Summary Background
While the full background can be found in the documentation attached to this Annex, the 30 August 2013 Reconsideration Request 13-8 brought by Merck KGaA seeks reconsideration of the 13 July 2013 resolution of the New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC") that permitted and encouraged dispute resolution panels to use discretion in enforcing the deadlines set forth in the New gTLD Applicant Guidebook. Specifically, the Request challenges the NGPC resolution as it relates to Merck & Co. Inc.’s ("the Objector") community objection to Merck KGaA’s application for .MERCK, which was rejected by the International Chamber of Commerce for being filed after the published closing deadline.

The BGC considered Request 13-8 at its 10 October 2013 meeting and recommended that the Request be denied and that no further action be taken in response to the Request. As detailed in the Recommendation and the documents attached to this Reference Materials, the BGC determined that Merck KGaA has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration.

The New gTLD Program Committee agrees with the BGC and is adopting the BGC Recommendation on Reconsideration Request 13-8.

Document/Background Links
The following attachments are relevant to the BGC’s recommendation regarding Merck KGaA’s Reconsideration Request 13-8.

Attachment A is Reconsideration Request 13-8, submitted on 30 August 2013.

Attachment B is the Attachments to Request 13-8, submitted on 30 August 2013.
Attachment C is the Letter from Judith Harris to the BGC, submitted on 13 September 2013.

Attachment D is the BGC’s Recommendation on Reconsideration Request 13-8, issued on 10 October 2013.

Submitted by: Amy A. Stathos
Position: Deputy General Counsel
Date Noted: 21 November 2013
Email: amy.stathos@icann.org
Reconsideration Request Form

Version of 11 April 2013

1. Requester Information

Name: Merck KGaA
Representative: Dr. Torsten Bettinger
Address: Contact Information Redacted

Email:

Phone Number (optional): Contact Information Redacted

2. Request for Reconsideration of (check one only):

x Board action

3. Description of specific action you are seeking to have reconsidered.

The present Reconsideration Request concerns an inappropriate decision taken by the New gTLD Program Committee, which acts on behalf of the ICANN Board with regard to new gTLD matters. As stated in the Board’s resolution of April 10, 2012: “[…] Board hereby delegates to the Board New gTLD Program Committee all legal and decision making authority of the Board relating to the New gTLD Program (for the round of the Program, which commenced in January 2012 and for the related Applicant Guidebook that applies to this current round) as set forth in its Charter…” Thus, the decisions of the NGPC may be properly considered actions of the ICANN Board.

On July 13, 2013, the NGPC issued a resolution which, in part, recommended that a retroactive “discretionary” standard should be imposed on DSRPs in evaluating the
timeliness of specific submissions in the context of new gTLD dispute procedures. As stated by the NGPC:

"In the interest of fairness and reasonableness, and after a review of the Ombudsman reports, the NGPC has determined that it is appropriate for the NGPC to ask the DRSPs, in light of the circumstances presented by the Ombudsman, to reconsider their strict adherence to the deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook and apply reasonable judgment in such matters. Taking this action will have a positive impact on ICANN's accountability to the community, as it is appropriate to review of all applicable circumstances when taking decisions that have significant impact on participants within ICANN."

As may be clearly noted from the above quotation, the NGPC made this ruling on the basis of the ombudsman’s reports. The ombudsman, however, acted improperly and in manifest violation of due process in preparing these “reports,” and thus the NGPC’s decision cannot have been made in light of the full and complete set of relevant facts. Moreover, it is herein challenged that ICANN (including through its ombudsman and the NGPC) lacks jurisdiction to oversee, appeal or challenge the procedural decisions taken by its properly-appointed DSRPs, as nothing in the Guidebook, the ICANN Bylaws, or otherwise grants it such authority.

Although the NGPC ruling discusses only two cases which may be affected by its ruling (those involving the strings .AXIS and .GAY), there is in fact a third case which was intentionally kept under the radar to prevent detection by the relevant respondent (Merck
KGaA), whose rights have been intentionally harmed by the actions herein described. This third case, concerning the applied-for TLD .MERCK, is far more dramatically affected by the NGPC ruling. In the .GAY situation, the dispute in question concerned a typographical error committed by a provider (in entering the email address of an objector incorrectly when sending a deficiency notice). Indeed, the NGPC’s remedy, ordering a complete review of the matter on the basis of an entirely different evaluation standard is unnecessary to address an issue this minor. The second case concerns the late filing of a response, which is not provided for under the Guidebook. That said, the majority of other, tradition domain name dispute mechanisms provide for some leeway in the acceptance of responses (for example, paragraph 5(e) of the UDRP), due to the tight timelines under which respondents are placed in ADR matters. Thus, although inappropriate, there is perhaps some slight precedence for the NGPC’s actions in this regard.

The same cannot be said for the impact of the NGPC’s ruling with regard to the .MERCK dispute. In this case, the prospective Objector (Merck & Co.) elected to wait until the very last second of the filing deadline (notwithstanding the nine months it had to prepare its materials for submission), to transmit its materials to the ICC. It sent no email communications to the ICC prior to the running of the deadline, and indeed its eventual submissions were not transmitted until ten and eleven minutes past the close of the objection period (thus well past the ICANN-mandated “grace period” of four minutes and fifty-nine seconds). Unlike in the .AXIS situation, concerning a late-filed response, the text of the Applicant Guidebook expressly and affirmatively prevents the imposition of a
“discretionary” standard with regard to the acceptance of untimely objections. As stated in Article 7(a) of the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure: “[a]ny Objection to a proposed new gTLD must be filed before the published closing date for the Objection Filing period.” Thus, the NGPC’s ruling, with regard to the .MERCK dispute, is in direct contravention with published ICANN policy, to which all other prospective objectors were bound. Merck & Co. appears to be the only objector who stands to benefit from this improper, post-facto change to the Guidebook’s tenets. Accordingly, the NGPC’s actions constitute a breach of the Core Values established in Article 2 of the ICANN Bylaws, which include the requirement to make “decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.” As discussed in more detail below, the NGPC’s actions are additionally in violation of the requirement that all policy development mechanisms be undertaken in an “open and transparent” manner, to “ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process,” as set out in point 7 of Bylaw’s Core Values.

The NGPC’s ruling was reached on the basis of the ombudsman’s reports. However, the ombudsman did not undertake a thorough assessment of the situation in this case, and indeed affirmatively prevented the respondent in the .MERCK action from participating in the (apparently extensive!) discussions between his office, members of the ICANN Board and the objector, and from presenting any arguments or evidence on its own behalf. As the respondent to the action in dispute, the respondent (Merck KGaA) had an inalienable and absolute right to be heard in any communications between the ICANN ombudsman and opposing counsel. Principles of natural justice dictate that where a
party, who legal rights are in issue in a given dispute, must be properly joined to those proceedings. In this case, the ombudsman went to great lengths to ensure that Merck KGaA was denied its right to be heard, and issued its recommendations to the NGPC on the basis of unilateral communications with only one side of controversial dispute.

**Background Information About the Parties**

Before entering into a discussion of the ombudsman’s actions which led to the issuance of the NGPC’s ruling, it may be helpful for the Governance Board to be provided with a very brief summary of the history of the parties and the nature of their dispute.

The parties involved in the underlying dispute are Merck & Co., a US pharmaceuticals concern which was formerly a subsidiary of the respondent, whose attorneys (either via inexcusable negligence or a strategic attempt to gain additional time to prepare their materials), and Merck KGaA, the world’s oldest pharmaceutical company and the former parent of the objector. Both parties have filed for numerous TLDs, and are currently engaged in several LRO actions. The two LRO actions (as well as a string confusion objection regarding an unrelated string) filed by Merck & Co. against Merck KGaA have been dismissed as unfounded. Merck KGaA is still awaiting the results of its three LRO actions filed against Merck & Co. (and anticipates a positive outcome on the basis of the majority holding in *Del Monte Corporation v. Del Monte International GmbH*, LRO Case No. LRO2013-0001), as well as its two Community Based Objections against Merck & Co. before the ICC. Both parties have filed for the .MERCK TLD, and currently the companies exercise their rights in the “Merck” trademark under a reciprocal
use agreement, which has been in force (through various versions and revisions) since the 1930s. Merck & Co.'s rights are territorially limited to domestic use within North America, whereas Merck KGaA retains those rights globally throughout the rest of the world. Merck KGaA has also taken legal action against the infringing activities of Merck & Co. before the District Court of Hamburg, Germany, and in the courts of the United Kingdom. Merck KGaA is preparing additional legal measures in other jurisdictions.

The Ombudsman’s Actions

The fact that the ombudsman had been engaged in extensive communications with the objector (Merck & Co.) and its counsel only came to the respondent’s attention well after the issuance of the NGPC’s ruling. This is because, although Mr. LaHatte discussed many of his ongoing “investigations” on his online blog, he intentionally elected not to utilize the names of the parties, or the TLD, involved in the .MERCK case. He named the .AXIS and .GAY TLDs, but intentionally omitted any identifying references to the parties or TLD in the present matter. His behavior vis-à-vis the parties and in his email communications, and his statements in a recent reply message to Merck KGaA make abundantly clear his intent to prevent Merck KGaA from asserting its legal rights, and from providing evidence which would certainly have been material for the NGPC.

A short outline of the actions taken in this matter, as they involve the ombudsman, will be provided below for the benefit of the Governance Board.

As noted above, Merck & Co. did not submit its pleadings before the ICC in a timely
manner. Counsel for Merck & Co. made a number of allegations, first claiming technical failure and then "human error," to excuse its actions before the ICC. These fact-specific issues are not in play in the present matter, and thus will be left aside for the purposes of this Request. If the Governance Board would like any additional information, however, Merck KGaA will be happy to supply any further evidence that is required. For the present, it is noted that Merck & Co.'s objections were untimely filed. Two days after the deadline had passed, Merck & Co.'s counsel sent a message to the ICANN ombudsman, improperly failing to copy the respondent (Merck KGaA) under the required communications rules of Article 6(b) of the New gTLD Dispute Resolution policy. Merck & Co.'s counsel asked, essentially, how he could receive special treatment and have his untimely filed pleading accepted by the ICC. See Annex 1. The ombudsman's reply suggested that Merck & Co. should take the matter up with the ICC. Merck KGaA was only provided with a copy of this email when Merck & Co. requested acceptance of its improperly filed materials with the ICC. Given that the ombudsman appeared to have correctly indicated that the ICC was the sole authority on such matters, it appeared at that time that ICANN was taking no further role in the dispute. In the weeks that followed, the ICC requested numerous rounds of comments from the parties, and entered its proper and accurate ruling to dismiss Merck & Co.'s untimely filed submissions.

On July 12, Merck & Co.'s counsel sent an email communication to Mr. Jeffry, Mr. Akram and Ms. Dryden, again arguing that its untimely submissions should be accepted. At that time, Merck & Co. did not disclose that it had been undertaking extensive conversations with the ICANN ombudsman or members of the ICANN Board. Merck
KGaA replied to this message, copying the same individuals listed on Merck & Co.'s email, indicating that the issue had already been properly handled by the ICC. Merck & Co.'s counsel sent another letter, again advancing the same arguments already rejected by the ICC. Merck KGaA replied on July 29, noting that there were no grounds for any further consideration of the issue, but indicating that if ICANN, or any other body were to contemplate the reopening of these discussions, that Merck KGaA must be offered its opportunity to reply. At no time did the Ombudsman, the relevant ICANN Board members, or any member of ICANN staff reply to the various messages of Merck KGaA, nor offer it (the respondent in the matter, whose legal rights were in issue through the entire course of these discussions) any opportunity to refute the dubious claims of Merck & Co., to challenge the jurisdiction of the ombudsman, or to assert any arguments on its own behalf.

On August 16th, Merck KGaA became aware that not only the ICANN ombudsman, but also members of the ICANN Board and the entire NGPC had been making decisions in the matter, which directly and adversely impacted its rights, all without being provided an opportunity to be heard, to provide evidence or arguments on its behalf, or even to be provided with mere notice of the ongoing discussions. On that date, Merck KGaA was copied to a lengthy pleading, filed by Merck & Co. with the ICC, demanding rehearing of the dismissal on the basis of a newly-imposed “discretionary” standard, which was designed to offer special and preferential treatment to an extremely small percentage of dispute participants. At that time, Merck KGaA discovered that ICANN, via its Board members, staff members, and ombudsman, had been engaging in a lengthy and complex
series of unilateral discussions, including a clandestine, in-person hearing of the matter during the ICANN meeting in Durban. At no time was Merck KGaA made aware of these communications or offered a right to refute the allegations made by Merck & Co. (some of which are very dubious, including one early version of their “timeline” which has been affirmatively disproven by the timing of their filings with WIPO).

