Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (DAAR) System

Updated monthly report on data from June 2022

Office of the CTO Security, Stability and Resiliency team

June 2022
Contents

1 General Trends in gTLDs ........................................ 5
2 Breakdown of Individual Security Threats ......................... 5
3 Normalized Metric: Percentage of Security Threats .............. 6
4 Percentage of Security Threats: Breakdown of Individual Threats 8
Preface

This report highlights activities reported in the Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (DAAR) System using monthly median values over the whole of June 2022. The DAAR system studies security threat concentrations across all top-level domain (TLD) registries for which required data is available. The report provides aggregated statistics and time series analysis about a specific set of security threats1. While no single snapshot can capture trends or anomalies, historical data collected over time will show trends and can be used to identify areas for further study. For more information regarding data used in the DAAR monthly report see “Understanding the Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (DAAR) Monthly Report” [1].

The overarching purpose of DAAR is to give the ICANN community reliable and persistent data as well as insights that help inform policy discussions around security threat concentration patterns utilizing an open and community vetted methodology. DAAR monthly reports do not measure security threat mitigations, i.e., how reliably or quickly security threats are mitigated by TLDs. DAAR only provides aggregated information related to trends in concentrations of security threats across TLDs based on threat data listed by the Reputation Block List (RBL) providers listed in the Appendix. The data from these third-party RBLs are collected using different methodologies such as honeypots, spam filters, and crowdsourcing, among others. As such, they are subject to limitations that correspond to their methodology. The DAAR system aims to use highly reputable data feeds and makes continuous attempts to evaluate and update DAAR RBL input lists accordingly. It is important to note that apart from a few feeds where the RBL itself contains tags, neither the DAAR system nor the other feeds make an explicit distinction between maliciously registered domains and those that have been compromised. To learn more about DAAR, visit the ICANN Domain Abuse Activity Reporting web page [2].

Up to June 2020, DAAR provided aggregated monthly gTLD registry reports only. From July 2020 onwards, ccTLDs could also volunteer to join the DAAR project by providing their zone files. Currently, ccTLD managers get their own individualized monthly report and their numbers are not included in this report. We intend on providing similar reports to gTLD managers in the future.

Finally, reporting about registrar portfolios requires domain name registration data to identify which domains are sponsored by which registrars. A system that can collect and analyze the necessary registrar data on a daily basis remains under development. We hope to add registrar reporting in future reports.

1The security threats of interest to DAAR for this report are: spam, phishing, malware distribution, and botnet command and control.
Executive Summary

The Domain Abuse Activity Reporting (DAAR) system provides data related to domain names and security threat concentrations within all generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs) and other TLDs that have made their zone files available for analysis. This June 2022 report looked into 215,211,870 domain names from 1088 gTLDs in comparison to last month’s 215,948,727 domains in 1156 gTLDs. Reputation feeds the DAAR system employs, reported at least one security threat in 414 of the 1088 gTLDs as of June 2022 in comparison to 446 of the 1156 gTLDs identified in May 2022. As a result, this report provides an analysis for only the 542,461 domains within the 414 gTLDs with at least one security threat.

Security threats are not uniformly distributed across legacy\(^2\) and new gTLDs. While new gTLD domains seem to be more used in spam\(^3\), domains in legacy gTLDs are distributed over botnet command and control (C&C) and malware with phishing being relatively equally distributed over both gTLD types.

Additionally, the report shows that while knowing where most security threat domains are concentrated is important, for a meaningful comparison between TLDs, the number of security threat domains needs to be normalized by the size of the TLDs.

---

\(^2\)gTLDs launched before 2010, referred to hereafter as “Legacy gTLDs”

\(^3\)when spam is used as a delivery mechanism for other types of threats such as a mean for malware distribution or provision of access to phishing links
1 General Trends in gTLDs

In June 2022, DAAR collected zone data for 1088 gTLDs. Table below summarizes the data captured in June 2022 and indicates the changes from the data reported for the previous month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total listed as security threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 2022</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 2022</td>
<td>1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+/- changes from previous month</td>
<td>-68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first column reports data on total domains and gTLDs for which DAAR collects data in two consecutive months. The second column reports numbers of domains and their corresponding gTLDs that are listed at least once in the RBLs that DAAR utilizes within the same time period.

