OEP’s reasoning is described in further detail below.

4. The Related SCO Expert Determinations
On August 13, 2013, the Sole Expert Panelist in the RSCO cases on .CAM issued separate Expert Determinations, in both cases dismissing VeriSign’s objection. The Sole Expert Panelist’s reasoning in the two RSCOs is described below to the extent relevant to this decision.

E. ICANN’s Determination to Create a New Review Mechanism

1. In October 2013, ICANN’s Board Governance Committee (“BGC”) issued a ruling on a reconsideration request in a string confusion objection, unrelated to the SCO at issue here, that also involved two different Expert Panels which had reached different conclusions on “potentially similar objections.” The BGC recommended that ICANN’s staff provide a report to the NGPC setting out options for dealing with the situation of differing outcomes in similar SCO disputes. Recommendation of the Board Governance Committee on Reconsideration Request 13-9 (10 October 2013) at [https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/recommendation-amazon-10oct13-en.pdf](https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/recommendation-amazon-10oct13-en.pdf)

2. In October 2014, the NGPC, having considered the staff report prepared in response to the BGC’s recommendation and public comments on a potential review mechanism, took action “to address certain perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determinations” which it identified “as not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community.” The NGPC directed ICANN’s President and CEO to take all steps necessary for the ICDR to provide supplemental rules and create a

---

4 See, e.g., VeriSign, Inc. v. United TLD Holdco Ltd., String Confusion Objection to .CAM String, dated 13 March 2013 (“Objection”).
Review Panel ("the Final Review Panel") to determine "whether the original Expert Panel could have reasonably come to the decision reached on the underlying SCO through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program"[https://www.icann.org/resources/boardmaterial/resolutions-new-gtld-2014-10-12-en#2.b ("the NGPC Resolution").

3. The NGPC limited application of the new Final Review Panel procedure to only the .CAR/.CARS and .CAM/.COM disputes.6 Significantly, the NGPC did not designate for review each of the Expert Panel Determinations relating to the gTLDs disputes at issue. Rather, in each case, the NGPC specifically identified one of the SCO Expert Determinations in each set as “perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable” and “as not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community.” Only the SCO Expert Determinations so-identified were submitted to the new Final Review Panel procedure.

4. It follows that in ICANN’s organization of the new Final Review Panel procedure, the NGPC identified the Expert Panel Determination at issue here "as not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet Community." Thus, the NGPC implicitly endorsed the determinations in the RSCO .CAM cases, both of which were made by a single Expert Panelist different from the OEP.

F. The Final Review Procedures

1. The NGPC provided the ICDR with detailed standards for the organization and operation of the new Final Review Panel procedure. The NGPC standards were incorporated in the ICDR’s Final Review Procedures.

2. The Standard of Review provided in Article 10 of the Final Review Procedures is the same as that set out in the NGPC Resolution:

“Whether the original Expert Panel could have reasonably come to the decision reached on the underlying SCO through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program.”

6 The NGPC determined not to extend the Final Review Panel mechanism to any other applications in the initial gTLD round, but stated that it might consider establishing such a mechanism to apply more broadly in future rounds.
3. Article 11 (c) of the Final Review Procedures provides that the possible outcomes of the FRP’s Final Determination are:

   a. Adopt the underlying SCO Expert Determination as the Final Determination; or

   b. Reverse the underlying SCO Expert Determination and draft a new Final Determination that shall replace and supersede the underlying SCO Expert Determination.

4. Article 9 of the Final Review Procedures defines the matter to be included in the Record for Final Review.

5. Article 6 of the Final Review Procedures provides that the Final Review Panel shall include at least one panel member, and, if possible, other members who have familiarity with ICANN or the Domain Name System.

III. The Record for Final Review

A. The ICDR initially had posted to the Record for Final Review the pleadings and supporting evidence submitted in the RSCO Expert Determinations ("the Related SCO Records"), but withdrew them upon receipt of an objection from the Applicant who contended that Article 9 (a) of the Final Review Procedures required that only the RSCO EPDs and not the Related SCO Records be included in the Record for Final Review.

B. On July 4, 2015, the FRP issued an Order pursuant to Article 9 (d) of the Final Review Procedures that the Related SCO Records should be included in the Record. Exclusion of the Related SCO Records foreclosed the FRP from any review based on differences in the record before the three Expert Panels that considered the .CAM/.COM objection. The FRP also believed it would be helpful to have access to the pleadings and the expert reports submitted in the RSCO. The FRP interpreted Article 9 (a) of the Final Review Procedures as precluding the parties from submitting briefs or other new evidence to the FRP, but not as limiting the FRP’s access to materials already in the record of the Related SCO objections.

C. Subsequent to the July 4 Order, the ICDR advised the FRP of ICANN’s position that the Related SCO Records were not to be included in the Record and requested that the July 4 Order be modified to finalize the Record without the Related SCO Records.
D. After due deliberation, the FRP determined to defer to ICANN’s interpretation of the Final Review Procedures. Accordingly, on July 23, 2015, the FRP issued a Revised Order Finalizing the Record which modified the July 4 Order finalizing the Record to contain only the following materials:

- The OEPD
- The pleadings and supporting evidence that were before the OEP
- The two RSCO EPDs, without supporting evidence

IV. The Original Expert Panel’s Determination

A. The OEP’s Determination
The OEP held that:

“The gTLD[s] “CAM” and “COM” are confusingly similar and the use of “CAM” will likely result in string confusion. Objector has met its burden to prove that “CAM” so nearly resembles “COM” that it is probable that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user.”

The OEP based this conclusion on the following:

1. Contemporary Internet Usage
Objector contended that the “relevant class of users here consists of casual Internet users, likely to exercise a low degree of care when exposed to or interacting with TLDs, increasing the likelihood of confusion.” Objection at 7. Applicant countered that “today the average Internet user is sophisticated enough to make determinations about the origin of a website based on its content, rather than its domain name.” Response at 8.

The OEP found that Applicant had an “overly optimistic picture of the general audience of Internet users and their willingness to pay attention to technicalities of sorting out roots of top level domain names” and that Applicant also was “overly optimistic about their focused attention to online tasks.”

