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INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Independent Review Process Panel

In the Matter of an Independent Review Process

Between:

Booking.com B.V.

Applicant

-and-

ICDR Case No: 50-20-1400-0247

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)

Respondent

FINAL DECLARATION

The Panel:
Hon. A. Howard Matz
David H. Bernstein, Esq.
Stephen L. Drymer (Chair)
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DECLARATION

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED PANELISTS, members of the Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel" or "Panel"), having been designated in accordance with ICANN Bylaws dated 11 April 2013, hereby issue the following Final Declaration ("Declaration").

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Declaration is issued in the context of an Independent Review Process ("IRP") as provided for in Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"; "ICANN Bylaws" or "Bylaws"). In accordance with those Bylaws, the conduct of this IRP is governed by the International Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution as amended and in effect June 1, 2009 ("ICDR"; "ICDR Rules") as supplemented by the Supplementary Procedures for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Independent Review Process ("Supplementary Procedures").

2. The subject matter of the dispute here concerns alleged conduct by the ICANN Board in relation to one particular facet of the process by which new generic top-level domains ("gTLDs", also known as gTLD "strings") are applied for, reviewed and delegated into the Internet’s domain name system ("DNS") root zone.

3. As explained in this Declaration, the Applicant, Booking.com, alleges that, in establishing and overseeing the process by which so-called string similarity reviews are conducted, and in refusing to reconsider and overturn a decision to place Booking.com’s applied-for gTLD string .hotels in a so-called string contention set, the Board acted in a manner inconsistent with applicable policies, procedures and rules as set out in ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and gTLD Applicant Guidebook ("Guidebook").

4. Reading between the lines of the parties’ submissions, the Panel senses that both sides would welcome the opportunity to contribute to an exchange that might result in enabling disputants in future cases to avoid having to resort to an IRP to resolve issues such as have arisen here. Certainly the Panel considers that the present matter would ideally have been resolved amicably by the parties. This is particularly true given that the matter here concerns two of ICANN’s guiding principles – transparency and fairness – as applied to one of ICANN’s most essential activities – the delegation of new gTLDs² – in circumstances in which various members of the Internet community, including certain members of the ICANN Board’s New gTLD Program Committee, have expressed their own concerns regarding the string similarity review process. That being the case, though, the Panel does not shy away from the duty imposed by the Bylaws to address the questions before it and to render the

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¹ As requested by the ICDR, the Declaration was provided to the ICDR in draft form on 26 January 2015 for non-substantative comments on the text (if any). It was returned to the Panel on 2 March 2015.

² As stated in the very first sentence of the Guidebook: “New gTLDs have been in the forefront of ICANN’s agenda since its creation.”
present Declaration, in accordance with, and within the constraints of the Bylaws, the ICDR Rules and the Supplementary Procedures.

II. THE PARTIES

A. The Applicant: Booking.com

5. The Applicant, Booking.com, is a limited liability company established under the law of the Netherlands. Booking.com describes itself as “the number one online hotel reservation service in the world, offering over 435,605 hotels and accommodations.” Booking.com’s primary focus is on the U.S. and other English-language markets.

6. Booking.com is represented in this IRP by Mr. Flip Petillion and Mr. Jan Janssen of the law firm Crowell & Moring in Brussels, Belgium.

B. The Respondent: ICANN

7. The Respondent, ICANN, is a California not-for-profit public benefit corporation, formed in 1998. As set forth in Article I, Section 1 of its Bylaws, ICANN’s mission is “to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s system of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure option of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.” ICANN describes itself as “a complex organization that facilitates input from a wide variety of Internet stakeholders. ICANN has a Board of Directors and staff members from around the globe, as well as an Ombudsman. ICANN, however, is much more than just the corporation—it is a community of participants.”

8. ICANN is represented in this IRP by Mr. Jeffrey A. LeVee, Esq. and Ms. Kate Wallace, Esq. of the law firm Jones Day in Los Angeles, California, USA.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND – IN BRIEF

9. We recount here certain uncontested elements of the factual and procedural background to the present IRP. Other facts are addressed in subsequent parts of the Declaration, where the parties’ respective claims and the Panel’s analysis are discussed.

A. ICANN’s Adoption of the New gTLD Program and the Applicant Guidebook

10. Even before the introduction of ICANN’s New gTLD Program (“Program”), in 2011, ICANN had, over time, gradually expanded the DNS from the original six gTLDs (.com; .edu; .gov; .mil; .net; .org) to 22 gTLDs and over 250 two-letter country-code TLDs. Indeed, as noted above, the introduction of new gTLDs has been “in the forefront of ICANN’s agenda” for as long as ICANN has existed.

\(^2\) Request, ¶ 10.

\(^4\) Response, ¶ 11-12.

\(^5\) Request, ¶ 12; see also Guidebook, Preamble.
11. The Program has its origins in what the Guidebook refers to as “carefully deliberated policy development work” by the ICANN community.\(^5\)

12. In 2005, ICANN’s Generic Names Supporting Organization (“GNSO”), one of the groups that coordinates global Internet policy at ICANN, commenced a policy development process to consider the introduction of new gTLDs.\(^7\) As noted in the Guidebook:

   Representatives from a wide variety of stakeholder groups – governments, individuals, civil society, business and intellectual property constituencies, and the technology community – were engaged in discussions for more than 18 months on such questions as the demand, benefits and risks of new gTLDs, the selection criteria that should be applied, how gTLDs should be allocated, and the contractual conditions that should be required for new gTLD registries going forward.

13. In October 2007, the GNSO formally completed its policy development work on new gTLDs and approved a set of 19 policy recommendations.

14. In June 2008, the ICANN Board decided to adopt the policies recommended by the GNSO.\(^8\) As explained in the Guidebook, ICANN’s work next focused on implementation of these recommendations, which it saw as “creating an application and evaluation process for new gTLDs that is aligned with the policy recommendations and provides a clear roadmap for applicants to reach delegation, including Board approval.”\(^9\)

15. This process concluded with the decision by the ICANN Board in June 2011 to implement the New gTLD Program and its foundational instrument, the Guidebook.\(^10\)

16. As described by ICANN in these proceedings, the Program “constitutes by far ICANN’s most ambitious expansion of the Internet’s naming system. The Program’s goals include

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\(^5\) Guidebook, Preamble

\(^7\) Request, ¶ 13, Reference Material 7, “Public Comment Forum for Terms of Reference for New gTLDs (6 December 2005), http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-09dec05-en.html#FOR; Reference Material 8, “GNSO Issues Report, Introduction of New Top-Level Domains (5 December 2005) at pp. 3-4. See also Guidebook, Preamble. Booking.com refers to the GNSO as “ICANN’s main policy-making body for generic top-level domains”. Article X of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation provides: “There shall be a policy-development body known as the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), which shall be responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains” (Section 1); the GNSO shall consist of “a number of Constituencies” and “four Stakeholder Groups” (Section 2).

\(^8\) Guidebook, Preamble. A review of this policy process can be found at http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds (last accessed on January 15, 2015).

\(^9\) Guidebook, Preamble: “This implementation work is reflected in the drafts of the applicant guidebook that were released for public comment, and in the explanatory papers giving insight into rationale behind some of the conclusions reached on specific topics. Meaningful community input has led to revisions of the draft applicant guidebook.”

\(^10\) RM 10 (ICANN resolution). The Guidebook (in its 30 May 2011 version) is one of seven “elements” of the Program implemented in 2011. The other elements were: a draft communications plan; operational readiness activities; a program to ensure support for applicants from developing countries; a process for handling requests for removal of cross-ownership restrictions on operators of existing gTLDs who want to participate in the [Program]; budgeted expenditures; and a timetable.
enhancing competition and consumer choice, and enabling the benefits of innovation via the introduction of new gTLDs ...”.

17. The Guidebook is “continuously iterated and revised”, and “provides details to gTLD applicants and forms the basis for ICANN’s evaluation of new gTLD applications.” As noted by Booking.com, the Guidebook “is the crystallization of Board-approved consensus policy concerning the introduction of new gTLDs.”

B. Booking.com’s Application for .hotels, and the Outcome

18. In accordance with the process set out in the Guidebook, Booking.com filed an application (Application ID 1-1016-75482) for the gTLD string .hotels.

19. At the same time, Despegar Online SRL (“Despegar”), a corporation established under the law of Uruguay, applied (Application ID 1-1249-87712) for the string .hoteis.

20. “Hotels” is the Portuguese word for “hotels”.

21. According to Booking.com, Despegar is “a competitor of Booking.com.” Booking.com claims that it intends “to operate .hotels as a secure Internet environment providing hotel reservation services for consumers, hotels, and other stakeholders,” while Despegar similarly intends .hoteis to be dedicated primarily to “individuals that are interested in, and businesses that offer, hotel- and travel-related content.” That being said, a key difference between the two applications, as Booking.com acknowledges, is that Booking.com intends to focus the services it will offer under its proposed gTLD “on the U.S. (with its strongly Anglos-Saxon traditions) and other English-language markets,” whereas Despegar intends to target “Portuguese-speaking” markets.

22. As part of the Initial Evaluation to which all applied-for gTLDs were subject, .hotels and .hoteis were each required to undergo so-called string review in accordance with the Guidebook, the first component of which is a process known as string similarity review. As provided by the Guidebook, the string similarity review was conducted by an independent

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11 Response, ¶ 14.

12 Response, ¶ 14. The resolution (RM 10) adopting the Guidebook explicitly “authorizes staff to make further updates and changes to the Applicant Guidebook as necessary and appropriate, including as the possible result of new technical standards, reference documents, or policies that might be adopted during the course of the application process, and to prominently publish notice of such changes.”

1313 Request, ¶ 13. See also Guidebook, Module 1-2: “This Applicant Guidebook is the implementation of Board approved consensus policy concerning the introduction of new gTLDs, and has been revised extensively via public comment and consultation over a two-year period.”

1414 Request, ¶ 17.

15 Request, ¶ 15.

16 Request, ¶ 17. See also Despegar Application for .hoteis (Request, Annex 2), ¶ 18(a).

17 Request, ¶ 16.

18 Request, ¶ 17. See also Despegar Application for .hoteis (Request, Annex 2), ¶ 18(a).
String Similarity Panel ("SSP") selected and engaged by ICANN for this purpose. (Extracts of the relevant provisions of the Guidebook can be found below, at Part IV of this Declaration.) ICANN engaged InterConnect Communications Ltd. ("ICC"), a company registered under the law of England and Wales, specializing in communications sector strategy, policy and associated regulatory frameworks,

19 in cooperation with University College London, to act as the SSP.

23. On 26 February 2013 ICANN published the results of all of the string similarity reviews for all of the applications for new gTLDs submitted as part of the Program. The announcement revealed, among other things, that two "non-exact match" contention sets had been created: .hotels & .hoteis; and .unicorn & .unicom.20 Booking.com's applied for string .hotels (as well as the .hoteis, .unicorn and .unicom strings) had thus failed the string similarity review.

24. The results of the string similarity review were notified to Booking.com by ICANN that same day. In its letter of 26 February 2013 ICANN wrote:

> After careful consideration and extensive review performed against the criteria in Section 2.2.1.1 of the Applicant Guidebook, the String Similarity Panel has found that the applied-for string (.hotels) is visually similar to another applied-for string (.hoteis), creating a probability of user confusion.

> Due to this finding, the ... two strings have been placed in a contention set.21

25. The impact of being put into a contention set is that the proposed strings in the set will not be delegated in the root zone unless and until the applicants reach agreement on which single string should proceed (with the other proposed string therefore rejected), or until after an auction is conducted, with the highest bidder being given the right to proceed to the next step in the review process.

C. DIDP Request and Request for Reconsideration

26. On 28 March 2013 Booking.com submitted a request for information under ICANN's Documentary Information Disclosure Policy ("DIDP Request") asking for "all documents directly and indirectly relating to (1) the standard used to determine whether gTLDs are confusingly similar, and (2) the specific determination that .hotels and .hoteis are confusingly similar."22

27. On the same date, Booking.com also filed a formal Request for Reconsideration ("Request for Reconsideration"). The "specific action(s)" that Booking.com asked to be reconsidered were: the decision to place .hotels and .hoteis in a contention set; and the decision not to

19 See http://www.icc-uk.com/

20 Request, Annex 3. ICANN published document dated 26 February 2013. As its name suggests, a "non-exact match" connotes a determination that two different (non-identical) strings are visually similar within the meaning of the Guidebook. Another752 applied-for gTLDs were put into 230 identical contention sets.


22 Request, ¶ 30 and Annex 3.
provide a "detailed analysis or a reasoned basis" for the decision to place .hotels in contention.23

28. ICANN responded to the DIDP Request on 27 April 2013. Although ICANN provided certain information regarding the review process, in its response to the DIDP Request, ICANN also noted:

The SSP is responsible for the development of its own process documentation and methodology for performing the string similarity review, and is also responsible for the maintenance of its own work papers. Many of the items that are sought from ICANN within the [DIDP] Request are therefore not in existence within ICANN and cannot be provided in response to the DIDP Request. ICANN will, however, shortly be posting the SSP's String Similarity Process and Workflow on the New gTLD microsite ... 24

29. By letter dated 9 May 2013 Booking.com replied to ICANN, writing that "ICANN’s response fails to provide any additional information or address any of Booking.com’s concerns as conveyed in its DIDP Request or Request for Reconsideration." On 14 May 2013, ICANN answered that it "intends to post the string similarity process documentation on or before ... 17 May 2013." 25 ICANN further informed Booking.com that "ICANN will afford you 30 days from the posting of the process document for the submission of a revised Request for Reconsideration." 26

30. On 7 June 2013, ICANN published the "String Similarity New gTLD Evaluation Panel [i.e., the SSP] – Process Description" ("SSP Process Description").28

31. On 28 June 2013 Booking.com wrote to ICANN regarding both its DIDP Request and its 28 March 2013 Request for Reconsideration. In its letter, Booking.com noted among other things that "the generalized information ICANN thus far has provided does not explain a rationale for or analysis for the decision to put .hotels and .hotels in a contention set and therefore does not allow Booking.com to appropriately amend its Request for Reconsideration." The letter concluded by stating: "Considering ICANN’s obligations of transparency and accountability, there cannot be any ‘compelling reason for confidentiality’.

23 Request, Annex 12, §3. The Request for Reconsideration (which appears to be in the form of a template) expressly states at §2 that it is a "Request for Reconsideration of ... Staff [vs. Board] action/inaction." The cover letter attaching the Request states that, "[d]espite the fact that the origin of the decisions is unclear, this Reconsideration Request is being submitted as a reconsideration of a ‘Staff action’. In the event that the decisions referenced above are determined to be a ‘Board action’, this request may be amended." As explained below, the Request for Reconsideration was amended on 7 July 2013. That amendment did not alter the stated nature of the request in §2 or the description of the specific actions that Booking.com sought to have reconsidered (§3). Unless otherwise indicated, all further references in this Declaration to the Request for Reconsideration are understood to be the amended Request for Reconsideration.

