IN THE MATTER OF AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

DONUTS INC. 
Claimant, 

v. 

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, 
Respondent. 

ICDR Case No. 01-14-0001-6263

ADDITIONAL SUBMISSION BY DONUTS INC. IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF (APPLICATION FREEZE)

RE NEW gTLD APPLICATIONS
FOR .SPORTS, .SKI and .RUGBY

THE IP & TECHNOLOGY LEGAL GROUP, C. John M. Genga, Contact Information Redacted
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http://newgtltdisputes.com

Attorneys for Claimant DONUTS INC.
Claimant Donuts respectfully submits the following in response to the Emergency Arbitrator’s Procedural Order No. 2, and to ICANN’s consolidated response to Donuts’ request for IRP and for emergency relief.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Correctly recognizing that a “substantial amount of money and possibly irreparable harm appear to be involved” in this matter, the Emergency Arbitrator has requested the parties to address that as well as other key issues associated with Donuts’ request for emergency relief. However, ICANN’s opposition to Donuts’ request does not even mention the irreparable harm Donuts would suffer absent emergency relief.

2. The terminal nature of the harm Donuts faces could not be clearer. Without a stay, ICANN could enter into contracts and award the .SPORTS, .SKI and .RUGBY domains to other applicants, thereby preventing Donuts from obtaining the relief it seeks by this IRP. Failing to grant emergency relief would render this IRP a complete nullity and a meaningless review procedure.

3. ICANN instead devotes its opposition exclusively to attacking Donuts’ IRP on the merits. More specifically, it relies entirely on the faulty premise that a prerequisite for Donuts to obtain relief – namely, Board action – does not exist in this case. That is simply not true.

4. One need look no further than statements by the ICANN Board itself, through its New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”), to find that ICANN concedes Board action – and inaction, also reviewable by IRP – in connection with new gTLD objection rulings. On October 14, 2014 – after Donuts initiated this proceeding – the NGPC issued a resolution establishing a special review mechanism for certain objection determinations, reaffirming the Board’s ultimate responsibility for the new gTLD program and its power to correct rulings that are inconsistent or otherwise fail to apply the correct Guidebook standards.

¹ Capitalized and abbreviated terms used herein have the meanings ascribed to them in Donuts’ IRP request.
5. Donuts attaches the recent NGPC resolution hereto as Exhibit A, and addresses it in greater detail below. Donuts also responds below to questions raised by the Emergency Arbitrator in his Procedural Order No. 2, and to other points raised in ICANN’s opposition.

II. ARGUMENT

6. Donuts has established beyond serious question its right to emergency relief. It undoubtedly will suffer irreparable injury absent that interim remedy – an undeniable fact that ICANN does not even begin to challenge. And, regarding likelihood of success on the merits, ICANN devotes its entire opposition to the sole issue of Board action, which Donuts has shown. This along with the numerous violations of ICANN Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation that Donuts has demonstrated more than satisfy the “likelihood of success” element, making emergency relief not only proper but necessary.

A. The Arbitrator Understands the Legal Standard He Must Apply to the Request for Emergency Relief.

7. Procedural Order No. 2 accurately states an element of the standard of review – namely, whether Donuts’ IRP request “raises questions for decision which are not frivolous ....” This is consistent with principles applied generally for emergency relief both in U.S. courts and internationally. The other portion of the test, of course, asks whether the party seeking emergency relief would suffer irreparable harm absent such a remedy.

8. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which ICANN partially cites, articulates a two-part standard familiar to U.S. practitioners: whether the party requesting relief (a) would suffer “[h]arm not adequately reparable by an award of damages ...

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2 The Order also asks “whether there has been careful compliance by ICANN with the requirements of the review process to date and ... whether there are any obstacles to completing the review process in a timely manner in the future.” The Emergency Panelist already knows that ICANN has not fully complied, having failed to appoint a standing panel to hear emergency requests such as this, so that this Panel must make that determination. And, while we know of no obstacles to completing this IRP in a timely manner, ICANN still in the meantime could enter into contracts for the subject strings, irreparably damaging Donuts.
if the [relief] is not ordered,” and (b) has “a reasonable possibility … [of] succeed[ing] on the merits of the claim.” UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 17A(1), Resp. Ex. 1.

9. American courts apply a similar standard. A court will grant a preliminary injunction, for example, when the party applying for it shows (i) irreparable injury, and (ii) likelihood of success on the merits. The test represents a sliding scale, so that if a party shows a greater likelihood of irreparable injury – clearly the case here – courts will grant relief on a lesser showing of likely success, stating the test as “serious questions going to the merits … and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011).

10. In addition to irreparable harm, Donuts more than satisfies the standard on the ultimate merit of its position. Applying this commonly accepted two-pronged, sliding scale test, the Emergency Arbitrator should readily find the requested relief necessary, and order it.

B. Donuts Faces Irreparable Injury Absent Emergency Relief.

11. This Panel hit the nail on the head when it asked, in Procedural Order No. 2, “isn’t the emergency arbitrator’s function to enter an order staying all action by ICANN until the matter can be reviewed by the IRP?” This Panel has exactly that function,\(^3\) and should exercise it to prevent irreparable injury to Donuts pending determination of its IRP on the merits.

12. Without the emergency relief that Donuts seeks, it would have no adequate remedy. It would render this IRP and the ICANN accountability mechanism moot. Should ICANN be permitted to contract with others for the strings at issue before a resolution of this

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\(^3\) “Under Article 6 of the ICDR Rules, as amended 2006, the ‘emergency arbitrator shall have the power to order or award any interim or conservancy measures that the emergency arbitrator deems necessary, including injunctive relief and measures for the protection or conservation of property. Any such measures may take the form of an interim award or of an order. The emergency arbitrator shall give reasons in either case. The emergency arbitrator may modify or vacate the interim award or order. Any interim award or order shall have the same effect as an interim measure made pursuant to Article 24 and shall be binding on the parties when rendered. The parties shall undertake to comply with such an interim award or order without delay.’” (emphasis added)
IRP on the merits – as it has forthrightly stated it will do\(^4\) – the relief sought be this IRP will become unavailable. The irreparability of the harm to Donuts is obvious, and consistent with what courts have widely recognized. See, e.g., *Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto*, 114 F.3d 330, 332 (1st Cir. 1997) (loss of “unique or fleeting business opportunity can constitute irreparable injury”); *Tom Doherty Associates Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc.*, 60 F.3d 27 (2d. Cir. 1995) (upholding preliminary injunction to protect against deprivation of unique product or contract right that would allow plaintiff to expand its business); *Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc.*, 903 F.2d. 904, 908-909 (2d. Cir. 1990) (terminating delivery of a unique product “almost inevitably” constitutes irreparable harm).

C. Donuts Further Has Shown the Requisite Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

13. Choosing not to address the obvious and irreparable harm to Donuts absent the stay it requests, ICANN would have this emergency panel decide now that Donuts has no case on the merits. However, the issue of Board action on which ICANN solely relies does not lend itself to final resolution at this stage.

14. In its IRP request, Donuts has demonstrated at length and in detail that Board action and inaction pervades the matters under review. The balance of the request catalogs the myriad transgressions of the ICANN Bylaws and Articles caused by the Board’s actions and inaction.

15. Donuts thus makes a strong case for likelihood of success. At minimum, its showing raises serious questions on the merits which, when coupled with the certainty of irreparable harm if the subject TLDs go to other applicants, makes a hornbook case for emergency relief.

1. Donuts properly directs this IRP to Board action and inaction.

16. At paragraphs 25 through 30 of its IRP request, Donuts demonstrates that the matters under review in this case arise from ICANN Board action or inaction. Donuts does not

\(^4\) See Resp. at 12 ¶ 34 (“ICANN has elected to proceed with the processing of the other applications for .SPORTS, .RUGBY and .SKI”).
repeat itself here. That is because the Board itself has validated Donuts’ position. In its recent NGPC resolution, the Board reaffirms the extent of its involvement in the new gTLD program in general and with objection rulings in particular.

17. In its October 14 resolution, the NGPC directed further review of certain inconsistent new gTLD objection rulings, noting throughout the Board’s involvement in such proceedings:

One component of the NGPC’s responsibilities in providing general oversight of the New gTLD Program is "[r]esolving issues relating to the approval of applications and the delegation of gTLDs pursuant to the New gTLD Program for the current round of the Program."... Additionally, the Applicant Guidebook (Section 5.1) provides that:

*ICANN's Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application.*

Addressing the perceived inconsistent and unreasonable ... Expert Determinations is part of the ... authority reserved to the Board in the Guidebook to consider individual gTLD applications under exceptional circumstances.

See Ex. A at 6 ¶ 2. Donuts makes exactly these points in showing that the objection rulings challenged in its IRP involve Board action and inaction subject to review. IRP Req. ¶ 27.

18. Also in the October 14 resolution, in response to community comments about expanding review of new gTLD objection determinations, the NGPC “determined that to promote the goals of predictability and fairness, establishing a review mechanism more broadly” would be “more appropriate as part of ... subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program.” *Id.* at 7 ¶ 4. For now, “the Board may individually consider a gTLD application ... as a result of ... the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism.” AGB § 5.1. Because no other
means of review exist due to the Board’s failure to provide for it, this IRP represents just such an accountability mechanism to direct the Board to act where it has failed to do so.

19. Indeed, the very fact of the NGPC resolution shows Board action involved with new gTLD objection rulings. While ICANN argues that nothing “requires” the Board to review inconsistent or erroneous objection decisions, the Board has done exactly that in issuing the NGPC resolution. The panel deciding the merits of this IRP can likewise so compel the Board.

20. ICANN’s opposition focuses entirely on Board action, but completely ignores that review by IRP lies to determine “whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws” of ICANN. Bylaws Art. IV § 3.11.c (emphasis added). Donuts’ IRP request shows at length how both Board action and inaction with regard to the objection rulings at issue have violated numerous provisions of the ICANN Bylaws and Articles. The NGPC resolution further demonstrates that the Board has failed to act to correct certain inconsistent or improper new gTLD objection rulings, and that it has the power and overall responsibility to do so under the Guidebook. Donuts thus establishes the merit of its position that the matters at issue in this case arise from reviewable Board action and inaction.5

2. ICANN ignores the abundant additional evidence of Board violations of the Bylaws and Articles going to Donuts’ likelihood of success on the merits.

21. ICANN’s Independent Review Process allows a party “materially affected by a decision or action by [ICANN’s Board]” that is “inconsistent with [ICANN’s] Articles of

5 ICANN cannot, as it attempts to do (Resp. ¶ 54), characterize the challenged actions as those of “ICANN staff” rather than the Board itself. While that is not the case (as shown above), the Board in any event cannot simply shift the responsibility that the Bylaws have given it whenever a party raises a legitimate concern. To allow such a hyper-technical and shallow distinction would undermine the central precepts of independent review. See DCA Case 2014-08-14 Declaration re IRP Procedure ¶¶ 114-115, criticizing efforts by ICANN to “adopt [an IRP] remedial scheme with no teeth” and emphasizing the need for IRP actions to constitute a “compulsory remedy” to ensure Board accountability. While Donuts has included that ruling in an appendix to its IRP request, we attach it again here for the Emergency Arbitrator’s convenience, along with the DCA Case panel’s 2014-05-12 Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, as Exhibits B and C hereto, respectively.
Incorporation or Bylaws” to seek review by a neutral third party. Bylaws Art. IV § 3.2. To make this determination, the IRP Panel on the merits must “compar[e] contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws.” Id. ¶ 12.4.

22. In its IRP request, Donuts has revealed numerous violations of the ICANN Bylaws and Articles attributable to Board action or inaction. To summarize (without repeating the lengthy details of) these transgressions:

a. A sole arbitrator was allowed to preside over the .SPORTS and .SKI cases despite serious ethical questions raised by Claimant and another similarly-situated party concerning that panelist’s impartiality, thus breaching a host of core ICANN principles. These include: (i) non-discrimination; (ii) transparency; (iii) accountability; and (iv) neutrality, objectivity, integrity and fairness. See Bylaws Art. I §§ 2.7, 2.8, 2.10 and Art. II § 3; Articles §§ 3, 4; AOC §§ 3(a), (c), 9.1, 9.3. See also IRP Req. ¶¶ 62-69.

b. In all cases, the Board failed to act, as it did with its recent NGPC resolution, where objection panels failed to apply documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness. Bylaws Art. I § 2.8. Rather, entrenched commercial interests utilized the community objection process in an improper manner, never envisioned by ICANN, for anti-competitive purposes, in contravention of ICANN’s tenet, and express new gTLD program goal, to promote competition in the domain name space. Bylaws Art. I §§ 2.5, 2.6; Articles § 4; AOC § 9.3; AGB Preamble, § 1.1.2.3 and Mod. 2 Attmt. at A-1. Such unchecked conduct singled Donuts out for disparate treatment in comparison to other applicants faced with community objections, operates to the detriment of the Internet community as a whole, and violates applicable law. Bylaws Art. II § 3; Articles § 4. See also IRP Req. ¶¶ 70-86.

c. The Board repeatedly ignored and ultimately rejected any efforts to remedy the many concerns raised by Donuts and numerous similarly-situated parties, violating its mandate to remain accountable to, and to act for the benefit of, the
Internet community as a whole. Bylaws Art. I § 2.10; Articles § 4. See also IRP Req. ¶¶ 81-83.

Such extensive, repeated violations of ICANN’s own governing principles bespeak the very reason that ICANN has created the IRP mechanism. Bylaws Art. IV § 3.2. They establish more than adequate grounds for this Emergency Panel to find likelihood of success on the merits, and certainly “serious questions” going to such merits.

3. IRP precedent further supports Donuts’ right to emergency relief in the exact circumstances presented here.

23. In opposing emergency relief in the DCA Case, ICANN made the same arguments it does here, particularly with regard to Board action. Those arguments did not persuade that panel, which found emergency relief justified “based on two independent and equally sufficient grounds (Ex. D ¶ 28):

a. First, “a stay order ... is proper to preserve [Claimant’s] right to a fair hearing and decision [on the merits] before ICANN takes any further steps that could potentially moot [Claimant’s] request for an independent review.” Ex. D ¶ 31. The DCA Case panel found this particularly important because of ICANN’s failure to follow its own Bylaws and create an omnibus standing panel to handle IRP requests expeditiously: “it would be unjust to deny [Claimant’s] request for interim relief when the need for such relief ... arises out of ICANN’s failure to follow its own Bylaws and procedures.” Id. ¶ 33.

b. Second, notwithstanding the position taken by ICANN, as here, that the IRP request involved no Board action, the DCA Case panel found that the claimant had established a *prima facie* case or “reasonable possibility” of success on the merits.

24. Just as in the DCA Case, ICANN cannot plausibly contend that this IRP challenges actions of “ICANN staff” rather than the Board itself. See ICANN Resp. ¶ 54. While, as shown, that is not the case, the Board in any event cannot simply shift the responsibility that the Bylaws have given it whenever a party raises a legitimate concern. To allow such a hyper-technical and shallow distinction would undermine the central precepts Independent Review.
See DCA Case 2014-08-14 Declaration re IRP Procedure ¶¶ 114-115 (Ex. E hereto), criticizing efforts by ICANN to “adopt [an IRP] remedial scheme with no teeth” and emphasizing the need for IRP actions to constitute a “compulsory remedy” to ensure Board accountability.

25. The panel’s reasoning in the DCA Case applies directly to this one. Aside from the soundness of that determination, it also has “precedential value.” Bylaws Art. IV §3.21. The Emergency Arbitrator should follow it and Donuts’ showing of irreparable harm and serious questions going to the merits of this case and grant the request for emergency relief.

III. CONCLUSION

26. The foregoing addresses the questions raised in Procedural Order No. 2, and refutes the premise on which ICANN’s entire opposition rests. Donuts has made a case on the merits that the Board has acted or failed to act so as to make independent review proper. It certainly has demonstrated irreparable harm. These showings make a “classic” case for emergency relief, which the Emergency Arbitrator should waste no time in granting.

DATED: November 17, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

THE IP and TECHNOLOGY LEGAL GROUP, P.C.

By: __________/jmg/________________________
John M. Genga
Attorneys for Claimant DONUTS INC.

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[6] The Order also requested a timeline, which Donuts attaches as Exhibit D hereto.
EXHIBIT A

(“Approved Resolutions | Meeting of the New gTLD Program Committee”
October 12-14, 2014)
Approved Resolutions | Meeting of the New gTLD Program Committee

12 Oct 2014

12 – 14 October 2014

1. Consent Agenda:
   a. Approval of Minutes

2. Main Agenda:
   a. GAC Advice in Beijing Communiqué regarding Category 2 Safeguards – Exclusive Registry Access
   b. Perceived Inconsistent String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations Rationale for Resolutions 2014.10.12,NG02 – 2014.10.12,NG03
   c. Reconsideration Request 14-37, I-Registry Ltd Rationale for Resolution 2014.10.12,NG04
   d. GAC Advice regarding Protections for the Red Cross and Red Crescent – Singapore Communiqué Rationale for Resolution 2014.10.12,NG05
   e. Any Other Business

The ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee meeting on 12 October 2014 was continued to 14 October 2014. The following resolutions were adopted during the meeting:

1. Consent Agenda:
   a. Approval of Minutes
Resolved (2014.10.12.NG01), the Board New gTLD Program Committee (NGPC) approves the minutes of its 8 September 2014 meeting.