2. Expert Linguistic Evidence
   a. Objector provided the Affidavit of Gail Stygall (“Stygall”) to bolster its argument that .CAM is likely to be confused with .COM. Stygall is a Professor at the University of Washington in Seattle and an English language linguist. Stygall presented a

---

7 The FRP nonetheless urges that, to the extent ICANN determines to establish a similar final review mechanism in subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program, it consider including the full record of related SCOs in the record before future Final Review Panels.
diagram of the mouth to show that the vowel sounds in "CAM" and "COM" are both formed in the lower third of the mouth. Stygall went on to discuss selected dictionary meanings of "CAM" and "COM," noting “they both can have something to do with computers.” Stygall then concluded that the linguistic similarities between "CAM" and "COM" suggest that “Internet users who encounter domain names with .CAM are likely to be confused.”

b. Applicant supplied the OEP with the Rebuttal Affidavit of Sandra Ferrari Disner, PhD (“Disner”), an Assistant Professor of Linguistics at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. In her lengthy rebuttal, Disner gave a detailed analysis of (a) the lack of confusion between the vowels of "CAM" and "COM" in published psycholinguistic studies; (b) the distinctly different acoustic characteristics of these vowels; (c) the distinctly different articulatory characteristics of these vowels; (d) dialectic characteristics that heighten the distinction between these words; (e) the somewhat different initial consonants of "CAM" and "COM"; (f) the greater psycholinguistic prominence of sounds at the beginning of a word than sounds at the end; (g) the regularizing effect of spelling rules on the pronunciation of "CAM" and "COM" syllables, even in foreign borrowings; (h) the meaningfulness of "CAM"; and (i) the semantic differentiation of "CAM" and "COM."

c. The OEP concluded that the Disner Affidavit did not overcome the Stygall contention that the “o” and “a” sounds are made in the same part of the mouth. The OEP also found that Applicant had not shown that most people take “CAM” as short for camera. The OEP also criticized one of the Disner references because it pertained primarily to American English.

3. Expert Survey Evidence
a. Objector submitted a survey designed, supervised, and implemented by Hal L. Poret of ORC International in New York (Report on Survey to Measure Whether the gTLD .CAM is Confusingly Similar to the gTLD .COM, March 2013, Objection, Annex 3 (the “Poret Survey”). The Poret Survey involved 400 American Internet consumers and an additional 400 consumers in two “control” groups of 200 consumers each. The survey purports to find “a net confusion level of 39% that must be attributed to the similarity of the TLDs .CAM and .COM.” (Poret Survey at 1.) Objector also submitted and relied upon the Poret Survey in each of the RSCOs.
b. Applicant submitted a critique of the Poret Survey (Review of a Survey Conducted by Mr. Hal Poret Concerning the Possible Confusion between Proposed “.CAM” Top Level Domain Name with “.COM” TLD, Response, Annex 4 (the “Ostberg Critique”), and an alternative survey (Survey to Determine Likelihood of Confusion (if any) between the “.COM” and “.CAM” Top Level Domain Names, (the “Ostberg Survey”), by Henry D. Ostberg of The Admar Group, Inc. in Alpine, New Jersey, Response, Annex 5.

c. The OEP found the Poret Survey result convincing and appears to have relied on it heavily in reaching its conclusion sustaining the objection. (OEPD at 6.) The OEP found that the Ostberg survey was “not persuasive.” The OEP stated:

“Applicant relies on the Ostberg Report to rebut the Poret survey, but the Ostberg Report is deficient on several fronts.”

“Ostberg’s rebuttal may only slightly lower the weight accorded an otherwise good piece of evidence that shows probability of confusion.”

“Dr. Ostberg’s survey of 440 average Internet users that led to the conclusion that there is no likelihood of confusion, seems to compare ‘apples with oranges’ and is less convincing than the Poret survey. It is not a strong rebuttal [to Poret].”

OEPD at 6.

4. Length of the Strings
Objector argued that there was an important “similarity of appearance” between the two strings because each included only three letters, and each begins with “c” and ends with “m.” Objection at 8. Applicant responded that the short length of the strings weighs against a finding of visual similarity, because small differences may frequently lead in short words to a different overall impression. Response at 3.

The OEP relied on the short length of the strings and reached its own conclusion as to their visual similarity:

“While one out of 3 letters is indeed only 33 1/3% of the word, Applicant did not adequately discuss how visually close the letters in question, “o” and “a” are. These letters
do not look entirely different such as e.g., “y” and “F”, or “x” and “T”. While this is true in general, it is especially so to a fast reader. No matter what standards and purpose the ICANN SWORD algorithm includes, it has comparative value. ...Since pairs such as “God” and “dog” (85%) reach similarity scores of 84% and higher, how much more similar would “cxm” and “cxml” be (x being replaced with a vowel)?" OEPD at 5.

5. Marketing Channels
   a. Citing trademark law, Objector contended that convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion and it follows that registration of the .CAM string as an “open, accessible namespace” will “significantly increase the likelihood of confusion.” Objection at 7. Applicant responded that the marketing channels for .CAM and .COM were “irrelevant” because the fact that both parties will appear on the Internet will shed little, if any, light on whether confusion is likely. Applicant also argued that although it intends to operate .CAM as an open gTLD, it will likely appeal to groups interested in “a live feed from a web camera.”

   b. The OEP found that .COM and .CAM would use the same marketing channels, comprised of the entire Internet, since Objector operates the .COM gTLD as an open registry and Applicant proposes to operate .CAM on the same basis. The OEP noted that courts evaluating claims of trademark infringement “find that goods marketed in similar channels of trade are more likely to be confused.” The OEP found confusion more likely here because both parties would use “the same channels appealing to a broad audience” and “this would lead to extensive overlap.” OPED at 7.

B. The Related SCO Expert Panel Determinations

The principal conclusions in the Related SCO Expert Determinations were:

1. The very reputation of the .COM name limits the potential for confusion.

2. While there are “considerable” visual and aural similarities between .COM and .CAM, it does not follow that confusion would result. Objector’s survey evidence does not form a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that the average, reasonable Internet user would be confused by the string .CAM or be inclined to think that there is some association with the .COM string.
3. The evidence of Objector’s linguistics expert was not persuasive that the similarity of sound of the two terms would lead to confusion amongst consumers.