24 Request, Annex 5.
26 Request, Annex 7.
27 Request, Annex 7.
28 Request, Annex 8.
And ... there are numerous compelling reasons for publication of [the information requested by Booking.com].

32. ICANN responded on 25 July 2013, explaining among other things that “the evaluation of the .hotels string by the SSP panel was performed according to the [SSP Process Description] ...” and “[the SSP’s work was subjected to quality review, as has been publicly discussed.”

Approximately six months later, on 9 January 2014, ICANN posted a letter dated 18 December 2013 addressed to ICANN by the SSP Manager at ICC (Mr. Mark McFadden) providing a further “summary of the process, quality control mechanisms and some considerations surrounding the non-exact contention sets for the string similarity evaluation ...” ("SSP Manager’s Letter").

According to that Letter:

When ALL of the following features of a pairwise comparison [of non-exact match strings] are evident the evaluators found the string pair to be confusingly similar:

- Strings of similar visual length on the page;
- Strings within +/- 1 character of each other;
- Strings where the majority of characters are the same and in the same position in each string; and
- The two strings possess letter combinations that visually appear similar to other letters in the same position in each string

- For example m–m & I–i

33. Meanwhile, on 7 July 2013 Booking.com had submitted its amended Request for Reconsideration. In its letter attaching the amended Request for Reconsideration, Booking.com stated: “Booking.com reserves the right to further amend its Request for Reconsideration upon receipt of the information it previously requested and urges ICANN to publish the requested information as specified in our letter of 25 June 2013.”

34. By virtue of Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws, ICANN’s Board Governance Committee ("BGC") is charged with evaluating and making recommendation to the Board with respect to requests for reconsideration. The Board’s New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC") receives and acts on such recommendations on behalf of the ICANN Board. In accordance with this procedure, Booking.com's Request for Reconsideration was evaluated by the BGC. In a detailed analysis dated 1 August 2013, the BGC “conclude[d] that Booking.com has not
stated proper grounds for reconsideration and we therefor recommend that Booking.com's request be denied" ("BGC Recommendation").

35. At a telephone meeting held on 10 September 2013 the NGPC, "bestowed with the powers of the Board", considered, discussed and accepted the BGC Recommendation. Booking.com's Request for Reconsideration was denied.  

D. The Cooperative Engagement Process

36. Booking.com thereafter filed a request for a Cooperative Engagement Process ("CEP") on 25 September 2013, with a view to attempting to reach an amicable resolution of its dispute with ICANN. In its CEP request, Booking.com wrote:

"Booking.com is of the opinion that Resolution 2013.09.10.NG02 [the Board resolution denying its Request for Reconsideration] violates various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles of incorporation. In particular Booking.com considers that ICANN’s adoption of the Resolution is in violation of Articles I, II(3), II and IV of the ICANN Bylaws as well as Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation. In addition, Booking.com considers that ICANN has acted in violation of Articles 3, 5, 7 and 9 of ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitment...."

37. The CEP ultimately did not result in a resolution, and Booking.com duly commenced the present IRP.

38. One further point should be made, here, prior to describing the commencement and conduct of the present IRP proceedings: The determination by the SSP that .hotels and .hostels are so visually similar as to give rise to the probability of user confusion, and the resulting placement of those applied-for strings into a contention set, does not mean that Booking.com’s application for .hotels has been denied or that .hotels will not proceed to delegation to the root zone. Rather, as noted above and explained in the extracts from the Guidebook reproduced below, the Guidebook establishes a process for resolving such contention, under which the applicants for the contending strings in the set – here, Booking.com and Despegar – may resolve the contention by negotiation, failing which the matter will proceed to auction. Ultimately, no matter the outcome of these IRP proceedings, Booking.com may yet be successful and .hotels may yet be delegated into the Internet root zone. However, the fact that .hotels has been put into a contention set does raise the risk that .hotels may never be delegated into the root zone, or that it may be more costly for Booking.com to obtain approval of its proposed string. It also has caused a significant delay in the potential delegation of the string into the root zone (which could prove to be detrimental to the ultimate success of Booking.com’s proposed string if other applicants...

33 Request, Annex 14, BGC Recommendation dated 1 August 2013, p.9. See also Request, Annex 15, NGPC Resolution dated 10 September 2013. As noted in footnote 1 to the BGC Recommendation, the Recommendation was ultimately finalized and submitted for posting on 21 August 2013.

34 Request, Annex 15, NGPC Resolution dated 10 September 2013.

35 Request, Annex 17.
whose strings were not put into a contention set are able to establish themselves as pioneer providers of hotel- and travel-related services under a different new gTLD).

E. The IRP Proceedings


40. In accordance with Article IV, Section 3(9) of the ICANN Bylaws, Booking.com requested that a three-member IRP panel be constituted to consider and determine the Request. As the omnibus standing panel referred to in Article IV, Section 3(6) of the ICANN Bylaws had yet to be established, Booking.com further proposed, in accordance with Article 6 of the ICDR Rules, that each party appoint one panelist, with the third (the Chair of the panel) to be appointed by the two party-appointed panelists.

41. On 25 April 2014, ICANN submitted a Response to ICANN's Request with supporting documents ("Response").

42. The parties having thereafter agreed on the number of panelists and the method of their appointment, David H. Bernstein, Esq. was duly appointed as panelist by Booking.com on 1 May 2014, and the Hon. A Howard Matz was duly appointed as panelist by ICANN on 30 May 2014.

43. On 17 July 2014, the ICDR notified the parties that Mr. Stephen L. Drymer had been duly nominated by the two party-appointed panelists as Chair of the Panel. Mr. Drymer's appointment became effective and the Panel was duly constituted as of 1 August 2014.

44. On 21 August 2014, further to consultations among the panelists and between the Panel and the parties, the Panel convened a preparatory conference with the parties (by telephone) for the purpose of discussing organizational matters, including a timetable for any further written statements or oral argument. Both parties requested the opportunity to make supplemental submissions and to present oral argument.

45. On 22 August 2014 the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 1 in which, among other things, it established a Procedural Timetable for the IRP. As specifically requested by the parties, the Procedural Order and Timetable provided for the submission of additional written statements by the parties as well as for a brief oral hearing to take place by telephone, all on dates proposed by and agreed between the parties.36

46. In accordance with the Procedural Timetable, on 6 October 2014 Booking.com submitted its Reply to ICANN's Response, accompanied by additional documents ("Reply").

36 Paragraph 6 of Procedural Order No. 1 provided that, in its forthcoming Reply to ICANN's Response, "Booking.com shall only address two issues raised in Respondent's Response: (1) the nature and scope of the IRP requested; (2) the nature of the relief sought by Claimant." Paragraph 7 of Procedural Order No. 1 provided that "Respondent's Sur-Reply ... shall address only the issues raised in the Reply."
47. In accordance with the Procedural Timetable, ICANN submitted a Sur-Reply on 20 November 2014 ("Sur-Reply").

F. The Hearing

48. As provided by Procedural Order No. 1 and the Procedural Timetable, a hearing was held (by telephone) on 10 December 2011, commencing at 9:00 PST/18:00 CET.

49. In the light of the significance of the issues raised by the parties, and given the many questions prompted by those issues and by the parties’ extensive written submissions and supporting materials, the Panel indicated that it would allow the hearing to continue beyond the approximately one hour originally envisaged. The hearing ultimately lasted two and one-half hours. Counsel for each party made extensive oral submissions, including rebuttal and sur-rebuttal submissions, and responded to the panelists’ questions.

50. Prior to the close of the hearing each party declared that it had no objection concerning the conduct of the proceedings, that it had no further oral submissions that it wished to make, and that it considered that it had had a full opportunity to present its case and to be heard.

51. As agreed and ordered prior to the close of the hearing, the parties were provided the opportunity to file limited additional materials post-hearing, in relation to a certain question asked of them by the Panel. This was done, and, on 13 December 2014, the proceedings were declared closed.

IV. ICANN ARTICLES, BYLAWS AND POLICIES – KEY ELEMENTS

52. We set out here the key elements of ICANN’s Articles of Association, Bylaws and policies on which the parties rely in their submissions and to which the Panel will refer later in this Declaration.

A. Articles of Association

4. The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations.

[Underlining added]

B. Bylaws

ARTICLE I: MISSION AND CORE VALUES

Section 1. MISSION

The mission of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers,
and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.

[...]  

Section 2. CORE VALUES

In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN:

1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN’s activities to those matters within ICANN’s mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination.

3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties.

4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.

5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment.

6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness.

11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments’ or public authorities’ recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated, and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN
body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among compelling values.

[...]  

ARTICLE III: TRANSPARENCY  

Section 1. PURPOSE  

ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.

[...]  

ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW  

Section 1. PURPOSE  

In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws. The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of Article III and the Board and other selection mechanisms set forth throughout these Bylaws.

Section 2. RECONSIDERATION

1. ICANN shall have in place a process by which any person or entity materially affected by an action of ICANN may request review or reconsideration of that action by the Board.

2. Any person or entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction ("Reconsideration Request") to the extent that he, she, or it have been adversely affected by:

   a. one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or

   b. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act; or

   c. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that are taken as a result of the Board's reliance on false or inaccurate material information.

3. The Board has designated the Board Governance Committee to review and consider any such Reconsideration Requests. The Board Governance Committee shall have the authority to:

   a. evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;
b. summarily dismiss insufficient requests;

c. evaluate requests for urgent consideration;

d. conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;

e. request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties;

f. make a final determination on Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without reference to the Board of Directors; and

g. make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request, as necessary.

[...]

Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS

1. In addition to the reconsideration process described in Section 2 of this Article, ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

2. Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board's action.

3. A request for independent review must be filed within thirty days of the posting of the minutes of the Board meeting (and the accompanying Board Briefing Materials, if available) that the requesting party contends demonstrates that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. Consolidated requests may be appropriate when the causal connection between the circumstances of the requests and the harm is the same for each of the requesting parties.

4. Requests for such Independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel"), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

   a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;

   b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and

   c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company (ICANN)?

[...]

11. The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:
a. summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious;

b. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties;

c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and

d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;

\[...\]

e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar; and

f. determine the timing for each proceeding.

[...]

14. Prior to initiating a request for independent review, the complainant is urged to enter into a period of cooperative engagement with ICANN for the purpose of resolving or narrowing the issues that are contemplated to be brought to the IRP. [...]

15. Upon the filing of a request for an independent review, the parties are urged to participate in a conciliation period for the purpose of narrowing the issues that are stated within the request for independent review. A conciliator will be appointed from the members of the omnibus standing panel by the Chair of that panel. [...]

16. Cooperative engagement and conciliation are both voluntary. However, if the party requesting the independent review does not participate in good faith in the cooperative engagement and the conciliation process, if applicable, and ICANN is the prevailing party in the request for independent review, the IRP Panel must award to ICANN all reasonable fees and costs incurred by ICANN in the proceeding, including legal fees.

[...]

18. The IRP Panel should strive to issue its written declaration no later than six months after the filing of the request for independent review. The IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party. The party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider, but in an extraordinary case the IRP Panel may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties' positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses.

[Underlining added]

53. Lest there be any misunderstanding as regards the proper subject matter of IRP proceedings or the role of the Panel, we note that, as was clearly established during the hearing, it is common ground between the parties that the term “action” (or “actions”) as used in Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws is to be understood as action(s) or inaction(s) by the ICANN Board. The Panel observes that this understanding comports not only with the provisions of Article
IV. Section 2 of the Bylaws concerning "Reconsideration", which expressly refer to "actions or inactions of the ICANN Board", but with the clear intent of Section 3 itself, which stipulates at sub-section 11 that "[t]he IRP Panel shall have the authority to: ... (c) declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws."

C. The gTLD Applicant Guidebook

54. As noted above and as understood by all, the Guidebook is (to borrow Booking.com’s phrase) "the crystallization of Board-approved consensus policy concerning the introduction of new gTLDs."  

55. The Guidebook is divided into "Modules", each of which contains various sections and subsections. The three Modules of primary relevance here are Modules 1, 2 and 4. Module 1, titled "Introduction to the gTLD Application Process," provides an "overview of the process for applying for a new generic top-level domains." Module 2, titled "Evaluation Procedures," describes the "evaluation procedures and criteria used to determine whether applied-for gTLDs are approved for delegation." Module 4, titled "String Contention Procedures," concerns "situations in which contention over applied-for gTLD strings occurs, and the methods available to applicants for resolving such contention cases."

(I) Initial Evaluation

56. As explained in Module 1, "[I]mmediately following the close of the application submission period, ICANN will begin checking all applications for completeness." Initial Evaluation begins "immediately after the administrative completeness check concludes. All complete applications will be reviewed during Initial Evaluation."

57. Initial Evaluation is comprised of two main elements or types or review: string review, which concerns the applied-for gTLD string; and applicant review, which concerns the entity applying for the gTLD and its proposed registry services. It is the first of these – string review, including more specifically the component known as string similarity review – that is particularly relevant.

(II) String Review, Including String Similarity Review

58. String review is itself comprised of several components, each of which constitutes a separate assessment or review of the applied-for gTLD string, conducted by a separate reviewing body or panel. As explained in Module 2:

The following assessments are performed in the Initial Evaluation:

37 Request, ¶ 13.
39 Module 2-2.
40 Guidebook, §1.1.2.2: "Administrative Completeness Check", Module 1-5.
41 Guidebook, §1.1.2.5: "Initial Evaluation", Module 1-8 (underlining added).
• String Reviews
  • String similarity
  • Reserved names
  • DNS stability
  • Geographic names

[...]

An application must pass all these reviews to pass the initial Evaluation. Failure to pass any one of these reviews will result in a failure to pass the Initial Evaluation.\(^{42}\)

59. As indicated, all complete applications are subject to Initial Evaluation, which means that all applied-for gTLD strings are subject to string review. String review is further described in Module 2 as follows:

[String review] focuses on the applied-for gTLD string to test:

• Whether the applied-for gTLD string is so similar to other strings that it would create a probability of user confusion;

• Whether the applied-for gTLD string might adversely affect DNS security or stability; and

• Whether evidence of requisite government approval is provided in the case of certain geographic names.\(^{33}\)

60. The various assessments or reviews (i.e., string similarity, reserved names, DNS stability, etc.) that comprise string review are elaborated at Section 2.2.1 of Module 2. As mentioned, the most relevant of these reviews for our purposes is string similarity review, which is described in detail at Section 2.2.1.1. Because of the central importance of the string similarity review process in the context of the present dispute, this section of the Guidebook is reproduced here at some length:

2.2.1.1 String Similarity Review

This review involves a preliminary comparison of each applied-for gTLD string against existing TLDs, Reserved Names (see subsection 2.2.1.2), and other applied-for strings. The objective of this review is to prevent user confusion and loss of confidence in the DNS resulting from delegation of many similar strings.