2. Main Agenda:

a. **GAC Advice in Beijing Communiqué regarding Category 2 Safeguards – Exclusive Registry Access**

No resolution taken.

b. **Perceived Inconsistent String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations**

Whereas, on 10 October 2013 the Board Governance Committee (BGC) requested that staff draft a report for the NGPC on String Confusion Objections (SCOs) "setting out options for dealing with the situation raised within this [Reconsideration] Request, namely the differing outcomes of the String Confusion Objection Dispute Resolution process in similar disputes involving Amazon's Applied – for String and TLDH's Applied for String."

Whereas, the NGPC considered potential paths forward to address perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations from the New gTLD Program SCO process, including possibly implementing a new review mechanism.

Whereas, on 5 February 2014, the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee (NGPC) directed the ICANN President and CEO, or his designee, to initiate a public comment period on framework principles of a potential review mechanism to address perceived inconsistent String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations (the "proposed review mechanism"). The proposed review mechanism, if adopted, would have been limited to the String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations for .CAR/.CARS and .CAM/.COM, and would have constituted a change to the Objection process set forth in the New gTLD Applicant Guidebook.

Whereas, the NGPC has carefully considered the report that the BGC asked staff to draft in response to Reconsideration Request 13-9, the received public comments to the proposed review mechanism, other comments provided to the NGPC for consideration, as well as the processes set out in the Applicant Guidebook.

Whereas, as set out in the Applicant Guidebook, ICANN has reserved the right to individually consider any application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community.

Whereas, the NGPC is undertaking this action pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Board on 10 April 2012, to exercise the ICANN Board's authority for any and all issues that may arise relating to the New gTLD Program.

Resolved (2014.10.12.NG02), the NGPC has identified the following String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations as not being in the best...
interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCO Expert Determinations for Review</th>
<th>String</th>
<th>Related SCO Expert Determinations</th>
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</table>
| VeriSign Inc. (Objector) v. United TLD Holdco Ltd. (Applicant) | .CAM [PDF, 5.96 MB] | - Dot Agency Limited [PDF, 248 KB].CAM
- AC Webconnecting Holding B.V. [PDF, 264 KB].CAM |
| Commercial Connect LLC (Objector) v. Amazon EU S.à r.l. (Applicant) | .通販 [PDF, 73 KB] | Top Level Domain Holdings Limited [PDF, 721 KB].通販 |

Resolved (2014.10.12.NG03), the NGPC directs the President and CEO, or his designee(s), take all steps necessary to establish processes and procedures, in accordance with this resolution and related rationale, pursuant to which the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) shall establish a three-member panel to re-evaluate the materials presented, and the Expert Determinations, in the two objection proceedings set out in the chart above under the "SCO Expert Determinations for Review" column and render a Final Expert Determination on these two proceedings. In doing so, the NGPC recommends that the three-member panel also review as background the "Related SCO Expert Determinations" referenced in the above chart.


Today, the NGPC is taking action to address perceived inconsistent and unreasonable Expert Determinations resulting from the New gTLD Program String Confusion Objections process. The NGPC's action today is part of its role to provide general oversight of the New gTLD Program. One component of the NGPC's responsibilities is "resolving issues relating to the approval of applications and the delegation of gTLDs pursuant to the New gTLD Program for the current round of the Program." (See NGPC Charter, Section II.D).

The New gTLD Applicant Guidebook (AGB or Guidebook) identifies four grounds upon which a formal objection may be filed against an applied-for string. One such objection is a String Confusion Objection or SCO, which may be filed by an objector (meeting the standing requirements) if the objector believes that an applied-for gTLD string is confusingly similar to an existing TLD or to another applied-for gTLD string in the same round of applications. If successful, an SCO could change the configuration of the preliminary contention sets in that the two applied-for gTLD strings at issue in the objection proceedings will be considered in direct contention with one another (see AGB Module 4, String Contention Procedures). All SCO proceedings were administered by the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), and Expert Determinations in all such proceedings have been issued.

Some stakeholders have raised concerns about the perceived inconsistencies with or unreasonableness of certain SCO Expert Determinations. The NGPC has monitored these concerns over the past year, and discussed the issue at several of its meetings. On 10 October 2013, the Board Governance Committee (BGC) asked staff to draft a report for the NGPC on String Confusion Objections "setting out options for dealing with the situation raised within this Request, namely the differing outcomes of the String Confusion Objection Dispute Resolution process in similar disputes involving Amazon's Applied – for String and TLDH's Applied-for String." (See http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/governance/reconsideration/recommen amazon-10oct13-en.pdf [PDF, 131 KB]).

In light of the BGC request following its consideration of Reconsideration Requests 13-9 and 13-10, and community-raised concerns about perceived inconsistent SCO Expert Determinations, the NGPC considered its options, including possibly implementing a review mechanism not contemplated in the Applicant Guidebook that would be available in limited circumstances.

On 5 February 2014, the NGPC directed the ICANN President and CEO to initiate a public comment period on framework principles of a potential review mechanism to address the perceived inconsistent String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations. The proposed review mechanism, as drafted and posted for public comment, would be limited to the SCO Expert Determinations for .CAR/.CARS and .CAM/.COM. The public comment period on the proposed review mechanism closed on 3 April 2014, and a summary of the comments [PDF, 165 KB] has been publicly posted.

At this time, the NGPC is taking action to address certain perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determinations by sending back to the ICDR for a three-member panel evaluation of certain Expert Determinations. The NGPC has identified these Expert Determinations as not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community. The ICDR will be provided supplemental rules to guide the review of the identified Expert Determinations, which include the following:

- The review panel will consist of three members appointed by the ICDR (the "Review Panel").

- The only issue subject to review by the Review Panel shall be the SCO Expert Determinations identified in these resolutions.

- The record on review shall be limited to the transcript of the proceeding giving rise to the original Expert Determination, if any, expert reports, documentary evidence admitted into evidence during the original proceeding, or other evidence relevant to the review that was presented at the original proceeding. No additional documents,
briefs or other evidence may be submitted for consideration, except that it is recommended that the Review Panel consider the identified "Related SCO Expert Determinations" in the above chart as part of its review.

- The standard of review to be applied by the Review Panel is: whether the original Expert Panel could have reasonably come to the decision reached on the underlying SCO through an appropriate application of the standard of review as set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and the ICDR Supplementary Procedures for ICANN's New gTLD Program.

- ICANN will pay the applicable fees to conduct the review by the Review Panel.

- The possible outcomes of the review are: (1) the original Expert Determination is supported by the standard of review and reference to the identified related Expert Determinations, and will stand as is; or (2) the original Expert Determination reasonably cannot be supported based on the standard of review and reference to the identified related Expert Determinations, and will be reversed. The Review Panel will submit a written determination including an explanation and rationale for its determination.

As part of its months-long deliberations on this issue, the following are among the factors the NGPC found to be significant:

1. The NGPC notes that the Guidebook was developed by the community in a multi-stakeholder process over several years. The NGPC considered whether it was appropriate to change the Guidebook at this time to implement a review mechanism to address certain perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations. On 18 April 2013, ICANN posted a proposed review mechanism for public comment. The NGPC carefully considered the public comments received. The NGPC notes that comments submitted during the public comment period generally fell into the following categories and themes, each of which is discussed more fully in the summary of public comments:

   a. Do not adopt the proposed review mechanism.

   b. Adopt the proposed review mechanism.

   c. Adopt a review mechanism with an expanded scope.

   d. Do not adopt the proposed review mechanism or expand the scope.

   e. Adopt some form of review, but not necessarily the one posted for public comment.

   f. Recommended modifications to the framework principles of the proposed review mechanism, if any review mechanism is adopted.
The comments presented by various stakeholders highlight the difficulty of the issue and the tension that exists between balancing concerns about perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations, and the processes set forth in the Guidebook that were the subject of multiple rounds of public comment over several years.

As highlighted in many of the public comments, adopting a review mechanism this far along in the process could potentially be unfair because applicants agreed to the processes included in the Guidebook, which did not include this review mechanism, and applicants relied on these processes. The NGPC acknowledges that, while on balance, a review mechanism is not appropriate for the current round of the New gTLD Program, it is recommended that the development of rules and processes for future rounds of the New gTLD Program (to be developed through the multi-stakeholder process) should explore whether there is a need for a formal review process with respect to Expert Determinations.

2. The NGPC considered its role and purpose to provide general oversight of the New gTLD Program. One component of the NGPC’s responsibilities in providing general oversight of the New gTLD Program is “[r]esolving issues relating to the approval of applications and the delegation of gTLDs pursuant to the New gTLD Program for the current round of the Program.” (See NGPC Charter, Section II.D). Additionally, the Applicant Guidebook (Section 5.1) provides that:

   ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application. For example, the Board might individually consider an application as a result of GAC Advice on New gTLDs or of the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism.

Addressing the perceived inconsistent and unreasonable String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations is part of the discretionary authority granted to the NGPC in its Charter regarding “approval of applications” and “delegation of gTLDs”, in addition to the authority reserved to the Board in the Guidebook to consider individual gTLD applications under exceptional circumstances. The NGPC considers that the identified SCO Expert Determinations present exceptional circumstances warranting action by the NGPC because each of the Expert Determinations falls outside normal standards of what is perceived to be reasonable and just. While some community members may identify other Expert Determinations as inconsistent or unreasonable, the SCO Expert Determinations identified are the only ones that the NGPC has deemed appropriate for further review. The NGPC notes, however, that it also identified the String Confusion Objection Expert
Determinations for .CAR/.CARS as not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community. Nonetheless, because the parties in the .CAR/.CARS contention set recently have resolved their contending applications, the NGPC is not taking action to send these SCO Expert Determinations back to the ICDR for re-evaluation to render a Final Expert Determination.

3. The NGPC also considered whether there was a reasonable basis for certain perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations to exist, and particularly why the identified Expert Determinations should be sent back to the ICDR while other Expert Determinations should not. The NGPC notes that while on their face some of the Expert Determinations may appear inconsistent, including other SCO Expert Determinations, and Expert Determinations of the Limited Public Interest and Community Objection processes, there are reasonable explanations for these seeming discrepancies, both procedurally and substantively.

First, on a procedural level, each expert panel generally rests its Expert Determination on materials presented to it by the parties to that particular objection, and the objector bears the burden of proof. Two panels confronting identical issues could – and if appropriate should – reach different determinations, based on the strength of the materials presented.

Second, on a substantive level, certain Expert Determinations highlighted by the community that purportedly resulted in "inconsistent" or "unreasonable" results, presented nuanced distinctions relevant to the particular objection. These nuances should not be ignored simply because a party to the dispute disagrees with the end result. Further, the standard guiding the expert panels involves some degree of subjectivity, and thus independent expert panels would not be expected to reach the same conclusions on every occasion. However, for the identified Expert Determinations, a reasonable explanation for the seeming discrepancies is not as apparent, even taking into account all of the previous explanations about why reasonably "discrepancies" may exist. To allow these Expert Determinations to stand would not be in the best interests of the Internet community.

4. The NGPC considered whether it was appropriate, as suggested by some commenters, to expand the scope of the proposed review mechanism to include other Expert Determinations, such as some resulting from Community and Limited Public Objections, as well as other String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations, and possibly singular and plural versions of the same string. The NGPC determined that to promote the goals of predictability and fairness, establishing a review mechanism more broadly may be more appropriate as part of future community discussions about subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program. Applicants have already taken action in reliance on many of the Expert Determinations, including signing Registry Agreements, transitioning to delegation, withdrawing their applications, and
requesting refunds. Allowing these actions to be undone now would not only delay consideration of all applications, but would raise issues of unfairness for those that have already acted in reliance on the Applicant Guidebook.

It should also be noted that in response to advice from the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), the NGPC previously considered the question of whether consumer confusion may result from allowing singular and plural versions of the same strings. On 25 June 2013, the NGPC adopted a resolution resolving "that no changes [were] needed to the existing mechanisms in the Applicant Guidebook to address potential consumer confusion resulting from allowing singular and plural versions of the same string"
http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-new-gtld-25jun13-en.html#2.d. The NGPC again notes that the topic of singular and plural versions of the same string also may be the subject of further community discussion as it relates to future rounds of the New gTLD Program.

5. The NGPC considered community correspondence on this issue in addition to comments from the community expressed at the ICANN meetings. The concerns raised in the ICANN meetings and in correspondence have been factored into the deliberations on this matter.

The NGPC previously delayed its consideration of BGC Recommendations on Reconsideration Requests 13-9 and 13-10 pending the completion of the NGPC’s review of the issues discussed above. Now that the NGPC has taken action as noted above, it will resume its consideration of the BGC Recommendations on Reconsideration Requests 13-9 and 13-10 as soon as feasible.

There will be direct fiscal impacts on ICANN associated with the adoption of this resolution since certain proceedings will be sent back to the ICDR for re-review by a three-member expert panel. Approval of the resolution will not impact security, stability or resiliency issues relating to the domain name system.

Taking this action is an Organizational Administrative Action that was the subject of public comment. The summary of public comments is available for review here: (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-sco-framework-principles-24apr14-en.pdf [PDF, 165 KB]).

c. Reconsideration Request 14-37, I-Registry Ltd.

Whereas, iRegistry Ltd. ("Requester") filed Reconsideration Request 14-37 asking the New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC") to reverse Resolutions 2014.07.30.NG01 – 2014.07.30.NG04 (the "Resolution") "or at least amend[,]" the Resolution, and to then put the decision as to how to address name collisions "on hold" until the issues the Requester raises have "been solved."

Whereas, the BGC considered the issues raised in Reconsideration
Resources - ICANN

Request 14-37.

Whereas, the BGC recommended that the Request be denied because the Requester has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration and the NGPC agrees.

Resolved (2014.10.12.NG04), the NGPC adopts the BGC Recommendation on Reconsideration Request 14-37, which can be found at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/recommendation-i-registry-04sep14-en.pdf [PDF, 150 KB].

Rationale for Resolution 2014.10.12.NG04

I. Brief Summary

iRegistry Ltd. ("Requester") is a domain name registry that disputes the NGPC's adoption of the Name Collision Occurrence Management Framework (the "Framework").

After conducting several independent studies regarding the name collision issue, ICANN implemented a public comment period from 26 February 2014 through 21 April 2014 where the community provided feedback on possible solutions to the name collision issue, including the issue of implementing a framework to manage and mitigate name collisions. ICANN received 28 comments, none of which were from the Requester.2

After considering the public comments received, the detailed studies analyzing the issue, and advice from the relevant ICANN advisory committee, the NGPC approved Resolutions 2014.07.30.NG01 – 2014.07.30.NG04 (the "Resolution")3 on 30 July 2014, adopting the Framework. The Framework sets forth procedures that registries must follow to prevent name collisions from compromising the security or stability of the Internet.

The Requester filed the instant Request (Request 14-37), arguing that the NGPC failed to sufficiently involve the public in its decision to adopt the Framework and contending that the Framework will lead to confusion amongst registrants, a lower volume of registrations, and thus adversely impact the Requester financially. The Board Governance Committee (BGC) considered Request 14-37 and concluded that: (i) there is no evidence that the NGPC's actions in adopting the Resolution support reconsideration; (ii) the Requester has not demonstrated that the NGPC failed to consider any material information in passing the Resolution or that the NGPC relied on false or inaccurate material information in passing the Resolution; and (iii) the Requester has not demonstrated that it has been materially and adversely affected by the Resolution. Therefore, the BGC recommended that Reconsideration Request 14-37 be denied (and the entirety of the BGC Recommendation is incorporated by reference as though fully set forth in this rationale). The NGPC agrees.
II. Summary of Relevant Background Facts

In furtherance of ICANN's core values aimed at "[p]reserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet" (Bylaws, Art. 1, § 2.1), ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory Committee ("SSAC") published SAC057: SSAC Advisory on Internal Name Certificates on 15 March 2013. The report identified a Certificate Authority ("CA") practice that, if widely exploited, could pose risks to the privacy and integrity of secure Internet communications (name collisions). The SSAC advised ICANN to take immediate steps to mitigate the risks. The issues identified in SAC057 are part of the more general category of name collision issues. Accordingly, on 18 May 2013, the ICANN Board approved a resolution commissioning a study in response to the SSAC's advice in SAC057.

On 5 August 2013, ICANN released the study, prepared by Interisle Consulting Group, of the likelihood and potential consequences of collision between new public gTLD labels and existing private uses of the same strings.

On 7 October 2013, ICANN introduced the New gTLD Collision Occurrence Management Plan (the "Plan"), which permitted the use of an alternate path to delegation. As part of the Resolution adopting the Plan, the NGPC recommended that the ICANN Board "direct the ICANN President and CEO to develop a long term plan to manage name collision risks related to the delegation of new TLDs, and to work with the community to develop a long-term plan to retain and measure root-server data."

In November 2013, ICANN engaged JAS Global Advisors LLC ("JAS") to lead the development of the Framework, in cooperation with the community.