Accordingly, on August 20th, Merck KGaA’s counsel contact Mr. LaHatte directly, noting a copy of an email which had been listed as an Annex by Merck & Co., and requesting an explanation of the nature and extent of these discussions. See Annex 2. Mr. LaHatte’s reply made quite clear that he had no intention of allowing Merck KGaA any opportunity to defend its rights or to challenge the submissions and claims of Merck & Co. Furthermore, he questioned how Merck KGaA had become aware of his involvement, and indicated that his communications were intended to be “confidential.” See Annex 3.

Mr. LaHatte’s claims that his communications were intended to be “confidential,” and that he felt he did not have “permission” to discuss this issue with Merck KGaA, are extremely disingenuous for a number of reasons. First, as the potential respondent in these matters, Merck KGaA has an absolute right to both be heard in the matter and to be kept apprised of all case-related communications. Secondly, Merck KGaA was copied on several of the emails sent by Merck & Co.’s counsel to ICANN staff, thus clearly indicating Merck & Co.’s assent to the inclusion of Merck KGaA on all such discussions. Third, Mr. LaHatte has apparently been posting details of this dispute publicly on his
blog for several months now, and has specifically solicited the input from the online community (see Annex 4). To quote from his blog entry of June 10th, discussing the Merck & Co. late filing issue:

“To undertake this investigation I have undertaken a number of steps. In particular I discussed this with the applicant with an exchange of emails, I have talked to Christine Willett (VP gTLD Operations) and legal staff at ICANN, and I have also made a call for comments on my blog and Twitter feed. I believe it is important that the community should comment on this issue, both from the perspective of applicants and of objectors. I am grateful to those who have made comments, which have been thoughtful and useful. I am conscious that there have been very substantial investments in the applications, but also of course recognise that objectors also consider that they have economic and other interests affected by awarding a new gTLD to applicants.” [emphasis added]

So, apparently, the ombudsman was willing to discuss this issue with anyone, anywhere in the world, except the party which is adversely affected by this inappropriate ruling. By intentionally preventing the respondent, Merck KGaA from discovering the nature and extent of his closed-door dealings with Merck & Co., and his discussions with ICANN staff and Board members, combined with his election to discuss these issues on his blog without naming the concerned parties (or mentioning the name “Merck & Co.”), it is clear that Mr. LaHatte conspired to ensure that Merck KGaA was shut out of the process, and denied an opportunity to assert its rights or challenge the legality of his actions. It is highly inappropriate for one party to a dispute to have recourse to a deciding body
without providing copies of said communications, and a full and fair chance to respond, to the other party to the action. Such conduct is akin to unilateral communications between an appointed Expert and one party, which is expressly forbidden by Article 6(b) of the new gTLD dispute procedure. These actions taken by the ombudsman are manifestly contrary to the principles of natural justice. Both parties to a dispute must be provided with full knowledge of all discussions regarding the contested matter, and certainly with regard to the passage of any rulings which would severely and detrimentally harm their rights and interests. The fact that the ombudsman actively discussed this issue with numerous unrelated third parties, but refused to hear the arguments of the respondent to the dispute is not only extremely troubling, but constitutes a serious breach of due process. The ombudsman’s reports the NGPC, therefore, were based on biased information, did not contain the full and necessary facts concerning this matter, and were intentionally skewed in a manner which deprived Merck KGaA of its due process rights.

The Ombudsman’s Lack of Jurisdiction

The ombudsman’s recommendations to the NGPC are additionally inappropriate in this matter, as the ombudsman lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions taken by a DSRP, which is a “supplier” of dispute services and thus explicitly removed from the ombudsman’s oversight under Article V (3)(1) of the ICANN Bylaws. The ombudsman himself notes that this is likely the case, noting on his blog that it is indeed highly questionable whether ICANN has any scope to intercede in these matters, and appears decidedly unsure as to whether he has jurisdiction to enter any ruling on this issue (please
refer to Annex 4). He appears to come to the conclusion that, since Merck & Co. raised the issue with him, this is in his mind sufficient to grant him authority to review procedural matters uniquely within the control of the DSRPs. Specifically, he states:

“This is a matter where I do need to carefully consider the jurisdiction to investigate the complaint. My jurisdiction is limited to issues between ICANN and the ICANN community. The issue is therefore whether a dispute resolution provider, contracted by ICANN to evaluate objections, can be subject of an investigation by the ombudsman in relation to fairness. Put in another way, is the dispute resolution provider a member of the ICANN community? My jurisdiction is excluded for certain types of contractual relationship with the bylaws says “or issues related to vendor/supplier relations”. However that sort of contractual relationship is intended to deal with issues of procurement rather than the more complex arrangements made in the context of the gTLD programme. The complainant did make the point that ICANN was consulted during the course of the discussion about loosening the rigour of the time for objection. So in the context of the purpose of the exclusion, I do believe that I have jurisdiction. Certainly the applicant/complainant submitted that I did, and should investigate the decision.”

This does not, in any way, constitute sufficient grounds for a finding of jurisdiction. Mr. LaHatte has cited no provision, in the Guidebook or otherwise, which indicates that the ICANN ombudsman or ICANN Board (via the NGPC) can hear “appeals” of sorts, where one party has failed to comply with the stipulated rules of procedure. Thus, in the context
of this Reconsideration Request, the Governance Board must consider whether the ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is defensible under the ICANN Bylaws, or on any other strong, clearly-published and unambiguous grounds.

Arguing that jurisdiction “by consent” is sufficient is extremely inappropriate in this case, where only one party to the dispute was granted leave of hearing. Merck KGaA was never asked to comment on this issue, never given an opportunity to challenge ICANN’s jurisdiction in this matter, and was not allowed to submit any arguments or evidence to challenge Merck & Co.’s dubious claims. One party cannot “consent” to jurisdiction in an improper venue where the other side has been affirmatively denied an opportunity to comment or challenge such jurisdiction. Moreover, where a particular body has no authority to hear a particular case, it cannot exercise jurisdiction simply because a case is filed with it.

The Resolution of the NGPC

Turning again to the ruling issued by the NGPC, on the basis of the ombudsman’s incomplete reports, there is the question of the legality of the NGPC’s actions. Under the laws of the United States, hard deadlines (including filing deadlines and statutes of limitations) are strictly imposed. Under US law, statutes of limitations, or statutes of repose, establish absolute time bars, after which no case may be brought. Filing deadlines are strictly enforced in all cases, unless explicit, prior-established provisions allow for late filing in a particular instance. In the absence of such a provision, however, untimely filings are rejected, regardless of how minor or technical the breach may be. Accordingly,
an attorney in the United States can have no reasonable expectation that a tribunal would accept an untimely filing when there is no explicit, previously-established exception to the deadline.

In a recent case, Merck & Co. (who is now asking for special treatment from the ICC), itself successfully moved to dismiss a complaint because the plaintiffs had failed to file within the statute of limitations. Merck & Co. argued for the strict enforcement of the statute of limitations, and insisted that the plaintiff must bring its case within the two-year filing window, regardless of any mitigating or later-arising factors. In decreeing that the statute of limitations (which governs the filing time of actions), the Supreme Court of Virginia wrote: “It is well-established that statutes of limitations are strictly enforced … A statute of limitations may not be tolled, or an exception applied, in the absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect. [A]ny doubt must be resolved in favor of the enforcement of the statute.” *Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc.*, 283 Va. 411, 416 (Va. 2012) (citations omitted, case provided in *Annex 5*). See also *Mione v. McGrath*, 435 F. Supp. 2d 266, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same, see *Annex 6*).

Not all examples of strict filing deadlines in the United States are based on statutes of limitations. The Securities Investor Protection Act provides for the liquidation of bankrupt broker-dealers, and it sets forth a procedure by which customers of the bankrupt entity may file claims against the estate for lost funds and securities. The Act sets a hard deadline for the filing of all customer claims against the bankrupt debtor. Customer claims filed after the bar date are denied because “[t]he statutory time limitations for
filing a claim in a SIPA case are clearly delineated and do not allow the Court to fashion judicial exceptions to such filing deadlines.” *In re Lehman Brothers, Inc.*, 493 B.R. 437, 444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (see *Annex 7*). In the absence of an explicit exception to a filing deadline, “equitable pleas for special exceptions are beyond the scope of the statutory language and are unavailing.” *Id.*

Here, the applicable rules do not provide for any extension of the deadline to file objections. The Guidebook explicitly states, in Article 7(a) of the new gTLD dispute resolution procedure – the controlling authority on such matters, which was published well before the opening of the new gTLD application cycle, and over a year prior to the objection period – that no objections may be accepted if filed after the published deadline. To quote, the provision reads: “[a]ny Objection to a proposed new gTLD must be filed before the published closing date for the Objection Filing period.” Accordingly, Merck & Co. had no reasonable expectation of the deadline being “discretionary,” and under U.S. law, they are entitled to no extension of any kind.

While deadlines that have no statutory exceptions are strictly enforced, some filing deadlines in the United States have “excusable neglect” provisions. Under those provisions, a party’s late-filed submission will be considered timely if the party is able to show “excusable neglect.” As defined in *Kanoff v. Better Life Renting Corp.*, 350 Fed. Appx. 655, 657 (3d Cir. 2009), “excusable neglect” describes situations where the court, after weighing the relevant considerations, is satisfied that counsel has exhibited substantial diligence, professional competence and has acted in good faith to conform his
or her conduct in accordance with the rule, but as the result of some minor neglect, compliance was not achieved. See Annex 8.

The “excusable neglect” standard echoes the common requirement in the United States that an attorney act with diligence and competence in representing a client. See, e.g., New York Rules of Professional Conduct, Part 1200, Rule 1.3(a) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). Missing a published deadline is not an example of “excusable neglect,” however, and often such behavior results in bar sanctions for the responsible attorney. See, for example, Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Dunn, 262 P.3d 1268 (Wyo. 2011) (attorney sanctioned for late filings), and In the Matter of Brown-Williams, 2012 WL 366587 (Ga. 2012) (attorney sanctioned for missing statute of limitations).

A recent case from New York illustrates this point. In Graves v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., No. 07-05471, 2011 WL 1044357 (Mar. 4, 2011, S.D.N.Y.), the court rejected an attorney’s filing because it missed the 11:59 p.m. filing deadline by one minute and the attorney was unable to establish excusable neglect. See Annex 9.

Accordingly, there is no basis in fact or law for the NGPC’s post-facto imposition of a discretionary standard, in direct contravention of Article 7(a) of the Guidebook, to benefit only a select few participants in the new gTLD dispute process. The NGPC’s ruling was made on the basis of incomplete, and improperly compiled, reports by the ICANN ombudsman, and as it stands, represents a gross dereliction of ICANN’s duty to treat all
participants equally and fairly (under the ICANN Bylaws) and of principles of due process.

4. **Date of action:**
The NGPC issued its recommendation on July 13, 2013, although Merck KGaA was unaware of the intended impact of this ruling (as it did not mention “Merck & Co.” by name) until opposing counsel filed for rehearing with the ICC on August 16, 2013. Mr. LaHatte’s active exclusion of Merck KGaA from his unilateral discussions with opposing counsel, and failure to provide notice to Merck KGaA (both as the respondent in the disputed action and as a party whose rights were materially affected by his decision) prevented Merck KGaA from being made aware of the impact and intent of the NGPC’s ruling.

5. **On what date did you become aware of the action or that action would not be taken?**
Neither Merck KGaA nor its counsel was made aware of the ongoing discussion between opposing counsel and members of ICANN staff, let alone of the ombudsman’s election to take a decision in this matter without offering the potential respondent a chance to be heard, until receiving the voluminous file submitted by Merck & Co.’s counsel to the ICC on August 16, 2013. This lack of notice is further confirmed by Mr. LaHatte’s email to Merck KGaA’s counsel on August 20th, in which he indicated that he intentionally and affirmatively prevented Merck KGaA from discovering the nature or existence of his ongoing discussions with Merck & Co., and questioning precisely how Merck KGaA had become aware of his unilateral communications with opposing counsel (see **Annex 3**).
Accordingly, under Article IV, Section 2(5)(b) of the ICANN Bylaws, this Request for Reconsideration of an ICANN staff member’s action is brought within the 15-day time limit stipulated for such challenges, starting from the date on which Merck KGaA reasonably became aware of the ruling (August 16th, 2013).

6. **Describe how you believe you are materially affected by the action or inaction:**

In this case, Merck KGaA was denied its right to respond and be heard, or at a bare minimum, to be provided with any notice whatsoever that the ICANN ombudsman and members of the ICANN Board (it has come to our attention that Ms. Dryden was copied on several of the ombudsman’s messages) was engaging in unilateral discussions with opposing counsel. As the respondent in the relevant action, it had an unalienable right to be joined as a participant in these discussions, and to be provided with an opportunity to challenge both ICANN’s jurisdiction and the allegations of Merck & Co. Thus, Merck KGaA has suffered real and tangible harm by the loss of its right to be heard in these proceedings.

