Domains: A phishing chokepoint

Carel Bitter | ICANN IDS 2019



Are these bad?



(Spoiler alert: Yes)

Many are not marked as bad No messages seen... No significant traffic... No website to crawl...

...yuu



IF YOU ARE CONSIDERING & CAR IN THE EVALUATION FARE & CAREFUL LOOK AT THIS DETAILED INTERAL DULEARNY DEFINIT IT BARLANS & FEW OF THE ENDLEDRING REASONS THAT MALE INTERAL THE WCOMPARABLE LUTURY CAR OF 1965


HARRAND BUT COMMENDED ENDING FROM FOR MERSED ADDREEFER AND AND ACTIVOL MESS WHER WHER AND ACTIVOL ENDER FOR ACTIVITY FOR ENDER FROM AND CONFELT RETINGT RETAIL AND CONFELT RETINGT

AND CANSHAFT DESIGN DELIVERS AND ADDRESS ACCESENTION: FAMME ALANSERS AND COMONE PLATED TO BETTER RESULTIONER

MAREAL IS DONE OF THE MODEL SPACHDUS AUTOMODUSE BULLY IN AMBRICA IT SHARES ITS DOTT SHELL WITH NOS SHALLER CARE THUS, IN THE WOODL SHOLD RELEAD HIRROOM IN THE MODEL SHOLD RELEAD FILE FEET, FRONT AND REAR

-111 JTL - 311 JE

PAPERAL'S 3 SATES TORALE-CONVERTER AUTOMATIL PRANT-MESSION IS ABOUT THE MOST ASSAUNSIVE HARLE IN AUT AUTOMOBILE (IT'S & BEFTRE WERLING OF THE TURE MALT DEAL STAFF DEVEST METRE)



WHY CRADINE STREE TORSION ANAS SOME OF ROCHWEST ROAD SMOLES BEFORE THEY REACH THE CAR BODY

DUAL FLITERS IN BASILING FANK AND FUEL LINE BIN DOUBLE PROTECTION ABAIN FOREIGN PARTICLES ENTER LARBURETOR

e 187.

SCALE: I* = I's*	129"WHEELBASE
oannins Mal Black	THE INCOMPARABLE



0

- 14

Integral 5 Adus Loude Product Freeh. Office Antoniogo Paristica Plande Ting Schenk, article Librate Trans. Life

THE BODY OF AN INFERAL UNDERFORMENT DOWN IS STEP BUDT PREVENTIVE TREATMENT DOWN OF THE INITIAL BULLTONG LODGE, AFRICAT INCREASE THE STREES RESISTANCE TO CORRESPOND, BY ENAMINING THE MOLECHINE SUPPLIE STREETING















Why target domains? The domains are a choke point. Break the chain and the phishing fails.

filtering decisions on. Browsers, email and DNS all support filtering on domain level.



Domains are also well-supported to execute

Why target domains? There is a big opportunity for registries and registrars to proactively contribute towards fighting abuse.









1) Domain (string) Lots can be learned by just looking at the base (2nd level) domain.

Advantages: Readily available (zone files, pDNS, registrations)











Infrastructure nwolb.verification-ref4322.com operator-security-config4.info fls-na.amazon.com.ssl-us.cf secure.runescape.com-sdk.top secure2.appleid.apple.com-app-ids299192.com internet-security-0p3nei.ml



HE SPAMHAUS PROJECT

Infrastructure nwolb.verification-ref4322.com operator-security-config4.info fls-na.amazon.com.ssl-us.cf secure.runescape.com-sdk.top secure2.appleid.apple.com-app-ids299192.com internet-security-0p3nei.ml



Obfuscation help.Instagram-copyrightsupport.ml appleId-fInd.cn paypallimitionmanage.com accountsumaryverfyapplyca.com Icloud-fmi-appleid.com https-pay-netf1ix.icu



Obfuscation help.Instagram-copyrightsupport.ml appleId-fInd.cn paypallimitionmanage.com accountsumaryverfyapplyca.com cloud-fmi-appleid.com https-pay-netf1ix.icu



Obfuscation detection (1) Edit distance: the number of operations required to change one string into another.

Instagrarn > instagram = 3



Obfuscation detection (2) N-gram analysis, in this case using trigams.

security > sec ecu cur uri rit ity securty > sec ecu cur urt rty







github.xn--aetwork-4x2zag.com github.assetworks.com





github.xn--aetwork-4x2zag.com github.assetworks.com













2) Domain metadata Domain metadata can be of great help in amplifying some other measurements.

Advantages: Mostly available



(although sometimes difficult to get at scale).

Domain age Reputation is gained over time. Old means a long standing and continuous investment.

New can be suspicious.



Domain expiry New, and for <1 year New, and for >1 year Old, and for <1 year Old, and for >1 year



Domain TLD Free vs. paid-for ccTLD/gTLD/new gTLD/free TLD/pseudo TLD Open vs. restricted registration



Domain TLD Free vs. paid-for ccTLD/gTLD/new gTLD/free TLD/pseudo TLD Open vs. restricted registration

Operationally hard: pricing and promotions





Domain Meta







3) DNS DNS information gives us anchors for attaching history and reputation.

Advantages: Cheap to get at scale, history exists, reputation exists.



NS Records These can be found without touching miscreant infrastructure.

Age, self-NS vs external, NS IP addresses, reputation of those IP addresses, volatility, pDNS history ...



A/MX/TXT/etc records Caveat: by doing a record lookup that needs an answer from the domain authoratives you might reveal yourself.


Augment and expand as you would for NS.





Domain Meta







4) SSL certificates Newly created SSL certificates are public, thanks to the Certificate Transparency project.

Advantages: Free and open, near realtime.



Certificate issuer Who issued the certificate?

Paid vs. free



Certificate calendar mapping Compare certificate issue date to the domain issue date.

Same considerations apply as to domain age.



Common Name (CN) A certificate is usually given out for a specific name on a domain.



Common Name (CN) A certificate is usually given out for a specific name on a domain.



com-id-login.us copyright-10000739255.info joonggonara-613901.cf

Common Name (CN) A certificate is usually given out for a specific name on a domain.

appleid.apple.com-id-login.us

facebook.com.copyright-10000739255.info pay.naver.com-cafe.joonggonara-613901.cf



Common Name (CN) Sometimes the entire domain is new: Certificates can be an input by itself.


The stream itself is a valuable source of domains (but: good and bad).





Domain Meta







Conclusion Finding suspect phishing domains without having the phishing message is certainly possible. There is plenty of low-hanging fruit and places to pick it. Depending on your appetite for risk, various mitigation strategies are possible.



Thank you! For domain reputation discussions, metadata tales and my famous salmon recipe:

carel@spamhaus.org