From 26 February 2014 through 21 April 2014, ICANN implemented a public comment period where the community provided feedback on possible solutions to the name collision issue, including the issue of implementing a framework to manage and mitigate name collisions; ICANN received 28 comments, none of which were from the Requester. The Requester did not participate in the public comment forum. After collection of the public comments, JAS released the final version of its Phase One Report on Mitigating the Risk of DNS Namespace Collisions.

On 6 June 2014, SSAC published SAC066: SSAC Comment Concerning JAS Phase One Report on Mitigating the Risk of DNS Namespace Collisions, in which it offered advice and recommendations to the Board on the framework presented in the JAS Study and Name Collision Framework.

On 27 July 2014, the Requester sent a letter to ICANN: (i) asking ICANN to "thoroughly evaluate" a proposal for addressing the problem of name collisions; and (ii) providing five specific proposals...
as to the how the issue should be addressed. (Request, Ex. D.)

ICANN acknowledged receipt of the Requester's letter on 29 July
2014. (Request, Ex. E.)

On 30 July 2014, the NGPC approved Resolutions
2014.07.30 NG01 – 2014.07.30 NG04 (the "Resolution"), which
adopted the Framework. The Framework sets forth procedures that
registries must follow to prevent name collisions from
compromising the security or stability of the Internet and directs the
"President and CEO, or his designee(s), to take the necessary
actions to implement" the Framework.13

On 4 August 2014, ICANN's Global Domains Division issued each
new gTLD registry operator a Name Collision Occurrence
Assessment ("Assessment"), which identified which measures
registries must take to avoid name collision issues, in accordance
with the Framework.14 On that same date, the Requester received
the Assessment via email. (Request, Ex. A.)

On 12 August 2014, ICANN presented a webinar providing an
overview of the Framework specifically geared towards registry
operators.15

On 13 August 2014, the Requester filed the instant Request,
seeking reconsideration of the NGPC's Resolution.

While how to treat one category of names affected by the name
collision issue is not yet part of the Framework, ICANN is in the
process of gathering public input on this topic. Specifically, ICANN
has opened a public comment forum on this particular issue, which
will run from 25 August 2014 through 7 October 2014.16

On 4 September 2014, the Board Governance Committee ("BGC")
issued its Recommendation regarding Reconsideration Request
14-37.17 On 11 September 2014, the Requester filed a Clarification
to Reconsideration Request 14-37,18 containing further alleged
details regarding how the Requester has been materially affected
by the Resolution and the adoption of the Framework.

III. Issues

The issues for reconsideration are whether the NGPC:

1. Failed to consider material input from the community in
   approving the Resolution (Request, § 8, Pg. 11); and

2. Improperly underestimated the Resolution's potential
   negative consequences. (Id., § 8, Pgs. 7-8.).

IV. The Relevant Standards for Evaluating
Reconsideration Requests

ICANN's Bylaws call for the BGC to evaluate and, for challenged
Board (or NGPC) action, make recommendations to the Board (or
NGPC) with respect to Reconsideration Requests. See Article IV, Section 2 of the Bylaws. The NGPC, bestowed with the powers of the Board in this instance, has reviewed and thoroughly considered the BGC Recommendation on Request 14-37 and finds the analysis sound.\(^{19}\)

V. Analysis and Rationale

The Requester has not demonstrated that the Board failed to consider material information or relied on false or inaccurate material information in passing the Resolutions; therefore, reconsideration is not appropriate.

A. The Request Warrants Summary Dismissal.

The BGC concluded, and the NGPC agrees, that the Requester does not have standing because the Requester "had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action[,]" (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.9.). Specifically, ICANN's Bylaws permit the BGC to summarily dismiss a request for reconsideration if "the requestor had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action[,]" (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.9.)

From 26 February 2014 through 21 April 2014, ICANN implemented a public comment period, which was announced on ICANN's website, and where the community provided feedback on possible solutions, including a framework, to name collision issues\(^{20}\) The forum generated 28 comments, but the Requester did not participate in the public comment forum, and has offered no justification, excuse or explanation for its decision to refrain from doing so. The only communication it claims to have had with ICANN regarding name collisions is a letter dated 27 July 2014, which was well after the public comment period had closed.\(^{21}\) Given that the public comment period here is indisputably related to the Resolution, summary dismissal is warranted on the basis of the Requester's non-participation. However, in the interest of completeness, the NGPC will nonetheless address the merits of the Request.

B. The NGPC Considered All Material Information.

The BGC concluded, and the NGPC agrees, that the Requester has not demonstrated that the NGPC failed to consider material relevant information.

In order to state a basis for reconsideration of a Board action, the Requester must demonstrate that the Board (or in this case the NGPC) failed to consider material information or considered false or inaccurate material
information in adopting the Resolution. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2.) The Requester does not argue that the NGPC considered false or inaccurate material information, but it does claim that the NGPC failed to consider material information in two ways. First, the Requester claims that the NGPC did not sufficiently consult with the public prior to adopting the Resolution. Second, the Requester claims that the NGPC failed to consider how the Resolution will have material adverse effects on registries and internet users. Neither argument withstands scrutiny, and neither is grounds for reconsideration.

1. The NGPC Considered Public Comments Solicited During A Lengthy Public Comment Period.

The Requester claims that the NGPC “failed to take material input from the community into account.” (Request, § 8, Pg. 11.) Contrary to the Requester’s claims, the NGPC did consider feedback received in “the public comment forum” that was open from 26 February 2014 through 21 April 2014. The Requester does not explain why it failed to participate in that forum. Had it participated, its views would have been included along with the 28 detailed comments considered that were submitted by various stakeholders and members of the public, including other registries. Notably, the public comment period for this matter was actually longer than required. Typically, public comment periods are open 21 days, and if comments are received during that time, there is a 21-day reply period. Here, the public comment period was open for 33 days, with a 21-day reply period. In addition, ICANN facilitated an entire public session about the name collision issue at the London ICANN meeting on 23 June 2014 that provided yet another opportunity for public commentary and participation; the Requester again chose not to participate. As such, the Requester cannot reasonably claim that the NGPC did not consider public input before adopting the Resolution.

In sum, the Requester does not persuasively argue that the NGPC failed to consider material information in the form of public comments in adopting the Resolution, and therefore has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration on that basis. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2.)

2. The NGPC Considered All Material Information Relevant To The Resolution.

The Requester seeks reconsideration of the
Resolution because it claims the NGPC "did not properly assess the implications of the decision," (Request, § 8, Pg. 12.) The Requester's main basis for this assertion is that the issues raised in its own 27 July 2014 letter were not expressly addressed in the "Rationale" section of the Resolution. This argument fails to provide a basis for reconsideration for two reasons.

First, the Resolution does take into account the substance of the information provided in the Requester's 27 July 2014 letter. The 27 July 2014 letter made five requests, all related to either the "RPM rules" or the Requester's view that one common set of rules should apply to all gTLDs. (Request, § 8, Pg. 10 & Ex. D.) Despite Requester's claims to the contrary, the same issues raised in the 27 July 2014 letter were all presented to the NGPC during the public comment period by other stakeholders and were addressed by the NGPC. The Resolution acknowledges that the NGPC considered the public comments that: (i) expressed concern regarding the "interaction between the name collision block lists and intellectual property rights protection mechanisms"; (ii) referenced how the "name collision issue is creating an uneven competitive landscape"; and (iii) discussed the pros and cons of treating new gTLD operators differently from legacy operators. Furthermore, ICANN has already determined that the RPM issue requires further public comment before a decision can be made as to how to handle the issue. In fact, ICANN is currently soliciting comments, between 25 August 2014 and 7 October 2014, on the approach that should be taken "regarding the appropriate Rights Protection Mechanisms for release of SLD Block List names." In other words, the NGPC was not lacking any material information on the applicable issues, regardless of whether it specifically considered the Requester's 27 July 2014 letter.

Second, the Requester's disagreement with the substance of the Framework does not form the proper basis for reconsideration. The NGPC considered independent, detailed studies discussing the name collision issue, including one prepared by JAS and one prepared by Interisle Consulting Group. Further, the NGPC took into account advice from the SSAC before adopting the Resolution. The SSAC's role is to "advise the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the security and integrity of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems." (Bylaws, Art. XI, § 2.a.) In sum, the NGPC
considered public comments, independent analytical reports, and advice from the relevant ICANN advisory committee. While the Requester complains that the NGPC "did not mention the letter" (that the Requester sent months after the public comment period had closed) and as such "did not properly address the implications of the decision" to approve the Framework, those allegations do not amount to a claim that the NGPC failed to consider any material information. As such, no reconsideration is warranted.

As a final note, the Requester also claims reconsideration is warranted because "[t]here is no indication that the GAC has been given the opportunity to provide feedback" to the JAS reports or the SSAC advice. (Request, § 7, Pg. 7) The GAC provides "advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN’s policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues." (Bylaws, Art. XI, § 2.1.) That the GAC did not issue any formal advice related to how ICANN should address name collisions does not mean the NGPC failed to consider any material information. Had the GAC issued such advice, the ICANN Board would have considered it, as is required under ICANN’s Bylaws. (Bylaws, Art. XI, §§ 2.1.i, 2.1.j.)

Further, in July 2013, the GAC Durban Communiqué did advise that the Board "[a]s a matter of urgency consider the recommendations contained in the SSAC Report on Dotless Domains (SAC053) and Internal Name Certificates (SAC057)," and the latter involved name collision issues. The Board did consider the SSAC’s advice, and in turn, adopted the Framework.

Again, as the Requester does not show that the NGPC failed to consider material information in adopting the Resolution, reconsideration is not appropriate. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2.)

c. Alleged Confusion is not a Basis for Reconsideration.

The BGC concluded, and the NGPC agrees, that the Requester has not demonstrated that the NGPC failed to consider material relevant information concerning the importance of educating the public about the Framework.

The Requester complains that the NGPC failed to consider the supposed fact that the "overall majority" of registrants
are not aware of the name collision problem and will therefore be "confus[ed] about the availability of domain names in general." (Request, § 7, Pg. 6.) However, it is evident that the NGPC did consider information concerning the importance of educating the public about the Framework. The Resolution dedicates an entire provision (section B.6) to "Informational Materials" and requires ICANN to "produce informational materials as needed . . . [and] work to make this information available to parties potentially affected by name collision." Even though the Framework was just recently adopted, ICANN has already posted and provided a wide variety of informational materials, including webinars geared towards registry operators, handbooks and videos for IT professionals, and a "Frequently Asked Questions" page regarding the Framework. Moreover, ICANN has dedicated resources towards ensuring questions about the Assessment or the Framework will be answered promptly and accurately. In other words, far from failing to consider the potential for confusion regarding the Resolution, ICANN has taken proactive and significant steps to ensure that affected parties comprehend the Framework and the steps it requires. No reconsideration is warranted on the grounds that the NGPC did not consider information regarding public outreach, as it is clear that the NGPC did consider such information and acted on it by way of the aforementioned educational resources.

D. The Requester Has Not Demonstrated It Has Been Materially Affected By The Resolution.

The BGC concluded, and the NGPC agrees, that the Requester has not demonstrated that it has been materially and adversely affect by the Resolution.

Absent evidence that the Requester has been materially and adversely affected by the Resolution, reconsideration is not appropriate. (Bylaws, Art. IV, §§ 2.1-2.2.) Here, the Requester argues it is materially affected by the Resolution for two reasons. (Request, § 6, Pgs. 4-5.) First, it contends that the Framework does not provide clear guidance as to how to prevent harms related to name collisions. (Id., Pg. 5.) Second, the Requester contends that it will suffer "lower registration rates" due to the confusion the Framework will purportedly cause, because the Requester predicts that registrars will "not offer domain name registrations from the Name Collision lists." (Id.) Neither of these concerns has yet come to fruition, however, and both are merely speculative at this point. Again, only those persons who "have been adversely affected by" an ICANN action may file a request for reconsideration. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2) (emphasis added). Because the only harm the Requester identifies is, at this point, merely speculative and hypothetical, the
vi. Decision

The NGPC had the opportunity to consider all of the materials submitted by or on behalf of the Requester or that otherwise relate to Request 14-37. Following consideration of all relevant information provided, the NGPC reviewed and has adopted the BGC’s Recommendation on Request 14-37 [PDF, 150 KB], which shall be deemed a part of this Rationale and is attached to the Reference Materials to the NGPC Submission on this matter.

Adopting the BGC’s recommendation has no direct financial impact on ICANN and will not negatively impact the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system.

This decision is an Organizational Administrative Function that does not require public comment.

d. GAC Advice regarding Protections for the Red Cross and Red Crescent – Singapore Communiqué

Whereas, the GAC met during the ICANN 49 meeting in Singapore and issued a Communiqué [PDF, 449 KB] on 27 March 2014 (“Singapore Communiqué”).

Whereas, in the Singapore Communiqué the GAC clarified its previous advice to the ICANN Board to permanently protect from unauthorized use the terms associated with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and advised that the protections should also include "the 189 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, in English and the official languages of their respective states of origin," and the “full names of the International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the six (6) United Nations Languages.” The GAC Advice is identified in the GAC Register of Advice as 2014-03-27-RCRC.

Whereas, the GNSO has developed policy recommendations to the Board concerning the Red Cross and Red Crescent names that are the subject of the GAC’s Singapore Communiqué. The scope of protections in the GNSO policy recommendations differ from the GAC's advice, and the GAC, GNSO, Board, and ICANN community continue to actively work on resolving the differences.

Whereas, the NGPC is responsible for considering the GAC advice pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Board on 10 April 2012, to exercise the ICANN Board’s authority for any and all issues that may arise
relating to the New .

Resolved (2014.10.12.NG05), the President and CEO, or his designee(s), is directed to provide temporary protections for the names of the International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the 189 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as identified in the GAC Register of Advice as 2014-03-27-RCRC while the GAC, GNSO, Board, and ICANN community continue to actively work on resolving the differences in the advice from the GAC and the GNSO policy recommendations on the scope of protections for the RCRC names.

Rationale for Resolution 2014.10.12.NG05

The NGPC is taking action to provide temporary protections for Red Cross/Red Crescent (RCRC) names identified in the GAC’s advice in the Singapore Communiqué, while being mindful of the outstanding discussions among the GAC, GNSO, Board, and ICANN community to actively work on resolving the differences in the GAC advice and the GNSO policy recommendations on the scope of protections for the RCRC names.

Article XI, Section 2.1 of the ICANN Bylaws permits the GAC to “put issues to the Board directly, either by way of comment or prior advice, or by way of specifically recommending action or new policy development or revision to existing policies.” The GAC issued advice to the Board on the New . through its Singapore Communiqué dated 27 March 2014 (“Singapore Communiqué”). The ICANN Bylaws require the Board to take into account the GAC’s advice on public policy matters in the formulation and adoption of the polices. If the Board decides to take an action that is not consistent with the GAC advice, it must inform the GAC and state the reasons why it decided not to follow the advice. The Board and the GAC will then try in good faith to find a mutually acceptable solution. If no solution can be found, the Board will state in its final decision why the GAC advice was not followed.

In the Singapore Communiqué, the GAC clarified its previous advice to the ICANN Board to permanently protect from unauthorized used the terms associated with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and advised that the protections should also include “the 189 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, in English and the official languages of their respective states of origin,” and the “full names of the International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the six (6) United Nations Languages”.

The GNSO has also provided policy recommendations to the ICANN Board on the same RCRC names that are the subject of the GAC’s advice in the Singapore Communiqué. Unlike the GAC’s advice, the GNSO policy recommendations do not call for permanent protections for the set of RCRC names. Instead, the GNSO policy recommends that these names be protected by entering them into the TMCH for 90-days claims notification.
On 30 April 2014, the ICANN Board adopted the GNSO Council’s policy recommendations on [GO-INGO] protections that were not inconsistent with the GAC’s advice, and requested additional time to consider the remaining policy recommendations that are inconsistent with the GAC’s advice on the same topic. The Board committed to facilitate discussions among the relevant parties to reconcile any remaining differences between the policy recommendations and the GAC advice on the topic, and previously tasked the NGPC to help with this process. The NGPC action today is to provide temporary protections for the RCRC names identified in the GAC’s advice in the Singapore Communiqué, while being mindful of the outstanding discussions among the GAC, GNSO, Board, and ICANN community to actively work on resolving the differences in the advice from the GAC and the GNSO policy recommendations on the scope of protections for the RCRC names.

The NGPC’s action will have a positive impact on the community as it will allow for temporary protections for RCRC names, while allowing for discussions to continue. As part of its deliberations, the NGPC reviewed the following significant materials and documents:

- GAC Singapore Communiqué:


There are no foreseen fiscal impacts associated with the adoption of this resolution. Approval of the proposed resolution will not impact security, stability or resiliency issues relating to the DNS. This action is not a defined policy process within ICANN’s Supporting Organizations or ICANN’s Organizational Administrative Function decision requiring public comment or not requiring public comment. Subsequent actions related to protections for RCRC names may be subject to public comment.

d. Any Other Business

No resolution taken.

Published on 14 October 2014

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1 Japanese translation of “online shopping”


See https://features.icann.org/ssac-advisory-internal-name-certificates.


See https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/name-collision-2013-12-06-en.


See https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/name-collision-2013-12-06-en.