Note: In this Applicant Guidebook, "similar" means strings so similar that they create a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated into the root zone.

\(^{42}\) Module 2-2. The same is true of applicant review, which is also comprised of various assessments concerning the applicant entity.

\(^{33}\) Guidebook, §2.2: “Initial Evaluation”, Module 2-4 (underlining added). See also Module 1-9: “String reviews include a determination that the applied-for gTLD string is not likely to cause security or stability problems in the DNS ...”
The visual similarity check that occurs during initial evaluation is intended to augment the objection and dispute resolution process (see Module 3, Dispute Resolution Procedures) that addresses all types of similarity.

This similarity review will be conducted by an independent string similarity panel.

### 2.2.1.1.1 Reviews Performed

The String Similarity Panel's task is to identify visual string similarities that would create a probability of user confusion.

The panel performs this task of assessing similarities that would lead to user confusion in four sets of circumstances, when comparing:

- Applied-for gTLD strings against other applied-for gTLD strings;

Similarity to Other Applied-for gTLD Strings (String Contention Sets) – All applied-for gTLD strings will be reviewed against one another to identify any similar strings. In performing this review, the String Similarity Panel will create contention sets that may be used in later stages of evaluation.

A contention set contains at least two applied-for strings identical or similar to one another. Refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures, for more information on contention sets and contention resolution.

### 2.2.1.1.2 Review Methodology

The String Similarity Panel is informed in part by an algorithmic score for the visual similarity between each applied-for string and each of other existing and applied-for TLDs and reserved names. The score will provide one objective measure for consideration by the panel, as part of the process of identifying strings likely to result in user confusion. In general, applicants should expect that a higher visual similarity score suggests a higher probability that the application will not pass the String Similarity review. However, it should be noted that the score is only indicative and that the final determination of similarity is entirely up to the Panel's judgment.

The algorithm, user guidelines, and additional background information are available to applicants for testing and informational purposes. [Footnote in the original: See http://icann-sword-group.com/algorithms/](http://icann-sword-group.com/algorithms/) Applicants will have the ability to test their strings and obtain algorithmic results through the application system prior to submission of an application.

The panel will examine all algorithmic data and perform its own review of similarities between strings and whether they rise to the level of string confusion. In cases of strings in scripts not yet supported by the algorithm, the panel's assessment process is entirely manual.
The panel will use a common standard to test for whether string confusion exists, as follows:

**Standard for String Confusion** — String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another visually that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For the likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

**2.2.1.3 Outcomes of the String Similarity Review**

An application that fails the String Similarity review due to similarity to an existing TLD will not pass the Initial Evaluation, and no further reviews will be available. Where an application does not pass the String Similarity review, the applicant will be notified as soon as the review is completed.

An application for a string that is found too similar to another applied-for gTLD string will be placed in a contention set. [Underlining added]

61. Module 4 of the Guidebook, as mentioned, concerns "situations in which contention over applied-for gTLD strings occurs, and the methods available to applicants for resolving such contention cases." As explained in Module 4:

### 4.1 String Contention

String contention occurs when either:

1. Two or more applicants for an identical gTLD string successfully complete all previous stages of the evaluation and dispute resolution processes; or

2. Two or more applicants for similar gTLD strings successfully complete all previous stages of the evaluation and dispute resolution processes, and the similarity of the strings is identified as creating a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated.

ICANN will not approve applications for proposed gTLD strings that are identical or that would result in user confusion, called contending strings. If either situation above occurs, such applications will proceed to contention resolution through either community priority evaluation, in certain cases, or through an auction. Both processes are described in this module. A group of applications for contending strings is referred to as a contention set.

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61 Module 2-5 to 2-9. As regards the concept of string contention, see also Guidebook, §1.1.2.10: "String Contention", Module 1-13: "String contention applies only when there is more than one qualified application for the same or similar gTLD strings. String contention refers to the scenario in which there is more than one qualified application for the identical gTLD string or for similar gTLD strings. In this Applicant Guidebook, "similar" means strings so similar that they create a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated into the root zone."
(In this Applicant Guidebook, “similar” means strings so similar that they create a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated into the root zone.)

4.1.1 Identification of Contention Sets

Contention sets are groups of applications containing identical or similar applied-for gTLD strings. Contention sets are identified during Initial Evaluation, following review of all applied-for gTLD strings. ICANN will publish preliminary contention sets once the String Similarity review is completed, and will update the contention sets as necessary during the evaluation and dispute resolution stages.

Applications for identical gTLD strings will be automatically assigned to a contention set.

[...]

The String Similarity Panel will also review the entire pool of applied-for strings to determine whether the strings proposed in any two or more applications are so similar that they would create a probability of user confusion if allowed to coexist in the DNS. The panel will make such a determination for each pair of applied-for gTLD strings. The outcome of the String Similarity review described in Module 2 is the identification of contention sets …

[...]

As described elsewhere in this guidebook, cases of contention might be resolved by community priority evaluation (NB: community priority evaluation applies only to so-called “community” applications; it is not relevant here) or an agreement among the parties. Absent that, the last-resort contention resolution mechanism will be an auction.

[...]

62. As provided in Module 4, the two methods relevant to resolving a contention such as between .hotels and .hotesi are self-resolution (i.e., an agreement between the two applicants for the contending strings) and auction:

4.1.3 Self-Resolution of String Contention

Applicants that are identified as being in contention are encouraged to reach a settlement or agreement among themselves that resolves the contention. This may occur at any stage of the process, once ICANN publicly posts the applications received and the preliminary contention sets on its website.

Applicants may resolve string contention in a manner whereby one or more applicants withdraw their applications.

[...]

4.3 Auction: Mechanism of Last Resort

It is expected that most cases of contention will be resolved by the community priority evaluation, or through voluntary agreement among the involved applicants. Auction is a tie-breaker method for resolving string contention among the applications within a contention set, if the contention has not been resolved by other means.
63. Module 5 of the Guidebook, titled Transition to Delegation, describes "the final steps required of an applicant for completion of the process, including execution of a registry agreement with ICANN and preparing for delegation of the new gTLD into the root zone." Module 5-2 states:

"ICANN's Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application. For example, the Board might individually consider an application as a result of GAC Advice on New gTLDs or of the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism." Module 5-4.

[Underlining added]

V. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

64. The following brief summary of the parties' respective positions is provided with a view solely to assisting the reader to understand the present Declaration. It is not intended to recapitulate — and it does not recapitulate — the entirety of the parties' allegations and arguments. Additional references to the parties' positions, including submissions made by them in the course of the proceedings, are contained in the discussion at Part VI below.

A. Booking.com's position

(i) The Panel's Authority

65. Booking.com submits that the mandate of the Panel is "to determine whether the contested actions of the ICANN Board are consistent with applicable rules." Reply, ¶ 3. According to Booking.com:

"The set of rules against which the actions of the ICANN Board must be assessed includes: (i) ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws — both of which must be interpreted in light of ICANN's Affirmation of Commitments, and both of which require compliance with inter alia International law and generally accepted good governance principles — and (ii) secondary rules created by ICANN, such as the Applicant Guidebook. In setting up, implementing and supervising its policies and processes, the Board must comply with the fundamental principles embodied in these rules. That obligation includes a duty to ensure compliance with its obligations to act in good faith, transparently, fairly, and in a manner that is non-discriminatory and ensures due process." Reply, ¶ 3.

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45 Module 5-2.
46 Module 5-4.
47 Reply, ¶ 3.
48 Reply, ¶ 3.
66. Booking.com submits that IRP panels have broad authority to evaluate actions of the ICANN Board. An overly restrictive interpretation of the standard of review, such as proposed by ICANN in these proceedings, would, says Booking.com, "fail to ensure accountability on the part of ICANN and would be incompatible with ICANN’s commitment to maintain (and improve) robust mechanisms for accountability, as required by Article 9.1 of ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments and ICANN’s core values."\(^{9}\)

(ii) Booking.com’s Claims

67. The purpose of the IRP initiated by Booking.com is, in its own words, “to challenge the ICANN Board’s handling of Booking.com’s application for the new gTLD .hotels.”\(^{60}\) This includes the determination of the SSP to place .hotels and .hoteis in contention and the refusal of the Board (and its committees) to revise that determination. Elsewhere in its submissions, Booking.com makes an even broader claim; it asserts that it challenges the conduct of the ICANN Board in relation to what Booking.com refers to as the setting up, implementation, supervision and review of the entire of string similarity review process, and the Board’s alleged failure "to ensure due process and to respect its fundamental obligations to ensure good faith, transparency, fairness and non-discrimination" throughout.\(^{51}\)

68. In effect, Booking.com’s specific claims can be divided into two broad categories: claims related to the string similarity review process generally; and claims related to the particular case of .hotels.

69. Booking.com professes that this case "is not about challenging a decision on the merits [i.e., the decision to place .hotels in contention]; it is about "ICANN’s failure to respect fundamental [procedural] rights and principles in handling New gTLD applications, in particular in the context of String Similarity Review."\(^{52}\)

70. Booking.com also repeatedly emphasizes — and this is crucial — that it does not challenge the validity or fairness of the process as set out in the Guidebook. Rather, as indicated, it contests "the way in which that process was established, implemented and supervised by (or under the authority of) the ICANN Board."\(^{53}\) Equally crucial, as will be seen, is Booking.com’s acknowledgment that the established process was followed in the case of the review of .hotels.

a. The string similarity review process

71. According to Booking.com, the problem began when the ICANN Board failed to “provide transparency in the SSP selection process,” in particular by failing "to make clear how

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\(^{9}\) Reply, ¶ 6.
\(^{60}\) Reply, ¶ 7.
\(^{51}\) Reply, ¶ 15.
\(^{52}\) Reply, ¶ 14.
\(^{53}\) Reply, ¶ 17.
ICANN would evaluate candidate responses or how it ultimately did so.\textsuperscript{54} The problem was compounded by the selection of ICC/University College London to perform string similarity reviews as the independent SSP. In Booking.com's words:

\textit{[T]he identities of the unsuccessful candidates (if any) to perform the String Similarity Review remain unknown. Applicants have never been given any information in relation to the candidate responses that were submitted. ... There is no indication that any other candidate expressed an interest in performing the String Similarity Review. No information has been provided as to the steps (if any) taken by ICANN to reach out to other potential candidates. Numerous questions remain: How did ICANN deal with the situation if there was only one (or only a very few) respondent(s) wishing to perform the String Similarity Review? How did this impact on the discussions with InterConnect Communications? What are the terms of ICANN's contract with InterConnect Communications?}\textsuperscript{55}

72. Booking.com also faults ICANN for “allowing the appointed SSP to develop and perform an unfair and arbitrary review process”, specifically, by allowing the SSP “to perform the String Similarity Review (i) without any (documented) plan or methodology ... (ii) without providing any transparency regarding the evaluators or the evaluation criteria ... and (iii) without informing applicants of its reasoning ...”.\textsuperscript{56}

73. Among other things, Booking.com takes ICANN to task for establishing and posting the SSP Process Description and the SSP Manager’s Letter (see Part III.C above) only long after the string similarity review process had ended.\textsuperscript{57}

74. It also alleges that the factors identified in the SSP Manager’s Letter are “arbitrary and baseless ... not supported by any methodology capable of producing compelling and defensible conclusions ... [which] has allowed applications with at least equally serious visual string similarity concerns – such as .parts/.paris, .maif/mail, .srl/srl, .vote/voto and .date/data ... – to proceed while singling out .hotels/hotels”.\textsuperscript{58} According to Booking.com: “The failure to take actual human performance into account is at odds with the standard for assessment, i.e., the likelihood of confusion on the part of the average Internet user. Hence, the approach is directly contrary to ICANN’s own policy.”\textsuperscript{59}

75. Booking.com further contends that the SSP process is unfair and non-transparent due to the fact that the identity of SSP members has never been publicly disclosed.\textsuperscript{60}

76. Further, Booking.com argues that the process is unfair, non-transparent and arbitrary – and thus violates ICANN policy – for failing to provide for a “well-documented rationale” for each

\textsuperscript{54} Reply, ¶ 20.
\textsuperscript{55} Reply, ¶ 20.
\textsuperscript{56} Reply, ¶ 23.
\textsuperscript{57} Reply, ¶ 24.
\textsuperscript{58} Reply, ¶ 25.
\textsuperscript{59} Reply, ¶ 25.
\textsuperscript{60} Reply, ¶ 26-27.
SSP determination. In the absence of reasons for each string similarity determination, says Booking.com, “there is no basis on which decisions can be evaluated and, where appropriate, challenged.”

77. Another ground for Booking.com's challenge is the alleged failure by the ICANN Board to providing “effective supervision or quality control” of the SSP: “If nobody but the evaluator has any insight into how the evaluation was carried out, no effective quality control can be performed.” Nor, according to Booking.com, does the quality review of the SSP’s work supposedly performed by JAS Advisers (the independent consultant engaged by ICANN for this purpose) overcome the problem of a lack of transparency:

Booking.com is not aware that any selection process was put in place in relation to the appointment of JAS Advisers to perform the String Similarity Review quality control. No criteria for performing the quality control were published. When ICANN was looking for evaluators, no call for expressions of interest or similar document was issued for the selection of quality controllers.

78. In any case, says Booking.com, the “quality control review over a random sampling of applications to, among other things, test whether the process [set out in the Guidebook] was followed,” which ICANN claims was performed on the SSP’s work, could not provide adequate quality control of the string similarity review process. Finally, Booking.com argues that the arbitrary and unfair result of the string similarity review concerning .hotels – i.e., the decision to place .hotels and .hotels in contention – demonstrates that, “whatever quality control review ICANN may have engaged in … must therefore have been deficient.”

b. The case of .hotels

79. Booking.com argues, in part on the basis of expert evidence which it adduces in this IRP proceeding, that “[t]here is no probability of user confusion if both .hotels and .hotels were delegated as gTLD strings into the Internet root zone … The SSP could not have reasonably found that the average reasonable Internet user is likely to be confused between the two strings.” It continues:

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51 Reply, ¶ 28-29.
52 Reply, ¶ 30.
53 Reply, ¶ 31. Booking.com states that it “doubts” that any quality review was in fact performed, whether by JAS Advisers or any other entity.
54 Response, ¶ 30.
55 Reply, ¶ 34.
56 Reply, ¶ 38.
57 Request, Annex 20, Expert Report of Prof. Dr. Piet Desmet of the Faculty of Arts, Department of Linguistics of Leuven University, dated 10 March 2014. Portions of the work underlying Prof. Desmet’s report were performed by Dr. Emmanuel Keuleers, Research Fellow in the Department of Experimental Psychology at Ghent University.
58 Request, ¶ 58.
Since .hotels and .hotels are not confusingly similar, the determination that they are is contradictory to ICANN policy as established in the Applicant Guidebook. Acceptance of the determination, and repeated failure to remedy the wrongful determination, is a failure to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and a failure to neutrally and fairly apply established policies as required by Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.69

80. According to Booking.com, the Board should have acted to overturn the determination of the SSP either in the context of the Request for Reconsideration or under the authority accorded it by Module 5-4 of the Guidebook to “individually consider a gTLD application”.70

81. Booking.com claims that its DIDP Request alerted the Board to the need to intervene to “correct the errors in the process” related to .hotels, and that its Request for Reconsideration of the SSP determination further informed the Board of the many errors in the SSP’s review of .hotels, “giving the Board ample opportunity to correct those errors.”71 Booking.com claims that the Board’s failure, when responding to the DIDP Request, “to offer any insight into the SSP’s reasoning”, its refusal to reconsider and overturn the SSP determination regarding .hotels on the sole ground (says Booking.com) that “the Reconsideration process is not available as a mechanism to re-try the decisions of evaluation panels”, and its failure to investigate Booking.com’s complaints of a lack of fairness and transparency in the SSP process, constitute violations of ICANN’s governing rules regarding string similarity review.72

82. According to Booking.com, among the most compelling evidence of ICANN’s failure in this regard are the statements made on the record by several members of the NGPC during its 10 September 2013 meeting at which Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration was denied.73 Given the importance that the Panel attaches to these statements, they are addressed in some detail in the Analysis in Part VI, below.