4. The RSCO Expert Panel also found that the survey evidence submitted in opposition to the Poret Survey was more persuasive:

“I prefer the survey conducted by Dr. Wright which is more pertinent to the question at hand and belies the danger raised in the report of Mr. Poret in the context of a global Internet. The Wright survey was broader both in terms of respondents and in terms of countries surveyed.” RSCO EPD (AC Webconnecting) at 8.

“The Poret Survey tendered by VeriSign is limited in its reach. It does not form a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that the average Internet user would be confused by the string .CAM or be inclined to think that there is some association with the .COM string.” … “I accept much of the critique of the Poret Survey as detailed in the rebuttal report of Michael Barone.” RSCO EPD (dot Agency) at 7-8.

V. Analysis

A. Issue To Be Determined

As provided in the NGPC Resolution and the Final Review Procedures, the sole issue before the Final Review Panel is:

“Whether the original Expert Panel could have reasonably come to the decision reached on the underlying SCO through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD program.”

B. Scope of Review

The FRP has before it the same record that was available to the OEP. As such, the FRP is in a position to review the OEP’s analysis and determination on a plenary basis and to reach an independent conclusion as to whether the applied-for gTLD string is “likely to result in string confusion.”
C. Summary

1. The FRP’s Principal Findings
   The FRP finds that the OEP erred primarily in its conclusions regarding the knowledge and experience of the average, reasonable Internet user. The FRP also had a different assessment of the expert evidence offered by the parties. We disagree as well with the OEP’s conclusion that confusion is likely to arise from any combination of “c” and “m” with a vowel in between. The FRP’s disagreement with these cornerstones of the OEP’s analysis substantially informs the FRP’s conclusion that the OEP could not reasonably have come to the decision reached on the underlying SCO through an appropriate application of the standard of review.

2. The FRP’s Finding in Regard to Marketing Channels
   The FRP agrees in part with the OEP’s analysis regarding overlapping marketing channels. The FRP finds that Applicant’s intention to operate the .CAM TLD as an open registry weighs in favor of the objection. The FRP takes note that the RSCOs both involved a limited registry or niche-marketed registry related to cameras. The FRP finds that there is a greater chance for confusion if the ultimate delegation of the new string .CAM is not restricted to camera-related uses, and is allowed to be operated as an open gTLD, as in the .COM gTLD. We find this factor important, but not sufficient, standing alone, to uphold the OEP’s determination.

D. Discussion

1. Contemporary Internet Usage
   a. The FRP disagrees with the OEP’s view regarding the knowledge and experience level of the average, reasonable Internet user. The FRP believes that more than four decades after the inception of the Internet, in an era where many Internet users are “digital natives,” the average, reasonable Internet user is well-aware of the importance of precision in Internet searches and, in particular, that a difference of one letter in a domain name likely will lead to a destination other than the one intended or an error.

---

8 While acknowledging Applicant and Objector’s agreement that confusion is to be measured in reference to the average, reasonable Internet user, the OEP nonetheless appears to have given some weight to potential confusion of registrants of domain names. OEPD at 7. Moreover, the OEP appears to have erred by reversing the burden of proof, noting that Applicant “had failed to disprove” potential registrant confusion. The FRP finds that registrant confusion is unlikely and, in any event, the possibility of registrant confusion is not relevant to the stated standard, which refers to the average, reasonable Internet user.
b. The average, reasonable Internet user is likely to have experienced the impact of small errors by arriving at a landing page other than the one intended, or through ubiquitous search engine prompts such as “showing results for….” or “did you mean…” The OEP’s conclusion that “Google and other search engines would have to develop a gigantic algorithm to correct psychologically or otherwise induced confusion among its users” is at odds with the actual existence of such prompts and their effectiveness. Applicant submitted evidence that 92% of adult Internet users employ search engines to find information on the Internet.

c. Based on the average, reasonable Internet user’s experience and the importance of search engines, in the FRP’s view, confusion, if any, between .COM and .CAM is highly likely to be fleeting. While a fleeting association may create some “possibility of confusion” or evoke an “association in the sense that the string brings another string to mind,” both such reactions are insufficient under the ICANN SCO standard to support a finding that confusion is probable.

2. Linguistic Evidence

a. The FRP found Applicant’s evidence rebutting Stygall convincing, much as the RSCO EP found in the two RSCOs. Specifically, the FRP notes Disner’s use of a well-known experiment by Peterson and Barney to demonstrate that the vowel sounds in “CAM” and “.COM” are confused only .02% of the time. Disner states that even her phone persona Siri recognizes the difference in sound. Disner refers to diagrams showing different tongue positions in the pronunciation of “CAM” and “.COM.”

b. Disner also effectively rebuts the notion held by Stygall and Walsh (another Objector Affiant) that “CAM” and “COM” are mere sequences of letters, devoid of meaning. Disner offers various meanings of “cam,” concluding that an Internet user is far more likely to associate “CAM” with a camera than a computer, dispelling Stygall’s semantic comparison. Disner specifically references the Corpus of Contemporary American English (“COCA”), in which “CAM” appears 3150 times. She notes that, of those 3150 mentions, 46% of them are related to photography/cameras, with 31% referring to proper names.

c. The FRP finds Professor Disner’s evidence on the issue of whether .CAM is associated with a particular meaning to be
convincing. Moreover, the OEP appears to have improperly shifted the burden of proof to the Applicant in respect to the meaning of .CAM, finding that Applicant “never showed” that .CAM might be taken to designate camera-related uses. The FRP finds that the letters “CAM” already are associated substantially with camera-related uses, as terms such as nanny-cam, mini-cam and camcorder have entered the lexicon. These associations have the potential to dispel any confusion between .COM and .CAM in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Moreover, the association of the .CAM gTLD string with camera-related usages is likely to grow over time, as the average, reasonable Internet user becomes aware of the New gTLD program in general and potentially encounters camera-related sites that use the .CAM gTLD.

d. The OEP also criticizes one of the Disner references because it pertains primarily to the American English, and at the same time ignores that fact that the Stygall Affidavit is devoid of any mention of different dialects, or of non-English Internet users.