Having a reconsideration process whereby the BGC reviews and, if it chooses, makes a recommendation to the Board/NGPC for approval, positively affects ICANN’s transparency and accountability. It provides an avenue for the community to ensure that staff and the Board are acting in accordance with ICANN’s policies, Bylaws, and Articles of Incorporation.


The Requester states that it sent a letter to the NGPC “well in advance” of the NGPC meeting, but that statement is wrong given the mere three days between the date of the letter and the 30 July 2014 NGPC meeting. (See Request, § 8, Pg. 9.)


24 See https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/how-2014-03-17-en


30 Governmental Advisory Committee.


34 ICANN has also engaged in significant outreach activities on LinkedIn and via various media outlets, as well as launching a Google Adwords promotion.

35 In fact, the Framework will permit names to be activated in the DNS now that were previously not allowed to be activated. As such, the Framework may well lead to an increase in registrations.

36 On 11 September 2014, after the BGC issued its Recommendation, the Requester filed a Clarification to Reconsideration Request 14-37, purportedly providing additional details regarding ways in which the Requester has been materially and adversely affected by the Resolution. Despite its claims to the contrary, the Requester’s continued allegations of potential harm are still speculative and hypothetical.
EXHIBIT B

(DCA Trust v. ICANN, “Decision on Interim Measures of Protection”
May 12, 2014)
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ICDR)
A Division of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
CASE # 50 117 T 1083 13

In the matter of an Independent Review Process pursuant to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number’s (ICANN’s) Bylaws, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures of the ICDR, and the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process

Between: DotConnectAfrica (DCA) Trust;
(“Claimant”)


And

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN);
(“Respondent”)

Represented by Mr. Jeffrey A. LeVee of Jones Day, LLP located at 555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071, U.S.A.

Claimant and Respondent will together be referred to as “Parties”.

DECISION ON INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

Babak Barin, Chair
Prof. Catherine Kessedjian
Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret.)

12 May 2014
BACKGROUND

1. DotConnectAfrica ("DCA") Trust ("Claimant"), is a non-profit organization established under the laws of the Republic of Mauritius on 15 July 2010 with its registry operation – DCA Registry Services (Kenya) Limited – as its principal place of business in Nairobi, Kenya. DCA was formed with the charitable purpose of, among other things, advancing information technology education in Africa and providing a continental Internet domain name to provide access to internet services for the people of Africa and for the public good.

2. In March 2012, DCA Trust applied to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") for the delegation of the .Africa top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains ("gTLD") Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”), an internet resource available for delegation under that program.

3. ICANN ("Respondent") is a non-profit corporation established under the laws of the State of California, U.S.A., on 30 September 1998 and headquartered in Marina del Rey, California. According to its Articles of Incorporation, ICCAN was established for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, international conventions, and local law.

4. On 4 June 2013, the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC") posted a notice that it had decided not to accept DCA’s application.

5. On 19 June 2013, DCA Trust filed a request for reconsideration by the ICANN Board Governance Committee ("BGC"), which denied the request on 1 August 2013.

6. On 19 August 2013, DCA Trust informed ICANN of its intention to seek relief before an Independent Review Panel under ICANN’s Bylaws. Between August and October 2013, DCA Trust and ICANN participated in a Cooperative Engagement Process ("CEP") to try and resolve the issues relating to DCA Trust’s application. Despite several meetings, however, no resolution was reached.

7. On 24 October 2013, DCA Trust filed a Notice of Independent Review Process with the ICDR in accordance with Article IV, Section 3, of ICANN’s Bylaws.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS

8. According to DCA Trust, the central dispute between it and ICANN in the Independent Review Process invoked by DCA Trust in October 2013 and
described in its Amended Notice of Independent Review Process submitted to ICANN on 10 January 2014 arises out of:

“(1) ICANN’s breaches of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, international and local law, and other applicable rules in the administration of applications for the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains ("gTLD") Internet Expansion Program (the "New gTLD Program"); and (2) ICANN’s wrongful decision that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed [...].”

9. According to DCA Trust, “ICANN’s administration of the New gTLD Program and its decision on DCA’s application were unfair, discriminatory, and lacked appropriate due diligence and care, in breach of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.” DCA Trust also advanced that “ICANN’s violations materially affected DCA’s right to have its application processed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid out by ICANN for the New gTLD Program.”

10. In its Response to Claimant’s Amended Notice submitted to DCA Trust on 10 February 2014, ICANN submitted that in these proceedings, “DCA challenges the 4 June 2013 decision of the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC"), which has delegated authority from the ICANN Board to make decisions regarding the New gTLD. In that decision, the NGPC unanimously accepted advice from ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee ("GAC") that DCA application for .AFRICA should not proceed. DCA argues that the NGPC should not have accepted the GAC’s advice. DCA also argues that ICANN’s subsequent decision to reject DCA’s Request for Reconsideration was improper.”

11. ICANN argued that the challenged decisions of ICANN’s Board “were well within the Board’s discretion” and the Board “did exactly what it was supposed to do under its Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation, and the Applicant Guidebook ("Guidebook") that the Board adopted for implementing the New gTLD Program.”

12. Specifically, ICANN also advanced that “ICANN properly investigated and rejected DCA’s assertion that two of ICANN’s Board members had conflicts of interest with regard to the .AFRICA applications, [...] numerous African

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1 Claimant’s Amended Notice of Independent Review Process, para. 2.
2 Ibid.
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6 Ibid., para. 5
countries issued “warnings” to ICANN regarding DCA’s application, a signal from those governments that they had serious concerns regarding DCA’s application; following the issuance of those warnings, the GAC issued “consensus advice” against DCA’s application; ICANN then accepted the GAC’s advice, which was entirely consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws and the Guidebook; [and] ICANN properly denied DCA’s Request for Reconsideration.”

13. In short, ICANN argued that in these proceedings, “the evidence establishes that the process worked exactly as it was supposed to work.”

REQUEST FOR INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

14. In an effort to safeguard its rights pending the ongoing constitution of the IRP Panel, on 22 January 2014, DCA Trust wrote to ICANN requesting that it immediately cease any further processing of all applications for the delegation of the .AFRICA gTLD, failing which DCA Trust would seek emergency relief under Article 37 of the ICDR Rules. In addition, DCA Trust indicated that it believed it had the right to seek such relief because there is no standing panel (as anticipated in the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process), which would otherwise hear requests for emergency relief.

15. In response, in an email dated 5 February 2014, ICANN wrote:

“Although ICANN typically is refraining from further processing activities in conjunction with pending gTLD applications where a competing applicant has a pending reconsideration request, ICANN does not intend to refrain from further processing of applications that relate in some way to pending independent review proceedings. In this particular instance, ICANN believes that the grounds for DCA’s IRP are exceedingly weak, and that the decision to refrain from the further processing of other applications on the basis of the pending IRP would be unfair to others.”

16. In its Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection subsequently submitted to ICANN on 28 March 2014, DCA Trust argued, *inter alia*, that, “in an effort to preserve its rights, in January 2014, DCA requested that ICANN suspend its processing of applications for .AFRICA during the pendency of this proceeding. ICANN, however, summarily refused to do so.”

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. para. 6
9 ICANN counsel’s email to DCA Trust counsel dated 5 February 2014.
10 Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, para. 3
17. DCA Trust also argued that “on 23 March 2014, DCA became aware that ICANN intended to sign an agreement with DCA’s competitor (a South African company called ZACR) on 26 March 2014 in Beijing [...] Immediately upon receiving this information, DCA contacted ICANN and asked it to refrain from signing the agreement with ZACR in light of the fact that this proceeding was still pending. Instead, according to ICANN’s website, ICANN signed its agreement with ZACR the very next day, two days ahead of plan, on 24 March instead of 26 March.”

18. According to DCA Trust, that same day, “ICANN then responded to DCA’s request by presenting the execution of the contract as a fait accompli, arguing that DCA should have sought to stop ICANN from proceeding with ZACR’s application, as ICANN had already informed DCA of its intention [to] ignore its obligations to participate in this proceeding in good faith.” DCA Trust also argued that on 25 March 2014, as per ICANN’s email to the ICDR, “ICANN for the first time informed DCA that it would accept the application of Article 37 [of the ICDR International Dispute Resolution Procedures, amended and effective June 1, 2009 (“ICDR Rules”)] to this proceeding contrary to the express provisions of the Supplementary Procedures of ICANN has put in place for the IRP Process.”

19. In its Request, DCA Trust argued that it “is entitled to an accountability proceeding with legitimacy and integrity, with the capacity to provide a meaningful remedy. [...] DCA has requested the opportunity to compete for rights to .AFRICA pursuant to the rules that ICANN put into place. Allowing ICANN to delegate .AFRICA to DCA’s only competitor – which took actions that were instrumental in the process leading to ICANN’s decision to reject DCA’s application – would eviscerate the very purpose of this proceeding and deprive DCA of it’s rights under ICANN’s own constitutive instruments and international law.”

20. Finally, DCA Trust requested, among other things, the following interim relief:

   a. An order compelling ICANN to refrain from any further steps toward delegation of the .AFRICA gTLD, including but not limited to execution or assessment of pre-delegation testing, negotiations or discussions relating to delegation with the entity ZACR or any of its officers or agents; [...]
21. In its Response to DCA Trust’s Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection submitted on 4 April 2014, ICANN urged that DCA’s request for a stay be denied. ICANN also reproached DCA for having waited five months before initiating its Request for Interim Measures of Protection pursuant to Article 37 of the ICDR Rules.

22. ICANN further argued that Claimant’s Request for Interim Relief ought to be denied because “DCA has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that it will succeed on the merits of this IRP, which the law requires DCA to demonstrate.”

23. According to ICANN, “DCA’s decision to wait five months before seeking a stay reflects the weakness of DCA’s claims and the lack of any corresponding irreparable harm to DCA. This is compounded by the fact that DCA has done nothing to try to expedite these proceedings. To the contrary, DCA has failed to file its fees timely, it sought multiple extensions of time to file its papers, and it requested a very leisurely amount of time for the parties to select the IRP Panel. ICANN, and not the DCA, has been the party trying to expedite these proceedings, and DCA has resisted at every turn.”

24. DCA Trust’s Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, initially scheduled for a hearing on 14 April 2014 before an emergency arbitrator pursuant to ICDR Rules 21 and 37, was instead referred to this Panel on 13 April 2014 for review and consideration pursuant to Article 37.6 of the ICDR Rules.

25. On 22 April 2014, this Panel held an organizational telephone conference call with the Parties. During that call, it was agreed, among other things, that the telephone hearing for DCA’s Request for Interim Measures of Protection will be heard on 5 May 2014, and that ICANN would not take any further steps that would in any way prevent this Panel from granting the full relief requested by DCA Trust in its Request. These and a number of directions given by the Panel to the Parties were reflected in a Procedural Order No. 1 issued on 24 April 2014.

26. On 5 May 2014 this Panel heard the Parties’ submissions on their respective written submissions and the Panel’s questions sent to them in advance on 2 May 2014.

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16 ICANN’s Response to Claimant’s Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, para. 3.
17 Ibid., para. 30.
DECISION AND REASONS OF THE IRP PANEL

27. After having carefully read DCA Trust’s written submissions and the responses filed by ICANN, and after listening to the Parties’ respective oral presentations made by telephone on 5 May 2014, for reasons set forth below, the Panel is unanimously of the view that a stay ruling in the form described below is in order in this proceeding and that ICANN must immediately refrain from any further processing of any application for .AFRICA until this Panel has heard the merits of DCA Trust’s Notice of Independent Review Process and issued its final decision regarding the same.

28. The Panel finds that interim relief in this proceeding is warranted based on two independent and equally sufficient grounds.

29. First, the Panel is of the view that this Independent Review Process could have been heard and finally decided without the need for interim relief, but for ICANN’s failure to follow its own Bylaws (Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 6) and Supplemental Procedures (Article 1), which require the creation of a standing panel as follows:

“There shall be an omnibus standing panel between six and nine members with a variety of expertise, including jurisprudence, judicial experience, alternative dispute resolution and knowledge of ICANN’s mission and work from which each specific IRP Panel shall be selected."

30. This requirement in ICANN’s Bylaws was established on 11 April 2013. More than a year later, no standing panel has been created. Had ICANN timely constituted the standing panel, the panel could have addressed DCA Trust’s request for an Independent Review Process as soon as it was filed in January 2014. It is very likely that, by now, that proceeding would have been completed, and there would be no need for any interim relief by DCA Trust.

31. In the Panel’s unanimous view, therefore, a stay order in this proceeding is proper to preserve DCA Trust’s right to a fair hearing and a decision by this Panel before ICANN takes any further steps that could potentially moot DCA Trust’s request for an independent review. This is the same opportunity DCA would have enjoyed without a stay, but for ICANN’s failure to create the standing panel.

32. Whether the Panel’s decision is advisory only, as ICANN contends, or binding, as DCA Trust argues, the Panel is strongly of the view that ICANN’s unique, international and important public functions require it to scrupulously honor the procedural protections its Bylaws, rules and regulations purport to offer the internet community. ICANN has been entrusted with the important
responsibility of bringing order to the global internet system. As set out in Article I, Sections 1 and 2 of ICANN’s Bylaws:

"[t]he mission of ICANN is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems. [...] In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN:

6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial to public interest.

[...]

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness."

33. In the Panel’s unanimous view, it would be unfair and unjust to deny DCA Trust’s request for interim relief when the need for such a relief by DCA Trust arises out of ICANN’s failure to follow its own Bylaws and procedures.

34. Second, interim relief in this case is independently warranted for reasons unrelated to ICANN’s role in creating the need for such relief as explained above.

35. DCA Trust argues that four criteria must be satisfied before interim relief is granted under international law and in international proceedings: urgency, necessity, protection of an existing right, and existence of a prima facie case on the merits, without the necessity of prejudging the matter.

36. ICANN agrees with the first three criteria identified by DCA Trust, but disagrees with the fourth. For ICANN, the Panel needs to find more than a prima facie case on the merits before ordering interim relief in this proceeding. In its Response to DCA Trust’s Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, ICANN submits that the standard must be the one set out in article 17(A)(1)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. ICANN explains:

"In fact, it is generally accepted under both international and U.S. law that, in order to demonstrate entitlement to interim relief, the party seeking relief must also demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success on the merits. For example, Article 27 [sic.] (A)(1)(b) of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s ("UNCITRAL’s") Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration states that a party requesting an interim measure must demonstrate
that "there is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the claim." [...] Likewise, under U.S. law, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must at least demonstrate that "the likelihood of success is such that serious questions going to the merits were raised." 18

37. The Panel agrees with the Parties that the four criteria listed above in paragraph 35 form a part of the criteria most commonly used by international and national courts and arbitral tribunals 19 to evaluate a party’s request for interim relief. The Panel, however, does not see a distinction between the demonstration of "a prima facie case" or "a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the claim". Like the International Law Association ("ILA"), the Panel is of the view that the demonstration of "a prima facie case" and "a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits of the claim" are in reality one and the same standard.

38. Indeed, as the ILA recommended in its resolution of 1996 20, the granting of an interim relief should be available "on a showing of a case on the merits on a standard of proof which is less than that required for the merits under the applicable law".

Urgency

39. Both DCA Trust and ICANN agree that urgency is one of the criteria that this Panel must consider before it decides to grant interim relief. DCA Trust in particular argues that the orders it requests are needed urgently, because:

"[w]ithout the order compelling ICANN to stay processing of ZACR’s application, DCA will suffer irreparable harm before the IRP process can be concluded... A request for interim measures of protection is considered urgent, if absent the requested measure, an action that is prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken before such final decision is given. This standard is sometimes termed "imminent harm". In light of ICANN’s response to DCA’S request that it refrain from signing a Registry Agreement with ZACR – namely, signing the agreement 48 hours ahead of time in order to prevent any effective intervention by DCA – the additional harm DCA seeks to prevent clearly is imminent. Moreover, ZACR claims that it will have received

18 ibid., para. 21.
19 By "most commonly used", the Panel means that this standard is used by international or regional courts and tribunals, but also by many domestic courts under their own laws.
all rights to .AFRICA by April 2014, and will begin operating .AFRICA by May 2014.\textsuperscript{21}

40. The Panel is satisfied that the urgency test is met in the present case. Indeed, DCA Trust argues, without being contradicted by ICANN, that in March 2014 the latter officially signed the registry agreement for the .Africa gTLD with ZACR, DCA Trust’s competitor.

41. The urgency test is met as well when the Panel takes into consideration, ICANN’s noncommittal email to it and DCA Trust of 23 April 2014, in which ICANN writes:

“I am writing to follow up...with respect to the timing of the ultimate delegation by ICANN to ZA Central Registry of .AFRICA into the root zone...ICANN will not, as a practical matter, be able to conclude the delegation process prior to 15 May 2014. As a result, the schedule adopted by the Panel...would give ICANN the opportunity to consider the Panel’s recommendation in the event the Panel recommends a stay.” [Emphasis added]

42. The registry agreement being signed, the countdown for the launch of the .Africa gTLD could commence. ZACR announces on its website (https://www.registry.net.za/launch.php) that the launch should take place in June 2014. This Panel, even if it works very rapidly, will not be in a position to decide on the merits of DCA’s Request for an Independent Review before June 2014. Therefore, there is absolutely no doubt in the Panel’s mind that DCA Trust’s need for interim relief in this matter is urgent.