83. In its written submissions Booking.com asks the Panel to grant the following relief:

Finding that ICANN breached its Articles of Incorporation, its Bylaws, and the gTLD Applicant Guidebook;

Requiring that ICANN reject the determination that .hotels and .hotels are confusingly similar and disregard the resulting contention set;

Awarding Booking.com its costs in this proceeding; and

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69 Request, ¶ 59.
70 Reply, ¶ 39.
71 Reply, ¶ 41.
72 Reply, ¶ 41. In the passage of Booking.com’s submissions referred to here (as elsewhere), Booking.com speaks of violations of ICANN’s obligations of “due process”, which, it says, comprise concepts such as the right to be heard, the right to receive reasons for decisions, publicity, etc. For reasons explained in Part VI, below, the Panel prefers to use the terms fairness and transparency to connote the essence of ICANN’s obligations under review in this IRP.
73 See Part II.C, above.
Awarding such other relief as the Panel may find appropriate or Booking.com may request.

84. At the hearing Booking.com further requested that the Panel not only require ICANN to disregard the SSP determination regarding .hotels/.hoteis, but also order ICANN to "delegate both .hotels and .hoteis."

B. ICANN's position

85. ICANN's position is best summed up by ICANN itself:

Booking.com's IRP Request is really about Booking.com's disagreement with the merits of the String Similarity Panel's conclusion that .hotels and .hoteis are confusingly similar. But the Panel's determination does not constitute Board action, and the Independent Review Process is not available as a mechanism to re-try the decisions of an independent evaluation panel. The IRP Panel is tasked only with comparing contested actions of the ICANN Board to ICANN's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation; it is not within the IRP Panel's mandate to evaluate whether the String Similarity Panel's conclusion that .hotels and .hoteis are confusingly similar was wrong.  

86. According to ICANN, the Board "did exactly what it was supposed to do under its Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation, and the Guidebook."  

(i) The Panel's Authority

87. Throughout its submissions ICANN repeatedly stresses what it says is the very limited authority enjoyed by IRP panels.

88. As provided in Article IV, Section 3(4) of ICANN's Bylaws, ICANN observes that this Panel (as all IRP panels) is charged only with "comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws."

89. ICANN notes that, in undertaking this compare-and-declare mission, the Panel is further constrained to apply the very specific "standard of review" set out in Bylaw Article IV, Section 3(4), which requires the Panel to focus on three particular questions: "did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?"; "did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?"; and "did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company [ICANN]?"

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74 Response, ¶ 9.
75 Response, ¶ 8. Both parties agree that, as submitted by Booking.com, the "rules" at issue, against which the conduct of the ICANN Board is to be assessed, include the relevant provisions of the Guidebook.
76 See for example Response, ¶ 2, ¶ 9.
77 Response, ¶ 2.
90. ICANN further asserts that the IRP process "is not available as a mechanism to challenge the actions or inactions of ICANN staff or third parties that may be involved in ICANN activities," such as the action of the SSP which resulted in .hotels and .hoteis being placed in contention. Nor, says ICANN, may the IRP process be used as an "appeal mechanism" by which to overturn substantive decisions -- such as the determination that .hotels and .hoteis are confusingly visually similar -- with which an applicant may disagree.  

91. In this regard ICANN states that the affirmative relief sought by Booking.com -- specifically, a declaration requiring that ICANN "reject the determination that .hotels and .hoteis are confusingly similar and disregard the resulting contention set" and (as requested at the hearing) that ICANN "delegate both .hotels and .hoteis" -- exceeds the authority of the Panel.

(ii) ICANN's Response to Booking.com's Claims

a. The string similarity review process

92. According to ICANN, "[e]arly on in the iterations of the Guidebook, it was determined that, in the initial evaluation stage, the String Similarity Panel would only examine strings for visual confusion;" and "[i]f applied-for strings are determined to so nearly resemble each other visually that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion, the string will be placed in a contention set, which is then resolved pursuant to the contention set resolution processes in Module 4 of the Guidebook."  

93. According to ICANN, it was also determined early on that, as stated in Section 2.2.1.1 of the Guidebook, "[t]his similarity review will be conducted by an independent String Similarity Panel," not by ICANN itself. ICC was duly selected to perform the string similarity review further to "an open and public request for proposals," pursuant to which, as the successful bidder, "ICC was responsible for the development of its own process documents and methodology for performing the String Similarity Review consistent with the provisions of the Guidebook." ICANN emphasizes that "the Guidebook does not provide for any process by which ICANN (or anyone else) may conduct a substantive review of ICC's results."  

94. In ICANN's submission, the alternative proposed by Booking.com, that "the ICANN Board -- and the ICANN Board alone -- was obligated to perform the String Similarity Review for the more than 1,900 new gTLD applications submitted," is "untenable and is not supported by ICANN's Bylaws or Articles." As noted by ICANN, the Guidebook defines six distinct

75 Response, ¶ 3.
76 Response, ¶ 49.
77 Response, ¶ 55.
78 Response, ¶ 15 (underlining in original).
79 Response, ¶ 16.
80 Response, ¶ 17.
81 Sur-Reply, ¶ 7.
review processes that every gTLD application is required to go through, including string similarity review; each of those review processes was conducted by independent experts specifically engaged by ICANN staff for the purpose.

95. ICANN submits that "there simply is no requirement – under ICANN's governing documents or imposed by law – that would mandate that the ICANN Board inject itself into the day-to-day affairs of the evaluation process in the manner Booking.com proposes." It asserts that, consistent with well-settled legal principles, "neither ICANN's Bylaws, nor the Articles, nor the Guidebook requires the ICANN Board to conduct any analysis of the decisions of third party experts retained to evaluate string similarity."

96. Moreover, ICANN asserts that "[s]imply because the ICANN Board has the discretion [under Section 5.1 (Module 5-4) of the Guidebook] to consider individual applications does not mean it is required to do so or that it should do so, particularly at an initial evaluation stage." If ICANN was so obligated, ICANN would have assured the parties that ICANN’s decision is subject to judicial review after the application is accepted.

97. ICANN claims that that Booking.com’s repeated invocation of the Board’s so-called obligation to ensure “due process” in the administration of the New gTLD Program is misplaced. First, neither applicable California law nor any provision of the Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation or Guidebook “specifically affords any gTLD applicant a right to procedural ‘due process’ similar to that which is afforded in courts of law.” Second, because ICANN conducts its activities in the public interest it nevertheless provides “more opportunity for parties to be heard and to dispute actions taken” than most private corporate entities. Third, the “decision to proceed with the New gTLD Program followed many years of discussion, debate and deliberation within the ICANN community, including participation from end users, civil society, technical experts, business groups, governments and others.” Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, “ICANN adhered to the policies and procedures articulated in its Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and the Guidebook, the latter of which was adopted only after being publicly vetted with ICANN’s stakeholders and the broader Internet community.”

98. ICANN’s response to Booking.com’s various allegations regarding particular elements of the string similarity review process – including for example the selection of the SSP, the publication of the SSP’s methodology, the anonymity of the individuals SSP members, the supposed lack of quality control – is essentially three-fold: first, the actions challenged by Booking.com are not Board actions, but actions of ICANN staff or third parties, which cannot

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85 Sur-Reply, ¶ 10.
86 Sur-Reply, ¶ 10.
87 Sur-Reply, ¶ 11. It was established during the hearing that the several references to this discretionary authority in ICANN's written and oral submissions refer specifically to the authority conferred by Section 5.1 (Module 5-4) of the Guidebook.
88 Sur-Reply, ¶ 18.
89 Sur-Reply, ¶ 18.
90 Sur-Reply, ¶ 18, fn 18.
91 Sur-Reply, ¶ 18, fn 18.
be challenged by means of IRP proceedings; second, in any case, Booking.com’s claims are factually incorrect, and there has been no violation of the Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation or Guidebook; third, Booking.com’s claims are time-barred given that Article IV, Section 3(3) of the Bylaws requires that IRP requests “must be filed within thirty days of the posting of the minutes of the Board meeting ... that the requesting party contends demonstrates that ICANN violated its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation.”

b. The case of .hotels

99. ICANN’s position as regards the determination to place .hotels and .hoteis in contention is similar in many respects to its position regarding the string similarity review process generally. ICANN argues that the Board played no role whatsoever in performing the review of .hotels; that the SSP’s determination was in any event well supported and there was no violation of applicable rules; and that the Guidebook does not provide for any process by which ICANN (or any other body, including an IRP panel) may conduct a substantive review of a string similarity determination.

100. In any event, ICANN asserts that .hotels and .hoteis in fact meet every one of the visual similarity criteria applied by the SSP, as set out in the SSP Manager’s Letter. Moreover, .hotels and .hoteis scored a stunning 99% for visual similarity under the publicly available SWWORD algorithm which, as provided by Section 2.2.1.1.2 (Module 2-7) of the Guidebook, establishes “one objective measure for consideration by the [SSP]”. According to ICANN (in response to a question posed by the Panel during the hearing), this was the highest algorithmic score among the comparison of all non-identical pairs within the 1917 new gTLD applications received by ICANN; the only other pair of non-exact match strings found to be confusingly visually similar – .unicorn and .unicom – scored only 94%.

101. According to ICANN, “it was not clearly ‘wrong,’ as Booking.com argues, for the [SSP] to find that .hotels/.hoteis are confusingly similar.”

102. In conclusion, ICANN states that its conduct with respect to Booking.com’s application for .hotels, including in evaluating Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration, was fully consistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, its Bylaws and the procedures established in the Guidebook; and the fact that Booking.com disagrees with the SSP’s determination to put .hotels and .hoteis in a contention set does not give rise to an IRP.

103. ICANN asks the Panel to deny Booking.com’s IRP Request.

VI. ANALYSIS

A. The Panel’s Authority

92 Sur-Reply, ¶ 20-42.
93 A number of these applications were subsequently withdrawn.
94 Identical pairs, of course, received a score of 100% for visual similarity under the SWWORD algorithm.
95 Response, ¶ 53.
104. The jurisdiction and authority of an IRP panel is expressly prescribed — and expressly limited — by the ICANN Bylaws. To recap, Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws provides:

4. [The IRP Panel] shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;

b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and

c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company [ICANN]?

[...]

11. The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:

[...]

c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and

d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;

[...]

18. [...] The IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties [...]

[Underlining added]

105. Similarly, Article 8 of the Supplementary Procedures reads:

8. Standard of Review

The IRP is subject to the following standard of review: (i) did the ICANN Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision; (ii) did the ICANN Board exercise due diligence and care in having sufficient facts in front of them; (iii) did the ICANN Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

If a requestor demonstrates that the ICANN Board did not make a reasonable inquiry to determine it had sufficient facts available, ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest in participating in the decision, or the decision was not an exercise in independent judgment, believed by the ICANN Board to be in the best interests of the company, after taking account of the Internet community and the global public interest, the requestor will have established proper grounds for review.

106. There is no dispute as regards the Panel’s duty to compare the actions of the Board to ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws (and, in this case, Guidebook) with a view to
declaring whether those actions are inconsistent with applicable policies. Where the parties disagree is with respect to the standard of review to be applied by the Panel in assessing Board conduct.

107. ICANN submits that its Bylaws “specify that a deferential standard of review be applied when evaluating the actions of the ICANN Board ... the rules are clear that the appointed IRP Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board.”\(^{96}\) Booking.com argues that this “is simply wrong. No such specification is made in ICANN’s Bylaws or elsewhere, and a restrictive interpretation of the standard of review would ... fail to ensure accountability on the part of ICANN and would be incompatible with ICANN’s commitment to maintain (and improve) robust mechanisms for accountability.”\(^{97}\)

108. In the opinion of the Panel, there can be no question but that the provisions of the ICANN Bylaws establishing the Independent Review Process and defining the role of an IRP panel specify that the ICANN Board enjoys a large degree of discretion in its decisions and actions. So long as the Board acts without conflict of interest and with due care, it is entitled — indeed, required — to exercise its independent judgment in acting in what it believes to be the best interests of ICANN. The only substantive check on the conduct of the ICANN Board is that such conduct may not be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws — or, the parties agree, with the Guidebook. In that connection, the Panel notes that Article 1, Section 2 of the Bylaws also clearly states that in exercising its judgment, the Board (indeed “[a]ny ICANN body making a recommendation or decision”) shall itself “determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand.”

109. In other words, in making decisions the Board is required to conduct itself reasonably in what it considers to be ICANN’s best interests; where it does so, the only question is whether its actions are or are not consistent with the Articles, Bylaws and, in this case, with the policies and procedures established in the Guidebook.

110. There is also no question but that the authority of an IRP panel to compare contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and to declare whether the Board has acted consistently with the Articles and Bylaws, does not extend to opining on the nature of those instruments. Nor, in this case, does our authority extend to opining on the nature of the policies or procedures established in the Guidebook. In this regard it is recalled that Booking.com itself repeatedly stresses that it does not contest the validity or fairness of the string similarity review process as set out in the Guidebook, but merely whether ICANN’s actions were consistent with various elements of that process. Stated differently, our role in this IRP includes assessing whether the applicable rules — in this case, the rules regarding string similarity review — were followed, not whether such rules are appropriate or advisable.

111. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the IRP Panel may only review ICANN Board actions or inactions under the deferential standard advocated by ICANN in these proceedings. Rather, as explained below, the IRP Panel is charged with “objectively” determining whether

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\(^{96}\) Response, ¶ 24.

\(^{97}\) Reply, ¶ 6.
or not the Board's actions are in fact consistent with the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook, which the Panel understands as requiring that the Board's conduct be appraised independently, and without any presumption of correctness.