3. Survey Evidence

a. In his criticism of the Poret Survey, Ostberg focused on the undue length of the second level domain names used for the critical portion of the survey, noting that they “involved three full words” and that the use of such lengthy second level domain names might overshadow and might distract the focus from the TLDs that came after them.” (Ostberg Critique at 8,11, emphasis in original.)

b. The FRP’s own review of the Poret Survey’s methodology finds it unfairly skewed to produce results supportive of Objector’s position. The FRP agrees with Ostberg that the survey’s choice of unnaturally long second level domain names to pair with the gTLDs being tested for confusion is a significant flaw in the survey design. Specifically, the Poret Survey showed the subjects, at different times, the following domain names:

www.snapshotphotovideo.com
www.snapshotphotovideo.cam
and after the second viewing asked them to state whether the domain name then shown was the same as, or different from, one of the domain names they had seen earlier. The use of such a long second level domain name (the portion to the left of the dot), combining three separate words, appears highly likely to distort the results in favor of confusion. First, the undue length of the second level domain name, longer than Internet users typically encounter, attracts more than normal attention and focus on the material to the left of the gTLD. Second, the need to parse the three words to determine the similarity of the second level domain name requires more focus on that material. Taken together, these factors appear to have given the survey subject an unnaturally short time to evaluate the similarity of the gTLDs. This likely tended to foster mistakes, guessing and wrong answers and support a misleading survey result of confusion.

c. The FRP also finds problematic the Poret Survey’s initial choice of sample domain names to introduce the subject matter of the survey. At the start of the online survey, the subjects were provided with the following introduction to domain names:

“A domain name is the address of a specific website. The following are examples of five different domain names:

www.movies.com
www.autoinsurance.com
www.autoinsurance.net
www.socialsecurity.gov
www.literature.org”

All of the sample gTLDs chosen have been in use for many years and are quite familiar to all Internet users. This gives the subjects no inkling that new and unfamiliar gTLDs may be encountered later in the survey and increases the chances that the subjects will overlook them when they appear, or assume they are the gTLDs with which they are most familiar. An unbiased survey concerning new gTLDs should have introduced the concept of new gTLDs early on by using some unfamiliar gTLDs in the initial examples and mentioning that new gTLDs are on the way and Internet users will have to get used to encountering them. This would have much better simulated the way users will be encountering the new gTLDs in actual experience. As more and more new gTLDs are rolled out there will undoubtedly be significant publicity and “buzz” about their presence so
that typical Internet users will be cognizant that they may be encountered.

d. The distortion flowing from the unnaturally long and unnaturally constructed test second level domain names, and the introductory use of familiar gTLDs to the exclusion of new ones, should not have been lost on an experienced survey designer such as Mr. Poret. He has “personally designed, supervised, and implemented over 450 consumer surveys concerning consumer perception, opinion, and behavior.” (Poret Survey at 2.)

e. The FRP also agrees with Ostberg’s criticism of the Poret Survey’s failure to explicitly instruct the subjects “not to guess when answering and to feel free to give a “don’t know” response where appropriate.” (Ostberg Critique at 8.) Although the Poret Survey included a “don’t know” choice for subjects, no effort was made to assure them that “don’t know” was an acceptable choice they should feel free to use and that they should not guess. As Ostberg points out, citing the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, prepared by the Federal Judicial Center as a guide to judges evaluating the validity of a survey, it is not sufficient merely to give a “don’t know” choice. “Many respondents require assurance that a ‘don’t know’ response answer is acceptable, where appropriate, before they are willing to give such an answer.” (Ostberg Critique at 12.) Poret, in fact, has elsewhere stated, “It is well-settled that trademark survey instructions and questions should ... instruct respondents not to guess and that they are free to answer ‘don’t know’ if they have no opinion. Surveys that do not comply with th[is] criter[on] have been viewed with less reliability by the courts and TTAB. H. Poret, PLI Course Handbook, Advanced Seminar on Trademark Law 2009, Hot Topics in Trademark Surveys, at 8-9, available online at http://www.pli.edu/emktg/all_star/Trademark_Surveys21.DOC. To correct for this issue, the Ostberg Survey explicitly advised subjects, “We don’t want you to guess when giving an answer. If you ‘don’t know’ or ‘don’t recall,’ please indicate this as your answer.” This correction adds to the reliability of the Ostberg Survey in the FRP’s view.
f. Ostberg also criticizes the Poret Survey for relying only on visual observation of the domain names being surveyed. He notes that, “Respondents could react hastily, doing so without the thought or the effort involved when someone accesses a website on the internet.” (Ostberg Critique at 13.) To simulate the experience an actual Internet user would have, and reflect what occurs in the marketplace, the Ostberg Survey asked the subjects to type the .CAM domain name into the computer before responding to the question concerning whether this domain name was included in the group of domain names shown to the subject previously. In the Panel’s view, requiring this typing step does better simulate actual market conditions than the Poret Survey’s reliance on visual observation alone. It lends further credence to the Ostberg Survey over the Poret Survey results.

g. Because the underlying submissions from Dr. Wright and Prof. Barone in the RSCOs were not part of the record in this proceeding and not available to the FRP, the FRP cannot fully evaluate their criticism of the Poret Survey. It has to suffice to say that the RSCO EP found in both its determinations that the rebuttal experts persuasively countered the Poret Survey.

h. The FRP finds the OEP’s determination to credit the Poret Survey result and reject the Ostberg Survey result to be outside the range of reasonable views of the survey evidence that an expert could reach. The FRP can discern no basis for the OEP’s comment that the Ostberg survey compares “apples with oranges.” The FRP concludes that the Ostberg Survey is better designed to test for possible confusion between .COM and .CAM than the Poret Survey and its conclusion that confusion is unlikely is entitled to significantly more weight than Poret’s conclusion that confusion is probable.