\textit{Necessity}

43. Both DCA Trust and ICANN agree that a test of necessity must be met before granting the requested interim relief. Indeed, in its Response to Claimant’s Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, ICANN writes:

“As DCA acknowledges in its Request, in order to show necessity under international law, it must demonstrate proportionality, i.e. that the harm it would occur in the absence of interim relief measures would “exceed [ ] greatly the damage caused to the party affected” by these measures. DCA contends that it would suffer serious harm in the absence of interim relief because the “operation of .AFRICA is a unique right” and “DCA was created expressly for the purpose of campaigning for, competing for and ultimately operating .AFRICA.” But DCA fails to acknowledge that, whatever its unilateral plans might have been, its

\textsuperscript{21} Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, para. 30.
actual probability of harm is greatly diminished by its scant probability of success on the merits. DCA also fails to note the substantial potential harm that ZACR could suffer if the processing of its application for, and the ultimate delegation of,.AFRICA is delayed."

"ICANN'S decision to proceed with the processing of ZACR's application for .AFRICA despite DCA's pending IRP is a reflection of ICANN's belief that: (i) DCA's IRP is frivolous and unlikely to succeed on the merits; and (ii) ZACR potentially could suffer substantial harm if the delegation of .AFRICA to it is further delayed."22

44. The Panel is of the opinion that the necessity test requires the Panel to consider the proportionality of the relief requested. The Panel thus must balance the harm caused to DCA Trust if a stay is not granted and the harm that would be caused to ICANN if interim relief were to be ordered. As explained by DCA Trust:

"If [DCA Trust] is deprived of the opportunity even to compete to operate .AFRICA, DCA will be unable to accomplish its charitable aims and will be unable to perform its mandate [...] By contrast, ICANN will suffer no similar harm...Regardless of the outcome of the IRP, ICANN will be able to delegate .AFRICA. [Similarly, ZACR may receive the rights to "AFRICA even if DCA is permitted to compete with it pursuant to ICANN’s rules and procedures for the new gTLD program.] The IRP is meant to be an expedited dispute resolution process. A slight delay in delegation is hardly an undue burden compared to the issues at stake."23

45. It is abundantly clear to the Panel from the facts as explained by both Parties in this case that if a stay is not granted and the registry agreement between ICANN and ZACR is implemented further, the chances of DCA Trust having its Request for an independent review heard and properly considered will be jeopardized.

46. The Panel considers that a stay in the implementation of the registry agreement between ICANN and ZACR is therefore proportionate and adequate to the particular circumstances of this case. Indeed, neither ICANN, nor ZACR will suffer from a few more months of delay if a stay of processing of ZACR's .AFRICA application is ordered. Indeed, neither ICANN nor ZACR has pointed to any specific prejudice or harm that it will suffer if DCA Trust's request for interim relief is granted. The same cannot be said about the

23 Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, paras. 27 and 29.
absence of such a relief for DCA Trust, which clearly would suffer irreparable harm if interim relief is not granted.

Protection of an existing right

47. DCA Trust has demonstrated, to the satisfaction of this Panel that, beyond the procedural rights it must enjoy to have its case heard, DCA Trust also enjoys, according to ICANN’s own Bylaws, the right to have ICANN’s Board decision reviewed by an independent panel, a right which will be lost if interim relief is not granted in this case. Indeed, Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 1 of ICANN’s Bylaws unequivocally indicates that:

“In addition to the reconsideration process described in Section 2 of this Article, ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.” [Emphasis added]

Consequently, the Panel has determined that this criterion for the granting of interim relief in this case has also been met.

A reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the merits

48. This criterion was most heavily debated between the Parties. ICANN argues that DCA Trust does not have a case on the merits. In fact, ICANN goes as far as saying that Claimant’s Request for an Independent Review Process is frivolous. Therefore, ICANN argues that DCA Trust has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable possibility it would succeed on the merits. In the Panel’s view, by doing so, ICANN is asking for more than is required of DCA Trust at this stage of the independent review process.

49. Contrary to ICANN’S submissions, the Panel is of the view that it need not, at this stage, make a full appraisal of the merits of DCA Trust’s case, given that the standard of proof for interim relief is lower than the standard of proof required for the evaluation of the merits of the case.24

50. Having carefully examined the written submissions of the Parties, heard their oral submissions by telephone and deliberated on the various issues raised by them to date, the Panel is of the view that DCA Trust’s case must proceed to the next stage.

24 See the report accompanying the ILA resolution of 1996 mentioned in footnote 2. On page 195, the report says that the “standard of proof propounded (...) was one which found wide acceptance” among all the countries studied, except one.
DECISION OF THE IRP PANEL

51. The Panel therefore concludes that ICANN must immediately refrain from any further processing of any application for .AFRICA until this Panel has heard the merits of DCA Trust’s Notice of Independent Review Process and issued its conclusions regarding the same.

52. The Panel reserves its views with respect to the other requests for relief made by DCA Trust in its Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection. The Panel will consider the Parties’ respective arguments in that regard if and when required by the Parties and if appropriate.

53. The Panel reserves its decision on the issue of costs relating to this stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

This Decision on Interim Measures of Protection has thirteen (13) pages. The members of the Panel have all reviewed this decision and agreed that the Chair may sign it alone on their behalf.

Signed in Montreal, Quebec for delivery to the Parties in Los Angeles, California.

Dated 12 May 2014.

[Signature]

Babak Barah, President of the Panel, on behalf of himself, Prof. Catherine Kessedjian and the Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret.) as consented to by the Parties in their respective emails to the Panel of 7 May 2014
DECLARATION ON THE IRP PROCEDURE

In the matter of an Independent Review Process (IRP) pursuant to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number’s (ICANN’s) Bylaws, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures (ICDR Rules) of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), and the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process

Between: DotConnectAfrica Trust; ("Claimant" or “DCA Trust”)

Represented by Mr. Arif H. Ali, Ms. Marguerite Walter and Ms. Erica Franzetti of Weil, Gotshal, Manges, LLP located at Contact Information Redacted

And

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN);
("Respondent" or “ICANN”)

Represented by Mr. Jeffrey A. LeVee of Jones Day, LLP located at Contact Information Redacted

Claimant and Respondent will together be referred to as “Parties”.

IRP Panel:
Babak Barin, Chair
Prof. Catherine Kessedjian
Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret.)
I. BACKGROUND

1) DCA Trust is a non-profit organization established under the laws of the Republic of Mauritius on 15 July 2010 with its registry operation – DCA Registry Services (Kenya) Limited – as its principal place of business in Nairobi, Kenya. DCA Trust was formed with the charitable purpose of, among other things, advancing information technology education in Africa and providing a continental Internet domain name to provide access to internet services for the people of Africa and for the public good.

2) In March 2012, DCA Trust applied to ICANN for the delegation of the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains (“gTLD”) Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”), an internet resource available for delegation under that program.

3) ICANN is a non-profit corporation established under the laws of the State of California, U.S.A., on 30 September 1998 and headquartered in Marina del Rey, California. According to its Articles of Incorporation, ICANN was established for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, international conventions, and local law.

4) On 4 June 2013, the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”) posted a notice that it had decided not to accept DCA Trust’s application.

5) On 19 June 2013, DCA Trust filed a request for reconsideration by the ICANN Board Governance Committee (“BGC”), which denied the request on 1 August 2013.

6) On 19 August 2013, DCA Trust informed ICANN of its intention to seek relief before an Independent Review Panel under ICANN’s Bylaws. Between August and October 2013, DCA Trust and ICANN participated in a Cooperative Engagement Process (“CEP”) to try and resolve the issues relating to DCA Trust’s application. Despite several meetings, no resolution was reached.

7) On 24 October 2013, DCA Trust filed a Notice of Independent Review Process with the ICDR in accordance with Article IV, Section 3, of ICANN’s Bylaws.

II. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON THE MERITS

8) According to DCA Trust, the central dispute between it and ICANN in the Independent Review Process (“IRP”) invoked by DCA Trust in October 2013 and described in its Amended Notice of Independent Review Process submitted to ICANN on 10 January 2014 arises out of:
“(1) ICANN’s breaches of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, international and local law, and other applicable rules in the administration of applications for the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains ("gTLD") Internet Expansion Program (the “New gTLD Program”); and (2) ICANN’s wrongful decision that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed [...].”

9) According to DCA Trust, “ICANN’s administration of the New gTLD Program and its decision on DCA’s application were unfair, discriminatory, and lacked appropriate due diligence and care, in breach of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.” DCA Trust also advanced that “ICANN’s violations materially affected DCA’s right to have its application processed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid out by ICANN for the New gTLD Program.”

10) In its 10 February 2014 [sic] Response to DCA Trust’s Amended Notice, ICANN submitted that in these proceedings, “DCA challenges the 4 June 2013 decision of the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC"), which has delegated authority from the ICANN Board to make decisions regarding the New gTLD. In that decision, the NGPC unanimously accepted advice from ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee ("GAC") that DCA’s application for .AFRICA should not proceed. DCA argues that the NGPC should not have accepted the GAC’s advice. DCA also argues that ICANN’s subsequent decision to reject DCA’s Request for Reconsideration was improper.”

11) ICANN argued that the challenged decisions of ICANN’s Board “were well within the Board’s discretion” and the Board “did exactly what it was supposed to do under its Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation, and the Applicant Guidebook ("Guidebook") that the Board adopted for implementing the New gTLD Program.”

12) Specifically, ICANN also advanced that “ICANN properly investigated and rejected DCA’s assertion that two of ICANN’s Board members had conflicts of interest with regard to the .AFRICA applications, [...] numerous African countries issued “warnings” to ICANN regarding DCA’s application, a signal from those governments that they had serious concerns regarding DCA’s application; following the issuance of those warnings, the GAC issued “consensus advice” against DCA’s application; ICANN then accepted the GAC’s advice, which was entirely consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws and the

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6 Ibid, para. 5.
Guidebook; [and] ICANN properly denied DCA’s Request for Reconsideration.”

13) In short, ICANN argued that in these proceedings, “the evidence establishes that the process worked exactly as it was supposed to work.”

14) In the merits part of these proceedings, the Panel will decide the above and other related issues raised by the Parties in their submissions.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THIS DECISION

15) On 24 April 2013, 12 May, 27 May and 4 June 2014 respectively, the Panel issued a Procedural Order No. 1, a Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, a list of questions for the Parties to brief in their 20 May 2014 memorials on the procedural and substantive issues identified in Procedural Order No. 1 (“12 May List of Questions”), a Procedural Order No. 2 and a Decision on ICANN’s Request for Partial Reconsideration of certain portions of its Decision on Interim Measures of Protection. The Decision on Interim Measures of Protection and the Decision on ICANN’s Request for Partial Reconsideration of certain portions of the Decision on Interim Measures of Protection have no bearing on this Declaration. Consequently, they do not require any particular consideration by the Panel in this Declaration.

16) In Procedural Order No. 1 and the 12 May List of Questions, based on the Parties’ submissions, the Panel identified a number of questions relating to the future conduct of these proceedings, including the method of hearing of the merits of DCA Trust’s amended Notice of Independent Review Process that required further briefing by the Parties. In Procedural Order No. 1, the Panel identified some of these issues as follows:

B. Future conduct of the IRP proceedings, including the hearing of the merits of Claimant’s Amended Notice of Independent Review Process, if required.

Issues:

a) Interpretation of the provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures of the ICDR, and the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process (together the “IRP Procedure”), including whether or not there should be viva voce testimony permitted.

b) Document request and exchange.

c) Additional filings, including any memoranda and hearing exhibits (if needed and appropriate).

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7 Ibid.
8 ICANN’s Response to Claimant’s Amended Notice, para. 6. Underlining is from the original text.
d) Consideration of method of hearing of the Parties, i.e., telephone, video or in-person and determination of a location for such a hearing, if necessary or appropriate, and consideration of any administrative issues relating to the hearing.

17) In that same Order, in light of: (a) the exceptional circumstances of this case; (b) the fact that some of the questions raised by the Parties implicated important issues of fairness, due process and equal treatment of the parties ("Outstanding Procedural Issues"); and (c) certain primae impressionis or first impression issues that arose in relation to the IRP Procedure, the Panel requested the Parties to file two rounds of written memorials, including one that followed the 12 May List of Questions.

18) On 5 and 20 May 2014, the Parties filed their submissions with supporting material for consideration by the Panel.

IV. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PANEL

19) Having read the Parties’ submissions and supporting material, and listened to their respective arguments by telephone, the Panel answers the following questions in this Declaration:

1) Does the Panel have the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings?

2) If so, what directions does the Panel give the Parties with respect to the Outstanding Procedural Issues?

3) Is the Panel’s decision concerning the IRP Procedure and its future Declaration on the Merits in this proceeding binding?

Summary of the Panel’s findings

20) The Panel is of the view that it has the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings and consequently, it issues the procedural directions set out in paragraphs 58 to 61, 68 to 71 and 82 to 87 (below), which directions may be supplemented in a future procedural order. The Panel also concludes that this Declaration and its future Declaration on the Merits of this case are binding on the Parties.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AND REASONS FOR THE DECISION

1) Can the Panel interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings?

Interpretation and Future Conduct of the IRP Proceedings

DCA Trusts’ Submissions

21) In its 5 May 2014 Submission on Procedural Issues (“DCA Trust First Memorial”), DCA Trust submitted, *inter alia*, that:

“[Under] California law and applicable federal law, this IRP qualifies as an arbitration. It has all the characteristics that California courts look to in order to determine whether a proceeding is an arbitration: 1) a third-party decision-maker; 2) a decision-maker selected by the parties; 3) a mechanism for assuring the neutrality of the decision-maker; 4) an opportunity for both parties to be heard; and 5) a binding decision[...]. Thus, the mere fact that ICANN has labeled this proceeding an independent review process rather than an arbitration (and the adjudicator of the dispute is called a Panel rather than a Tribunal) does not change the fact that the IRP— insofar as its procedural framework and the legal effects of its outcome are concerned— is an arbitration.”

22) According to DCA Trust, the IRP Panel is a neutral body appointed by the parties and the ICDR to hear disputes involving ICANN. Therefore, it “qualifies as a third-party decision-maker for the purposes of defining the IRP as an arbitration.”

DCA Trust submits that, “ICANN’s Bylaws contain its standing offer to arbitrate, through the IRP administered by the ICDR, disputes concerning Board actions alleged to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws.”

23) DCA Trust submits that, it “accepted ICANN’s standing offer to arbitrate by submitting its Notice of Independent Review [...] to the ICDR on 24 October 2013 [...] when the two party-appointed panelists were unable to agree on a chairperson, the ICDR made the appointment pursuant to Article 6 of the ICDR Rules, amended and effective 1 June 2009. The Parties thus chose to submit their dispute to the IRP Panel for resolution, as with any other arbitration.”

24) According to DCA Trust, “the Supplementary Procedures provide that the IRP is to be comprised of ‘neutral’ [individuals] and provide that the panel shall be comprised of members of a standing IRP Panel or as selected by the...”

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9 DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 4 and 5.
10 Ibid, para. 8.
11 Ibid, para. 9.
12 Ibid.
parties under the ICDR Rules. The ICDR Rules [...] provide that panelists serving under the rules, ‘shall be impartial and independent’, and require them to disclose any circumstances giving rise to ‘justifiable doubts’ as to their impartiality and independence [...] The IRP therefore contains a mechanism for ensuring the neutrality of the decision-maker, just like any other arbitration.”

25) DCA Trust further submitted that the “IRP affords both parties an opportunity to be heard, both in writing and orally” and the “governing instruments of the IRP – i.e., the Bylaws, the ICDR Rules, and the Supplementary Procedures – confirm that the IRP is final and binding.” According to DCA Trust, the “IRP is the final accountability and review mechanism available to the parties materially affected by ICANN Board decisions. The IRP is also the only ICANN accountability mechanism conducted by an independent third-party decision-maker with the power to render a decision resolving the dispute and naming a prevailing party [...] The IRP represents a fundamentally different stage of review from those that precede it. Unlike reconsideration or cooperative engagement, the IRP is conducted pursuant to a set of independently developed international arbitration rules (as minimally modified) and administered by a provider of international arbitration services, not ICANN itself.”

26) As explained in its 20 May 2014 Response to the Panel’s Questions on Procedural Issues (“DCA Trust Second Memorial”), according to DCA Trust, “the IRP is the sole forum in which an applicant for a new gTLD can seek independent, third-party review of Board actions. Remarkably, ICANN makes no reciprocal waivers and instead retains all of its rights against applicants in law and equity. ICANN cannot be correct that the IRP is a mere ‘corporate accountability mechanism’. Such a result would make ICANN – the caretaker of an immensely important (and valuable) global resource – effectively judgment-proof.”