Additionally, the NGPC ruling in this matter has a direct impact on the outcome of an ADR dispute between two new gTLD applicants, as the NGPC’s actions (and direct orders from an ICANN staff member) have triggered a review of an already-closed procedure. See **Annex 10** for a copy of Ms. Willett’s letter to the ICC, indicating to the ICC that ICANN intended for a review to be conducted in the .MERCK case (this is made explicit by the fact that Ms. Willett also attached a letter from Ms. Harris (a member of Merck & Co.’s counsel) to ICANN staff – the attachment name, as shown on
the email, is “harris-to-atallah-12jul13[2].pdf”). Ms. Willett’s letter thus makes abundantly clear the fact that the NGPC’s ruling was issued specifically to interfere in this, and a very small, select number of other dispute proceedings. Thus, Merck & Co. has been offered (on the direct order of ICANN) a “second bite at the apple,” to the direct harm of Merck KGaA. This is not equitable practice. Merck & Co. had the same opportunity to assert its rights in the context of the new gTLD dispute procedure as all other potential objectors, and failed to comply with the mandatory requirements. To allow it a “second chance” to file, and to excuse its (likely strategic and intentional) violation of the applicable filing rules, is impermissible under US law, and unconscionable in light of due process requirements. Merck KGaA has thus suffered real and direct harm in this grant of additional, extra-legal “rights” to its opponent, and is thus forced to defend itself when there is no legal basis (as Merck & Co.’s objections should remain time-barred under the applicable and binding rules in effect at the time of filing) for the case now again brought against it.

Furthermore, Merck KGaA has suffered direct financial harm. It has now been put to the extra cost (including attorney’s fees) of again refuting the spurious claims and allegations of Merck & Co. before the ICC, as well as the cost of preparing the present Reconsideration Request for the Governance Board in order redress this matter and see the NGPC’s improper recommendation nullified. Should the Governance Board fail to discharge its duty in this regard, and vacate the relevant portion of the NGPC’s post-facto ruling (which purports to change the mandatory provisions of the new gTLD dispute resolution procedure in a way which benefits only one objector, and only a handful of
parties in total), then Merck KGaA will be put to the additional cost of filing an action for Independent Review with the ICDR, and potentially a case in antitrust against ICANN for breach of its duty as a monopoly provider of DNS services under the US Sherman Act.

8. **Detail of Board Action**

Given the complex nature of this matter, much of the relevant background and explanatory information has been listed together under heading # 3. It is noted that the NGPC’s ruling was issued on the basis of incomplete reports compiled by the ICANN ombudsman, which did not take into account critical facts and arguments which would have been offered by the affected respondent in the .MERCK case.

Additionally, it should be noted that the NGPC’s ruling is also insupportable in light of the antitrust law standards of the US and the EU. The NGPC’s/ICANN’s urging the ICC to grant an exception for a very small number of affected parties (including apparently only one, solitary objector), constitutes an abuse of a dominant position under Section 2 of the US Sherman Act and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

ICANN, as the sole authoritative body worldwide controlling the DNS root, and charged with overseeing and managing the new gTLD registration system, is undoubtedly a monopolist in the sense of US and EU antitrust law. It is settled (indeed, black-letter) law that its status as a non-profit organisation does not grant it antitrust immunity. Nor may ICANN claim immunity on the grounds of the “state-action-doctrine,” as its actions with respect to the new gTLD registration system are neither clearly and affirmatively
expressed nor explicitly determined and supervised by the State itself. In fact, the 1998 US Department of Commerce White Paper – which according to ICANN’s own statements dictates its policies still today – explicitly considered and rejected the idea that ICANN should be given antitrust immunity:

“The new corporation does not need any special grant of immunity from the antitrust laws so long as its policies and practices are reasonably based on, and no broader than necessary to promote the legitimate coordinating objectives of the new corporation. [...] Antitrust law will provide accountability to and protection for the international Internet community.”

See Annex 11, at section 9, pgs. 15 and 23. As a monopolist under antitrust law, ICANN is under a particular obligation, a special responsibility to act in a transparent, fair, reasonable and non-disiscriminatory manner and to treat all applicants equally. ICANN has – to the detriment of Merck KGaA – violated not only one, but all of these principles via the NGPC’s declaration requiring the ICC to “review” Merck & Co.’s late filing. While the original procedural rules of the new gTLD process established mandatory filing deadlines at each stage of the process, which were defined and published before the initiation of the process and made binding on all applicants to the same extent, does indeed meet the prerequisites of antitrust law, this recent deviation now required by the NGPC’s declaration clearly does not.

NGPC’s declaration is nothing less than a “lex Merck & Co.,” established behind closed doors, after closure of the proceedings and without any objective justification. It is neither transparent, nor fair, reasonable or non-discriminatory, and treats Merck & Co.
favourably to the detriment of Merck KGaA and all other objectors that abided by the published filing deadlines established by the Guidebook. Monopolists, however, are only allowed to treat companies subject to their regulations differently if there is an objective justification for such unequal treatment. Beyond any doubt, the NGPC’s declaration is in clear violation of antitrust law, by issuing a retroactive “law” which applies to (and benefits) only a slim handful of the various concerned parties.

9. **What are you asking ICANN to do now?**

The NGPC’s Resolution of July 13, 2013 which states:

“Resolved (2013.07.13.NG04), in the interests of fairness and reasonableness, notwithstanding the deadlines set out in the Applicant Guidebook, in the future, the DRSPs are permitted and encouraged to use their discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances of each matter, and in cases where it is shown that the affected party is making a good faith effort to comply with the deadlines, as to whether to grant extensions, or deviate from the deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook.”

must be vacated.

10. **Please state specifically the grounds under which you have the standing and the right to assert this Request for Reconsideration, and the grounds or justifications that support your request.**

Merck KGaA has suffered real, tangible and legal harm as a result of the actions of the NGPC, acting on behalf of the ICANN Board, and therefore has standing to bring this Request. Additionally, Merck KGaA is an applicant in the current new gTLD application cycle, and ICANN’s election to directly interfere in an ongoing ADR dispute between
Merck KGaA and Merck & Co. thus bears immediate impact on Merck KGaA’s rights as a participant in the application process.

As a party to a dispute under the ICANN new gTLD dispute resolution procedure, Merck KGaA has a right to be copied on all dispute-related communications under the provisions of the Guidebook. Where, as here, ICANN has elected to act as a final “court of appeals” overseeing, weighing in on, and indeed altering the very standards of implementation on a post-hoc basis of its DSRPs, ICANN must be held to the same standards of transparency and fair dealing outlined both in its Bylaws and required by the communications regulations of the Guidebook. There is no scope for the issuance of a retroactive ruling, requiring a DSRP to re-evaluate some (but not all) of its decisions utilizing a previously unpublished standard. There is likewise no scope for the adoption of a “discretionary” standard with regard to the acceptance of untimely objections under the text of the Guidebook, which was made binding on all parties to the new gTLD dispute process.

Accordingly, the NGPC has overstepped his authority in this matter, as it (or the ICANN ombudsman) does not have the authority to act as an appeals court for the decisions of the DSRPs. Furthermore, the NGPC made its decision, which directly affects the legal rights of Merck KGaA, without any of the information or arguments which Merck KGaA would have offered had it not been expressly excluded from the ombudsman’s decision making process. Thus, the NGPC’s ruling has caused material harm to Merck KGaA by denying it an opportunity to be heard in case-related matters which affect its legal rights. For all of the above reasons, Merck KGaA has standing to
bring the present Request.

11. Are you bringing this Reconsideration Request on behalf of multiple persons or entities?
   
   X No

Terms and Conditions for Submission of Reconsideration Requests

The Board Governance Committee has the ability to consolidate the consideration of Reconsideration Requests if the issues stated within are sufficiently similar.

The Board Governance Committee may dismiss Reconsideration Requests that are querulous or vexatious.

Hearings are not required in the Reconsideration Process, however Requestors may request a hearing. The BGC retains the absolute discretion to determine whether a hearing is appropriate, and to call people before it for a hearing.

The BGC may take a decision on reconsideration of requests relating to staff action/inaction without reference to the full ICANN Board. Whether recommendations will issue to the ICANN Board is within the discretion of the BGC.

The ICANN Board of Director’s decision on the BGC’s reconsideration recommendation is final and not subject to a reconsideration request.

Martin Müller, Attorney at Law

Date

30/08/2013

on behalf of Dr. Torsten Bettinger,
Attorney at Law
Annex 1
Dear Mr Cohen,

Thank you for the emails. Perhaps before I start a more formal investigation you could see if your objection has been accepted and this will determine my next steps.

Regards

Sent from my iPhone

On 16/03/2013, at 9:50 AM, "Cohen, Darren B." <DCohen@...> wrote:

Dear ICANN Ombudsman/Mr. Lahatte,

On behalf of one of our clients, we attempted to file a couple of Community Objections to certain newly applied for gTLDs last night prior to the filing deadline. During the course of submitting the two objections to the ICC, we experienced a lengthy Internet outage, which resulted in our email submissions being sent 10 and 11 minutes respectively past the 8PM EST deadline (we resent a supplement submission as soon as we could). Is there a process available for finding out whether the Community Objections were nonetheless accepted for processing? The fees had already been paid earlier on the day via wire transfer, and the only reason for the 10 and 11 minute delay was due to technical issues beyond our control. If the submissions will not be accepted, is there a process for appealing based on unforeseen and uncontrollable technical/internet outage issues? A good faith effort was made to reach the deadlines and the fees paid, and the difference was only roughly ten minutes.

I think you very much for your consideration and reply.

Darren Cohen

* * *

This E-mail, along with any attachments, is considered confidential and may well be legally privileged. If you have received it in error, you are on notice of its status. Please notify us immediately by reply e-mail and then delete this message from your system. Please do not copy it or use it for any purposes, or disclose its contents to any other person. Thank you for your cooperation.

* * *

To ensure compliance with Treasury Department regulations, we inform you that, unless otherwise indicated in writing, any U.S. Federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (1) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or applicable state and local provisions or (2) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any tax-related matters addressed herein.
Annex 2
Dear Mr. LaHatte,

I am writing to you in connection with the attached file, which appears to be a copy of an email communication between ICANN staff members, and which was copied to Ms. Judith Harris of Reed Smith LLP. I am extremely concerned that I was not made aware of this communication, nor of any potential ongoing discussions in the matter of Merck & Co.’s improperly-filed ICC actions.

As you are aware, given the content of my message of July 29, I represent Merck KGaA, the potential respondent in the untimely actions previously filed by Ms. Harris’ firm. If, in contravention of the published filing deadlines, the actions submitted by Merck & Co. were to be reconsidered for acceptance by the ICC, my client would suffer substantial and irreparable harm. Therefore, I am very concerned that I was not copied to your communications, and have not been made aware of any ongoing discussion in this matter.

As noted, there are no grounds for any “reconsideration” of the ICC’s proper rejection of Merck & Co.’s improperly submitted materials. The ICC considered several rounds of discussions between the parties in reaching its conclusion. Your office has not provided my client with an opportunity to submit copies of its materials, nor allowed it to be heard in the course of your decision-making process. There are indeed grave concerns with the “evidence” submitted by Ms. Harris, and discrepancies in the alleged timeline concerning the supposed technical issues experienced by Mr. Cohen in filing the materials. As confirmed by a member of the senior legal staff at WIPO, Mr. Cohen was able to file pleadings for Merck & Co. with the WIPO Center at 23:56 and 23:58 on March 13. Thus, the alleged time line proffered by Reed Harris is inaccurate, and merely constitutes an attempt to secure an improper extension of the mandated filing deadline.

In my previous email, I kindly requested the opportunity to submit additional evidence, demonstrating why it would be inappropriate to reopen this discussion or to consider accepting Merck & Co.’s untimely pleadings. Accordingly, I am quite distressed to learn that, apparently, these discussions have gone on without providing notice to the putative respondent. It is inappropriate for ICANN to carry on communications with only one party to a dispute, and to prevent said party from submitting evidence and argumentation on its behalf.

The ICC was in full possession of these facts when it reviewed the case, and it came to the proper conclusion in rejecting the untimely pleadings. There is no scope for the “reconsideration” of this rejection, as it was both in line with the mandated filing requirements and undertaken after a full and complete review of all available evidence.

Accordingly, I would kindly request to be provided with full and complete copies of all unilateral communications which have taken place with regard to this matter, and that any further discussion concerning the potential untimely acceptance of Merck & Co.’s pleadings be ceased. The ICC’s ruling, which was appropriate and well-informed, should remain.

With best regards,

Torsten Bettinger
Dr. Torsten Bettinger, LL.M.
Rechtsanwalt

Fachanwalt für Informationstechnologierecht
Fachanwalt für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz

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Important:
The information contained in this communication is attorney-client-privileged and confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity
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any dissemination, distribution, or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received the communication in error, please immediately
notify us by telephone and return the original to us at the above address and then delete the communication. Thank you.