4. Length of the String and Impact of Second Level Domain Names
   a. The FRP does not concur with the OEP’s conclusion that any three letter string beginning with “c” and ending with “m”, with a vowel in between, is likely to be confusing. OEPD at 5. The OEP observes that the ICANN SWORD algorithm score of visual similarity on the pair “God” and “dog” is
85%,” and finds that any combination of “e” and “m” with a vowel in between must be “much more similar.” This ignores that the actual SWORD algorithm score ICANN obtained in its initial evaluation of the proposed .CAM gTLD was 63%. Applicant in the dot Agency RSCO contended that ICANN already has registered more than 790 gTLD’s with higher SWORD scores than .CAM. RSCO EPD (dot Agency) at 6. On that basis, it would appear that strings with relatively high levels of visual similarity, as measured by the SWORD algorithm, can coexist on the Internet without causing unacceptable levels of confusion.

b. The FRP also finds persuasive the European Union Trade Mark Office guidance that the shorter a name, the more easily the public is able to perceive all its single elements and that small differences in short words may frequently lead to a different overall impression. Response at Annex I, p. 35. The FRP finds that the short length of a gTLD string, coupled with the average, reasonable Internet user’s general awareness of the importance of precision in web searches, are substantial factors in dispelling possible confusion between .COM and .CAM.

c. The OEP notes evidence that Internet users focus primarily on the second level domain name, but concludes, “this will increase, not decrease the potential for confusion.” OEPD at 7. The FRP disagrees. The FRP finds that the average, reasonable Internet user almost always will see the gTLD in combination with a second level domain name. The second level domain name, by adding further identifying information, should act to mitigate, not increase, string confusion. To the extent that the second level domain name increases confusion by being confusingly similar to another second level domain name, injured parties will have recourse to ICANN’s accessible, streamlined UDRP process.

5. Marketing Channels
The FRP notes that the RSCOs both would be restricted gTLDs limited to camera-related uses, or niche-marketed to such users. The FRP finds that Applicant’s plan to operate .CAM as an open gTLD, while stating an expectation that .CAM will appeal to a niche audience, is more likely to cause confusion than operation of .CAM as a restricted gTLD would be. Operation of .CAM as an open gTLD also may present opportunities for unscrupulous operators to attempt registration of second level domain names that are similar or identical to existing .COM domains. The FRP finds that the Applicant’s application for .CAM as an open registry,
rather than a restricted (or niche-marketed) registry, weighs in favor of the Objector. Ultimately, however, the FRP finds that this factor, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding that confusion is probable.

6. Fame of .COM TLD

a. Objector argued that .COM is analogous to a “famous” trademark and that by analogy to trademark law, “newcomers” should be required to “stay far afield.” Walsh Aff’ at 6-7. Applicant disagreed, contending that even if trademark law principles could provide helpful guidance, Objector is not entitled to trademark protection of .COM because it is a generic top level domain, not protected by trademark law. Response at 9. The OEP held that trademark law is “analogous only; it is not controlling.” The FRP finds the “famous mark” doctrine inapplicable in the SCO context where the standard is probability of confusion and not the protection of any vested property right in a gTLD.

b. The FRP agrees with the RSCO Expert Panelist that the “fame” of the string weighs against the objection. The .COM gTLD is truly a unique identifier. It is used more broadly, and is better known, than any other gTLD. The ubiquity and prominence of the .COM TLD is likely to operate to reduce the likelihood that the average, reasonable Internet user would confuse .COM and .CAM.

7. The NGPC’s Finding In Regard to the Best Interests of the New gTLD Program and the Internet Community

The FRP considered the NGPC’s finding that the OEP Determination was “not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet Community” and “outside normal standards of what is perceived to be reasonable and just.” However, the FRP was charged with making, and has made, an independent determination in this matter. The NGPC’s views are noted, but were not given weight in reaching the FRP’s Determination.

E. Conclusion

1. After carefully weighing the evidence in the record and considering the OEP’s analysis, the FRP finds that the OEP could not have “reasonably come to the decision reached on the underlying SCO through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR
Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program.” The FRP's determination to reverse the underlying SCO determination does not require that the FRP disagree with each and every finding in the OEP’s analysis.

2. This Report of the Final Review Panel shall constitute the report called for in Article 11 of the Final Review Procedures.

3. Based on the foregoing, the FRP reverses the OEP’s Determination and is issuing concurrently a new Final Determination overruling the objection.

Dated: August 26, 2015

Sandra J. Franklin
Date: August 26, 2015

L. Donald Prutzman
Date: August 26, 2015

Mark C. Morrill
Chair of the Final Review Panel
Date: August 26, 2015
Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program.” The FRP’s determination to reverse the underlying SCO determination does not require that the FRP disagree with each and every finding in the OEP’s analysis.

2. This Report of the Final Review Panel shall constitute the report called for in Article 11 of the Final Review Procedures.

3. Based on the foregoing, the FRP reverses the OEP’s Determination and is issuing concurrently a new Final Determination overruling the objection.

Dated: August 26, 2015

Sandra J. Franklin
Date: August 26, 2015

L. Donald Pruzman
Date: August 26, 2015

Mark C. Morril
Chair of the Final Review Panel
Date: August 26, 2015
Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program.” The FRP’s determination to reverse the underlying SCO determination does not require that the FRP disagree with each and every finding in the OEP’s analysis.

2. This Report of the Final Review Panel shall constitute the report called for in Article 11 of the Final Review Procedures.

3. Based on the foregoing, the FRP reverses the OEP’s Determination and is issuing concurrently a new Final Determination overruling the objection.

Dated: August 26, 2015

Sandra J. Franklin
Date: August 26, 2015

L. Donald Prutzman
Date: August 26, 2015

Mark C. Morrill
Chair of the Final Review Panel
Date: August 26, 2015
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

ICDR Case Number: 01-15-0003-3822

VeriSign, Inc., Objector

-and-

United TLD Holdco Ltd., Applicant

__________________________________________

FINAL REVIEW PANEL DETERMINATION

__________________________________________

Final Review Panel:

Sandra J. Franklin, Esq.
Mark C. Morril, Esq. (Chair)
L. Donald Prutzman, Esq.

August 26, 2015
FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL’S REPORT ISSUED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH, THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL HEREBY DECLARES:

1. It is not probable that the average, reasonable Internet user would confuse the applied-for new gTLD .CAM with the existing gTLD .COM.

2. The underlying String Confusion Objection Expert Panel Determination is reversed and henceforth shall be superseded and replaced by this New Final Determination.

3. The fees and expenses of this Final Review Process shall be borne by ICANN, as provided in Attachment 2 to the ICDR Procedure for Final Review of Perceived Inconsistent or Unreasonable String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations, effective 15 March 2015.