27) Finally DCA Trust submitted that:

“[It] is [...] critical to understand that ICANN created the IRP as an alternative to allowing disputes to be resolved by courts. By submitting its application for a gTLD, DCA agreed to eight pages of terms and conditions, including a nearly page-long string of waivers and releases. Among those conditions was the waiver of all of its rights to challenge ICANN’s decision on DCA’s application in court. For DCA and other gTLD applicants, the IRP is their only recourse; no other legal remedy is available. The very design of this process is evidence that the IRP is fundamentally unlike the forms of

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13 Ibid, paras. 10, 11 and 12.
14 Ibid, paras. 13, 16, 21 and 23.
15 DCA Trust Second Memorial, para. 6. Bold and italics are from the original text.
administrative review that precede it and is meant to provide a final and binding resolution of disputes between ICANN and persons affected by its decisions.”

**ICANN’s Submissions**

28) In response, in its first memorial entitled ICANN’s Memorandum Regarding Procedural Issues filed on 5 May 2014 (“ICANN First Memorial”), ICANN argued, *inter alia*, that:

“[This] proceeding is *not* an arbitration. Rather, an IRP is a truly unique 'Independent Review' process established in ICANN’s Bylaws with the specific purpose of providing for ‘independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws'. Although ICANN is using the International Center [sic] for Dispute Resolution ('ICDR') to administer these proceedings, nothing in the Bylaws can be construed as converting these proceedings into an ‘arbitration’, and the Bylaws make clear that these proceedings are not to be deemed as the equivalent of an ‘international arbitration’. Indeed, the word ‘arbitration’ does not appear in the relevant portion of the Bylaws, and as discussed below, the ICANN Board retains full authority to accept or reject the declaration of all IRP Panels […] ICANN's Board had the authority to, and did, adopt Bylaws establishing internal accountability mechanisms and defining the scope and form of those mechanisms. Cal. Corp. Code § 5150(a) (authorizing the board of a non-profit public benefit corporation to adopt and amend the corporation’s bylaws).”

29) In its 20 May 2014 Further Memorandum Regarding Procedural Issues (“ICANN Second Memorial”), ICANN submitted that many of the questions that the Panel posed “are outside the scope of this Independent Review Proceeding […] and the Panel's mandate.” According to ICANN:

“The Panel's mandate is set forth in ICANN's Bylaws, which limit the Panel to 'comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and [...] declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws'.”

**The Panel’s Decision on its power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure**

(i) **Mission and Core Values of ICANN**

30) ICANN is not an ordinary California non-profit organization. Rather, ICANN has a large international purpose and responsibility, to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s systems of unique identifiers, and in particular, to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.

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16 DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 22.
17 ICANN First Memorial, paras. 10 and 11. Bold and italics are from the original text.
18 ICANN Second Memorial, para. 2.
ICANN coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet. ICANN’s special and important mission is reflected in the following provisions of its Articles of Incorporation:

3. This Corporation is a [non-profit] public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the California [Non-profit] Public Benefit Corporation Law for charitable and public purposes. The Corporation is organized, and will be operated, exclusively for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes ... In furtherance of the foregoing purposes, and in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization, the Corporation shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv).

4. The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations. [Emphasis by way of italics is added]

In carrying out its mission, ICANN must be accountable to the global internet community for operating in a manner that is consistent with its Bylaws, and with due regard for its core values.

In performing its mission, among others, the following core values must guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: preserve and enhance the operational stability, security and global interoperability of the internet, employ open and transparent policy development mechanisms, make decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness and remain accountable to the internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness.

The core values of ICANN as described in its Bylaws are deliberately expressed in general terms, so as to provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated.
(ii) Accountability of ICANN

35) Consistent with its large and important international responsibilities, ICANN's Bylaws acknowledge a responsibility to the community and a need for a means of holding ICANN accountable for compliance with its mission and “core values.” Thus, Article IV of ICANN's Bylaws, entitled “Accountability and Review,” states:

“In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws.”


37) ICANN’s BGC is the body designated to review and consider Reconsideration Requests. The Committee is empowered to make final decisions on certain matters, and recommendations to the Board of Directors on others. ICANN’s Bylaws expressly provide that the Board of Directors “shall not be bound to follow the recommendations of the BGC.”

38) ICANN’s Bylaws provide that the “charter of the Ombudsman shall be to act as a neutral dispute resolution practitioner for those matters for which the provisions of the Reconsideration Policy [...] or the Independent Review Policy have not been invoked.” The Ombudsman’s powers appear to be limited to “clarifying issues” and “using conflict resolution tools such as negotiation, facilitation, and ‘shuttle diplomacy’.” The Ombudsman is specifically barred from “instituting, joining, or supporting in any way any legal actions challenging ICANN’s structure, procedures, processes, or any conduct by the ICANN Board, staff, or constituent bodies.”

39) The avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do not include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN's Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

“Applicant hereby releases ICANN [...] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN [...] in connection with ICANN's review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant's gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS
Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, the ultimate “accountability” remedy for applicants is the IRP.

(iii) IRP Procedures

41) The Bylaws of ICANN as amended on 11 April 2013, in Article IV (Accountability and Review), Section 3 (Independent Review of Board Actions), paragraph 1, require ICANN to put in place, in addition to the reconsideration process identified in Section 2, a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

42) Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Section 2 of the Bylaws, require all IRP proceedings to be administered by an international dispute resolution provider appointed by ICANN, and for that IRP Provider (“IRPP”) to, with the approval of the ICANN’s Board, establish operating rules and procedures, which shall implement and be consistent with Section 3.

43) In accordance with the above provisions, ICANN selected the ICDR, the international division of the American Arbitration Association, to be the IRPP.

44) With the input of the ICDR, ICANN prepared a set of Supplementary Procedures for ICANN IRP (“Supplementary Procedures”), to “supplement the [ICDR’s] International Arbitration Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws.”

45) According to the Definitions part of the Supplementary Procedures, “Independent Review or IRP” refers to “the procedure that takes place upon filing of a request to review ICANN Board actions or inactions alleged to be inconsistent with ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation”, and “International Dispute Resolution Procedures or Rules” refers to the ICDR’s International Arbitration Rules (“ICDR Rules”) that will govern the process in combination with the Supplementary Rules.

46) The Preamble of the Supplementary Rules indicates that these “procedures supplement the [ICDR] Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws” and Article

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20 Applicant Guidebook, Terms and Conditions for Top Level Domain Applications, para. 6. Capital letters are from the original text.
2 of the Supplementary Procedures requires the ICDR to apply the Supplementary Procedures, in addition to the ICDR Rules, in all cases submitted to it in connection with Article IV, Section 3(4) of ICANN's Bylaws. In the event there is any inconsistency between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, ICANN requires the Supplementary Procedures to govern.

47) The online Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “supplement” as “a thing added to something else in order to complete or enhance it”. Supplement, therefore, means to complete, add to, extend or supply a deficiency. In this case, according to ICANN's desire, the Supplementary Rules were designed to “add to” the ICDR Rules.

48) A key provision of the ICDR Rules, Article 16, under the heading “Conduct of Arbitration” confers upon the Panel the power to “conduct [proceedings] in whatever manner [the Panel] considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.”

49) Another key provision, Article 36 of the ICDR Rules, directs the Panel to “interpret and apply these Rules insofar as they relate to its powers and duties”. Like in all other ICDR proceedings, the details of exercise of such powers are left to the discretion of the Panel itself.

50) Nothing in the Supplementary Procedures either expressly or implicitly conflicts with or overrides the general and broad powers that Articles 16 and 36 of the ICDR Rules confer upon the Panel to interpret and determine the manner in which the IRP proceedings are to be conducted and to assure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case.

51) To the contrary, the Panel finds support in the “Independent Review Process Recommendations” filed by ICANN, which indicates that the Panel has the discretion to run the IRP proceedings in the manner it thinks appropriate. [Emphasis added].

52) Therefore, the Panel is of the view that it has the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings, and it does so here, with specificity in relation to the issues raised by the Parties as set out below.
2) What directions does the Panel give the Parties with respect to the Outstanding Procedural Issues?

a) Document request and exchange

Parties’ Submissions

53) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust seeks document production, since according to it, “information potentially dispositive of the outcome of these proceedings is in ICANN’s possession, custody or control.” According to DCA Trust, in this case, “ICANN has submitted witness testimony that, among other things, purports to rely on secret documents that have not been provided.” Given that these proceedings may be “DCA’s only opportunity to present and have its claims decided by an independent decision-maker”, DCA Trust argues “that further briefing on the merits should be allowed following any and all document production in these proceedings.”

54) According to DCA Trust, “by choosing the ICDR Rules, the Parties also chose the associated ICDR guidelines including the Guidelines for Arbitrators Concerning Exchanges of Information (“ICDR Guidelines”). The ICDR Guidelines provide that ‘parties shall exchange, in advance of the hearing, all documents upon which each intends to rely’ […]” DCA Trust submits that, “nothing in the Bylaws or Supplementary Procedures excludes such document production, leaving the ICDR Rules to cover the field.”

55) DCA Trust therefore, requests that the Panel issue a procedural order providing the Parties with an opportunity to request documents from one another, and to seek an order from the Panel compelling production of documents if necessary.

56) ICANN agrees with DCA Trust, that pursuant to the ICDR Guidelines, which it refers to as “Discovery Rules”, “a party must request that a panel order the production of documents.” According to ICANN, “those documents must be ‘reasonably believed to exist and to be relevant and material to the outcomes of the case,’ and requests must contain ‘a description of specific documents or classes of documents, along with an explanation of their materiality to the outcome of the case.’” ICANN argues, however, that despite the requirement by the Supplementary Rules that, ‘all necessary evidence’ to demonstrate the requestor’s claims that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation

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21 DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 61.
22 Ibid, paras. 61 and 66.
23 Ibid, para. 67.
24 Ibid.
25 ICANN First Memorial, para. 28.
26 Ibid.
should be part of the [initial written] submission’, DCA Trust has not to date “provided any indication as to what information it believes the documents it may request may contain and has made no showing that those documents could affect the outcome of the case.”

57) ICANN further submits that, “while ICANN recognizes that the Panel may order the production of documents within the parameters set forth in the Discovery Rules, ICANN will object to any attempts by DCA to propound broad discovery of the sort permitted in American civil litigation.” In support of its contention, ICANN refers to the ICDR Guidelines and states that those Guidelines have made it ‘clear that its Discovery Rules do not contemplate such broad discovery. The introduction of these rules states that their purpose is to promote ‘the goal of providing a simpler, less expensive and more expeditious form of dispute resolution than resort to national courts.’ According to ICANN, the ICDR Guidelines note that:

“One of the factors contributing to complexity, expense and delay in recent years has been the migration from court systems into arbitration of procedural devices that allow one party to a court proceeding access to information in the possession of the other, without full consideration of the differences between arbitration and litigation. The purpose of these guidelines is to make it clear to arbitrators that they have the authority, the responsibility and, in certain jurisdictions, the mandatory duty to manage arbitration proceedings so as to achieve the goal of providing a simpler, less expensive, and more expeditious process.”

The Panel’s directions concerning document request and exchange

58) Seeing that the Parties are both in agreement that some form of documentary exchange is permitted under the IRP Procedure, and considering that Articles 16 and 19 of the ICDR Rules respectively specify, inter alia, that “[s]ubject to these Rules the [Panel] may conduct [these proceedings] in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case” and “at any time during the proceedings, the tribunal may order parties to produce other documents, exhibits or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate”, the Panel concludes that some document production is necessary to allow DCA Trust to present its case.

59) The Panel is not aware of any international dispute resolution rules, which prevent the parties to benefit from some form of document production. Denying document production would be especially unfair in the circumstances of this case given ICANN’s reliance on internal confidential documents, as advanced by DCA Trust. In any event, ICANN’s espoused goals

27 Ibid, para. 29. Bold and italics are from the original text.
28 Ibid, para. 30.
of accountability and transparency would be disserved by a regime that truncates the usual and traditional means of developing and presenting a claim.

60) The Panel, therefore, orders a reasonable documentary exchange in these proceedings with a view to maintaining efficiency and economy, and invites the Parties to agree by or before 29 August 2014, on a form, method and schedule of exchange of documents between them. If the Parties are unable to agree on such a documentary exchange process, the Panel will intervene and, with the input of the Parties, provide further guidance.

61) In this last regard, the Panel directs the Parties’ attention to paragraph 6 of the ICDR Guidelines, and advises, that it is very “receptive to creative solutions for achieving exchanges of information in ways that avoid costs and delay, consistent with the principles of due process expressed in these Guidelines.”

b) Additional filings, including memoranda and hearing exhibits

Parties’ Submissions

62) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust submits that:

“[The] plain language of the Supplementary Procedures pertaining to written submissions clearly demonstrates that claimants in IRPs are not limited to a single written submission incorporating all evidence, as argued by ICANN. Section 5 of the Supplementary Procedures states that ‘initial written submissions of the parties shall not exceed 25 pages.’ The word ‘initial’ confirms that there may be subsequent submissions, subject to the discretion of the Panel as to how many additional written submissions and what page limits should apply.”

63) DCA Trust also submits that, “Section 5 of the Supplementary Procedures [...] provides that [a]ll necessary evidence to demonstrate the requestor’s claims that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation should be part of the submission.’ Use of the word ‘should’—and not ‘shall’—confirms that it is desirable, but not required that all necessary evidence be included with the Notice of Independent Review. Plainly, the Supplementary Procedures do not preclude a claimant from adding additional evidence nor would it make any sense if they did given that claimants may, subject to the Panel’s discretion, submit document requests.”

64) According to DCA Trust, in addition, “section 5 of the Supplementary Procedures provides that ‘the Panel may request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting

30 DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 57.
31 Ibid, para. 58.
Organizations, or from other parties.’ Thus, the Supplementary Procedures clearly contemplate that additional written submissions may be necessary to give each party a fair opportunity to present its case.”

In response, ICANN submits that, DCA Trust “has no automatic right to additional briefing under the Supplementary Procedures.” According to ICANN, “paragraph 5 of the Supplementary Procedures, which governs written statements, provides:

The initial written submissions of the parties shall not exceed 25 pages each in argument, double-spaced and in 12-point font. All necessary evidence to demonstrate the requestor’s claims that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation should be part of the submission. Evidence will not be included when calculating the page limit. The parties may submit expert evidence in writing, and there shall be one right of reply to that expert evidence. The IRP Panel may request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties.” [Bold and italics are ICANN’s]

ICANN adds:

“This section clearly provides that DCA [Trust’s] opportunity to provide briefing and evidence in this matter has concluded, subject only to a request for additional briefing from the Panel. DCA has emphasized that the rule references the ‘initial’ written submission, but the word ‘initial’ refers to the fact that the Panel ‘may request additional written submissions,’ not that DCA [Trust] has some ‘right’ to a second submission. There is no Supplementary Rule that even suggests the possibility of a second submission as a matter of right. The fact that DCA [Trust] has twice failed to submit evidence in support of its claims is not justification for allowing DCA [Trust] a third attempt.”

ICANN further notes, that in its 20 April 2014 letter to the Panel, ICANN already submitted that, “DCA [Trust’s] argument that it submitted its papers ‘on the understanding that opportunities would be available to make further submissions’ is false. ICANN stated in an email to DCA [Trust’s] counsel on 9 January 2014—prior to the submission of DCA [Trust’s] Amended Notice—that the Supplementary [Procedures] bar the filing of supplemental submissions absent a request from the Panel.”

According to ICANN:

“[The] decision as to whether to allow supplemental briefing is within the Panel’s discretion, and ICANN urges the Panel to decline to permit supplemental briefing for two reasons. First, despite having months to consider how DCA [Trust] might respond to ICANN’s presentation on the merits, DCA [Trust] has never even attempted to explain

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32 Ibid, para. 59.
33 ICANN First Memorial, para. 24.
34 Ibid.
what it could say in additional briefing that would refute the materials in ICANN's presentation. [...] The fact that DCA is unable to identify supplemental witnesses sixth months after filing its Notice of IRP is strong indication that further briefing would not be helpful in this case. Second, as ICANN has explained on multiple occasions, DCA [Trust] has delayed these proceedings substantially, and further briefing would compound that delay [...] as ICANN noted in its letter of 20 April 2014, despite DCA [Trust's] attempts to frame this case as implicating issues 'reach[ing] far beyond the respective rights of the parties as concerns the delegation of .AFRICA,' the issues in this case are in fact extremely limited in scope. This Panel is authorized only to address whether ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation in its handling of DCA's Application for .AFRICA. The parties have had the opportunity to submit briefs and evidence regarding that issue. DCA [Trust] has given no indication that it has further dispositive arguments to make or evidence to present. The Panel should resist DCA's attempt to delay these proceedings even further via additional briefing."

The Panel's directions concerning additional filings

68) As with document production, in the face of Article 16 of the ICDR Rules, the Panel is of the view that both Parties ought to benefit from additional filings. In this instance again, while it is possible as ICANN explains, that the drafters of the Supplementary Procedures may have desired to preclude the introduction of additional evidence not submitted with an initial statement of claim, the Panel is of the view that such a result would be inconsistent with ICANN’s core values and the Panel’s obligation to treat the parties fairly and afford both sides a reasonable opportunity to present their case.

69) Again, every set of dispute resolution rules, and every court process that the Panel is aware of, allows a claimant to supplement its presentation as its case proceeds to a hearing. The goal of a fair opportunity to present one’s case is in harmony with ICANN’s goals of accountability, transparency, and fairness.