Disclaimer Version RS.US.20.10.00
Dear Mr Bettinger,

I am not sure how this email reached you. Normally when someone complains to the Ombudsman, the communications are confidential, and this is a primary feature of my office. It would be wrong of me to communicate to any other person, without the specific consent of the affected parties. So the reason you were not notified of this email, is that I did not have permission to send this to you or anyone else. I should add that I did not seek such permission, because the default position for me, is always confidentiality. Obviously my recommendation is now out in the open. It would not be appropriate to engage in the debate any further, because the limit of my jurisdiction is the recommendation. Beyond that, it is not appropriate for me to enter into the dispute any further, unless a matter specifically within my jurisdiction arises. I hope this clarifies the position of the ombudsman.

Regards

Chris LaHatte
Ombudsman
Blog https://omblog.icann.org/
Webpage http://www.icann.org/en/help/ombudsman

Confidentiality
All matters brought before the Ombudsman shall be treated as confidential. The Ombudsman shall also take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall only make inquiries about, or advise staff or Board members of the existence and identity of, a complainant in order to further the resolution of the complaint. The Ombudsman shall take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure that if staff and Board members are made aware of the existence and identity of a complainant, they agree to maintain the confidential nature of such information, except as necessary to further the resolution of a complaint.
Annex 4
ICANN Ombudsman Blog

August 18, 2013

Investigation report on Civil Discourse Case 13-00058

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 4:45 pm

Office of the Ombudsman

Case 13-00058

In a matter of a Complaint by AB

Report dated August 2013

Introduction

This investigation has become a complicated mixture of a complaint about comments made on an ICANN mailing list, which on further investigation also resulted in a complaint about an election process, from the person the subject of the mailing list complaint. I deal with those separately, but the two matters are to some extent intermingled. The second complaint however appears to have resolved by other means.

I quote, with redactions to avoid identification of the individuals and organisation, the message which was posted on the mailing list.

"Having worked with the (name of body) and the (government department) in the past, and having maintained a relationship with senior members of each subsequently, I’m certain that whatever CD is up to is unlikely to be consistent with the public interest in public health in the (name) market of ideas and names.

C has always struck me as one of the least intelligent, and least principled persons to have ever been on the (name) Council."

The complainant found this offensive and asked for the posting to be removed from the archive because it breached the relevant rules of procedure. I have not identified the rules of procedure from the supporting organisation, again because it identifies the individuals without difficulty. The complaint was made on behalf of the person identified.

Facts

The essence of the complaint is whether the comments made are offensive, and whether they should be removed. I understand the comments have already been removed in any event. So the issue is whether it was appropriate for the comments to have been made and whether they are offensive.

Investigation

It is my common practice on issues involving personalities to strongly urge the parties to join in a mediation. The first part of my investigation therefore consisted of an attempt to persuade the person who made the statement, to join in such a mediation. This was a protracted exercise, because the statement maker did not focus on the specific issue, and chose only to respond to certain parts of my enquiries. This is a pity, because
of people do not engage in the process, it is difficult to achieve a resolution that restores some degree of harmony within the supporting organisation.

The statement maker was invited to retract and apologise for the statements, by a community leader, in a message which said as follows:-

“Upon the request of XY, Chair of the (Organisation), your posting rights to the (name) mailing list and (name) wiki have been suspended.

Per the Chair, your account can be reactivated if the following conditions are met:
1. You apologize for the (date) comment to the aggrieved party CC’ing the Chair and Secretary of (name);
2. You re-apply for unaffiliated (name) membership following the proper procedures; and
3. (name) review this case and reach a consensus.

Please also find attached a copy of the (name) Code of Conduct for your review.”

Regrettably, there has been no apology, although the membership issue appears to have been resolved by other means. His initial response was to question who had make the complaint, and when and where. I then specifically put the comment to him, identified by date, person and place. He declined to discuss the matter, and I was not able to persuade him to join a mediation. His primary response was that he thought that there was no complainant, but subsequently would not engage in a discussion about the comment posted on the mailing list, nor would he discuss whether the offensive comment was something which should be removed or apologise. This effectively frustrated any attempt to reach a more conciliatory settlement of the issue. I therefore notified him that I would prepare a formal report about the complaint and send him a copy in due course.

For the avoidance of any doubt, I consider it quite clear that the comment made was offensive by any standard. There is no doubt that on many mailing lists, there is often robust discussion about the issues currently before the organisation. But there are specific rules about content and standards of behaviour, which have been in place for some time.

Jurisdiction

This is a matter where I clearly have jurisdiction. An unfairness results when someone is offensively criticised in a mailing list within part of an ICANN supporting organisation. The unfairness is compounded when the statement maker refuses to engage in a conciliatory process.

Reasoning

The complainant’s issue is the statements made on the mailing list were offensive. The identification and investigation of this as being offensive was not difficult. Normally, as I have cited earlier, a mediation or conciliation process should resolve issues like this. Comments made in the heat of debate are sometimes inappropriate, but usually the parties can be persuaded to withdraw and apologise. I am conscious from my work as a mediator, that parties under stress sometimes act inappropriately. I would have liked to investigate whether there was some stress factor which influenced the statement maker to make the offensive comments. I am confident that if there had been some explanation based on some background, that the complainant would have been satisfied with a retraction and apology. The statement maker however has chosen not to engage in the process. I have little difficulty therefore in finding that the statements were offensive, and hopefully by now removed. The resulting suspension of the statement maker is understandable in the light of such refusal. I do not consider that the suspension was unfair and no circumstances. I would strongly suggest
to the statement maker, that engaging in the mediation process would be more productive in the future. It may be that he has some views about the mediation process, but he is also aware of the standards of behaviour expected, when making postings on this mailing list.

**Result**

As a result of this investigation, I consider the reaction of the organisation in suspending the posting privileges was an appropriate response and not unfair. I will be posting this report on my website, because it is appropriate to remind those within the ICANN world, that there are standards of behaviour and that they should be respected. It is also important to note that such interpersonal criticism is in my view, best resolved with a mediation process, where the parties can engage in constructive discussions, and apologise where needed. It is important to be inclusive, but where there are breaches of the standards of behaviour, then sanctions do need to be made.

Chris LaHatte
Ombudsman

Comments (0)

**July 19, 2013**

**Reappointment to second term as Ombudsman**

Filed under: **Uncategorized** — Chris LaHatte @ 9:41 pm

I am re-posting the resolution from the Board

1. **Reappointment of Ombudsman**

   Whereas, the Ombudsman’s initial term concludes on 27 July 2013.

   Whereas, the Compensation Committee, which is responsible for overseeing the Ombudsman performance and compensation, has recommended that the Board reappoint Chris LaHatte as the Ombudsman for another two-year term.

   Whereas, the current Ombudsman has agreed to serve another term if appointed.

   Resolved (2013.07.17.11), in accordance with Article V, Section 1.2 of the ICANN Bylaws, the Board hereby reappoints Chris LaHatte as the ICANN Ombudsman for a second two-year term from 28 July 2013 through 27 July 2015, and authorizes the General Counsel and Secretary to execute an agreement with Mr. LaHatte.

**Rationale for Resolution 2013.07.17.11**

affects the transparency and accountability of ICANN as the Ombudsman is one of the three main accountability mechanisms within ICANN. ICANN’s current Ombudsman is familiar with and well versed in the complex issues now facing ICANN, including the New gTLD Program and other initiatives currently under way. Mr. LaHatte’s caseload continues to increase over time, as both the nature of ICANN’s activities and the breadth of the ICANN community expand. Maintaining continuity in the Ombudsman’s Office with Mr. LaHatte, who is known and respected by members of the ICANN community, is important to ICANN’s accountability.

As there has been a budget for an ICANN Ombudsman since 2004 when the first Ombudsman was appointed this decision does not have any financial impact on ICANN, the community or the public that was not already anticipated or included in the budget. This decision will not have any impact on the security, stability or resiliency of the domain name system.

This is an Organizational Administrative Function that does not require public comment.

Comments (0)

June 26, 2013

Ombudsman Recommendation on Late Objection

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 5:27 pm

This is a letter which I sent to the Board on 31 May 2013:-

Steve Crocker

Chair

ICANN Board

Scott Seitz

dotgay LLC

Christopher R Barron
Chairman Emeritus, GOProud


Objections for String .gay by GOProud

I have received a complaint in relation to the rejection of an objection to the string .gay lodged by the community group called GOProud. The objection was filed within time but then rejected because it exceeded the prescribed word length, by approximately 500 words. The notice of the rejection was sent to an email address which was not the one used to file the objection, and therefore notice of the rejection arrived later than expected, which meant that the amended objection was then not filed on time. GOProud made some enquiries about progress of their objection and assert they did not get any response until they were told the objection had been rejected. They make the point that if the rejection had been sent to the correct email address, they could have easily lodged the amended objection within time.

I am concerned about the fairness of such a decision to reject the objection, when there appears to be a valid reason why notice of the initial rejection was not received. It is of course possible for the objector and the applicant to meet to discuss the objection, which is contemplated by the objection process outlined in the guidebook. However my concern as the ombudsman, is that there is some unfairness in the subsequent rejection given the apparent error in the use of the wrong email. It seems to me that it would be relatively easy to unwind that decision, and permit the late filing of the objection. I can of course only make a recommendation, but in this case where there is some unfairness I think the matter should be revisited.

Please contact me if you have any queries about this matter. I believe a quick decision does need to be made.

I have sent a copy of this letter to the objector and to the applicant. I have already offered to facilitate or mediate the objection, but the position of GOProud is that they want the objection in place before they would consider such a process. Given the unfairness in the rejection, that does not seem to be an unreasonable position.

Yours faithfully,

Chris LaHatte

ICANN Ombudsman
June 10, 2013

Ombudsman Report on Late Objections

Filed under: Uncategorized  — Chris LaHatte @ 1:12 am

Office of the Ombudsman

Case 13-00111

In a matter of a Complaint by AB

Report dated 10th June 2012

Introduction

This investigation began with a complaint about the objection process to the new gTLD Programme, and specifically a complaint that an objection was actually filed late, in that it was filed after midnight, and received late by the complainant (despite some amelioration of the strictness of the time limit). The significance of the objection process is that the Applicant Guidebook and procedure for the programme factored in the ability for affected individuals to object to applications for particular new gTLDs on a number of grounds. These include string confusion, legal rights objections, limited public interest objections and community objections. Once the objection had been filed then the applicant must respond to the objection, because otherwise the objector would prevail by default. Provided the objection was correctly lodged, and the applicant responded, then the objection would be handled by a panel of qualified experience depending on the category of objection.

Facts

The essence of this complaint is that objections were filed late, and it is the position of the complainant that it should not face an objection where the objector was unable to file an objection within the required time. The complainant said that when the objection was copied to them, it was clear the objection had been received at 12:01 a.m. on 14 March 2013 although the Applicant Guidebook stated that the objection had to be filed by midnight on 13 March 2013. On investigation, the applicant then discovered that the dispute resolution provider, in this case ICC, had conferred with other dispute resolution providers and agreed to permit a five minute window after midnight on 13th March, and that it would accept objections during that window. The applicant says specifically about the timing of the objection-

“That means, the employee tasked with the job of filing the objection pressed the send button after midnight, to be precise at 00:01:02 Thursday 14 March 2013 (UTC). I attach the report from (expert) which clearly shows this. The objection was then received by us at 00:04:54 Thursday 14 March 2013 (UTC).”

The complainant was concerned that I note that the objection was actually sent after the filing deadline, and not immediately before and then received late due to the process of sending taking more time.

The complainant then contacted ICANN and subsequently discovered that the providers had conferred among themselves, and was later advised that ICANN did not intervene or give any advice about the five minute window. The complainant has also expressed some frustration that it endeavoured to make enquiries
to ICANN about the decision, but had no response. The complainant indicates that this is why it has chosen to ask the ombudsman to investigate this issue.

It should be noted that the objector is a competing applicant, and this needs to be factored into what has happened. The complainant considered that this meant the objector acted in bad faith, by lodging the objection at the very last possible time.

I have discussed this with ICANN staff and was told decisions about the window were left entirely to the dispute resolution providers, and that ICANN did not participate in the decision, and accepted the decision. The perception seems to be from outside observers, that ICANN endorsed this decision, but certainly my investigation indicates that ICANN staff accepted a decision rather than say that it was right or wrong, which would be my understanding of endorsement. The complainant noted to me

“As we have already indicated, we did receive insight from Christine Willet as to ICANN’s decision making process, during webinars and presentations in which Ms. Willet was involved. Essentially the DRSPs asked ICANN for its view on late filed objections, ICANN responded that the DRSPs should decide amongst themselves, but be consistent. The DRSPs then unilaterally decided to extend the previously communicated deadline (after it had passed), presented this solution to ICANN, which agreed.”