4. This New Final Determination may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the New Final Determination in this Final Review Process.

Dated: August 26, 2015

Sandra J. Franklin
Date: August 26, 2015

L. Donald Prutzman
Date: August 26, 2015

Mark C. Morril
Chair of the Final Review Panel
Date: August 26, 2015
FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL'S REPORT ISSUED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH, THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL HEREBY DECLARES:

1. It is not probable that the average, reasonable Internet user would confuse the applied-for new gTLD .CAM with the existing gTLD .COM.

2. The underlying String Confusion Objection Expert Panel Determination is reversed and henceforth shall be superseded and replaced by this New Final Determination.

3. The fees and expenses of this Final Review Process shall be borne by ICANN, as provided in Attachment 2 to the ICDR Procedures for Final Review of Perceived Inconsistent or Unreasonable String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations, effective 15 March 2015.

4. This New Final Determination may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the New Final Determination in this Final Review Process.

Dated: August 26, 2015

Sandra J. Franklin  
Date: August 26, 2015

L. Donald Prutzman  
Date: August 26, 2015

Mark C. Morrill  
Chair of the Final Review Panel  
Date: August 26, 2015
FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL’S REPORT ISSUED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH, THE FINAL REVIEW PANEL HEREBY DECLARES:

1. It is not probable that the average, reasonable Internet user would confuse the applied-for new gTLD .CAM with the existing gTLD .COM.

2. The underlying String Confusion Objection Expert Panel Determination is reversed and henceforth shall be superseded and replaced by this New Final Determination.

3. The fees and expenses of this Final Review Process shall be borne by ICANN, as provided in Attachment 2 to the ICDR Procedures for Final Review of Perceived Inconsistent or Unreasonable String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations, effective 15 March 2015.

4. This New Final Determination may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the New Final Determination in this Final Review Process.

Dated: August 26, 2015

Sandra J. Franklin
Date: August 26, 2015

L. Donald Prutzman
Date: August 26, 2015

Mark C. Morril
Chair of the Final Review Panel
Date: August 26, 2015
APPENDIX M
International Centre for Dispute Resolution New
gTLD String Confusion Panel

RE: 0115 0003 3821

Commercial Connect L.L.C, OBJECTOR

vs

Amazon EU S.à r.l., APPLICANT String:

REPORT OF FINAL REVIEW PANEL

TO:      International Centre for Dispute Resolution, Attn: Mr. Thomas Simotas, Supervisor

FROM:    Judith Meyer, Esq., Robert O'Brien, Esq. and Stephen S. Strick, Esq. (the "Final Review Panel")

DATE:    August 2015


WE, the duly appointed undersigned members of the Final Review Panel hereby submit this Report of Final Determination of the Expert Determination.1

---

1 Under paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Procedures, the Final Review Panel was given the authority and tasked to evaluate and render a Final Determination on the Expert Determination pursuant to the NGPC Resolutions as defined in the paragraph 1 of the Procedures.
FINALE DETERMINATION:

The Expert Determination is REVERSED, replaced and superseded by the attached new Final Determination issued by this Final Review Panel.

BASIS AND RATIONALE

OF THE FINAL DETERMINATION

The question before this Final Review Panel is whether the Expert Panel\(^2\) could have reasonably come to the decision reached by it in connection with the underlying String Confusion Objection captioned above, through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN's New gTLD Program.\(^3\)

After fully reviewing the record in this proceeding,\(^4\) we find that the Expert Panel could not have reasonably come to the decision it reached. In arriving at our conclusion, we find that the Objector in the underlying String Confusion Objection failed to meet its burden of proving that "御飯" (the Japanese symbols for", online shopping" so nearly resembles ".shop" as to cause probable confusion in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. The two strings indisputably have no visual or aural similarity. The two strings are in different languages, written in different scripts that look very different, and have

\(^2\) The new gTLD program includes a dispute resolution procedure, pursuant to which disputes between a person or entity who applies for a new gTLD and a person or entity who objects to that gTLD are resolved in accordance with this New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure. (See, Model 3 of the ICAAN gTLD Applicant Guidebook containing Objection Procedures and the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure.

\(^3\) The applicable standard for review to be applied by the Expert in the underlying Expert Determination is whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. Under the terms of the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

\(^4\) Pursuant to paragraph 9(d) of the Procedures, the Final Review Panel reviewed the record in this proceeding and finalized it in our email to the ICDR on July 14, 2015. In that email, we confirmed that the record in this proceeding consists of the Objections, Response and Determination in the Commercial Connect, LLC vs Amazon EU S.a.r.l. matter as well as a consideration the Expert Determination in the Commercial Connect, LLC vs Top Level Domain Holdings Limited matter.
different phonetic spellings and pronunciations.

Although the two strings, .shop and <通販>, have similar meanings or connotations, we conclude that such similarity is not so great that their co-existence on the Internet would be likely or probable to cause the average Internet user to be deceived or confused.

The Final Review Panel

[Signature]
Judith Meyer, Esq.

________________________
Robert O'Brien

________________________
Stephen S. Strick, Chair
different phonetic spellings and pronunciations.

Although the two strings, .shop and <通販>, have similar meanings or connotations, we conclude that such similarity is not so great that their co-existence on the Internet would be likely or probable to cause the average Internet user to be deceived or confused.

The Final Review Panel

Judith Meyer, Esq.

Robert O'Brien

Stephen S. Strick, Chair
different phonetic spellings and pronunciations.

Although the two strings, .shop and <.通販>, have similar meanings or connotations, we conclude that such similarity is not so great that their co-existence on the Internet would be likely or probable to cause the average Internet user to be deceived or confused.

The Final Review Panel

_____________________________
Judith Meyer, Esq.

_____________________________
Robert O'Brien

_____________________________
Stephen S. Strick, Chair
RE: 0115 0003 3821

Commercial Connect LLC, OBJECTOR

vs

Amazon EU S.à r.l., APPLICANT String: <通販>

FINAL REVIEW PANEL DETERMINATION

The Parties:

The Objector is Commercial Connect LLC, 1418 South 3rd Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40208 USA and is represented by Jeffrey S. Smith.