112. In the only other IRP of which the Panel is aware in which such questions were addressed in a published decision, the distinguished members of the IRP panel had this to say about the role of an IRP panel, and the applicable standard of review, in appraising Board action:

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is a not-for-profit corporation established under the law of the State of California. That law embodies the 'business judgment rule'. Section 308 of the California Corporations Code provides that a director must act 'in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders... and shields from liability directors who follow its provisions. However ICANN is no ordinary non-profit California corporation. The Government of the United States vested regulatory authority of vast dimension and pervasive global reach in ICANN. In 'recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization' -- including ICANN -- ICANN is charged with 'promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet... ICANN 'shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law... Thus, while a California corporation, it is governed particularly by the terms of its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, as the law of California allows. Those Articles and Bylaws, which require ICANN to carry out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, do not specify or imply that the International [sic] Review Process provided for shall (or shall not) accord deference to the decisions of the ICANN Board. The fact that the Board is empowered to exercise its judgment in the application of ICANN's sometimes competing core values does not necessarily import that that judgment must be treated deferentially by the IRP. In the view of the Panel, the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be reviewed and appraised by the Panel objectively, not deferentially. The business judgment rule of the law of California, applicable to directors of California corporations, profit and nonprofit, in the case of ICANN is to be treated as a default rule that might be called upon in the absence of relevant provisions of ICANN's Articles and Bylaws and of specific representations of ICANN... that bear on the propriety of its conduct. In the instant case, it is those Articles and Bylaws, and those representations, measured against the facts as the Panel finds them, which are determinative.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{98} ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN, Declaration dated 19 February 2010 ("ICM Registry"), ¶ 136.

113. While on no way bound by that decision, we agree with its conclusions in this respect.

114. At the end of the day we fail to see any significant difference between the parties' positions in this regard. The process is clear, and both parties acknowledge, that the Panel is tasked with determining whether or not the Board's actions are consistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and the Guidebook. Such a determination calls for what the panel in

[Underlining added.]
the ICM Registry matter called an "objective" appraisal of Board conduct as measured against the policies and rules set out in those instruments; all agree that it is the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook which are determinative.

115. That being said, we also agree with ICANN to the extent that, in determining the consistency of Board action with the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook, an "IRP Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board." In other words, it is not for the Panel to opine on whether the Board could have acted differently than it did; rather, our role is to assess whether the Board's action was consistent with applicable rules found in the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook. Nor, as stated, is it for us to purport to appraise the policies and procedures established by ICANN in the Guidebook (since, again, this IRP is not a challenge to those policies and procedures themselves99), but merely to apply them to the facts.

116. With the foregoing firmly in mind, the Panel turns now to the issues to be determined in order to resolve the present dispute.

B. The String Similarity Review Process

117. The Panel is not unsympathetic to Booking.com's complaints regarding the string similarity review process as established by the Guidebook. There is no question but that that process lacks certain elements of transparency and certain practices that are widely associated with requirements of fairness. For example, the Guidebook provides no means for applicants to provide evidence or make submissions to the SSP (or any other ICANN body) and so be fully "heard" on the substantive question of the similarity of their applied-for gTLD strings to others.

118. Indeed, as stated at the outset of this Declaration, these observations and the concerns that they engender were voiced by several members of the ICANN Board's New gTLD Program Committee which voted to accept the BGC's Recommendation to deny Booking.com's Request for Reconsideration. The Panel can do no better than reproduce the statements made by the NGPC members in this respect, as recorded in the minutes of the NGPC's 10 September 2013 meeting100.

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99 As discussed in more detail in the following section (at para. 117 and following) and again at Part IV of this Declaration, the important questions that Booking.com highlights in its pleadings, as to whether the string similarity review process is consistent with ICANN's guiding principles of transparency and fairness, and regarding the published views of various members of ICANN's NGPC in this respect, are matters which the ICANN Board, in its discretion, may wish to consider on its own motion in the context of the present case, in accordance with its authority under Section 5.1 (Module 5-4) of the Guidebook, or when it issues the Guidebook for round two of the New gTLD Program. Those questions include a lack of clarity surrounding the way in which the string similarity review is conducted by the SSP, and the absence of any means for applicants to be heard in the string similarity review process where they may have evidence to adduce or arguments to make (such as the evidence and arguments presented by Booking.com to this Panel), which could in fact be relevant to the SSP's determination.

100 Request, Annex 16.
• Mr. George Sadowski stated his intention to abstain from the vote because, although 
  "he understood that the BGC did the right thing, [he] thought the end result that was 
  contrary to ICANN's ... and the user's best interests."

• Ms. Olga Madruga-Forti also stated her intention to abstain from voting on the BGC 
  recommendation "because there was not sufficient rationale provided for why the 
  string similarity review panel made its determination."

• In response to a comment by the Chair that the Request for Reconsideration deserved 
  to be denied "[b]ecause the process was followed," Mr. Ray Plzak "agreed that the 
  process was followed, but noted that the process needs to be reviewed to potentially 
  add a mechanism that would allow persons who don't agree with the outcome to make 
  an objection, other than using a Reconsideration Request."

• Mr. Plzak "recommended the Committee send a strong signal to the BGC, or adopt a 
  resolution recommending that the BGC consider development of a different 
  mechanism to provide an avenue for the community to appeal the outcome of a 
  decision based on the merits."

• Ms. Madruga-Forti agreed and "recommended that in the future, a remand or appeals 
  mechanism may help alleviate the concerns noted."

• Mr. Bill Graham also agreed with Mr. Plzak's suggestion, and noted that "generally, 
  there is a considerable level of discomfort and dissatisfaction with the process as 
  expressed by Committee members."

• The Chair "agreed with [Mr. Graham's] sentiment."

• The General Counsel and Secretary noted that ICANN ... "has tried to encourage 
  more use of the ombudsman, or other accountability mechanisms for these types of 
  concerns."

119. Ultimately, five members of the NGPC voted in favour of the resolution accepting the BGC's 
Recommendation; two members were unavailable to vote; and four members abstained. The 
abstaining members offered the following voting statements:

• Mr. Plzak stated that he abstained from voting "because he is disappointed in what is 
  being done to remedy the situation. [He] would like to see more resolve to fix the 
  process."

• Ms. Madruga-Forti stated that:

  [T]he BGC has done an appropriate job of applying a limited review standard to the 
  application for reconsideration, but unfortunately, in this circumstance, to apply that 
  limited review accompanied by a lack of information regarding the rationale of the string 
  similarity review panel is not possible in a logical and fair manner. The public interest 
  would not be served by applying the limited review standard without proper information 
  on the basis and reasoning for the decision of the panel. In my opinion, the public 
  interest would be better served by abstaining and continuing to explore ways to
establish a better record of the rationale of the string similarity review panel in circumstances such as this.

- Mr. Kuo-Wei Wu agreed with Ms. Madruga-Forti's and Mr. Plzak’s voting statements.

- Mr. Sadowsky provided the following detailed statement:

  I have a strong concern regarding the ratification of the BGC recommendation to deny the reconsideration request regarding string contention between .hotels and .hotels, and I therefore have therefore abstained when the vote on this issue was taken.

  The reconsideration process is a very narrowly focused instrument, relying solely upon investigating deviations from established and agreed upon process. As such, it can be useful, but it is limited in scope. In particular, it does not address situations where process has in fact been followed, but the results of such process have been regarded, sometimes quite widely, as being contrary to what might be best for significant or all segments of the ... community and/or Internet users in general.

  The rationale underlying the rejection of the reconsideration claim is essentially that the string similarity process found that there was likely to be substantial confusion between the two, and that therefore they belonged in a contention set. Furthermore, no process has been identified as having been violated and therefore there is nothing to reconsider. As a Board member who is aware of ICANN's ... Bylaws, I cannot vote against the motion to deny reconsideration. The motion appears to be correct based upon the criteria in the Bylaws that define the reconsideration process and the facts in this particular case. However, I am increasingly disturbed by the growing sequence of decisions that are based upon a criterion for user confusion that, in my opinion, is not only both incomplete and flawed, but appears to work directly against the concept that users should not be confused. I am persuaded by the argument made by the proponents of reconsideration in this case that users will in fact not be confused by .hotels and .hotels, since if they enter the wrong name, they are very likely to be immediately confronted by information in a language that they did not anticipate.

  Confusion is a perceptual issue. String similarity is only one consideration in thinking about perceptual confusion and in fact it is not always an issue. In my opinion, much more perceptual confusion will arise between .hotel and .hotels than between .hotels and .hotels. Yet if we adhere strictly to the Guidebook and whatever instructions have or have not been given to string similarity experts, it is my position that we work against implementing decisions that assist in avoiding user confusion, and we work in favor of decisions that are based upon an incorrect, incomplete and flawed ex ante analysis of the ICANN Network real issues with respect to user confusion.

  The goal of the string similarity process is the minimization of user confusion and ensuring user trust in using the DNS ... The string similarity exercise is one of the means in the new gTLD ... process to minimize such confusion and to strengthen user trust. In placing our emphasis, and in fact our decisions, on string similarity only, we are unwittingly substituting the means for the goal, and making decisions regarding the goal on the basis of a means test. This is a disservice to the Internet user community.

  I cannot and will not vote in favor of a motion that reflects, directly or indirectly, an unwillingness to depart from what I see as such a flawed position and which does not reflect in my opinion an understanding of the current reality of the situation.
120. These statements reflect to an important degree the Panel’s own analysis.

121. The elements of the string similarity review process were established and widely published several years ago, after extensive consultation and debate among ICANN stakeholders and the Internet community. Booking.com correctly describes the process established (or "crystallized") in the Guidebook as a component of "a consensus policy" concerning the introduction of new gTLDs.101

122. The Guidebook makes clear that, as part of the initial evaluation to which all applied-for gTLDs are subject, each string would be reviewed for a number of factors, one of which is "string similarity", which involves a determination of "whether the applied-for gTLD string is so similar to other strings that it would create a probability of user confusion."102 The term "user" is elaborated elsewhere in the Guidebook, which speaks of confusion arising "in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user."103

123. The Guidebook explains that string similarity review comprises merely a "visual similarity check,"104 with a view to identifying only "visual string similarities" that would create a probability of user confusion.105

124. The Guidebook makes clear that string similarity reviews would be conducted by an independent third party – the SSP – that would have wide (though not complete) discretion both in formulating its methodology and in determining string similarity on the basis of that methodology.

125. Section 2.2.1.1.2 of the Guidebook, titled "Review Methodology", provides that the SSP "is informed in part by an algorithmic score for ... visual similarity," which "will provide one objective measure for consideration by the [SSP]." Section 2.2.1.1.2 further states that, in addition to "examining all the algorithm data," the SSP will "perform its own review of similarities between strings and whether they rise to the level of string confusion." It is noted that the objective algorithmic score is to be treated as "only indicative". Crucially, the final determination of similarity is entirely up to the [SSP's] judgment." (Underlining added)

126. In sum, the Guidebook calls for the SSP to determine whether two strings are so "visually similar" as to create a "probability of confusion" in the mind of an "average, reasonable Internet user." In making this determination, the SSP is informed by an "algorithmic score", to ensure that the process comprises at least one "objective measure". However, the algorithmic score is not determinative. The SSP also develops and performs "its own review". At the end of the day, the determination is entirely a matter of "the [SSP's] judgment."

101 Request, ¶ 13.
102 Guidebook, §2.2 (Module 2.4).
103 Guidebook, §2.2.1.1.2. (Underlining added)
104 Guidebook, §2.2.1.1. (Underlining added)
105 Guidebook, §2.2.1.1. (Underlining added)
127. By its very nature this process is highly discretionary. It is also, to an important degree, subjective. The Guidebook provides no definition of "visual similarity", nor any indication of how such similarity is to be objectively measured other than by means of the SWORD algorithm. The Guidebook provides no definition of "confusion," nor any definition or description of an "average, reasonable Internet user." As Mr. Sadowski of the NGPC put it: "Confusion is a perceptual issue." (Mr. Sadowski further noted: "String similarity is only one consideration in thinking about perceptual confusion, and in fact it is not always an issue.) The Guidebook mandates the SSP to develop and apply "its own review" of visual similarity and "whether similarities rise to the level of user confusion", in addition to SWORD algorithm, which is intended to be merely "indicative", yet provides no substantive guidelines in this respect.

128. Nor does the process as it exists provide for gTLD applicants to benefit from the sort of procedural mechanisms – for example, to inform the SSP's review, to receive reasoned determinations from the SSP, or to appeal the merits of those determinations – which Booking.com claims are required under the applicable rules. Clearly, certain ICANN NGPC members themselves consider that such input would be desirable and that changes to the process are required in order for the string similarity review process to attain its true goal, which Mr. Sadowsky referred to as "the minimization of user confusion and ensuring user trust in using the DNS". However, as even the abstaining members of the NGPC conceded, the fact is that the sort of mechanisms that Booking.com asserts are required (and which those NGPC members believe should be required) are simply not part of the string similarity review process as currently established. As to whether they should be, it is not our place to express an opinion, though we note that such additional mechanisms surely would be consistent with the principles of transparency and fairness.

129. We add that we agree with ICANN that the time has long since passed for Booking.com or any other interested party to ask an IRP panel to review the actions of the ICANN Board in relation to the establishment of the string similarity review process, including Booking.com's claims that specific elements of the process and the Board decisions to implement those elements are inconsistent with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws. Any such claims, even if they had any merit, are long since time-barred by the 30-day limitation period set out in Article IV, Section 3(3) of the Bylaws. As ICANN expressed during the hearing, if Booking.com believed that there were problems with the Guidebook, it should have objected at the time the Guidebook was first implemented.

130. When asked during the hearing about its failure to object timely, Booking.com argued that it could not have known how the Board's actions – that is, how the process established in the Guidebook – would affect it prior to the submission of its application for .hotels. However, that is not a persuasive or meritorious answer. As did all stakeholders, Booking.com had the opportunity to challenge the Board's adoption of the Guidebook, at the time, if it considered any of its elements to be inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

C. The Case of .hotels

131. In the light of the preceding analysis of Booking.com's challenge concerning the ICANN Board's actions in relation to the string similarity review process generally, the Panel is not
persuaded by its challenge concerning the Board’s conduct in relation to the review of .hotels specifically.

132. There are two principal elements to this part of Booking.com’s case: a challenge in relation to the process followed by the SSP; and a challenge in relation to the Board’s handling of Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration of the SSP’s determination. However, the fundamental obstacle to Booking.com’s case is that the established process was followed in all respects.

133. Booking.com itself acknowledges that “the process was followed” by the SSP, which determined that .hotels and .hotels were so visually similar as to warrant being placed in a contention set. So too did all of the NGPC members who commented on the matter recognize that “the process was followed” — for all their stated misgivings concerning the outcome of the process.