Investigation

To undertake this investigation I have undertaken a number of steps. In particular I discussed this with the applicant with an exchange of emails, I have talked to Christine Willett (VP gTLD Operations) and legal staff at ICANN, and I have also made a call for comments on my blog and Twitter feed. I believe it is important that the community should comment on this issue, both from the perspective of applicants and of objectors. I am grateful to those who have made comments, which have been thoughtful and useful. I am conscious that there have been very substantial investments in the applications, but also of course recognise that objectors also consider that they have economic and other interests affected by awarding a new gTLD to applicants.

Issues

The issue which I am required to investigate is the fairness of the decision to permit the filing of the objection within the additional window and beyond the limit prescribed in the Applicant Handbook.

Jurisdiction

This is a matter where I do need to carefully consider the jurisdiction to investigate the complaint. My jurisdiction is limited to issues between ICANN and the ICANN community. The issue is therefore whether a dispute resolution provider, contracted by ICANN to evaluate objections, can be subject of an investigation by the ombudsman in relation to fairness. Put in another way, is the dispute resolution provider a member of the ICANN community? My jurisdiction is excluded for certain types of contractual relationship with the bylaws says “or issues related to vendor/supplier relations”. However that sort of contractual relationship is intended to deal with issues of procurement rather than the more complex arrangements made in the context of the gTLD programme. The complainant did make the point that ICANN was consulted during the course of the discussion about loosening the rigour of the time for objection. So in the context of the purpose of the exclusion, I do believe that I have jurisdiction. Certainly the applicant/complainant submitted that I did, and should investigate the decision.

Reasoning

The modern test for dealing with issues of fairness also encompasses the concept of proportionality. In his correspondence with me, the applicant/complainant did say, quoting from the NTAG meeting in Beijing “’The DRSP’s amongst themselves discussed this issue. And due to their own system issues, the synchronization of
clocks around the world, and concerns they had, they elected to extend their window by five minutes and accept objections that were filed, according to some clocks in some parts of the world, five minutes after the deadline.” The point that needs to be emphasised is that the objection is not by any means fatal to the success of any of the applications. It is simply a step which has to be undertaken and answered during the course of a long and complex process. In the context of proportionality, and considering the issue of fairness I would pose the question, is it better for the community that applications are properly challenged and debated and succeed therefore on the merits, or should a more prescriptive approach be adopted?

There have been a number of comments made in relation to this issue on blog sites which make it clear that some members of the community have strong views about a prescriptive approach. One comment was “people have spent years and hundreds of thousands of dollars on their applications. A technicality should not determine the outcome.” But another comment was that filing an objection late was not a technicality. Other objectors have agreed commenting that a strict approach should be adopted.

However I also need to bear in mind that my jurisdiction is limited to making a recommendation about the process, which would be to recommend that either a strict approach be adopted or that the decision of the dispute resolution providers is proportionate to the issue. Even if I were to recommend the strict approach, it is open to the dispute resolution providers to maintain their position about the five minute window.

It would also be open for me to suggest to the board that they suspend the objection process, a course urged upon me by this applicant. While I cannot predict what they would decide, I think it likely that they would respect the decision of the dispute resolution providers. The dispute resolution providers are independent, and make their own decisions. For the board to interfere would be controversial.

Of course it would be open to me to comment on the fairness or otherwise of such decisions. Given the circumstances described by the providers and discussed at Beijing, it is my view that a five minute window is a proportionate response and does not create unfairness for the applicants, but does provide fairness given that it is only five minutes. I am told that some objections received later were in fact rejected. I am directly aware of at least one. That is perhaps not surprising, in the context of a decision about a five minute window.

There is no doubt that sending an objection by the competing applicant for the same string is perhaps a different matter from an objection by a detached observer. I do not believe that this somehow taints the objection because the very process anticipates objections from competing applicants. They had a right to object, and exercised that right, if a little tardily. But in the context of the decision to accept within a five minute window, then the objection is proper lodged.

Result

As a result of this investigation, I consider that the decision of the dispute resolution providers to permit the five minute window does not create unfairness for the applicant and is a proportionate response. In addition I do not consider that the sending, and for the DRP to accept the objection, of the objection, within the window is unfair.

Chris LaHatte
Ombudsman

Comments (0)
May 15, 2013

**Objections to new gTLD Applications**

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 5:06 pm

I have had a number of complaints about the action of the dispute resolution providers in accepting some objections past the deadline. It appears that these come into two categories, some with very large attachments to emails which were sent before the deadline, but which took some time to transmit, meaning the final parts were sent late. In addition some were sent minutes after the deadline due to technical difficulties. Two complainants have both made a formal complaint to my office stating that I should recommend to the board that late complaints should not be received on the basis that the deadlines were well advertised and achievable. It appears from my discussions that there appears to have been a window of a a few moments permitted by the dispute resolution providers. It should also be added that ICANN did not approve or disapprove the leeway given by the dispute resolution providers. I am interested to hear community comments on this issue. One of the complainants specifically suggested a blog entry, and I have also made a Twitter comment. I look forward to hearing from you either here, on Twitter or to ombudsman@icann.org. Full confidentiality is of course assured if you wish this.

Comments (2)

April 15, 2013

**The voice of the crowd-ICANN Public Forum**

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 8:13 pm

One of the features of the regular ICANN meeting is the public forum which is now held on Thursday afternoon, the last day of the meeting. This is an occasion where the voice of the people can be heard, and the only restriction on the topic is that the speakers must limit their address to 2 minutes and comply with the ICANN rules about Expected Standards of Behaviour. These are “Treat all members of the ICANN community equally, irrespective of nationality, gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability, age, or sexual orientation; members of the ICANN community should treat each other with civility both face to face and online.”

So provided the speaker respects those standards, then they are free to speak. This means that the speaker can discuss anything of concern to them. This is perhaps a poignant issue, when the meeting is held in a country where the freedom to speak is not given the same importance as some other participant countries in the ICANN community.

There is often an issue of not wishing to offend a host. But underlying this is sometimes the need to respect freedom of speech. During the ICANN meeting there was an incident where someone tried to speak inappropriately at an earlier meeting, where they were off topic. This resulted in two complaints to my office, over the next day. One of those was from the speaker and the other from a participant in the meeting, who was concerned about a perception that the speaker had been treated badly by not being able to speak. I explained carefully both to the speaker, and to the other complainant, that the initial forum at which he tried to speak was the wrong place, because he was off topic. I explained that we did have the public forum where he could express his views freely. I then made a specific arrangement so that he would be able to speak at the forum and that he also understood the rules about expected standards of behaviour. He completely understood this issue and did explain to me why he wanted to talk.
So in due course on Thursday, he arranged for someone to talk for the 2 minutes on this topic and was pleased to have been given the opportunity.

Sometimes things like freedom of speech are taken for granted, when it is an accepted part of our community. Not all places offer the same freedom, and within the world of ICANN, we can assist in ensuring that there is free and open discussion. I was pleased to be able to assist this person. Otherwise of course this would have been unfair.

Comments (0)

April 8, 2013

Beijing ICANN 46

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 12:52 am

Today is the 1st official day of the full ICANN meeting in Beijing. We began with the traditional opening ceremony and another aspirational and inspiring speech from Fadi Chehade on the management tools which he is developing to ensure our bottom-up stakeholders model works with the open and transparent knowledge of what ICANN staff are actually doing. I am not part of that management system of course, because of the confidential nature of the complaints which come into my office. My new case management software however will do much the same for me, to more efficiently handle the increasing workload and respond better to my visitors. It has already been a little busy in my office with a range of complaints, some possibly quite controversial. I am shortly closing my afternoon clinic, to attend the Internet governance update. This proves to be a very topical issue and I am keen to see the latest developments. The ICANN ombudsman does have a role in the governance of ICANN, because of the particular function of fairness in the way in our multi stakeholder organisation works, and as a symbol to the community that they have an independent outlet if they feel the structure is not working. So I am keen to learn from the latest developments.

Comments (0)

March 18, 2013

Engineering Ethics and Codes of Conduct

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 6:41 pm

On Monday 18th March I had the privilege of listening to Professor John Uff QC talk about engineering ethics. He is a civil engineer with a specialty in geotechnics, an Emeritus Professor of Engineering Law at King’s College, London, a global authority on construction law and a Queen’s Counsel. He has served as Vice President of the London Court of International Arbitration and as President of the Society of Construction Arbitrators. I cannot think of many who are as well qualified to discuss this issue! My interest was sparked because I have been asked to comment on ethical issues from time to time. The whole concept of fairness must ultimately be based on ethical considerations, which for professionals, are often described in codes. Professor Uff was invited to address the New Zealand Institute of Professional Engineers, who extended the invitation to lawyers and members of the Arbitrators and Mediators Institute.

The reason Professor Uff was invited was the discussion of ethical duties of engineers arising from the 2 major disasters in New Zealand, relating to engineering failure. The 1st was the Christchurch earthquake and subsequent after-shocks, and the 2nd was the Pike River coal mine explosion. The fact this has caused the
New Zealand engineers to reappraise the duties which engineers owed to the public as expressed in their code of ethics, and Professor Uff has written extensively on the subject.

At ICANN we do not have a formal code of ethics for the operation of the domain name system. There are a number of elements however which collectively are the start of such code. The very creation of ICANN as a not-for-profit multi-stakeholder organisation separates it from purely commercial enterprises. The existence of the office of the ombudsman to deal with issues of fairness, delay and diversity does make ICANN different, and the Ombudsman have also adopted the standards of practice for online dispute resolution. Frank Fowlie also developed the statement for respectful communication. ICANN also has similar guidelines within the communities which make up ICANN. More recently, ICANN has proposed a new draft of Registrants’ Rights and Responsibilities, which is akin to a code of ethics. I have suggested the Ombudsman should have a specific role in this code. Professor Uff did warn the meeting however, that we should not create codes of ethics as a reaction to a problem or in the case of the engineering disasters, as a response to such major calamities. Fortunately at ICANN there has not been a significant issue, except of course this draft was developed because of the new GTLD program. This is different from the engineering code issues, but is analogous because it is a reaction to the event. I am hoping there will be some debate, at Beijing and further, on the use of such a code and perhaps a wider debate.

Comments (0)

March 13, 2013

Case Management

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 3:40 pm

A case management system is probably not something which attracts much discussion or interest among my readers. ICANN itself has recently moved into the use of a sophisticated project management system to assist with collaboration and planning of work. The office of the ombudsman has had a useful case management system, but unfortunately it has become somewhat outdated. So I have been spending a considerable amount of time recently in researching new systems, and evaluating the products available.

I have now had my new system approved by ICANN and also by our security team, an important element because of my need for confidentiality. I have been spending time with the vendor to create the different alternatives and tools to work with the system, which I hope will enable faster handling of complaints and better reports as to the issues which I am handling. I am incorporating within the system a project management option so that when more complex complaints are received they can be handled with appropriate templates and milestones to assist in a better product.

The interface, for people who want to lodge a complaint, will not change greatly. What I hope to achieve is a system which will enable much more information to be provided, and which will process the complaints more actively. While many of my complaints continue to be outside my jurisdiction, nonetheless they needed to be considered and appropriate referrals made to the correct place to consider the issue. I believe my visitors prefer to know quickly whether I am able to deal with their complaint or whether it has to go somewhere else.

So on the face of it nothing will have any substantial changes, but within about two months we should have a new system with greater analysis and efficiency available.

Perhaps this is not very exciting, but I am sharing this so that my visitors know that the engine is being lifted
and replaced by the 2013 model. The driver remains however as the 1954 model.

Comments (0)

March 7, 2013

Trolls

Filed under: Uncategorized — Chris LaHatte @ 4:50 pm

It is not unusual for me to receive complaints about intemperate or rude comments made within the ICANN community. Some years ago Frank Fowlie produced a most useful paper on the subject which is now placed on my pages at http://www.icann.org/en/help/ombudsman/respectful-communication. There are of course other policies within ICANN which consider similar issues. It is quite understandable when people are passionate about their ideas and policies, that they will occasionally step over the line and send an email or make a post, which often they will subsequently regret. Sadly the nature of the Internet is that sometimes these comments become embedded and impossible to remove because they have been repeated. I suspect in a number of cases the person who made the intemperate comment greatly regrets having done so, but is powerless to remove the trail. I have been following articles about someone who deliberately chooses to make critical, controversial and often very hurtful comments, and sadly this person is located in my own country of New Zealand. Apparently he is aged eighteen. I have a certain experience with teenagers, and understand how the mouth is often engaged before the brain is placed into gear. But one of the lubricants which makes society work is respect for the views of others. Perhaps politeness is regarded as an old-fashioned virtue, and certainly my parents told me that I must be polite. In the dark ages when I was a teenager, I am sure that I did not comply with the requests to be polite. But fortunately any comments I made were not embedded in the darker interstices of the Internet. Now this young New Zealand troll has achieved notoriety throughout the world by intemperate and hurtful comments, which apparently he claims are social experiments. I expect that he is pleased with all of the attention but I rather doubt that we are to see a considered academic consideration of his experiment. I am all for strong debate. But Frank Fowlie’s paper has a continued relevance, although I doubt that the eighteen-year-old has read this in preparation for his social experiment.