70) The Panel is aware of and fully embraces the fact that ICANN tried to curtail unnecessary time and costs in the IRP process. However, this may not be done at the cost of a fair process for both parties, particularly in light of the fact that the IRP is the exclusive dispute resolution mechanism provided to applicants.

71) Therefore, the Panel will allow the Parties to benefit from additional filings and supplemental briefing going forward. The Panel invites the Parties in this regard to agree on a reasonable exchange timetable. If the Parties are unable to agree on the scope and length of such additional filings and supplemental briefing, the Panel will intervene and, with the input of the Parties, provide further guidance.

36 Ibid, paras. 26 and 27.
c) Method of Hearing and Testimony

Parties’ Submissions

72) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust submitted that:

“[T]he parties agree that a hearing on the merits is appropriate in this IRP. DCA [Trust] respectfully requests that the Panel schedule a hearing on the merits after document discovery has concluded and the parties have had the opportunity to file memorials on the merits. Although the Panel clearly has the authority to conduct a hearing in-person, in the interest of saving time and minimizing costs, DCA [Trust] would agree to a video hearing, as stated during the April 22 hearing on procedural matters.”37

73) In response, ICANN submitted that, “during the 22 April 2014 Call, ICANN agreed that this IRP is one in which a telephonic or video conference would be helpful and offered to facilitate a video conference.”38 In addition, in the ICANN First Memorial, ICANN argued that according to Article IV, Section 3.12 of the Bylaws and paragraph 4 of the Supplementary Procedures, the IRP should conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via Internet to the maximum extent feasible and in the extraordinary event that an in-person hearing is deemed necessary by the panel, the in-person hearing shall be limited to argument only.

74) ICANN also advanced, that:

“[I]t does not believe [...] that this IRP is sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ so as to justify an in-person hearing, which would dramatically increase the costs for the parties. As discussed above, the issues in this IRP are straightforward – limited to whether ICANN’s Board acted consistent with its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in relation to DCA’s application for. AFRICA. – and can, easily [...], be resolved following a telephonic oral argument with counsel and the Panel.”39

75) In the DCA Trust First Memorial, DCA Trust also argued that, in “April 2013, ICANN amended its Bylaws to limit telephonic or in-person hearings to ‘argument only.’ At some point after the ICM Panel’s 2009 decision in ICM v. ICANN, ICANN also revised the Supplementary Procedures to limit hearings to ‘argument only.’ Accordingly, and as ICANN argued at the procedural hearing, ICANN’s revised Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures suggest that there is to be no cross-examination of witnesses at the hearing. However, insofar as neither the Supplementary Procedures nor the Bylaws expressly exclude cross-examination, this provision remains ambiguous.”40

37 DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 63.
38 ICANN First Memorial, para. 36.
39 Ibid, para. 36.
40 DCA Trust First Memorial, para. 64.
DCA Trust submitted that:

“[Regardless] of whether the parties themselves may examine witnesses at the hearing, it is clear that the Panel may do so. Article 16(1) provides that the Panel ‘may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.’ It is, moreover, customary in international arbitration for tribunal members to question witnesses themselves – often extensively – in order to test their evidence or clarify facts that are in dispute. In this case, ICANN has submitted witness testimony that, among other things, purports to rely on secret documents that have not been provided. As long as those documents are withheld from DCA [Trust], it is particularly important for that witness testimony to be fully tested by the Panel, if not by the parties. Particularly in light of the important issues at stake in this matter and the general due process concerns raised when parties cannot test the evidence presented against them, DCA [Trust] strongly urges the Panel to take full advantage of its opportunity to question witnesses. Such questioning will in no way slow down the proceedings, which DCA [Trust] agrees are to be expedited – but not at the cost of the parties’ right to be heard, and the Panel’s right to obtain the information it needs to render its decision.”

In response, ICANN submitted that:

“[Both] the Supplementary Procedures and ICANN’s Bylaws unequivocally and unambiguously prohibit live witness testimony in conjunction with any IRP.” Paragraph 4 of the Supplementary Procedures, which according to ICANN governs the “Conduct of the Independent Review”, demonstrates this point. According to ICANN, “indeed, two separate phrases of Paragraph 4 explicitly prohibit live testimony: (1) the phrase limiting the in-person hearing (and similarly telephonic hearings) to ‘argument only,’ and (2) the phrase stating that ‘all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in advance.’ The former explicitly limits hearings to the argument of counsel, excluding the presentation of any evidence, including any witness testimony. The latter reiterates the point that all evidence, including witness testimony, is to be presented in writing and prior to the hearing. Each phrase unambiguously excludes live testimony from IRP hearings. Taken together, the phrases constitute irrefutable evidence that the Supplementary Procedures establish a truncated hearing procedure.”

ICANN added:

“[Paragraph] 4 of the Supplementary Procedures is based on the exact same and unambiguous language in Article IV, Section 3.12 of the Bylaws, which provides that ‘[i]n the unlikely event that a telephonic or in-person hearing is convened, the hearing shall be limited to argument only; all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in writing in advance.’ […] While DCA [Trust] may prefer a different procedure, the Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures could not be any clearer in this regard. Despite the Bylaws’ and Supplementary Procedures’ clear and unambiguous prohibition of live witness testimony, DCA [Trust] attempts to argue that the Panel should instead be guided by Article 16 of the ICDR Rules, which states that subject to the ICDR Rules, ‘the tribunal may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that each

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41 Ibid, paras. 65 and 66.
42 ICANN First Memorial, paras. 15 and 16.
party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case.’ However, as discussed above, the Supplementary Procedures provide that ‘[i]n the event there is any inconsistency between these Supplementary Procedures and [ICDR’s International Arbitration Rules], these Supplementary Procedures will govern,’ and the Bylaws require that the ICDR Rules ‘be consistent’ with the Bylaws. As such, the Panel does not have discretion to order live witness testimony in the face of the Bylaws’ and Supplementary Procedures’ clear and unambiguous prohibition of such testimony.”

79) ICANN further submitted:

“[During] the 22 April Call, DCA vaguely alluded to ‘due process’ and ‘constitutional’ concerns with prohibiting cross-examination. As ICANN did after public consultation, and after the ICM IRP, ICANN has the right to establish the rules for these procedures, rules that DCA agreed to abide by when it filed its Request for IRP. First, ‘constitutional’ protections do not apply with respect to a corporate accountability mechanism. Second, ‘due process’ considerations (though inapplicable to corporate accountability mechanisms) were already considered as part of the design of the revised IRP. And the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the right of parties to tailor unique rules for dispute resolution processes, including even binding arbitration proceedings (which an IRP is not). The Supreme Court has specifically noted that ‘[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. . . . And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.’”

80) According to ICANN:

“[The] U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly held that the right to tailor unique procedural rules includes the right to dispense with certain procedures common in civil trials, including the right to cross-examine witnesses [...] Similarly, international arbitration norms recognize the right of parties to tailor their own, unique arbitral procedures. Party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the procedure to be followed in international arbitration. It is a principle that is endorsed not only in national laws, but by international arbitral institutions worldwide, as well as by international instruments such as the New York Convention and the Model Law.”

81) In short, ICANN advanced that:

“[Even] if this were a formal ‘arbitration’, ICANN would be entitled to limit the nature of these proceedings so as to preclude live witness testimony. The fact that this proceeding is not an arbitration further reconfirms ICANN’s right to establish the rules that govern these proceedings [...] DCA [Trust] argues that it will be prejudiced if cross-examination of witnesses is not permitted. However, the procedures give both parties equal opportunity to present their evidence—the inability of either party to examine witnesses at the hearing would affect both the Claimant and ICANN equally. In this instance, DCA [Trust] did not submit witness testimony with its Amended Notice (as clearly it should have). However, were DCA [Trust] to present any written witness statements in support of its position, ICANN would not be entitled to cross examine..."
those witnesses, just as DCA [Trust] is not entitled to cross examine ICANN's witnesses. Of course, the parties are free to argue to the IRP Panel that witness testimony should be viewed in light of the fact that the rules do not permit cross-examination.\footnote{Ibid, paras. 22 and 23.}

**The Panel's directions on method of hearing and testimony**

82) The considerations and discussions under the prior headings addressing document exchange and additional filings apply to the hearing and testimony issues raised in this IRP proceeding as well.

83) At this juncture, the Panel is of the preliminary view that at a minimum a video hearing should be held. The Parties appear to be in agreement. However, the Panel does not wish to close the door to the possibility of an in-person hearing and live examination of witnesses, should the Panel consider that such a method is more appropriate under the particular circumstances of this case after the Parties have completed their document exchange and the filing of any additional materials.

84) While the Supplementary Procedures appear to limit both telephonic and in-person hearings to “argument only”, the Panel is of the view that this approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the requirements in ICANN’s Bylaws for accountability and for decision making with objectivity and fairness.

85) Analysis of the propriety of ICANN’s decisions in this case will depend at least in part on evidence about the intentions and conduct of ICANN’s top personnel. ICANN should not be allowed to rely on written statements of these officers and employees attesting to the propriety of their actions without an appropriate opportunity in the IRP process for DCA Trust to challenge and test the veracity of such statements.

86) The Panel, therefore, reserves its decision to order an in-person hearing and live testimony pending a further examination of the representations that will be proffered by each side, including the filing of any additional evidence which this Decision permits. The Panel also permits both Parties at the hearing to challenge and test the veracity of statements made by witnesses.

87) Having said this, the Panel acknowledges the Parties’ desire that the IRP proceedings be as efficient and economical as feasible, consistent with the overall objectives of a fair and independent proceeding. The Panel will certainly bear this desire and goal in mind as these proceedings advance further.
3) Is the Panel's Decision on the IRP Procedure and its future Declaration on the Merits in this proceeding binding?

**DCA Trust’s Submissions**

88) In addition to the submissions set out in the earlier part of this Decision, DCA Trust argues that, the language used in the Bylaws to describe the IRP process is demonstrative that it is intended to be a binding process. When the language in the Bylaws for reconsideration is compared to that describing the IRP, DCA Trust explains:

"[It] is clear that the declaration of an IRP is intended to be final and binding [...] For example, the Bylaws provide that the [ICANN] [Board Governance Committee] BGC ‘shall act on a Reconsideration Request on the basis of the written public record’ and ‘shall make a final determination or recommendation.’ The Bylaws even expressly state that ‘the Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations’ of the BGC. By contrast, the IRP Panel makes ‘declarations’ — defined by ICANN in its Supplementary Procedures as ‘decisions/opinions’— that ‘are final and have precedential value.’ The IRP Panel ‘shall specifically designate the prevailing party’ and may allocate the costs of the IRP Provider to one or both parties. Moreover, nowhere in ICANN’s Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures does ICANN state that the Board shall not be bound by the declaration of the IRP. If that is what ICANN intended, then it certainly could have stated it plainly in the Bylaws, as it did with reconsideration. The fact that it did not do so is telling."\(^{47}\)

89) In light of the foregoing, DCA Trust advances:

"[The] IRP process is an arbitration in all but name. It is a dispute resolution procedure administered by an international arbitration service provider, in which the decision-makers are neutral third parties chosen by the parties to the dispute. There are mechanisms in place to assure the neutrality of the decision-makers and the right of each party to be heard. The IRP Panel is vested with adjudicative authority that is equivalent to that of any other arbitral tribunal: it renders decisions on the dispute based on the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties, and its decisions are binding and have res judicata and precedential value. The procedures appropriate and customary in international arbitration are thus equally appropriate in this IRP. But in any event, and as discussed below, the applicable rules authorize the Panel to conduct this IRP in the manner it deems appropriate regardless of whether it determines that the IRP qualifies as an arbitration."\(^{48}\)

**ICANN’s Submissions**

90) In response, ICANN submits that:

"[The] provisions of Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws, which govern the Independent Review process and these proceedings, make clear that the declaration of the Panel will not be binding on ICANN. Section 3.11 gives the IRP panels the authority

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\(^{47}\) DCA Trust First Memorial, paras. 33, 34 and 35. Bold and italics are from the original text.

\(^{48}\) Ibid. para. 44.
to ‘declare’ whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws’ and ‘recommend’ that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.’ Section 3.21 provides that ‘[w]here feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting.’ Section 3 never refers to the IRP panel’s declaration as a ‘decision’ or ‘determination.’ It does refer to the Board’s subsequent action on [the IRP panel’s] declaration [...].’ That language makes clear that the IRP’s declarations are advisory and not binding on the Board. Pursuant to the Bylaws, the Board has the discretion to consider an IRP panel’s declaration and take whatever action it deems appropriate.”49

91) According to ICANN:

“[This] issue was addressed extensively in the ICM IRP, a decision that has precedential value to this Panel. The ICM Panel specifically considered the argument that the IRP proceedings were ‘arbitral and not advisory in character,’ and unanimously concluded that its declaration was ‘not binding, but rather advisory in effect.’ At the time that the ICM Panel rendered its declaration, Article IV, Section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws provided that ‘IRP shall be operated by an international arbitration provider appointed from time to time by ICANN ... using arbitrators ... nominated by that provider.’ ICM unsuccessfully attempted to rely on that language in arguing that the IRP constituted an arbitration, and that the IRP panel’s declaration was binding on ICANN. Following that IRP, that language was removed from the Bylaws with the April 2013 Bylaws amendments, further confirming that, under the Bylaws, an IRP panel’s declaration is not binding on the Board.”50

92) ICANN also submits that:

“[The] lengthy drafting history of ICANN’s independent review process confirms that IRP panel declarations are not binding. Specifically, the Draft Principles for Independent Review, drafted in 1999, state that ‘the ICANN Board should retain ultimate authority over ICANN’s affairs – after all, it is the Board ... that will be chosen by (and is directly accountable to) the membership and supporting organizations.’ And when, in 2001, the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform (‘ERC’) recommended the creation of an independent review process, it called for the creation of ‘a process to require non-binding arbitration by an international arbitration body to review any allegation that the Board has acted in conflict with ICANN’s Bylaws.’ The individuals who actively participated in the process also agreed that the review process would not be binding. As one participant stated: IRP ‘decisions will be nonbinding, because the Board will retain final decision-making authority’.”51

93) According to ICANN:

“[The] only IRP Panel ever to issue a declaration, the ICM IRP Panel, unanimously rejected the assertion that IRP Panel declarations are binding and recognized that an IRP panel’s declaration ‘is not binding, but rather advisory in effect.’ Nothing has occurred since the issuance of the ICM IRP Panel’s declaration that changes the fact that IRP Panel declarations are not binding. To the contrary, in April 2013, following the

49 ICANN First Memorial, para. 33,
50 Ibid, para. 34,
51 ICANN Second Memorial, para. 5,
ICM IRP, in order to clarify even further that IRPs are not binding, all references in the Bylaws to the term 'arbitration' were removed as part of the Bylaws revisions. ICM had argued in the IRP that the use of the word 'arbitration' in the portion of the Bylaws related to Independent Review indicated that IRPs were binding, and while the ICM IRP Panel rejected that argument, to avoid any lingering doubt, ICANN removed the word 'arbitration' in conjunction with the amendments to the Bylaws.

94) ICANN further submits that:

“[The] amendments to the Bylaws, which occurred following a community process on the proposed IRP revisions, added, among other things, a sentence stating that ‘declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.’ DCA argues that this new language, which does not actually use the word ‘binding,’ nevertheless provides that IRP Panel declarations are binding, trumping years of drafting history, the sworn testimony of those who participated in the drafting process, the plain text of the Bylaws, and the reasoned declaration of a prior IRP panel. DCA is wrong.”

95) According to ICANN:

“[The] language DCA references was added to ICANN’s Bylaws to meet recommendations made by ICANN’s Accountability Structures Expert Panel (‘ASEP’). The ASEP was comprised of three world-renowned experts on issues of corporate governance, accountability, and international dispute resolution, and was charged with evaluating ICANN’s accountability mechanisms, including the Independent Review process. The ASEP recommended, inter alia, that an IRP should not be permitted to proceed on the same issues as presented in a prior IRP. The ASEP’s recommendations in this regard were raised in light of the second IRP constituted under ICANN’s Bylaws, where the claimant presented claims that would have required the IRP Panel to [re-evaluate] the declaration of the IRP Panel in the ICM IRP. To prevent claimants from challenging a prior IRP Panel declaration, the ASEP recommended that ‘[t]he declarations of the IRP, and ICANN’s subsequent actions on those declarations, should have precedential value.’ The ASEP’s recommendations in this regard did not convert IRP Panel declarations into binding decisions.”

96) Moreover, ICANN argues:

“[One] of the important considerations underlying the ASEP’s work was the fact that ICANN, while it operates internationally, is a California non-profit public benefit corporation subject to the statutory law of California as determined by United States courts. That law requires that ICANN’s Board retain the ultimate responsibility for decision-making. As a result, the ASEP’s recommendations were premised on the understanding that the declaration of the IRP Panel is not ‘binding’ on the Board. In any event, a declaration clearly can be both non-binding and precedential.”