134. The same is true of the Request for Reconsideration. The Panel is struck by the extent and thoughtfulness not only of the NGPC’s consideration of the issue, certain aspects of which are discussed above, but of the BGC’s detailed analysis and its Recommendation to the NGPC, on the basis of which Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration was denied. Contrary to Booking.com’s allegations, in neither instance was this merely a blind acceptance of a decision of a subordinate body. In fact, the reconsideration process itself, however limited and perhaps imperfect it may be, is inconsistent with Booking.com’s claims of lack of “due process”.

135. Although not addressed in great detail by the parties, the Panel considers several observations made by the BGC in its 1 August 2013 Recommendation to be particularly apposite:

   - These standing requirements [for Requests for Reconsideration] are intended to protect the reconsideration process from abuse and to ensure that it is not used as a mechanism simply to challenge an action with which someone disagrees, but that it is limited to situations where the staff [or the Board] acted in contravention of established policies.\textsuperscript{106}

   - Although the String Similarity Review was performed by a third party, ICANN has determined that the Reconsideration process can properly be invoked for challenges of the third party’s decisions where it can be stated that either the vendor failed to follow its process in reaching the decision, or that ICANN staff failed to follow its process in accepting that decision.\textsuperscript{107}

   - Booking.com does not suggest that the process for String Similarity Review set out in the Applicant Guidebook was not followed, or that ICANN staff violated any established ICANN policy in accepting the [SSP] decision on placing .hotels and .hotels in contention sets. Instead, Booking.com is supplanting what it believes the review

\textsuperscript{106} BGC Recommendation, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{107} BGC Recommendation, p. 4. The BGC explains that “Because the basis for the Request is not Board conduct, regardless of whether the 20 December 2012 version, or the 11 April 2013 version, of the Reconsideration Bylaws is operative, the BGC’s analysis and recommendation below would not change.”
methodology for assessing visual similarity should have been, as opposed to the methodology set out at Section 2.2.1.1.2 of the Applicant Guidebook. In asserting a new review methodology, Booking.com is asking the BGC (and the Board through the New gTLD Program Committee (NGPC)) to make a substantive evaluation of the confusability of the strings and to reverse the decision. In the context of the New gTLD Program, the Reconsideration process is not however intended for the Board to perform a substantive review of [SSP] decisions. While Booking.com may have multiple reasons as to why it believes that its application for .hotels should not be in contention set with .hotels, Reconsideration is not available as a mechanism to re-try the decisions of the evaluation panels.\textsuperscript{109}

* Booking.com also claims that its assertions regarding the non-confusability of the .hotels and .hotels strings demonstrate that "it is contrary to ICANN policy to put them in a contention set." (Request, pages 6-7.) This is just a differently worded attempt to reverse the decision of the [SSP]. No actual policy or process is cited by Booking.com, only the suggestion that – according to Booking.com – the standards within the Applicant Guidebook on visual similarity should have resulted in a different outcome for the .hotels string. This is not enough for Reconsideration.\textsuperscript{109}

* Booking.com argues that the contention set decision was taken without material information, including Booking.com's linguistic expert's opinion, or other "information that would refute the mistaken contention that there is likely to be consumer confusion between .hotels' and .hotels." (Request, page 7.) However, there is no process point in the String Similarity Review for applicants to submit additional information. This is in stark contrast to the reviews set out in Section 2.2.2 of the Applicant Guidebook, including the Technical/Operational review and the Financial Review, which allow for the evaluators to seek clarification or additional information through the issuance of clarifying questions. (AGB, Section 2.2.2.3 (Evaluation Methodology).)\textsuperscript{110}

* Just as the process does not call for additional applicant inputs into the visual similarity review, Booking.com's call for further information on the decision to place .hotels and .hotels in a contention set ... is similarly not rooted in any established ICANN process at issue. […] While applicants may avail themselves of accountability mechanism to challenge decisions, the use of an accountability mechanism when there is no proper ground to bring a request for review under the selected mechanism does not then provide opportunity for additional substantive review of decisions already taken.\textsuperscript{111}

* While we understand the impact that Booking.com faces by being put in a contention set, and that it wishes for more narrative information regarding the [SSP]'s decision, no such narrative is called for in the process.\textsuperscript{112}

* The Applicant Guidebook sets out the methodology used when evaluating visual similarity of strings. The process documentation provided by the String Similarity Review Panel describes the steps followed by the [SSP] in applying the methodology

\textsuperscript{109} BGC Recommendation, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{106} BGC Recommendation, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{110} BGC Recommendation, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{111} BGC Recommendation, pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{112} BGC Recommendation, p. 7.
set out in the Applicant Guidebook. ICANN then coordinates a quality assurance review over a random selection of [SSPs’s] reviews to gain confidence that the methodology and process were followed. That is the process used for a making and assessing a determination of visual similarity. Booking.com’s disagreement as to whether the methodology should have resulted in a finding of visual similarity does not mean that ICANN (including the third party vendors performing String Similarity Review) violated any policy in reaching the decision (nor does it support a conclusion that the decision was actually wrong).^{133}

- The [SSP] reviewed all applied for strings according to the standards and methodology of the visual string similarity review set out in the Applicant Guidebook. The Guidebook clarifies that once contention sets are formed by the [SSP], ICANN will notify the applicants and will publish results on its website. (AGB, Section 2.2.1.1.1.) That the [SSP] considered its output as “advice” to ICANN (as stated in its process documentation) is not the end of the story. Whether the results were transmitted as “advice” or “outcomes” or “reports”, the important query is what ICANN was expected to do with that advice once it was received. ICANN had always made clear that it would rely on the advice of its evaluators in the initial evaluation stage of the New gTLD Program, subject to quality assurance measures. Therefore, Booking.com is actually proposing a new and different process when it suggests that ICANN should perform substantive review (instead of process testing) over the results of the String Similarity Review Panel's outcomes prior to the finalization of contention sets.^{134}

- As there is no indication that either the [SSP] or ICANN staff violated any established ICANN policy in reaching or accepting the decision on the placement of .hotels and .hoteis in a non-exact contention set, this Request should not proceed.^{135}

136. These excerpts of the BGC Recommendation not only illustrate the seriousness with which Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration was heard, they mirror considerations to which we fully subscribe and which we find apply as well, with equal force and effect, in the context of Booking.com’s IRP Request.

137. It simply cannot be said – indeed, it is not even alleged by Booking.com – that the established process was not followed by the ICANN Board or any third party either in the initial string similarity review of .hotels or in the reconsideration process.

138. Booking.com was asked at the hearing to identify with particularity the ICANN Board’s actions (including inactions) in this case that it claims are inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Guidebook and regarding which it asks the Panel to render a declaration. It identified four:

- The Board’s adoption of certain provisions of the Guidebook, including the allegedly ill-defined, unfair and non-transparent procedures for selecting the SSP and supervising the SSP’s performance of the string similarity review process. As discussed, any claims in this regard are time-barred.

^{133} BGC Recommendation, p. 7.
^{134} BGC Recommendation, p. 8.
^{135} BGC Recommendation, p. 10.
• **The Board’s acceptance of the SSP determination.** As ICANN argues, there was no action (or inaction) by the Board here, no decision made (or not made) by the Board or any other body to accept the SSP’s determination. The Guidebook provides that applied-for strings “will be placed in contention set” where the SSP determines the existence of visual similarity likely to give rise to user confusion. Simply put, under the Guidebook the Board is neither required nor entitled to intervene at this stage to accept or not accept the SSP’s determination. Booking.com is correct that the Board could nevertheless have stepped in and reversed the SSP determination under Section 5.1 (Module 5-4) of the Guidebook, but did not do so; that inaction is addressed below.

• **The Board’s denial of Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration.** As discussed above, there is nothing in the evidence that even remotely suggests that ICANN’s conduct in this regard was inconsistent with its Articles, Bylaws or the Guidebook. On the contrary, we have already stated that the detailed analysis performed by the BGC and the extensive consideration of the BGC Recommendation by the NGPC undermine any claim that ICANN failed to exercise due care and independent judgment, or that its handling of the Request for Reconsideration was inconsistent with applicable rules or policy. As discussed above, just as in the present IRP, the question in the reconsideration process is whether the established process was followed. This was the question that the BGC and NGPC asked themselves in considering Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration, and which they properly answered in the affirmative in denying Booking.com’s request.

• **The Board’s refusal to “step in” and exercise its authority under Section 5.1 (Module 5-4) of the Guidebook** to “individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community.” As pointed out by ICANN during the hearing, the fact that the ICANN Board enjoys such discretion and may choose to exercise it any time does not mean that it is bound to exercise it, let alone at the time and in the manner demanded by Booking.com. In any case, the Panel does not believe that the Board’s inaction in this respect was inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws or indeed with ICANN’s guiding principles of transparency and fairness, given (1) Booking.com’s concession that the string similarity review process was followed; (2) the indisputable conclusion that any challenge to the adoption of the SSP process itself is time-barred; (3) the manifestly thoughtful consideration given to Booking.com’s Request for Reconsideration by the BGC; and (4), the fact that, notwithstanding its protestations to the contrary, Booking.com’s real dispute seems to be with the process itself rather than how the process was applied in this case (given that, as noted, Booking.com concedes that the process was indeed followed).

139. The Panel further considers that these – in addition to any and all other potential (and allegedly reviewable) actions identified by Booking.com during the course of these proceedings – fail on the basis of Booking.com’s dual acknowledgement that it does not challenge the validity or fairness of the string similarity review process, and that that process was duly followed in this case.
140. Finally, the panel notes that Booking.com's claim — largely muted during the hearing — regarding alleged “discrimination” as regards the treatment of its application for .hotels also founders on the same ground. Booking.com acknowledges that the established string similarity review process was followed; and there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that .hotels was treated any differently than any other applied-for gTLD string in this respect. The mere fact that the result of the string similarity review of .hotels differed from the results of the reviews of the vast majority of other applied-for strings does not suggest discriminatory treatment. In any event, the Panel cannot but note the obvious, which is that .hotels is not alone in having been placed in contention by the SSP. So too was .hoteis; and so too were .unicom and .unicom. Moreover, and once again, it is recalled that Booking.com does not claim to challenge the merits of the string similarity review, that is, the determination that .hotels and .hoteis are so visually similar as to warrant placement in a contention set.

D. Conclusion

141. In launching this IRP, Booking.com no doubt realized that it faced an uphill battle. The very limited nature of IRP proceedings is such that any IRP applicant will face significant obstacles in establishing that the ICANN Board acted inconsistently with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. In fact, Booking.com acknowledges those obstacles, albeit inconsistently and at times indirectly.

142. Booking.com purports to challenge “the way in which the [string similarity review] process was established, implemented and supervised by (or under the authority of) the ICANN Board”; yet it also claims that it does not challenge the validity or fairness of the string similarity review process as set out in the Guidebook. It asks the Panel to overturn the SSP’s determination in this case and to substitute an alternate result, in part on the basis of its own “expert evidence” regarding similarity and the probability of user confusion as between .hotels and .hoteis; yet it claims that it does not challenge the merits of the SSP determination and it acknowledges that the process set out in the Guidebook was duly followed in the case of its application for .hotels.

143. In sum, Booking.com has failed to overcome the very obstacles that it recognizes exist.

144. The Panel finds that Booking.com has failed to identify any instance of Board action or inaction, including any action or inaction of ICANN staff or a third party (such as ICC, acting as the SSP), that could be considered to be inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws or with the policies and procedures established in the Guidebook. This includes the challenged actions of the Board (or any staff or third party) in relation to what Booking.com calls the implementation and supervision of the string similarity review process generally, as well as the challenged actions of the Board (or any staff or third party) in relation to the string similarity review of .hotels in particular.

145. More particularly, the Panel finds that the string similarity review performed in the case of .hotels was not inconsistent with the Articles or Bylaws or with what Booking.com refers to as the “applicable rules” as set out in the Guidebook.

146. To the extent that the Board’s adoption and implementation of specific elements of the new gTLD Program and Guidebook, including the string similarity review process, could
potentially be said to be inconsistent with the principles of transparency or fairness that underlie ICANN’s Articles and Incorporation and Bylaws (which the Panel does not say is the case), the time to challenge such action has long since passed.

147. Booking.com’s IRP Request must be denied.

VII. THE PREVAILING PARTY; COSTS

148. Article IV, Section 3(18) of the Bylaws requires that the Panel “specifically designate the prevailing party.” This designation is germane to the allocation of costs, given that Article IV, Section 3(18) provides that the “party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider.”

149. The same provision of the Bylaws also states that “in an extraordinary case the IRP Panel may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses.”

150. Similarly, the Supplementary Procedures state, at Article 11:

The IRP PANEL shall fix costs in its DECLARATION. The party not prevailing in an IRP shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the proceedings, but under extraordinary circumstances the IRP PANEL may allocate up to half of the costs to the prevailing party, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their contribution to the public interest.

In the event the Requestor has not availed itself, in good faith, of the cooperative engagement or conciliation process, and the requestor is not successful in the Independent Review, the IRP PANEL must award ICANN all reasonable fees and costs incurred by ICANN in the IRP, including legal fees.

151. The “IRP Provider” is the ICDR, and, in accordance with the ICDR Rules, the costs to be allocated between the parties — what the Bylaws call the “costs of the IRP Provider”, and the Supplementary Procedures call the “costs of the proceedings” — include the fees and expenses of the Panel members and of the ICDR (we refer to all of these costs as “IRP costs”).

152. ICANN is undoubtedly the prevailing party in this case. That being said, the Panel considers that the nature and significance of the issues raised by Booking.com, and the contribution to the “public interest” of its submissions, are such that it is appropriate and reasonable that the IRP costs be shared equally by the parties. We consider that the extraordinary circumstances of case — in which some members of ICANN’s New gTLD Program Committee have publicly declared that, in their view, the rules on the basis of which Booking.com’s claims fail should be reconsidered by ICANN — warrants such a holding.

153. The Panel cannot grant Booking.com the relief that it seeks. A panel such as ours can only declare whether, on the facts as we find them, the challenged actions of ICANN are
or are not inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. We have found that the actions in question are not inconsistent with those instruments. The process established by ICANN under its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws and set out in the Guidebook was followed, and the time to challenge that process (which Booking.com asserts is not its intention in these proceedings in any event) has long passed.

154. However, we can – and we do – acknowledge certain legitimate concerns regarding the string similarity review process raised by Booking.com, discussed above, which are evidently shared by a number of prominent and experienced ICANN NGPC members. And we can, and do, encourage ICANN to consider whether it wishes to address these issues in an appropriate manner and forum, for example, when drafting the Guidebook for round two of the New gTLD Program or, more immediately, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5.1 (Module 5-4) of the Guidebook (which it may choose to exercise at any time, in its discretion) to consider whether, notwithstanding the result of the string similarity review of .hotels and .hotels, approval of both of Booking.com’s and Despegar’s proposed strings would be in the best interest of the Internet community.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the Panel hereby declares:

(1) Booking.com’s IRP Request is denied;

(2) ICANN is the prevailing party;

(3) In view of the circumstances, each party shall bear one-half of the costs of the IRP Provider, including the fees and expenses of the Panel members and the fees and expenses of the ICDR. As a result, the administrative fees and expenses of the ICDR, totaling US$4,600.00, as well as the compensation and expenses of the Panelists totaling US$163,010.05 are to be borne equally. Therefore, ICANN shall pay to Booking.com the amount of US$2,300.00 representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by Booking.com

(4) This Final Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final Declaration of this IRP Panel.