2 Breakdown of Individual Security Threats

DAAR uses third-party reputation feeds to identify domain names that are associated with at least one of four kinds of security threats: phishing, malware distribution, botnet command-and-control, and spam. The rationale for tracking these specific security threats is documented in [3, 1]. Figures 1a and 1b display the breakdown of security threats out of the total number of threats identified this month in the reputation block list (RBL) data that DAAR is utilizing for legacy gTLDs and new gTLDs respectively.

![Figure 1: Breakdown of domains identified as security threats across all DAAR threat types](a)

![Figure 2: Breakdown of domains identified as security threats in raw counts over time for legacy gTLDs and new gTLDs respectively.](b)

Figures 2a and 2b display the breakdown of security threats in raw counts over time for legacy gTLDs and new gTLDs respectively.

Figures 3a and 3b display the breakdown of security threat percentage in proportion to total domains over time for legacy gTLDs and new gTLDs respectively.

---

4 The list of Security Threat Reputation Providers DAAR uses for the generation of this report is included in the Appendix.
3 Normalized Metric: Percentage of Security Threats

Raw counts of domains identified as security threats do not necessarily reflect the extent to which a TLD is the focus of exploitation by security threat actors, since each TLD has a different number of domains registered. For this reason, we calculate a normalized value, a percentage of security threat ($P_{st}$). $P_{st}$ represents the percentage of domains that are listed for being a security threat in at least one of the reputation blocklist feeds DAAR utilizes, normalized by the amount of resolving domains within a given TLD. That is, $P_{st}$ is determined as follows: Figure 4 demonstrates the median raw counts of domains identified as security threats (y-axis) versus domains in TLD zone files (x-axis) over this month. A logarithmic scale is used for the x-axis and y-axis to assist in visualizing the diverse counts of these two variables.

$$P_{st} = \left( \frac{\text{Median of domains identified as security threats in TLD}}{\text{Median number of domains within TLD zone}} \right) \times 100$$

$P_{st}$ can be used to provide “apples to apples” comparisons for the number of resolving domains that are identified as security threats over time or between TLDs. This information could help the TLD operators determine whether their anti-abuse measures are effective as well as help the ICANN community in making informed policy decisions regarding security threat mitigation.
The average $P_{st}$ for all 1088 gTLDs in DAAR for June 2022 is approximately 0.15%. Figure 5 illustrates the $P_{st}$ in these TLDs. Circle size indicates the median non-normalized raw counts of domains identified as security threats in June 2022. Additionally, Figure 6 displays the trends of the average $P_{st}$ across different TLD types over time.
4 Percentage of Security Threats: Breakdown of Individual Threats

Figure 7 displays the percentage of security threat for domains identified as security threats versus domains resolved in new and legacy gTLDs for each of the security threats of interest to DAAR. Each dot represents a TLD. The larger the dot, the higher the raw non-normalized count of domains identified as security threats.

Figure 7: Percentage of domain names identified as security threats vs. counts of domains in TLD zones across different threat types
Finally, Figure 8 shows the trends in changes in the average percentage of security threat in legacy and new gTLDs over time for each security threat of interest to DAAR.
References


Appendix

The table below provides a listing of the reputation providers and feeds used in the DAAR system along with their corresponding threat types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reputation provider</th>
<th>Feed used</th>
<th>Threat type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sa-blacklist</td>
<td>Spam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SpamCop</td>
<td>Spam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AbuseButler</td>
<td>Spam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phishing domains</td>
<td>Phishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malware domains</td>
<td>Malware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Phishing Working Group [7]</td>
<td>Phishing URLs</td>
<td>Phishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhishTank [8]</td>
<td>Phishing URLs</td>
<td>Phishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware Patrol [9]</td>
<td>Malware URLs</td>
<td>Malware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ransomware URLs</td>
<td>Malware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botnet C&amp;C URLs</td>
<td>Botnet C&amp;C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>