97) In short, ICANN argues that the IRP is not binding. According to ICANN, “not only is there no language in the Bylaws stating that IRP Panel declarations

52 Ibid, para. 6.
53 Ibid, para. 7.
54 Ibid, paras. 8 and 9.
55 Ibid, paras. 9 and 10.
are binding on ICANN, there is no language stating that an IRP Panel even may determine if its advisory Declarations are binding.”  

According to ICANN, words such as “arbitration” and “arbitrator” were removed from the Bylaws to ensure that the IRP Panel’s declarations do not have the force of normal commercial arbitration. ICANN also argues that DCA Trust, “fails to point to a single piece of evidence in all of the drafting history of the Bylaws or any of the amendments to indicate that ICANN intended, through its 2013 amendments, to convert a non-binding procedure into a binding one.”  

Finally, ICANN submits that “it is not within the scope of this Panel’s authority to declare whether IRP Panel declarations are binding on ICANN’s Board...the Panel does not have the authority to re-write ICANN’s Bylaws or the rules applicable to this proceeding. The Panel’s mandate is strictly limited to ‘comparing contested actions of the Board [and whether it] has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and [...] declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws’.”  

The Panel’s Decision on Binding or Advisory nature of IRP decisions, opinions and declarations

Various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures support the conclusion that the Panel’s decisions, opinions and declarations are binding. There is certainly nothing in the Supplementary Rules that renders the decisions, opinions and declarations of the Panel either advisory or non-binding.  

In paragraph 1, the Supplementary Procedures define “Declaration” as the “decisions and/or opinions of the IRP Panel”. In paragraph 9, the Supplementary Procedures require any Declaration of a three-member IRP Panel to be signed by the majority and in paragraph 10, under the heading “Form and Effect of an IRP Declaration”, they require Declarations to be in writing, based on documentation, supporting materials and arguments submitted by the parties. The Supplementary Procedures also require the Declaration to “specifically designate the prevailing party”.  

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56 ICANN letter of 2 June 2014 addressed to the Panel.
57 Ibid. Italics are from the original decision.
58 Ibid.
59 The Reconsideration process established in the Bylaws expressly provides that ICANN’s “Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations” of the BGC for action on requests for reconsideration. No similar language in the Bylaws or Supplementary Procedures limits the effect of the Panel’s IRP decisions, opinions and declarations to an advisory or non-binding effect. It would have been easy for ICANN to clearly state somewhere that the IRP’s decisions, opinions or declarations are “advisory”—this word appears in the Reconsideration Process.
60 Moreover, the word “Declaration” in the common law legal tradition is often synonymous with a binding decision. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Edition 1999) at page 846, a “declaratory
100) Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures, resembles Article 27 of the ICDR Rules. Whereas Article 27 refers to “Awards”, section 10 refers to “Declarations”. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures, however, is silent on whether Declarations made by the IRP Panel are “final and binding” on the parties.

101) As explained earlier, as per Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 8 of the Bylaws, the Board of Directors of ICANN has given its approval to the ICDR to establish a set of operating rules and procedures for the conduct of the IRP set out in section 3. The operating rules and procedures established by the ICDR are the ICDR Rules as referred to in the preamble of the Supplementary Procedures. These Rules have been supplemented with the Supplementary Procedures.

102) This is clear from two different parts of the Supplementary Procedures. First, in the preamble, where the Supplementary Procedures state that: “These procedures supplement the International Centre for Dispute Resolution’s International Arbitration Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws”.

103) And second, under section 2 entitled (Scope), that states that the “ICDR will apply these Supplementary Procedures, in addition to the INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, in all cases submitted to the ICDR in connection with the Article IV, Section 3(4) of the ICANN Bylaws”. It is therefore clear that ICANN intended the operating rules and procedures for the independent review to be an international set of arbitration rules supplemented by a particular set of additional rules.

104) There is also nothing inconsistent between section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures and Article 27 of the ICDR Rules.

105) One of the hallmarks of international arbitration is the binding and final nature of the decisions made by the adjudicators. Binding arbitration is the essence of what the ICDR Rules, the ICDR itself and its parent, the American Arbitration Association, offer. The selection of the ICDR Rules as the baseline judgment” is, “a binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other legal obligations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement”.

61 As explained by the Panel before, the word “supplement” means to complete, add to, extend or supply a deficiency. The Supplementary Procedures, therefore, supplement (not replace or supersede) the ICDR Rules. As also indicated by the Panel before, in the event there is any inconsistency between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, ICANN requires the Supplementary Procedures to govern.
set of procedures for IRP’s, therefore, points to a binding adjudicative process.

106) Furthermore, the process adopted in the Supplementary Procedures is an adversarial one where counsel for the parties present competing evidence and arguments, and a panel decides who prevails, when and in what circumstances. The panelists who adjudicate the parties’ claims are also selected from among experienced arbitrators, whose usual charter is to make binding decisions.

107) The above is further supported by the language and spirit of section 11 of ICANN’s Bylaws. Pursuant to that section, the IRP Panel has the authority to summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious. Surely, such a decision, opinion or declaration on the part of the Panel would not be considered advisory.

108) Moreover, even if it could be argued that ICANN’s Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures are ambiguous on the question of whether or not a decision, opinion or declaration of the IRP Panel is binding, in the Panel’s view, this ambiguity would weigh against ICANN’s position. The relationship between ICANN and the applicant is clearly an adhesive one. There is no evidence that the terms of the application are negotiable, or that applicants are able to negotiate changes in the IRP.

109) In such a situation, the rule of contra proferentem applies. As the drafter and architect of the IRP Procedure, it was open to ICANN and clearly within its power to adopt a procedure that expressly and clearly announced that the decisions, opinions and declarations of IRP Panels were advisory only. ICANN did not adopt such a procedure.

110) ICANN points to the extensive public and expert input that preceded the formulation of the Supplementary Procedures. The Panel would have expected, were a mere advisory decision, opinion or declaration the objective of the IRP, that this intent be clearly articulated somewhere in the Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures. In the Panel’s view, this could have easily been done.

111) The force of the foregoing textual and construction considerations as pointing to the binding effect of the Panel’s decisions and declarations are reinforced by two factors: 1) the exclusive nature of the IRP whereby the non-binding argument would be clearly in contradiction with such a factor\(^{62}\);
and, 2) the special, unique, and publicly important function of ICANN. As explained before, ICANN is not an ordinary private non-profit entity deciding for its own sake who it wishes to conduct business with, and who it does not. ICANN rather, is the steward of a highly valuable and important international resource.

112) Even in ordinary private transactions, with no international or public interest at stake, contractual waivers that purport to give up all remedies are forbidden. Typically, this discussion is found in the Uniform Commercial Code Official Comment to section 2719, which deals with “Contractual modification or limitation of remedy.” That Comment states:

“Under this section parties are left free to shape their remedies to their particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given effect. However, it is the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.” [Panel’s emphasis by way of italics added]

113) The need for a minimum adequate remedy is indisputably more important where, as in this case, the party arguing that there is no compulsory remedy is the party entrusted with a special, internationally important and valuable operation.

114) The need for a compulsory remedy is concretely shown by ICANN’s longstanding failure to implement the provision of the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures requiring the creation of a standing panel. ICANN has offered no explanation for this failure, which evidences that a self-policing regime at ICANN is insufficient. The failure to create a standing panel has consequences, as this case shows, delaying the processing of DCA Trust’s claim, and also prejudicing the interest of a competing AFRICA applicant.

115) Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it is acceptable for ICANN to adopt a remedial scheme with no teeth, the Panel is of the opinion that, at a minimum, the IRP should forthrightly explain and acknowledge that the process is merely advisory. This would at least let parties know before embarking on a potentially expensive process that a victory before the IRP panel may be ignored by ICANN. And, a straightforward acknowledgment that the IRP process is intended to be merely advisory might lead to a legislative or executive initiative to create a truly independent compulsory process. The Panel seriously doubts that the Senators questioning former ICANN President Stuart Lynn in 2002 would have been satisfied had they

ICANN, is also a party to the dispute and directly interested in the outcome. Nor is the process “neutral,” as ICANN’s “core values” call for in its Bylaws.
understood that a) ICANN had imposed on all applicants a waiver of all judicial remedies, and b) the IRP process touted by ICANN as the “ultimate guarantor” of ICANN accountability was only an advisory process, the benefit of which accrued only to ICANN.63

ICM Case

116) The Parties in their submissions have discussed the impact on this Decision of the conclusions reached by the IRP panel in the matter of ICM v. ICANN (“ICM Case”). Although this Panel is of the opinion that the decision in the ICM Case should have no influence on the present proceedings, it discusses that matter for the sake of completeness.

117) In the ICM Case, another IRP panel examined the question centrally addressed in this part of this Decision: whether declarations and/or decisions by an IRP panel are binding, or merely advisory. The ICM Case panel concluded that its decision was advisory.64

118) In doing so, the ICM Case panel noted that the IRP used an “international arbitration provider” and “arbitrators nominated by that provider,” that the ICDR Rules were to “govern the arbitration”, and that “arbitration connotes a binding process.” These aspects of the IRP, the panel observed, were “suggestive of an arbitral process that produces a binding award.”65 But, the panel continued, “there are other indicia that cut the other way, and more deeply.” The panel pointed to language in the Interim Measures section of the Supplementary Procedures empowering the panel to “recommend” rather than order interim measures, and to language requiring the ICANN Board to “consider” the IRP declaration at its next meeting, indicating, in the panel’s view, the lack of binding effect of the Declaration.

119) The ICM Case panel specifically observed that “the relaxed temporal proviso to do no more than ‘consider’ the IRP declaration, and to do so at the next meeting of the Board ‘where feasible’, emphasized that it is not binding. If the IRP’s declaration were binding, there would be nothing to consider but rather a determination or decision to implement in a timely manner. The Supplementary Procedures adopted for IRP, in the article on ‘Form and Effect of an IRP Declaration’, significantly omit provision of Article 27 of the ICDR Rules specifying that an award ‘shall be final and binding on the parties’. Moreover, the preparatory work of the IRP provisions...confirms that the


64 ICM Case, footnote 30. The panel’s brief discussion on this issue appears in paras. 132-134 of the ICM Decision.

65 Ibid, para. 132.
intention of the drafters of the IRP process was to put in place a process that produced declarations that would not be binding and that left ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of the Board."  

120) Following the issuance of the *ICM* Case Declaration, ICANN amended its Bylaws, and related Supplementary Procedures governing IRPs, removing most, but not all, references to “arbitration”, and adding that the “declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.”

**Difference between this IRP and the *ICM* Case**

121) According to DCA Trust, the panel in the *ICM* Matter, “based its decision that its declaration would not be binding, ‘but rather advisory in effect,’ on specific language in both a **different** set of Bylaws and a **different** set of Supplementary Procedures than those that apply in this dispute...one crucial difference in the Bylaws applicable during the ICM was the absence of the language describing panel declarations as ‘final and precedential’."  

The Panel agrees.

122) Section 3(21) of the 11 April 2013 ICANN Bylaws now provides: “Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting. The declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value.” At the time the *ICM* Matter was decided, section 3(15) of Article IV of ICANN’s Bylaws did not contain the second sentence of section 3(21).

123) As explained in the DCA Trust First Memorial:

> “[I]n finding that the IRP was advisory, the *ICM* Panel also relied on the fact that the Bylaws gave the IRP [panel] the authority to ‘declare,’ rather than ‘decide’ or ‘determine,’ whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or the Bylaws. However, the *ICM* Panel did not address the fact that the Supplementary Procedures, which govern the process in combination with the ICDR Rules, defined ‘declaration’ as ‘decisions/opinions of the IRP’. If a ‘declaration’ is a ‘decision’, then surely a panel with the authority to ‘declare’ has the authority to ‘decide’.”

The Panel agrees with DCA Trust.

124) Moreover, as explained by DCA Trust:

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66 *Ibid, para. 133.*
67 DCA Trust First Memorial, *para. 36.* Bold and italics are from the original text.
“[The] ICM Panel [...] found it significant that the Supplementary Procedures adopted for the IRP omitted Article 27 of the ICDR Rules – which specifies that an award ‘shall be final and binding on the parties.’ On that basis, the ICM Panel concluded that Article 27 did not apply. ICANN’s Supplementary Rules, however, were – and continue to be – silent on the effect of an award. In the event there is inconsistency between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, then the Supplementary Procedures govern; but there is nothing in the applicable rules suggesting that an omission of an ICDR Rule means that it does not apply. Indeed, the very same Supplementary Procedures provide that ‘the ICDR’s International Arbitration Rules [...] will govern the process in combination with these Supplementary Procedures. Furthermore, it is only in the event there is ‘any inconsistency’ between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules that the Supplementary Procedures govern.”69

Again, the Panel agrees with DCA Trust.

125) With respect, therefore, this Panel disagrees with the panel in the ICM Case that the decisions and declarations of the IRP panel are not binding. In reaching that conclusion, in addition to failing to make the observations set out above, the ICM panel did not address the issue of the applicant’s waiver of all judicial remedies, it did not examine the application of the contra proferentem doctrine, and it did not examine ICANN’s commitment to accountability and fair and transparent processes in its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

126) ICANN argues that the panel’s decision in the ICM Case that declarations are not binding is dispositive of the question. ICANN relies on the provision in the Bylaws, quoted above, (3(21)) to the effect that declarations “have precedential value.” Like certain other terms in the IRP and Supplementary Procedures, the Panel is of the view that this phrase is ambiguous. Legal precedent may be either binding or persuasive.70 The Bylaws do not indicate which kind of precedent is intended.

127) Stare decisis is the legal doctrine, which gives binding precedential effect, typically to earlier decisions on a settled point of law, decided by a higher court. The doctrine is not mandatory, as illustrated by the practice in common law jurisdictions of overruling earlier precedents deemed unwise or unworkable. In the present case, there is no “settled” law in the usual sense of a body of cases approved by a court of ultimate resort, but instead, a single decision by one panel on a controversial point, which this Panel, with respect, considers to be unconvincing.

128) Therefore, the Panel is of the view that the ruling in the ICM Case is not persuasive and binding upon it.

69 Ibid, para. 40. Bold and italics are from the original text.
VI. DECLARATION OF THE PANEL

129) Based on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel is of the view that it has the power to interpret and determine the IRP Procedure as it relates to the future conduct of these proceedings.

130) Based on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel issues the following procedural directions:

(i) The Panel orders a reasonable documentary exchange in these proceedings with a view to maintaining efficacy and economy, and invites the Parties to agree by or before 29 August 2014, on a form, method and schedule of exchange of documents between them;

(ii) The Panel permits the Parties to benefit from additional filings and supplemental briefing going forward and invites the Parties to agree on a reasonable exchange timetable going forward;

(iii) The Panel allows a video hearing as per the agreement of the Parties, but reserves its decision to order an in-person hearing and live testimony pending a further examination of the representations that will be proffered by each side, including the filing of any additional evidence which this Decision permits; and

(iv) The Panel permits both Parties at the hearing to challenge and test the veracity of statements made by witnesses.

If the Parties are unable to agree on a reasonable documentary exchange process or to agree on the scope and length of additional filings and supplemental briefing, the Panel will intervene and, with the input of the Parties, provide further guidance.

131) Based on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel concludes that this Declaration and its future Declaration on the Merits of this case are binding on the Parties.

132) The Panel reserves its views with respect to any other issues raised by the Parties for determination at the next stage of these proceedings. At that time, the Panel will consider the Parties’ respective arguments in those regards.

133) The Panel reserves its decision on the issue of costs relating to this stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.
This Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Declaration of this Panel.

This Declaration on the IRP Procedure has thirty-three (33) pages.

Thursday, 14 August 2014

Place of the IRP, Los Angeles, California.

[Signatures]

Professor Catherine Kessedjian

Hon. Richard C. Neal

Babak Barin, President of the Panel
EXHIBIT D

(Timeline)
**Donuts v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 01-14-0001-6263**

**Timeline of Events Leading to Request for Independent Review Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013-07-25</td>
<td>ICC rejects Donuts’ motion to disqualify Mr. Taylor from .SKI panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-07-25</td>
<td>ICC grants dot Sport’s motion to disqualify Mr. Taylor from .SPORT panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-11-01</td>
<td>Donuts and 11 others request ICANN Board to establish a new gTLD objection review process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-01-22</td>
<td>Objection ruling re .SPORTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-01-22</td>
<td>Objection ruling re .SKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-01-31</td>
<td>Objection ruling re .RUGBY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-02-05</td>
<td>Donuts’ request for reconsideration of .HOSPITAL ruling rejected</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-02-27</td>
<td>Donuts’ request for reconsideration of .CHARITY ruling rejected</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-03-12</td>
<td>Donuts reiterates request for ICANN Board to establish a new gTLD objection review process</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-03-24</td>
<td>Donuts request for Ombudsman review of .SPORTS, .SHI, .RUGBY, .HOSPITAL, .CHARITY and four other objection determinations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-07-07</td>
<td>Ombudsman rejection of Donuts request</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-07-18</td>
<td>Donuts request for “cooperative engagement” process (CEP) with ICANN</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-09-19</td>
<td>ICANN closes CEP as to .SPORTS, .SKI and .RUGBY</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-10-08</td>
<td>Donuts files IRP request on date agreed upon by ICANN</td>
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