______________________________
Hon. A. Howard Matz
Date: March 2, 2015

______________________________
David H. Bernstein
Date:

______________________________
Stephen L. Drymer,
Chair of the IRP Panel
Date:
I, Hon. A. Howard Matz, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is the Final Declaration of the IRP Panel.

Date: March 2, 2015
Hon. A. Howard Matz

I, David H. Bernstein, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is the Final Declaration of the IRP Panel.

Date: [Signature]
David H. Bernstein

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Date: [Signature]
Stephen L. Drymer
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David H. Bernstein  
Date: March 2, 2015

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Chair of the IRP Panel  
Date:
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Date
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March 2, 2015

Date
David H. Bernstein

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Date
Stephen L. Drymer
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shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final
Declaration of this IRP Panel.

_________________________________________    ________________________________
Hon. A. Howard Matz                                David H. Bernstein
Date:                                               Date:

Stephen L. Dryer,
Chair of the IRP Panel
Date: 7 March 2015
I, Hon. A. Howard Matz, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is the Final Declaration of the IRP Panel.

Date

Hon. A. Howard Matz

I, David H. Bernstein, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is the Final Declaration of the IRP Panel.

Date

David H. Bernstein

I, Stephen L. Drymer, do hereby affirm upon my oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is the Final Declaration of the IRP Panel.

Date

Stephen L. Drymer
Approved Resolution | Meeting of the New gTLD Program Committee

This page is available in: English | Español | Français | Русский | 中文 |

18 May 2013

1. Consent Agenda
   a. Approval of Minutes of New gTLD Program Committee Meeting of 26 March 2013, 5 April 2013 and 11 April 2013

   b. BGC Recommendation on Reconsideration Request 13-1
      Rationale for Resolutions 2013.05.18.NG02 – 2013.05.18.NG03

   c. BGC Recommendation on Reconsideration Request 13-2
      Rationale for Resolution 2013.05.18.NG04

2. Main Agenda
   a. Addressing GAC Advice from Beijing Communiqué

1. Consent Agenda:
   a. Approval of Minutes of New gTLD Program Committee Meeting of 26 March 2013, 5 April 2013 and 11 April 2013

   Resolved (2013.05.18.NG01), the New gTLD Program Committee approves the minutes of the 26 March 2013, 5 April 2013 and 11 April 2013 Meetings of the New gTLD Program Committee.

A note about tracking cookies:

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Whereas, the BGC recommended that Reconsideration Request 13-1 be denied because Ummah has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration, and Ummah's stay request fails to satisfy the Bylaws' requirements for a stay.

Whereas, the BGC noted that "Ummah raises some interesting issues in its Request and suggests that the Board direct that the concerns raised in Ummah's Request be included in a review of the Applicant Support Program so that the design of future mechanisms to provide financial assistance and support in the New gTLD Program can benefit from the experiences within this first round."

Resolved (2013.05.18.NG02), the New gTLD Program Committee adopts the recommendation of the BGC that Reconsideration Request 13-1 be denied on the basis that Ummah has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration and that Ummah's stay request fails to satisfy the Bylaws' requirements for a stay.

Resolved (2013.05.18.NG03), the Board directs the President and CEO to include the concerns raised in Ummah's Reconsideration Request in the review of the Applicant Support Program so that the design of future mechanisms to provide financial assistance and support in the New gTLD Program can benefit from the experiences within this first round.

Rationale for Resolutions 2013.05.18.NG02 – 2013.05.18.NG03

In July 2009, as part of the comprehensive GNSO Improvements program, the ICANN Board approved the formal Charters of four new GNSO Stakeholder Groups (see ICANN Board Resolution 2009.30.07.09).

ICANN’s Bylaws at the time Reconsideration Request 13-1 was filed, called for the Board Governance Committee to evaluate and make recommendations to the Board with respect to Reconsideration Requests. See Article IV, section 3 of the Bylaws. The New gTLD Program Committee, bestowed with the powers of the Board in this instance, has reviewed and thoroughly considered the BGC's recommendation with respect to Reconsideration Request 13-1 and finds the analysis sound. The full BGC Recommendation, which includes the reasons for recommending that the Reconsideration Request be denied can be found at: http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/governance/reconsideration

Having a Reconsideration process set out in ICANN's Bylaws positively affects ICANN's transparency and accountability. It provides an avenue for the community to ensure that staff and the Board are acting in accordance with ICANN's policies, Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.

To assure that ICANN continues to serve the global public interest by ensuring worldwide accessibility to the Internet and opportunities for operating a registry, ICANN will include the issues raised in Ummah's Request in its review of the Program so that the design of future mechanisms to provide financial assistance and support in the New gTLD Program can benefit from the experiences within this first round.

Adopting the BGC’s recommendation has no financial impact on ICANN and will not negatively impact the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system.

This is an Organizational Administrative Function not requiring public comment.
c. BGC Recommendation on Reconsideration Request 13-2

Whereas, Reconsideration Request 13-2, sought reconsideration of: (1) Staff and Board inaction on the consideration of Nameshop’s letter of “appeal” sent after denial of Nameshop’s change request to change its applied-for string in the New gTLD Program from .IDN to .INTERNET (the “Change Request”); and (ii) the decision of the Support Applicant Review Panel (“SARP”) that Nameshop did not meet the criteria to be eligible for financial assistance under ICANN’s Applicant Support Program.

Whereas, the BGC recommended that Reconsideration Request 13-2 be denied because Nameshop has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration.

Whereas, the BGC concluded that the Reconsideration Request 13-2 challenges: (i) an “appeal” process that does not exist; and (ii) the substantive decisions taken within the New gTLD Program on a specific application, not the processes by which those decisions were taken and that the reconsideration process is not, and has never been, a tool for requestors to seek the reevaluation of decisions.

Resolved (2013.05.18.NG04), the New gTLD Program Committee adopts the BGC’s recommendation that Reconsideration Request 13-2 be denied on the basis that Nameshop has not stated proper ground for reconsideration.

Rationale for Resolution 2013.05.18.NG04

ICANN’s Bylaws at the time Reconsideration Request 13-2 was filed, called for the Board Governance Committee to evaluate and make recommendations to the Board with respect to Reconsideration Requests. See Article IV, section 3 of the Bylaws. The New gTLD Program Committee, bestowed with the powers of the Board in this instance, has reviewed and thoroughly considered the BGC’s recommendation with respect to Reconsideration Request 13-2 and finds the analysis sound. The full BGC Recommendation, which includes the reasons for recommending that the Reconsideration Request be denied can be found at:


Having a Reconsideration process set out in ICANN’s Bylaws positively affects ICANN’s transparency and accountability. It provides an avenue for the community to ensure that staff and the Board are acting in accordance with ICANN’s policies, Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.

Request 13-2 challenges an “appeal” process that does not exist, and challenges the substantive decisions taken in implementation of the New gTLD Program on a specific application and not the processes by which those decisions were taken. Reconsideration is not, and has never been, a tool for requestors to seek the reevaluation of substantive decisions. This is an essential time to recognize and advise the ICANN community that the Board is not a mechanism for direct, de novo appeal of staff (or evaluation panel) decisions with which the requester disagrees. Seeking such relief from the Board is, in itself, in contravention of established processes and policies within ICANN.

Adopting the BGC’s recommendation has no financial impact on ICANN and will not negatively impact the security, stability and resiliency of the domain name system.
This is an Organizational Administrative Function not requiring public comment.

2. Main Agenda:
   a. Addressing GAC Advice from Beijing Communiqué

   No resolution taken.

Published on 21 May 2013
ICANN Board Rationales for the Approval of the Launch of the New gTLD Program

*Note: The Rationales are not final until approved with the minutes of the Board meeting.
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I. WHY NEW gTLDs ARE BEING INTRODUCED

New gTLDs are being introduced because the community has asked for them. The launch of the new generic top-level domain (gTLD) program will allow for more innovation, choice and change to the Internet’s addressing system, now constrained by only 22 gTLDs. In a world with over 2 billion Internet users – and growing – diversity, choice and competition are key to the continued success and reach of the global network. New gTLDs will bring new protections to consumers (as well as brand holders and others) that do not exist today in the Domain Name System (DNS). Within this safer environment, community and cultural groups are already anticipating how they can bring their groups together in new and innovative ways. Companies and consumers that do not use the Latin alphabet will be brought online in their own scripts and languages. Industries and companies will have the opportunity to explore new ways to reach customers. The years of community work in planning have produced a robust implementation plan, and it is time to see that plan through to fruition.

II. FOLLOWING ICANN’S MISSION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPED PROCESSES

A. Introduction of new TLDs is a core part of ICANN’s Mission

When ICANN was formed in 1998 as a not for profit, multi-stakeholder organization dedicated to coordinating the Internet’s addressing system, a purpose was to promote competition in the DNS marketplace, including by developing a process for the introduction of new generic top-level domains while ensuring internet security and stability. The introduction of new top-level domains into the DNS has thus been a fundamental part of ICANN’s mission from its inception, and was specified in ICANN’s Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Project Agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce.¹

ICANN initially created significant competition at the registrar level, which has resulted in enormous benefits for consumers. ICANN’s community and Board has now turned its attention to fostering competition in the registry market. ICANN began this process with the “proof of concept” round for the addition of a limited number of new generic Top Level Domains (“gTLDs”) in 2000, and then permitted a limited number of additional “sponsored” TLDs in 2004-2005. These additions to the root demonstrated that TLDs could be added without adversely affecting the security and stability of the domain name system. Follow on economic studies indicated that, while benefits accruing from innovation are difficult to predict, that the introduction of new gTLDs will bring benefits in the form of increased competition, choice and new services to Internet users. The

¹ ICANN’s Bylaws articulate that the promotion of competition in the registration of domain names is one of ICANN’s core missions. See ICANN Bylaws, Article 1, Section 2.6.
studies also stated that taking steps to mitigate the possibility of rights infringement and other forms of malicious conduct would result in maximum net social benefits.

B. The Community Created a Policy Relating to the Introduction of new gTLDs

After an intensive policy development process, in August 2007, the Generic Names Supporting Organization issued a lengthy report in which it recommended that ICANN expand the number of gTLDs. See http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm. Contributing to this policy work were ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (“GAC”), At-Large Advisory Committee (“ALAC”), County Code Names Supporting Organization (“ccNSO”) and Security and Stability Advisory Committee (“SSAC”). The policy development process culminated with Board approval in June 2008. See http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-26jun08.htm#_Toc76113171.

III. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT WAS KEY IN IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

Since the June 2008 decision, the community has been hard at work creating, commenting on, and refining the implementation of this policy.

Seven versions of the Applicant Guidebook have been published. Fifty-eight explanatory memoranda have been produced. There have been nearly 50 new gTLD-related public comment sessions, over these documents as well as a variety of excerpts and working group reports. Over 2,400 comments were received through those public comment fora, which have been summarized and analyzed, and considered in revisions to the new gTLD program. Over 1,350 pages of summary and analysis have been produced. The community has also participated in numerous workshops and sessions and open microphone public forums at ICANN meetings, providing additional suggestions for the improvement of the new gTLD program. ICANN has listened to all of these community comments in refining the program that is being approved today.

Nearly every ICANN Supporting Organization and Advisory Committee was represented in targeted community-based working groups or expert teams formed to address implementation issues. The GNSO and its component stakeholder groups and constituencies participated in all aspects of the implementation work arising out of its policy recommendations. The ccNSO was particularly active on issues relating to internationalized domain names (IDNs) and the treatment of geographical names in the new gTLD program.

ICANN’s technical Advisory Committees provided direct input into the implementation work. For example, RSSAC and SSAC provided expert analysis that there is no expected significant impact of new gTLDs on the stability and scalability of the root server system.

ALAC members served on nearly every working group and team, and actively participated in all public comment fora, giving the world’s Internet users a voice in implementation discussions.
IV. CONSULTATION WITH THE GAC LEAD TO IMPROVEMENTS

Under the ICANN Bylaws, the GAC has an assurance that the Board will take GAC advice into account. The Board, through an extensive and productive consultation process with the GAC, has considered the GAC’s advice on the new gTLD program and resolved nearly all of the areas where there were likely differences between the GAC advice and the Board’s positions.

The ICANN Board and the GAC held a landmark face-to-face consultation on 28 February – 1 March 2011 and subsequently exchanged written comments on various aspects of the new gTLD Program. On 15 April 2011, ICANN published a revised Applicant Guidebook, taking into account many compromises with the GAC as well as additional community comment. On 20 May 2011, the GAC and the ICANN Board convened another meeting by telephone, and continued working through the remaining differences between the Board and GAC positions. See http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-22may11-en.htm. On 26 May 2011, the GAC provided its comments on the 15 April 2011 Applicant Guidebook, and the GAC comments were taken into consideration in the production of the 30 May 2011 Applicant Guidebook.

On 19 June 2011, the ICANN Board and GAC engaged in a further consultation over the remaining areas where the Board’s approval of the launch of the new gTLD program may not be consistent with GAC advice. At the beginning of the GAC consultation process, there were 12 issues under review by the GAC and the Board, with 80 separate sub-issues. The GAC and the Board have identified mutually acceptable solutions for nearly all of these sub-issues. Despite this great progress and the good faith participation of the GAC and the Board in the consultation process, a few areas remain where the GAC and the Board were not able to reach full agreement. The reasons why these items of GAC advice were not followed are set forth in responses to the GAC such as Board responses to item of GAC Advice.

V. MAJOR IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED

The launch of the new gTLDs has involved the careful consideration of many complex issues. Four overarching issues, along with several other major substantive topics have been addressed through the new gTLD implementation work. Detailed rationale papers discussing the approval of the launch of the program as it relates to nine of those topics are included here. These nine topics are:

- Evaluation Process
- Fees
- Geographic Names
- Mitigating Malicious Conduct
- Objection Process
- Root Zone Scaling
- String Similarity and String Contention
- Trademark Protection.

VI. CONCLUSION

The launch of the new gTLD program is in fulfillment of a core part of ICANN’s Bylaws: the introduction of competition and consumer choice in the DNS. After the ICANN community created a policy recommendation on the expansion of the number of gTLDs, the community and ICANN have worked tirelessly to form an implementation plan. The program approved for launch today is robust and will provide new protections and opportunities within the DNS.

The launch of the new gTLD program does not signal the end of ICANN’s or the community’s work. Rather, the launch represents the beginning of new opportunities to better shape the further introduction of new gTLDs, based upon experience. After the launch of the first round of new gTLDs, a second application window will only be opened after ICANN completes a series of assessments and refinements – again with the input of the community. The Board looks forward to the continual community input on the further evolution of this program.