The Applicant is Amazon EU S.à r.l., 5 Rue Plaetsis L-2338 Luxembourg, and is represented by Flip Petillion, Crowell & Moring, rue Joseph Stevens 7, Brussels 1000 Belgium.

The New gTLD String Objected To:

The new gTLD string applied for and objected to is: <通販> based on alleged confusion with Objector's string ".shop."

Prevailing Party:

On August 21, 2013, the Expert Panel issued its Expert Determination with respect to the String Confusion Objection captioned above. Finding that the Objector had prevailed, the Expert Panel sustained the Objection and concluded that the Objector was the prevailing party.

However, the undersigned Final Review Panel, having been duly appointed, and having reviewed the record and reported its findings to the ICDR in accordance with Procedures for Final Review of Perceived Inconsistent or Unreasonable String Confusion Expert Determination, has concluded that the Expert Panel could not have reasonably come to the decision reached by it in connection with the underlying String Confusion Objection captioned above, through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the

1 See, June 24, 2015 letter from ICDR's Thomas Simotas to parties confirming the panel's appointment.
connection with the underlying String Confusion Objection captioned above, through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program.²

Consequently, the Expert Determination is reversed, replaced and superseded by the within Final Determination issued by this Final Review Panel.

Background:

Article 1(b) of the Module 3 of the ICANN gTLD Applicant Guidebook (“Guidebook”) contains Objection Procedures and the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (“the Procedure”) states that “[t]he new gTLD program includes a dispute resolution procedure, pursuant to which disputes between a person or entity who applies for a new gTLD and a person or entity who objects to that gTLD are resolved in accordance with this New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure.”

Section 3.1 of the Guidebook provides: “The independent dispute resolution process is designed to protect certain limited interests and rights. The process provides a path for objections during evaluation of the applications. It allows a party with standing to have its objection considered before a panel of qualified experts.”

Article 3(a) of the Procedure states that “String Confusion Objections shall be administered by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution.”

A formal objection initiates a dispute resolution proceeding. In filing an application for a gTLD, the applicant agrees to accept the applicability of the gTLD dispute resolution process. Similarly, an objector accepts the applicability of the gTLD dispute resolution process by filing its objection.

Article 4(b)(i) of the Procedure provides that the applicable Dispute Resolution Service Provider (“DRSP”) Rules are the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN’s New gTLD Program.

A formal objection can be filed on four enumerated grounds, only one of which is relevant here. Specifically, as expressed in the Guidebook, and the Procedure, one of the grounds expressed is “String Confusion.” Article 2(e)(i) of the Procedure provides: “(i) ‘String Confusion Objection’ refers to the objection that the string comprising the potential gTLD is confusingly similar to an existing top-level domain or another string applied for in the same round of applications.”

A panel hearing a string confusion objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly

² The applicable standard for review to be applied by the Expert in the underlying Expert Determination is whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. Under the terms of the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.
resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. (Guidebook, Section 3.4.1.)

Standing and Other Procedural Matters:

An Objector must satisfy standing requirements to have its objections considered. Standing requirements for objections on the grounds of string confusion require that the Objector be existing TLD operators or TLD applicants in the current round.

An existing TLD operator may file a string confusion objection to assert string confusion between an applied-for gTLD and the TLD that the Objector currently operates.

Any gTLD applicant in the same application round may file a string confusion objection to assert string confusion between an applied-for gTLD and the gTLD for which it has applied, where string confusion between the two applicants has not already been found. That is, an applicant does not have standing to object to another application with which it is already in a contention set.

Here, Objector has applied for the gTLD string <.shop>. Applicant has applied for the gTLD string <.通贩(Online Shopping)> aka <.xn--gk3atl1e (Online Shopping)> . Accordingly, Objector has standing to file this string confusion objection.

In the case where an existing TLD operator successfully asserts string confusion with an applicant, the application will be rejected.

In the case where a gTLD applicant successfully asserts string confusion with another applicant, the only possible outcome is for both applicants to be placed in a contention set and to be referred to a contention resolution procedure (refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures). If an objection by one gTLD applicant to another gTLD applicant is unsuccessful, the applicants may both move forward in the process without being considered in contention with one another.

Article 21(d) of the Procedure provides: “The Expert Determination shall be in writing, shall identify the prevailing party and shall state the reasons upon which it is based. The remedies available to an Applicant or an Objector pursuant to any proceeding before a Panel shall be limited to the success or dismissal of an Objection and to the refund by the DRSP to the prevailing party, as determined by the Panel in its Expert Determination, of its advance payment(s) of Costs pursuant to Article 14(e) of this Procedure and any relevant provisions of the applicable DRSP Rules.”

The Parties’ Positions:

Applicant asks that the Objection be denied because Objector allegedly did not properly serve the objection on Applicant in accord with applicable rules set out in the Procedure. However, Applicant acknowledges that it previously has been provided with a copy of Objector’s application for the <.shop> gTLD string, the Objector’s Demand for Arbitration and other materials.
Applicant’s counsel also has submitted a detailed brief in support of its application, and the panel has reviewed and considered all of Applicant’s submissions, arguments and contentions. Thus, it appears that Applicant received actual notice of the Objection, and has been accorded a full and fair opportunity to be heard on its application. Applicant also has not shown that it was prejudiced by any alleged defects in the filing of the Objection. As the procedures for String Confusion Objections were relatively new at the time when the Objection was made, in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice to the Applicant, the panel is of the view that the Objection should be evaluated on the merits. Consequently, Applicant’s procedural objections are denied.

Objector asserts that confusing similarity exists because the Applicant’s proposed string has a similar meaning to the Objector’s string. The Objection further asserts that visual or aural similarity is not required, if the two strings have the same meaning, even if in different languages using different characters.

Applicant responds by contending that the objection should be denied because its application will promote innovation and competition among domain name registries. Applicant asserts that such competition advances the program’s goals, to expand consumer choice in the gTLD space.

Applicant also asserts that the string it has applied for will not create confusion. Applicant argues that the strings have a different meaning, because the word “shop” means “commercial establishment” or “store” and is a noun, while “online shopping” refers either to an action of purchasing something online or to order something for delivery via mail.

Lastly, Applicant asserts that the likelihood of confusion is merely possible, not probable, because the two strings are in different languages and the characters used by the two languages for the two strings have no visual similarity.