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Annex 5
Background: Prescription drug users brought products liability actions against drug manufacturer, which were later consolidated, asserting claims under Virginia law for, inter alia, strict liability, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, and negligence in the design, testing, development, manufacture, labeling, marketing, distribution, and sale of drug. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, John F. Keenan, J., 694 F.Supp.2d 253, granted manufacturer's motion for summary judgment. Drug users appealed. The Court of Appeals, 653 F.3d 95, Lohier, J., certified questions to the Virginia Supreme Court.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, S. Bernard Goodwyn, J., held that:
(1) Virginia's two year statute of limitations applicable to prescription drug users' products liability actions against manufacturer of a nitrogenous bisphosphonate was not equitably tolled due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction, and
(2) two year statute of limitations applicable to prescription drug users' products liability actions against manufacturer of a nitrogenous bisphosphonate was not statutorily tolled during the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction.

Certified questions answered in the negative.

West Headnotes
[1] Limitation of Actions 241 k 126.5

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Computation of Period of Limitation
241II(H) Commencement of Proceeding; Relation Back
241k126.5 k. Class actions, matters peculiar to. Most Cited Cases
Virginia's two-year statute of limitations applicable to prescription drug users' products liability actions against manufacturer of a nitrogenous bisphosphonate, allegedly linked to osteonecrosis, was not equitably tolled due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction. West's V.C.A. § 8.01–243(A).

[2] Limitation of Actions 241 k 199(1)

241 Limitation of Actions
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review
241k199 Questions for Jury
241k199(1) k. In general. Most Cited Cases
The applicability of the statute of limitations is a purely legal question of statutory construction.

[3] Limitation of Actions 241 k 5(1)

241 Limitation of Actions
241II Statutes of Limitation
241II(A) Nature, Validity, and Construction in General
241k5 Construction of Limitation Laws in General
241k5(1) k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Statutes of limitations are strictly enforced and must be applied unless the General Assembly has clearly created an exception to their application.

[4] Limitation of Actions 241 k 5(1)
General

241k(5) k. In general. Most Cited Cases

Limitation of Actions 241

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation

241II(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense

241k43 k. Causes of action in general. Most Cited Cases

A statute of limitations may not be tolled, or an exception applied, in the absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect; any doubt must be resolved in favor of the enforcement of the statute.

[5] Limitation of Actions 241

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation

241II(H) Commencement of Proceeding; Relation Back

241k126.5 k. Class actions, matters peculiar to. Most Cited Cases

Virginia's two-year statute of limitations applicable to prescription drug users' products liability actions against manufacturer of a nitrogenous bisphosphonate, allegedly linked to osteonecrosis, was not statutorily tolled during the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction, where the drug users were not named plaintiffs in the putative class action that they claimed triggered the tolling, but were merely members of the putative class that included every single American who took the drug in question, whether he or she sought a refund, medical monitoring, or an award for personal injury. West's V.C.A. §§ 8.01–229(E)(1), 8.01–243(A).

[6] Limitation of Actions 241

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation

241II(H) Commencement of Proceeding; Relation Back

241k130 New Action After Dismissal or Nonsuit or Failure of Former Action

241k130(5) k. Dismissal or nonsuit in general. Most Cited Cases

For the filing of an action that is subsequently abated or dismissed without a determination on the merits to toll the statute of limitations from running on a subsequently filed action, there must be identity of the parties in the two lawsuits; in other words, for the statute of limitations to be tolled for a subsequent action, the party who brought the original action must be the same as the plaintiff in the subsequent action or a recognized representative of that plaintiff asserting the same cause and right of action. West's V.C.A. § 8.01–229(E)(1).


13 Action

13I Grounds and Conditions Precedent

13k13 k. Persons entitled to sue. Most Cited Cases

An individual or entity does not acquire standing to sue in a representative capacity by asserting the rights of another, unless authorized by statute to do so.

[8] Action 13

13 Action

13I Grounds and Conditions Precedent

13k13 k. Persons entitled to sue. Most Cited Cases

Limitation of Actions 241

241 Limitation of Actions

241II Computation of Period of Limitation

241II(H) Commencement of Proceeding; Relation Back

241k117 Proceedings Constituting Commencement of Action

241k118 In General

241k118(1) k. In general. Most Cited Cases

When a party without standing brings a legal
action, the action so instituted is, in effect, a legal nullity, and thus cannot toll the statute of limitations.

[9] Limitation of Actions 241 130(8)

241 Limitation of Actions
  241II Computation of Period of Limitation
    241III(H) Commencement of Proceeding; Relation Back
      241k130 New Action After Dismissal or Nonsuit or Failure of Former Action

[10] Parties 287 35.13

287 Parties
  287III Representative and Class Actions
    287III(A) In General
      287k35.13 k. Representation of class; typicality. Most Cited Cases

A “putative class action” is a representative action in which a representative plaintiff attempts to represent the interests of not only named plaintiffs, but also those of unnamed class members.


228 Judgment
  228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
    228XIV(B) Persons Concluded
      228k677 k. Persons represented by parties. Most Cited Cases

Parties 287 35.13

287 Parties
  287III Representative and Class Actions
    287III(A) In General
      287k35.13 k. Representation of class; typicality. Most Cited Cases

A class representative who files a putative class action is not recognized as having standing to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of the unnamed members of the putative class; thus there is no identity of parties between the named plaintiff in a putative class action and the named plaintiff in a subsequent action filed by a putative class member individually.

[12] Limitation of Actions 241 126.5

241 Limitation of Actions
  241II Computation of Period of Limitation
    241III(H) Commencement of Proceeding; Relation Back
      241k126.5 k. Class actions, matters peculiar to. Most Cited Cases

A putative class action cannot toll the running of the statutory period for unnamed putative class members who are not recognized as plaintiffs or represented plaintiffs in the original action. West's V.C.A. § 8.01–229(E)(1).

*843 Monica Taylor Monday (James J. O'Keeffe; Timothy M. O'Brien; Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore; Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell Echsnr & Proctor, on briefs), for appellants.

Dino S. Sangiamo (Paul F. Strain; David J. Heubeck; William D. Dolan, III; Venable, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice S. BERNARD GOODWYN.

*413 Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia and our Rule 5:40, we accepted the following certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:

(1) Does Virginia law permit equitable tolling of a state statute of limitations due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction?
Does Va.Code Ann. § 8.01–229(E)(1) permit tolling of a state statute of limitations due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction?

Background
On September 15, 2005, a putative class action, Wolfe v. Merck & Co., was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The putative class included “[a]ll persons who consume or have consumed FOSAMAX, whether intravenously or by mouth.” The representative plaintiffs in the class action asserted claims of strict liability, negligence and medical monitoring against Merck & Co., Inc. (Merck).

The Wolfe putative class action was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which consolidated certain Fosamax cases. The Southern District of New York denied class certification and dismissed the Wolfe class action on January 28, 2008.

Prior to the dismissal of the Wolfe putative class action, four plaintiffs, all residents of Virginia, filed individual state law based actions against Merck in the Southern District of New York, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction. All four plaintiffs allegedly suffered from osteonecrosis of the jaw as a result of taking Fosamax. The district court noted that “[i]t is undisputed that all four plaintiffs filed suit more than two years after the latest possible date that they sustained their respective alleged injuries,” and that Virginia law applied to the claims.

Merck moved for summary judgment, alleging that the four plaintiffs’ actions were untimely under Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. In response, the plaintiffs claimed that the Wolfe putative class action, which was filed within the two-year limitation period, tolled the running of the Virginia statute of limitations on their individual actions because they would have been members of the proposed class had certification been granted. The district court granted Merck’s motion, finding that the pendency of the Wolfe putative class action did not toll Virginia’s limitations period for the four plaintiffs’ state law claims.

The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit determined that Virginia law governed whether the Wolfe putative class action tolled the running of the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs’ individual claims, and asked this Court to determine whether Virginia law permits equitable or statutory tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction.

Facts
The relevant facts, as set forth in the certification order, are not in dispute. Merck manufactures Fosamax, a prescription drug that falls within a class of drugs known as bisphosphonates, which are used to treat bone conditions such as osteoporosis. Fosamax, a nitrogenous bisphosphonate, has allegedly been linked to osteonecrosis —bone death—of the jaw.

The four plaintiffs were prescribed and consumed Fosamax. Rebecca Quarles was diagnosed with osteonecrosis of the jaw and failure of dental implants in 2003 and sued Merck in 2007. Dorothy Deloriea was prescribed and took Fosamax in 1999, developed osteomyelitis and osteonecrosis of the jaw in 2004, and filed her complaint against Merck in 2008. Ora Casey began taking Fosamax in 2000 and was diagnosed with osteonecrosis of the jaw in 2004. She died in 2007 and her estate initiated this action in 2008. Roberta Brodin was prescribed and took Fosamax in 2001 and was diagnosed with osteonecrosis of the jaw in 2005. She initiated her action in 2007.

[1] The plaintiffs’ complaints against Merck assert exclusively Virginia state law claims: strict liability, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranty, and negligence in the design, testing, development, manufacture, labeling, marketing, distribution and sale of Fosamax. As a result, it
is agreed that Virginia law governs the question of whether the filing of the putative class tolled the running of the statute of limitations on their claims.

Analysis


FN* Code § 8.01–243(A) provides: “every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery ... shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.”

*416 The plaintiffs contend that Virginia law permits equitable tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations based upon the filing of a cross-jurisdictional putative class action. Plaintiffs also argue that the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction statutorily tolls Virginia’s statute of limitations under Code § 8.01–229(E)(1). Merck responds that Virginia law does not permit equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, and that Code § 8.01–229(E)(1) does not provide for tolling due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction.

Certified Question (1)

[3][4] It is well-established that “statutes of limitations are strictly enforced and must be applied unless the General Assembly has clearly created an exception to their application.” Rivera v. Witt, 257 Va. 280, 283, 512 S.E.2d 558, 559 (1999). A statute of limitations may not be tolled, “or an exception applied, in the absence of a clear statutory enactment to such effect.” Arrington v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 250 Va. 52, 55–56, 458 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1995). “[A]ny doubt must be resolved in favor of the enforcement of the statute.” Id. at 55, 458 S.E.2d at 290–91.

Given these principles, there is no authority in Virginia jurisprudence for the equitable tolling of a statute of limitations based upon the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction. Certified Question (1) is answered in the negative.

Certified Question (2)

[5] Code § 8.01–229(E)(1) provides that “if any action is commenced within the prescribed limitation period and for any cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part of the period within which such action may be brought, and another action may be brought within the remaining period.” The plaintiffs contend that Code § 8.01–229(E)(1) statutorily tolled the statute of limitations for plaintiffs’ claims during the pendency of the putative class action. The plaintiffs assert that this Court’s decision in Welding, Inc. v. Bland Cnty. Serv. Auth., 261 Va. 218, 541 S.E.2d 909 (2001), indicates that Virginia should recognize cross-jurisdictional putative class action tolling.

In Welding, the plaintiff originally filed a breach of contract action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, but that court found it lacked jurisdiction because of a forum selection clause in the contract between the parties. Id. at 222, 541 S.E.2d at 911. Subsequently, the same plaintiff filed suit in Virginia state court on the same cause of action. Id. This Court stated “[t]here is no language in Code § 8.01–229(E)(1) which limits or restricts its applicability to a specific type of action or precludes its applicability to actions filed in a federal court.” Id. at 224, 541 S.E.2d at 912. This Court also noted that “[t]he term ‘action’ refers to civil litigation in both the state and federal courts.” Id. Therefore, Code § 8.01–229(E)(1) tolled the running of the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s action and its suit in Virginia was timely filed. Id. at 226, 541 S.E.2d at 913.

It is clear that under Virginia law, an action filed in a foreign jurisdiction may trigger tolling under Code § 8.01–229(E)(1). See id. at 224, 541 S.E.2d at 912. There is no particular type of action...
that must be filed and no particular jurisdiction in
which that action must be brought for the com-
mencement of an action to trigger tolling under
Code § 8.01–229(E)(1). However, for tolling to be
permitted, the subsequently filed action must be
filed by the same party in interest on the same
cause of action in the same right. See McDaniel v.
North Carolina Pulp Co., 198 Va. 612, 619, 95
S.E.2d 201, 206 (1956), overruled on other grounds
by Harmon v. Sadjadi, 273 Va. 184, 192–93, 639
S.E.2d 294, 299 (2007) (permitting tolling where
“the real party in interest remained the same; the
suit was instituted in the same right; and the cause
of action was the same”).