The Board relied on all members of the ICANN community for the years of competent and thorough work leading up to the launch of the new gTLD program. Within the implementation phase alone, the community has devoted tens of thousands of hours to this process, and has created a program that reflects the best thought of the community. This decision represents ICANN’s continued adherence to its mandate to introduce competition in the DNS, and also represents the culmination of an ICANN community policy recommendation of how this can be achieved.
8. ICANN Board Rationale on String Similarity and String Contention Associated with the gTLD Program

I. Introduction

Through the development of the new gTLD program, the Board has given consideration to issues of potential user confusion resulting from the delegation of many similar TLD strings, as well as to creating procedures for resolving contention cases (i.e., where there is more than one qualified applicant for a TLD).

The foundational policy guidance for the program contains the principle that strings likely to cause user confusion should be avoided. Additionally, policy guidance recommended that there should be a preference for community applications in contention situations.

This memorandum focuses on the Board’s review of these issues in implementing these principles in the new gTLD program. The memorandum summarizes the Board’s consideration of these issues, and the Board’s rationale for implementing the new gTLD program with the provisions on string contention and string similarity.

II. Brief History of ICANN’s Analysis of String Similarity and String Contention Associated With the gTLD Program

This section sets forth a brief history of significant actions on the subject of string contention associated with the new gTLD program.

- In December 2005, the GNSO commenced a rigorous policy development process to determine whether (and the circumstances under which) new gTLDs would be added. A broad consensus was achieved that new gTLDs should be added to the root in order to further stimulate competition and for other reasons.

- In February 2007, Bruce Tonkin sent an email to the GNSO Council, describing the type of contention resolution methods under discussion for the gTLD process, including self-resolution, among the parties, third-party mediation, a bidding process, auctions, and testing for community affiliations.
In March 2007, the Governmental Advisory Committee issued its GAC Principles regarding New gTLDs. This included: 2.4: In the interests of consumer confidence and security, new gTLDs should not be confusingly similar to existing TLDs. To avoid confusion with country-code Top Level Domains, no two letter gTLDs should be introduced.

http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD_principles_0.pdf

In August 2007, the GNSO issued its final report regarding the introduction of new gTLDs, including Recommendation 2, which stated that “strings must not be confusingly similar to an existing top-level domain or a Reserved Name.”

http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm

The GNSO’s Final Report also included Implementation Guideline F, which stated: If there is contention for strings, applicants may: i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe; ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim, and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of contention and; iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff and expert panels.

In March 2008, ICANN reported on preliminary work with SWORD to develop a potential algorithm that could help to automate the process for assessing similarity among proposed and existing TLD strings. http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/prelim-report-27mar08.htm

On 26 June 2008, the Board adopted the Generic Names Supporting Organization’s (“GNSO”) policy recommendations for the introduction of new gTLDs, and directed ICANN staff to continue to develop a detailed implementation plan.

See Board Resolution at http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-
• In August 2008, ICANN considered the use of auctions as a tie-breaking mechanism within the new gTLD process.  


• Also in August 2008, ICANN considered the use of a string similarity algorithm to help automate the process for assessing similarity among the proposed and existing TLD strings. SWORD completed a beta algorithm and reviewed several test cases with ICANN staff to refine the parameters and discuss how the algorithm could be successfully integrated as a tool to help implement the GNSO's recommendation that new gTLD strings should not result in user confusion.  
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-08aug08-en.htm

• In October 2008, the Board passed a resolution, authorizing the CEO, COO and/or General Counsel of ICANN to enter into an agreement for algorithm related services with SWORD.  
https://www.icann.org/en/minutes/prelim-report-01oct08.htm

• On 24 October 2008, ICANN published Version 1 of the new gTLD Applicant Guidebook (“Version 1”), as well as an explanatory memorandum, “Resolving String Contention,” http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/string-contention-22oct08-en.pdf, describing the reasons for the contention procedures found in the draft Guidebook. The Guidebook included a preliminary establishment of contention sets based on similarity between strings, opportunities for applicants to self-resolve such contention, a comparative evaluation process, and an objective
mechanism as a last resort.  


• Comments on successive drafts of the Guidebook expressed a desire for greater clarity around the standards to be used for comparative evaluation, including requests for examples of applications that would and would not meet the threshold. In response to these comments, ICANN developed detailed explanatory notes for each of the scoring criteria to give additional guidance to applicants. These were included beginning in draft version 3 of the Guidebook.  

• In May 2010, ICANN issued draft version 4 of the Guidebook. The comparative evaluation was renamed the Community Priority Evaluation, to more accurately convey the purpose and nature of the evaluation (i.e., not comparing applicants to one another but comparing each against a common set of criteria). Version 4 also included definitions for terms used in the explanatory notes as well as clarifications and expanded guidance in several areas.  
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/comments-4-en.htm

• In June 2010, the GNSO Council and the Registries Stakeholder Group requested that exceptions be granted from findings of confusing similarity. The reason for granting an exception would be that a string pair that was found to be confusingly similar constituted a case of "non-detrimental confusion."  
http://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/council/msg09379.html;  
http://forum.icann.org/lists/string-similarity-
amendment/msg00002.html;

• In September 2010, the Board discussed the subject of string similarity and resolved to encourage policy development as needed to consider any exceptions from findings of confusing similarity. http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-25sep10-en.htm#2.4

• On 30 May 2011, ICANN posted the Applicant Guidebook for consideration by the Board. http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/comments-7-en.htm

III. The Board’s Analysis of String Similarity and String Contention

A. Brief Introduction to String Similarity and String Contention

1. String Similarity

This section sets forth an overview of the string similarity determination:

• What is the Concern over String Similarity?
  
o The Board determined that delegating highly similar TLDs in the new gTLD program created the threat of detrimental user confusion.

• How Is It Determined that String Similarity Exists?
  
o The preliminary similarity review will be conducted by a panel of String Similarity Examiners, who will use the following standard to test for whether string confusion exists:

String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another visually that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For the likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.
The examination will be informed by human judgment assisted by criteria and an algorithmic score for the visual similarity between each applied-for string and each of other existing and applied-for TLDs. http://icann.sword-group.com/algorithm/

- What Happens Once the Determination is Made that String Similarity Exists?
  - In the simple case in which an applied-for TLD string is identical to an existing TLD, the application system will not allow the application to be submitted.
  - An application that fails the string confusion review and is found too similar to an existing TLD string will not pass the Initial Evaluation stage of the evaluation process, and no further reviews will be available.
  - An application that passes the string similarity review in the Initial Evaluation is still subject to challenge regarding string similarity in the current application round. That process requires that a specific string similarity objection be filed by an objector having the standing to make such an objection. Such category of objection is not limited to visual similarity. Rather, confusion based on any type of similarity may be claimed by an objector, visual, phonetic, and semantic similarity.
  - An application that passes the string similarity review and is not subject to a string confusion objection would proceed to the next relevant stage of the process.

2. String Contention

This section sets forth an overview of the string contention process:

- What is String Contention?
  - String contention is said to occur when the strings of two or more applications are identical or found to be so similar that delegation of both will create a threat of user confusion.

- What Components Are Involved in the String Contention Process?
o Identifying gTLD strings that are likely to deceive or cause user confusion in relation to either existing TLDs or reserved names or applied-for gTLDs; and

o Resolving the string contention.

• How is a Contention Set Identified?

o In the initial evaluation of an applied for gTLD, a string similarity panel, using the procedures described above, will determine whether two or more applications for gTLDs are in direct string contention. The applications that are determined to be in direct string contention will be marked for later resolution of the contention and proceed to the subsequent process steps. Applications that are not part of a contention set can proceed to the next stage of the evaluation process without further action.

  ➢ Applications are in direct string contention if their proposed strings are identical or so similar that string confusion would occur if both were to be delegated as TLDs. The determination is based on human judgment assisted by an algorithmic test performed on applications.

  ➢ Two applications are in indirect string contention if they are both in direct string contention with a third application, but not with each other.

o During the objection process, an applicant may file a string confusion objection to assert string confusion. If the objection is upheld by the panel adjudicating the objection, the applications will be deemed to be in a direct string contention and the relevant contention sets will be modified accordingly.

o The final contention sets are established once the extended evaluation and objection process have been concluded, because some applications may be excluded in those steps.

• How is a Contention Set Resolved?
Voluntary settlements or agreements can occur between applications that result in the withdrawal of one or more applications. These can occur at any stage of the process, once ICANN has posted the applications received. However, material changes to an application may require a re-evaluation.

Community priority evaluation can be used only if at least one of the applications involved is community-based and has expressed a preference for community priority evaluation. A panel will receive and score the community-based applications against the established criteria for: (1) community establishment; (2) nexus between the proposed string and community; (3) dedicated registration policies; and (4) community endorsement. If one application is a “clear winner” (i.e., meets the community priority criteria), the application proceeds to the next step and its direct contenders are eliminated. If there is no “clear winner,” the contention set will be resolved through negotiation between the parties or auction. It may occur that more than one application meets the community priority criteria, in which case time will be allowed for resolving the remaining contention by either applicant withdrawing, otherwise an auction between those applicants will resolve the contention.

A community application that prevails in a community priority evaluation eliminates all directly contending standard applications, regardless of how well qualified the latter may be. This is a fundamental reason for very stringent requirements for qualification of a community-based application, as embodied in the criteria. Arriving at the best outcome in a contention situation requires careful balancing of several variables, and this is the reason that a number of factors are included in the analysis.

Auction is available as a last resort mechanism for resolving string contention when (1) contending applicants successfully complete all evaluations; (2) contending applicants elect not to use community priority evaluation, were not eligible for community priority evaluation, or
community priority evaluation did not provide a “clear winner”; and (3) contending applications have not resolved the contention among themselves.

B. Why The Board Addressed String Similarity and String Contention

- The new gTLD program will increase the number of domain names available, implying a risk that “confusingly” similar strings will appear.

- It is in the interests of consumer confidence and security to protect against the threat of user confusion and to avoid increasing opportunities for bad faith entities who wish to defraud users.

- Measures should be in place to protect internet users from the potential harm in delegating confusingly similar strings in the new gTLD program.

- The Board wants to create greater certainty in the domain name marketplace by crafting a fair and practical approach on how to identify and how best to resolve contention sets.

- The Board adopted the GNSO policy recommendations, including the implementation guideline implying that a community-based TLD application could be given a priority in cases of contention.

C. Who the Board Consulted

- Legal Counsel
- The GNSO
- The GAC
- The ALAC
- The ccNSO
- The SSAC
- All other Stakeholders and Community members through public comment forum and other methods of participation.

D. What Significant Non-Privileged Materials the Board Reviewed
• **GNSO Policy Recommendations**
  o Recommendation 2: Strings must not be confusingly similar to an existing top-level domain or a Reserved Name [http://GNSO.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm](http://GNSO.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm)
  o Implementation Guideline F: If there is contention for strings, applicants may:
    i) resolve contention between them within a pre-established timeframe
    ii) if there is no mutual agreement, a claim to support a community by one party will be a reason to award priority to that application. If there is no such claim, and no mutual agreement a process will be put in place to enable efficient resolution of contention and
    iii) the ICANN Board may be used to make a final decision, using advice from staff and expert panels.

• **GAC Principles**
  o Recommendation 2.4: In the interests of consumer confidence and security, new gTLDs should not be confusingly similar to existing TLDs. To avoid confusion with country-code Top Level Domains, no two letter gTLDs should be introduced [http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD_principles_0.pdf](http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD_principles_0.pdf)

• **Comments from the Community**

E. **What Concerns the Community Raised**

• There is a need for clarification on the definition of “confusing similarity.”

• There are questions about the definitions for “standard” vs. “community-based” TLD types.

• There is a need for objective procedures and criteria for the community priority evaluation.
• A special form of resolution should be considered for a contention set involving two community-based applicants of equal strength, so that such a contention set is not required to go to auction.

• There is concern over using the auction process (and the receipt of auction proceeds) as a means to resolve contention for TLDs.

• There is concern that the string similarity algorithm only accounts for visual similarity, and does not accurately gauge the human reaction of confusion.

• Proceeds from auctions may be used for the benefit of the DNS and be spent through creation of a foundation that includes oversight by the community.

F. What Factors the Board Found to Be Significant

• There should be a consistent and predictable model for the resolution of contention among applicants for gTLD strings;

• The process should be kept as straightforward as possible to avoid unnecessary risks;

• There is potential harm in confusingly similar TLD strings that extends not only to the interests of existing TLD operators, but also to Internet users; and

• The protections set forth in the current string similarity process will safeguard both user and operator interests;

IV. The Board’s Reasons for Supporting the String Contention Process Contemplated in the new gTLD Program

• The Algorithm is a tool to aid the string similarity analysis.

  o The algorithm will be a consistent and predictable tool to inform the string confusion element of the new gTLD program. The algorithm will provide guidance to applicants and evaluators;

  o The role of the algorithm is primarily indicative; it is intended to provide informational data to the panel of examiners and expedite their review.
o The algorithm, user guidelines, and additional background information are available to applicants for testing and informational purposes

- Human judgment will be the determining factor in the final decisions regarding confusing similarity for all proposed strings.

- Contending applicants should be given the opportunity to settle contention among themselves – this will result in innovative and economic solutions.

- The community priority evaluation stage of the string contention process features sufficient criteria to: (a) validate the designation given to community-based applications; and (b) assess a preference for community-based applications in a contention set. Both the GNSO Final Report and GAC Principles encourage the special consideration of applications that are supported by communities. http://GNSO.icann.org/issues/new-gtlds/pdp-dec05-fr-parta-08aug07.htm; http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD_principles_0.pdf

- The GAC Principle that two-letter TLDs should not be delegated to avoid confusion with ccTLDs was adopted.

- There are advantages to an auction as a resolution mechanism of last resort.
  
  o It is an objective test; other means are subjective and might give unfair results, are unpredictable, and might be subject to abuses.

  o It assures the round will finish in a timely way.

  o It is thought than few auctions will actually occur. A negotiated settlement will be a lower-cost solution for the parties than an auction. The availability of auctions will encourage parties to settle. Even if there are proceeds from auctions, these will be expended in a process that includes independent oversight.

  o Ascending clock auctions typically employ an “activity rule,” where a bidder needs to have been “in” at early prices in the auction in order to continue to stay “in” at later prices. This is useful because in an ascending clock auction, bidders are
informed of the number of contending applications that have remained “in” after each round, but not their identities. With the specified activity rule, this demand information has real significance, as a competitor who has exited the auction cannot later re-enter.

- The auctioneer in ascending clock auctions has the ability to pace the speed at which prices increase. This facet has greatest importance if related items are auctioned simultaneously, as their prices can then be paced to increase together in relation to the level of demand. This has the advantage of providing bidders with information about the level of demand for other new gTLDs—and hence the value of a new gTLD—while the auction is still in progress.