Jurisdiction:

The Expert was properly appointed pursuant to the Procedure and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures, and had jurisdiction to decide this dispute. The Applicant accepted the applicability of the Procedure and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures by applying for a new gTLD pursuant to Article 1(d) of the Procedure. The Objector has likewise accepted the applicability of the Procedure and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures by filing an objection to a new gTLD pursuant to Article 1(d) of the Procedure.

As noted above, Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook explains the string confusion standard as follows:

A DRSP panel hearing a string confusion case objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is
insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

Section 2.2.1.1 of the Guidebook refers to visual similarity. However, that provision explains that "[t]he visual similarity check that occurs during the Initial Evaluation is intended to augment the objection and dispute resolution process ... that addresses all types of similarity." Similarly, Section 2.2.1.1.3 of the Guidebook clarifies that a third party string confusion objection "is not limited to visual similarity"; rather, confusion "may be based on any type of similarity (including visual, aural, or similarity of meaning)."

Section 3.5 of the Guidebook states that "[t]he objector has the burden of proof." Section 3.5 further states that the panel "will use appropriate general principles (standards) to evaluate the merits of each objection" and "may also refer to other relevant rules of international law in connection with the standards."

The plain language of Section 3.5.1 makes clear that string confusion is a high standard. In addition to requiring "a likelihood of confusion," Section 3.5.1 emphasizes that "mere association" is insufficient, and that confusion must be "probable, not merely possible."

Section 3.5.1 also refers to "so nearly resembles," indicating that the resemblance between the two strings should be quite close.

Imposing a high standard for string confusion is consistent with the purpose of the new gTLD program. As explained in the Preamble of the Guidebook, "[t]he new gTLD program will open up the top level of the Internet's namespace to foster diversity, encourage competition, and enhance the utility of the DNS" [Domain Name System]. While there are currently 22 gTLDs (as well as over 250 country code top-level domains), "[t]he new gTLD program will create a means for prospective registry operators to apply for new gTLDs, and create new options for consumers in the market." To this end, ICANN did not limit the number of gTLDs applications in the current application round, because this would "severely limit the anticipated benefits of the Program: innovation, choice, and competition." New gTLDs Applicant Guidebook April 2011 Discussion Draft Public Comment Summary and Analysis, page 5, http://archive.icann.org/en/topics/new- gtds/summary-analysis-agv6-30mayl 1-en.pdf (hereafter "Draft Summary and Analysis").

The New gTLD Program expressly contemplates the establishment of new Internationalized Domain Names ("IDNs") that are written in a script other than the standard ASCII Roman characters and Arabic numbers. The Preamble of the Guidebook states that "ICANN expects a diverse set of applications for new gTLDs, including IDNs, creating significant potential for new uses and benefit to Internet users across the globe" (emphasis added). Consistent with this expectation, Section 1.3 of the Guidebook sets forth special requirements for Internationalized Domain Name applications String Confusion.

5
Findings On String Confusion Objection:

The Expert found that the Objector had met its burden of proving that Applicant’s string (.
) so nearly resembles ".shop" as to cause probable confusion in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. However, as noted, we find to the contrary. The two strings indisputably have no visual or aural similarity, are in different languages, written in different scripts that look very different, and have different phonetic spellings and pronunciations.

The only sense in which ".shop" and (.) are similar is their meaning. However, this similarity in meaning is apparent only to individuals who read and understand both Japanese and English. Moreover, a person who can read both languages would understand that ".shop" is directed at English-speaking users, while (.) is directed at Japanese-speaking users. While there is some potential overlap between these two markets, they are largely distinct. Therefore, there is little likelihood that a bilingual user would be deceived or confused.

Furthermore, as noted above, the New gTLD Program expressly contemplated the creation of new Internationalized Domain Names written in non-Roman scripts. If similarity in meaning between gTLDs written in two different scripts were deemed sufficient, by itself, to result in confusing similarity, then all Internationalized Domain Name applications with the same meaning would need to be put in the same contention set with each other and with any Roman gTLD applications with the same meaning. This would mean that only one application in any script could be registered, which would conflict with the basic purpose of encouraging "a diverse set of applications for new gTLDs, including IDNs, creating significant potential for new uses and benefit to Internet users across the globe." (Preamble to the Guidebook.)

For the above reasons, this Final Review Panel concludes that (.) and ".shop" are not confusingly similar to the average, reasonable Internet user under the standard set forth in the Procedure and the Guidebook. We note that under Section 2.2.1.1.3 of the Guidebook, a third party string confusion objection "is not limited to visual similarity," but "may be based on any type of similarity (including visual, aural, or similarity of meaning)."

Other Issues:

The Objector has alleged that ICANN agreed to give it preferential treatment as the initial applicant for the ".shop" gTLD. The Objector has not argued, however, that this alleged preference has any bearing on the merits of its Objection. In any event, we find that the Objector's alleged discussions with ICANN are irrelevant to the determination in this case. Whether the Objection has merit depends on whether it meets the criteria set forth in the Procedure and the Guidebook. Moreover, ICANN has stated that "[t]here should be a level playing field for the introduction of new gTLDs, with no privileged treatment for potential applicants." New gTLD Draft Applicant Guidebook Version 4 Public Comment Summary and Analysis, page 90, http://archive.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtds/summary-analysis-agv4-12nov10-en.pdf.

6
For the forgoing reasons, this Final Review Panel reverses the Expert Determination and finds that the Applicant has prevailed and the Objection is dismissed.

DATE: August 18, 2015

The Final Review Panel

Judith Meyer, Esq.

Robert O'Brien

Stephen S. Strick, Chair
For the forgoing reasons, this Final Review Panel reverses the Expert Determination and finds that the Applicant has prevailed and the Objection is dismissed.

DATE: August 18, 2015

The Final Review Panel

________________________________________
Judith Meyer, Esq.

Robert O'Brien

________________________________________
Stephen S. Strick, Chair
For the forgoing reasons, this Final Review Panel reverses the Expert Determination and finds that the Applicant has prevailed and the Objection is dismissed.

DATE: August 18, 2015

The Final Review Panel

________________________
Judith Meyer, Esq.

________________________
Robert O'Brien

________________________
Stephen S. Strick, Chair