Welding differs from the instant case because it
calls a situation where the same plaintiff ini-
tially sued in federal court on the same cause of ac-
tion he subsequently pursued in state court. The
plaintiff in both actions was clearly the same.
Whereas, in the instant matter, it is undisputed that
the four plaintiffs were not named plaintiffs in the
putative class action that they claim triggered the
tolling. They were merely members**846 of a pu-
tative class that included every single American
who took Fosamax, whether he or she sought a re-
fund, medical monitoring or an award for personal
injury.

[6] For the filing of an action to toll the statute
of limitations from running on a subsequently filed
action pursuant to Code § 8.01–229(E)(1), there
must be identity of the parties in the two lawsuits.
In other words, for the statute of limitations to be
tolled for a subsequent action, the party who
brought the original action must be the same as the
plaintiff in the subsequent action or a recognized
representative*418 of that plaintiff asserting the
same cause of action. See McDaniel, 198 Va.
at 619, 95 S.E.2d at 206. We must rely upon
Virginia law to determine if this identity of parties
and rights exists.

[7][8][9] “An individual or entity does not ac-
quire standing to sue in a representative capacity by
asserting the rights of another, unless authorized by
statute to do so.” W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Su-
pervisors, 252 Va. 377, 383, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300
(1996). “Our jurisprudence is clear that when a
party without standing brings a legal action, the
action so instituted is, in effect, a legal nullity,” and
thus cannot toll the statute of limitations. Harmon,
273 Va. at 193, 639 S.E.2d at 299; see also Har-
bour Gate Owners’ Ass’n v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 107,
348 S.E.2d 252, 258 (1986) (holding original mo-
tion for judgment filed by plaintiff who lacked
standing “did nothing to toll the running of the sta-
tute of limitations” as to the second suit brought by
subsequent plaintiffs with standing); Braddock,
L.C. v. Board of Supervisors, 268 Va. 420, 426, 601
S.E.2d 552, 555 (2004) (action brought by party
lacking standing was a “nullity” that could not be
resurrected by adding parties with standing). In es-
sence, to toll the statute of limitations, the plaintiff
in the first suit must have legal standing to assert
the rights that are at issue in the second lawsuit.

[10][11][12] A putative class action is a repre-
sentative action in which a representative plaintiff
attempts to represent the interests of not only
named plaintiffs, but also those of unnamed class
members. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d
713 (1974). Virginia jurisprudence does not recog-
nize class actions. Under Virginia law, a class rep-
resentative who files a putative class action is not
recognized as having standing to sue in a represent-
ative capacity on behalf of the unnamed members
of the putative class. Thus, under Virginia law,
there is no identity of parties between the named
plaintiff in a putative class action and the named
plaintiff in a subsequent action filed by a putative
class member individually. See Fowler v.
Winchester Med. Ctr., Inc., 266 Va. 131, 136, 580
S.E.2d 816, 818 (2003) (noting plaintiff could not
be “substantially the same party” as the plaintiff in
the first suit because she was not qualified as a per-
sonal representative anywhere); Brake v. Payne,
268 Va. 92, 95, 597 S.E.2d 59, 60 (2004) (holding a
plaintiff without standing and a proper plaintiff are
not suing in the same right). Consequently, a putat-
ive class action cannot toll the running of the statutory period for unnamed putative class members who are not recognized under Virginia law as plaintiffs or represented plaintiffs in the original action. See Harmon, 273 Va. at 198, 639 S.E.2d at 302.

We hold that Code § 8.01–229(E)(1) does not toll the statute of limitations for unnamed putative class members due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction. Certified question (2) is answered in the negative.

Conclusion
For these reasons, this Court holds that Virginia recognizes neither equitable nor statutory tolling due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction.

Certified questions answered in the negative.

Va., 2012.
Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc.

END OF DOCUMENT
Annex 6
Peter MIONE and Anne Mione, as parents and natural guardians of Alexis Mione, an infant and John Mione, an infant, Plaintiffs,
v.
Kevin McGrath, Tonya Bernitt, Sullivan County Sheriff's Department, Villa Roma Resort Hotel, Sullivan County and “John Doe” and “Jane Doe,” full names unknown but believed to be individuals involved in the acts complained of herein, Defendants.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 1, 2006.

Plaintiffs Peter Mione ("Mione") and Anne Mione, on behalf of themselves and apparently their minor children, A.M. and J.M., bring the instant action against defendants Sullivan County (the "County"), the Sullivan County Sheriff's Department (the "Department"), the Villa Roma Resort Hotel (the "Hotel"), Hotel employees Kevin McGrath and Tonya Bernitt, as well as John Doe and Jane Doe for alleged violations of plaintiffs' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986. Defendants now move to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

According to the limited information that can be gleaned from the woefully deficient Complaint, plaintiffs' action stems from "the unlawful and improper detention of plaintiffs' child and subsequent prosecution" of plaintiff on charges of abuse and endangering the welfare of a child in Sullivan County Court. (Compl. ¶ 1.) The Complaint states that on November 27, 1998, while plaintiffs were guests of the Hotel, Mione "was caused to reprimand" J.M. (Id. ¶ 13.) His actions prompted McGrath and Bernitt to notify the Department and, after an investigation, the Department, in conjunction with the County, instituted neglect and endangerment proceedings against Mione. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)

The Complaint alleges that defendants proceeded to prosecute these charges despite lacking probable cause to believe any harm had befallen Mione's son and despite "the existence of clear exculpatory evidence." (Id. ¶¶ 18-20, 22, 25.) Defendants are accused of failing "to properly investigate the facts surrounding the injury to" J.M. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) As a result of the continued prosecution, "[p]laintiffs were forced to make numerous appearances in Court." (Id. ¶ 27.) On February 5, 1999, the charges against Mione were dismissed by the county court. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Plaintiffs, with the assistance of counsel, subsequently filed two separate actions in state court. The first, filed on or about February 23, 2000, alleged libel, slander, emotional distress, false arrest and false
imprisonment. That action was dismissed by Decision and Order of Judge Meddaugh of the New York State Supreme Court for Sullivan County, dated January 8, 2003, for failure to timely serve the defendants in accordance with C.P.L.R. 3012(b). (Nash Decl., Ex. E.) The second, filed in and around June 2003, also was dismissed on the same grounds. (Id., Ex. F.) Plaintiffs, through their attorney, then filed this Complaint on November 13, 2003 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
Annex 7
United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
In re: Lehman Brothers Inc., Debtor.
Case No. 08–01420(JMP) (SIPA)
July 11, 2013

Background: Trustee for liquidation of broker-dealer under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) filed omnibus objection to claims that were filed after the bar date. Claimants objected, arguing, inter alia, that they did not have actual notice of the filing deadline.

Holdings: The Bankruptcy Court, James M. Peck, J., held that:
(1) given trustee's diligent compliance with the court's claims process order and with the notice provisions of SIPA, the late-filed claims had to be disallowed, and
(2) claimants were not entitled to equitable relief under a standard of “manifest injustice.”

Objection granted; claims disallowed and expunged.

West Headnotes

[1] Securities Regulation 349B ☞ 185.21

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.21 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

SIPA mandates that all claims against the estate must be filed within six months after the date of commencement of the case, while providing the limited right to extend this deadline for cause shown within the six-month period. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78fff.

[2] Securities Regulation 349B ☞ 185.21

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.21 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

SIPA’s rather rigid approach to time limitations differs from customary bankruptcy practice in setting bar dates and reflects Congress's response to the policies underlying the SIPA statutory scheme, namely, ensuring the systematic integrity of the securities industry, restoring investor confidence, and upgrading the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and dealers. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78fff.

[3] Securities Regulation 349B ☞ 185.10

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.10 k. In general. Most Cited Cases

Congress enacted SIPA to address the systematic integrity of the financial system and the inability of bankruptcy proceedings to otherwise effect-

[5] Securities Regulation 349B ☐185.18

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.18 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

Under SIPA, extensions of time are limited to a narrow class of claimants, namely, governmental units, infants, and incompetents without guardians, and must be requested before the expiration of the six-month time period. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78fff.

[6] Bankruptcy 51 ☐2900(1)

51 Bankruptcy
51VII Claims
51VII(D) Proof; Filing
51k2897 Time for Filing
51k2900 Extension of Time; Excuse for Delay
51k2900(1) k. In general. Most Cited Cases

Securities Regulation 349B ☐185.18

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.18 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

Extensions of the time period for filing claims in SIPA cases are permitted only when the express statutory requirements are satisfied, which differs from the familiar “excusable neglect” standard that applies to late-filed claims in Chapter 11 cases. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78fff; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1).

[7] Securities Regulation 349B ☐185.10

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.10 k. In general. Most Cited Cases

SIPA’s goal of the prompt return of customer property, like the goal of prompt closure and distribution in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, justifies a strict six-month time limitation for filing claims against the debtor broker-dealer, a limitation period that by design may be extended only in those circumstances that are specified in the SIPA statute. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 §§ 1, 6, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aaa, 78fff.

[8] Securities Regulation 349B ☐185.18

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.18 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

Statutory time limitations for filing a claim in a SIPA case are clearly delineated and do not allow the court to fashion judicial exceptions to such filing deadlines. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78fff.

[9] Securities Regulation 349B ☐185.18

349B Securities Regulation
349BI Federal Regulation
349BI(F) Liquidation of Broker-dealers; Securities Investor Protection Corporation
349Bk185.18 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

[10] Bankruptcy 51 ☐2131

51 Bankruptcy
Title 11 ordinarily calls for notice to be given by mail, although bankruptcy courts may decide that notifying creditors by publication is sufficient or desirable under the circumstances. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(l).


Direct and substantial evidence is required to rebut the presumption that the addressee of a properly addressed and mailed notice actually receives that notice.

[13] Constitutional Law 92 §3881

Due process does not require that the interested party to whom notice was sent actually receive the notice. U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 14.

[14] Bankruptcy 51 §2131

Although notice by publication alone is insufficient for known creditors in bankruptcy, it is well settled that constructive notice of the claims bar date by publication satisfies the requirements of due process for unknown creditors. U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 14.

[15] Securities Regulation 349B §185.18

Direct and substantial evidence is required to
349Bk185.18 k. Requisites of claims; time for filing. Most Cited Cases

Even if bankruptcy court had discretion, under a standard of “manifest injustice,” to grant relief from the harsh consequences of the six-month time limitation for filing claims in SIPA cases, claimants did not establish the kind of truly extraordinary or exceptional extenuating circumstances that might justify granting such relief, such as a disruptive event that temporarily impairs the claimant’s ability to manage his, her, or its affairs and makes it virtually impossible or impracticable to file the claim on time, for example, a life-threatening accident, an unexpected serious medical emergency, or a major natural disaster that destroys business records and interrupts ordinary operations of a business; claimants alleged only routine or mundane circumstances, including ordinary confusion about proper name of affiliate that was obligated to a claimant, filing of claims by mistake in the wrong cases, or problems with mail delivery. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 § 6, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78fff.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING THE TRUSTEE’S TWENTY-EIGHTH OMNIBUS OBJECTION TO GENERAL CREDITOR CLAIMS (LATE-FILED CLAIMS)

JAMES M. PECK, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Introduction

The provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (“SIPA”), governing the filing of claims in this largest ever broker-dealer liquidation impose time limits that subject all customers and claimants to a well-defined deadline with few permitted exceptions. SIPA mandates that all claims against the estate must be filed within six months after the date of commencement of the case and by its express language does not accommodate late claims unless the claimant has moved for an extension before expiration of the bar date. Only limited classes of potential claimants even qualify to request such an extension. The standards are designed to be tough, and they are.

SIPA, as written, does not tolerate garden-variety excuses for the failure to comply with the bar date for claims, even in situations where the claimant has only constructive notice by publication of the filing deadline and is able to show a plausible excuse for having missed the deadline. The omnibus objection to late-filed claims brought by James W. Giddens (the “Trustee”), as trustee for the liquidation of Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) under SIPA, calls for an examination and application of this very strict procedural requirement. Consistent with the letter of the law as written, the seemingly harsh result is that all claims presently before the Court are untimely and will be disallowed and expunged.

[1]The Trustee has objected to certain claims
that were filed after the bar date and seeks an order under section 502(b) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), applicable to this case pursuant to sections 78fff(b) and 78fff–1(a) of SIPA, and Rule 3007(d) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, disallowing and expunging these claims (the “Twenty–Eighth Omnibus Objection to General Creditor Claims” or the “Motion”). [ECF No. 5775.] The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) supports the Motion. FN1 [ECF No. 6319.]

FN1. SIPC is deemed to be a party in interest in all matters arising under a SIPA liquidation proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(d).

Responses to the Motion have been filed by various affected claimants: Aaron Akman (“Akman Response”) [ECF No. 5888]; Grace Gathungu (“Gathungu Response”) [ECF No. 5874]; Dean R. Monksfield (“Monksfield Response”) [ECF No. 6323 Ex. C]; Stephen H. Thomas (“Thomas Response”) [ECF No. 5864]; Andre Verderame (“Verderame Response”) [ECF No. 6323 Ex. B]; and Mario Monello (“Monello Response”) [ECF No. 6062] (collectively the “Respondents”). FN2 Mario Monello also filed a Cross Motion of Mario A. Monello Pursuant to Rule 9006(b)(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to Deem as Timely Late–Filed Proofs of Claim (the “Monello Cross–Motion”). [ECF No. 6062.]

FN2. Several additional responses were filed—ZPR International, Inc. [ECF No. 6083]; CA, Inc. [ECF No. 5930]; and Adam Epstein [ECF No. 6323 Ex. D]—but the hearing on these claim objections has been adjourned to September 18, 2013. This Memorandum Decision does not address these adjourned responses directly, but the Court’s ruling necessarily will impact the treatment of similarly situated claimants.

The Trustee filed an Omnibus Reply to Certain Responses to the Twenty–Eighth Omnibus Objection to General Creditor Claims and an Opposition to the Cross–Motion of Mario A. Monello (the “Reply”). [ECF No. 6323.] Annexed to the Reply is the declaration of James Katchadurian (“Katchadurian Declaration”). [ECF No. 6323 Ex. A.] Mario Monello filed a Sur–Reply. [ECF No. 6390.]

A hearing on the Motion was held on June 19, 2013. During oral argument, counsel for SIPC noted that controlling authority with respect to late filed claims in cases arising under SIPA can compel outcomes that at times may seem draconian. That observation is correct. Upon consideration of the Motion and each of the responses, the Court agrees with the *441 Trustee and SIPC and finds, based on the facts presented, that it does not have the discretion to grant any relief from the firm and final deadline established by the Claims Process Order (as defined below). Therefore, for the reasons stated in this Memorandum Decision, the Twenty–Eighth Omnibus Objection to General Creditor Claims is granted as to all claim objections not otherwise adjourned or withdrawn, and the Monello Cross–Motion is denied.

Background

The SIPA case for LBI was commenced at the end of a tumultuous week in September 2008 that began with the chapter 11 filing of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”). In furtherance of the administration of LBI’s liquidation, on November 7, 2008 the Court entered an order Approving Form and Manner of Publication and Mailing of Notice of Commencement; Specifying Procedures and Forms for Filing, Determination, and Adjudication of Claims; Fixing a Meeting of Customers and Other Creditors; and Fixing Interim Reporting Pursuant to SIPA (the “Claims Process Order”). [ECF No. 241.]

The Claims Process Order specified the requirements for the Trustee to give notice of a June 1, 2009 deadline for filing claims against LBI (the “Bar Date”) (i) by publication in the December 1, 2008, editions of The New York Times, The Wall
Street Journal and The Financial Times and (ii) by mail to “persons who, as identified from LBI's books and records, may potentially assert claims as customers or general creditors on December 1, 2008.” Id. The Trustee complied with the publication notice requirements and published additional notice in the December 1, 2008, edition of The International Herald Tribune. See Affs. of Publication, ECF Nos. 396–399.

The Trustee engaged a third-party vendor to mail printed notices of the Bar Date to all potential customers or general creditors whose names and addresses appeared in LBI's books and records (each, a “Mailed Notice” and together, the “Mailed Notices”). See Aff. of Service, ECF No. 391; Katchadurian Decl. ¶ 4. In accordance with the Claims Process Order, the notice given by publication and the Mailed Notices was calculated to notify all potential customers and general creditors that it was essential to file a claim on or before the Bar Date, and the Trustee's compliance with these procedures fulfilled the requirements of the notice provisions of SIPA. See Claims Process Order at 2, ECF No. 241.

The Respondents have objected to the Motion on a variety of grounds, but, in general, each of them contends that his or her late filed claim should be allowed because the notice procedures of the Claims Process Order failed to give them actual notice of the filing deadline. They do not challenge the adequacy of the procedures themselves. They focus instead on the unfairness in disallowing their claims under circumstances when they did not know about or understand the obligation to file their claims against LBI before the June 1, 2009 Bar Date. Their individual arguments are summarized below.

No Mailed Notice was sent to Respondent Thomas because the Trustee did not identify him as a known claimant from LBI's books and records. See Katchadurian Decl. ¶ 13. The Thomas Response urges that Thomas's late-filed compensation-based claim [Claim No. 6119] should be allowed because: (i) he did not receive actual notice of the Bar Date, (ii) he only learned of the Bar Date when attempting to file a claim in the LBHI chapter 11 case, and (iii) certain other mailings that he received from LBI and LBHI did not give notice of the Bar Date. See Thomas Resp. ¶¶ 1–9. The Mailed Notices were sent to all of the other Respondents, and only the Mailed Notice sent to Respondent #442 Gathungu was returned as undeliverable. See Katchadurian Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 9–11.

The Akman Response argues that Akman's compensation-based claim [Claim No. 6127] should be allowed on grounds of either excusable neglect or laches because: (i) he never received actual notice of the Bar Date, (ii) he was suffering from a depressed mental state in the wake of the LBI bankruptcy and the subsequent termination of his employment, (iii) he was confused as to the separate filing deadlines that applied to the LBI and LBHI cases, and (iv) he believed his claim had been accepted by the Trustee due to the three- and-one-half-year delay between the filing of his claim on September 21, 2009 and the date of the Motion. See Akman Resp. 1–3.

The Gathungu claim [Claim No. 6197] relates to securities held by LBI on Gathungu's behalf, and, in the Gathungu Response, the claimant cites to a letter accompanying her claim. See Gathungu Resp. 1. The letter explains that Gathungu had submitted information on June 3, 2008 in an effort to recover securities moved from her account to LBI's “abandoned properties” account as a result of her not having been in contact with LBI for eight years. [Claim No. 6197.] She asserts that she never received a response regarding the status of her account or any actual notice of the bar date. Id.

The Monksfield Response relates to a claim for unpaid wages [Claim No. 6129] and concedes that this claim was filed after the Bar Date. Monksfield argues for an exception because he missed the bar date due to “an overload of documentation.” See Monksfield Resp. 1. Similarly, the Verderame Response in connection with Verderame's claim for
unpaid severance pay [Claim No. 6246] concedes that his claim was filed after the Bar Date. The Verderame Claim originally was filed against LBHI rather than LBI. Verderame asks for an equitable exception to the Bar Date in the LBI case, arguing that the late filing should be excused due to having mistakenly filed the claim in the wrong case. See Verderame Resp. ¶¶ 2–6.

The Monello Response states that Monello's claims are based on deferred compensation [Claim No. 6123] and shares in LBI's Private Employee Equity Fund [Claim No. 6132]. The Monello Cross–Motion requests a finding that his late-filed claims should be deemed timely filed under the excusable neglect standard of FED. R. BANKR.P. 9006(b) because Monello allegedly did not receive actual notice of the Bar Date due to a chronic problem of mail not being delivered properly to his address and because he believed erroneously that he needed to file his proofs of claim in the LBHI case. See Monello Resp. ¶¶ 1–21.

The Mailed Notices to Akman, Verderame, and Monksfield were sent to the same addresses that they submitted on their late-filed proof of claim forms (and, in the case of Akman and Monksfield, these addresses also were provided with their responses), and the Mailed Notices sent to Monello and Gathungu were sent to the same addresses that appeared on the documentation supporting their proofs of claim. See Katchadurian Decl. ¶¶ 4–13.

These various objections to the Motion and requests by the Respondents that they be excused from the consequences of not having complied with the Bar Date must be considered in light of the strict governing legal standards discussed below.

Discussion

Filing Deadlines for Claims in SIPA Proceedings are Narrowly Constrained

The Statutory Time Limitation, Exceptions, and Policy of SIPA

[SIPA provides that “[i]n the extent consistent with the provisions of [SIPA], a liquidation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with, and as though it were being conducted under chapters 1, 3, and 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of [the Bankruptcy Code].” 15 U.S.C. § 78fff. SIPA contains a plainly-worded and mandatory time limitation of six months for filing claims against the debtor while providing the limited right to extend this deadline for cause shown within the six-month time period. It provides that

[3][4] This rather rigid approach to time limitations differs from customary bankruptcy practice in setting bar dates and reflects Congress’s response to the policies underlying the SIPA statutory scheme—namely, ensuring the systematic integrity of the securities industry, restoring investor confidence, and “upgrad[ing] the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and dealers.” See SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415–16, 95 S.Ct. 1733, 44 L.Ed.2d 263 (1975) (citing S. Rep. No. 91–1218, pp. 2–4 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 91–1613, pp. 2–4 (1970), and U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1970, p. 5254.). Congress enacted SIPA to address the systematic integrity of the financial system and the inability of bankruptcy proceedings to otherwise effectively preserve and timely return creditor funds held by broker-dealers. See id. at 417, 95 S.Ct. 1733 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)) (“[A SIPA] trustee is empowered and directed by [SIPA] to return customer property, complete open transactions, enforce rights of subrogation, and liquidate the business of the member ... he is not empowered to reorganize or rehabilitate the
Given these policy objectives of SIPA and the explicit statutory language concerning time limitations, extensions of time are limited to a narrow class of claimants (governmental units, infants and incompetents without guardians) and must be requested before the expiration of the six-month time period. Under this structure, extensions of the time period for filing claims in SIPA cases are permitted only when the express statutory requirements are satisfied. This differs from the familiar “excusable neglect” standard that applies to late filed claims in chapter 11 cases. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (footnote and citation omitted) (“The “excusable neglect” standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) governs late filings of proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases but not in Chapter 7 cases. The rules’ differentiation between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings corresponds with the differing policies of the two chapters. Whereas the aim of a Chapter 7 liquidation is the prompt closure and distribution of the debtor’s estate, Chapter 11 provides for reorganization with the aim of rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by creditors.”).

The aim of a SIPA case is not reorganization but the prompt return of customer property, and that goal, like the goal of prompt closure and distribution in chapter 7, justifies a strict six-month time limitation for filing claims against the debtor broker-dealer, a limitation period that by design may be extended only in those circumstances that are specified in the SIPA statute.

Equitable Discretion to Extend Deadline for Filing Claims is Limited Under SIPA

The statutory time limitations for filing a claim in a SIPA case are clearly delineated and do not allow the Court to fashion judicial exceptions to such filing deadlines. Miller v. Austin, 72 B.R. 893, 896–99 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (“It is clear from the face of the statute that the six-month time limit for filing is subject to extension at the discretion of the court in only three specified instances,” and “the ‘excusable neglect’ exception contained in ... Rule 9006(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Rules[ ] is inapplicable to SIPC liquidations.”). This conclusion is consistent with the wording of the SIPA statute, the legislative history of the provision and SIPA’s policy goals. See Act to Amend the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 95–283, 92 Stat. 259 and 261–2 (1978) (amending SIPA to include the stand-alone limitations of 15 U.S.C. § 78fff–2(a)(3) and eliminate references to equitable extensions of time available under the Bankruptcy Act).

SIPA Notice Requirements

Section 78fff–2(a)(1) of SIPA governs the manner for giving notice to both customers and creditors in a SIPA liquidation. The section provides that

[promptly after the appointment of the trustee, such trustee shall cause notice of the commencement of proceedings under this section to be published in one or more newspapers of general circulation in the form and manner determined by the court, and at the same time shall cause a copy of such notice to be mailed to each person who, from the books and records of the debtor, appears to have been a customer of the debtor with an open account within the past twelve months, to the address of such person as it appears from the books and records of the debtor. Notice to creditors other than customers shall be given in the manner prescribed by Title 11, except that such notice shall be given by the trustee.]


Title 11 ordinarily calls for notice to be given by mail, although bankruptcy courts may decide that notifying creditors by publication is sufficient or desirable under the circumstances. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(i) (“The court may order notice by publication if it finds that notice by mail is impracticable or that it is desirable to supplement the notice.”). Here, the form and manner of notice pre-
scribed under the Claims Process Order and implemented by the Trustee were appropriate and fully consistent with the noticing requirements of SIPA. Everything was done that reasonably could have been done to provide actual or publication notice to all known brokerage customers and other parties with potential claims against LBI.

[12] Despite proof of mailing of the Mailed Notices, certain of the Respondents complain that they did not receive actual written notice of the Bar Date, and they urge that an exception should be made for this reason. The cause for not having received the Mailed Notices that used addresses taken from LBI’s books and records is unexplained. None of the Respondents have produced “direct and substantial evidence” to rebut the “presumption that the addressee of a properly addressed and mailed notice actually receives that notice.” In re Chicago P’ship Bd., Inc., 236 B.R. 249, 256 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Trustee has satisfied his obligation to give notice to customers by mailing notices of the Bar Date.

[13][14] The Mailed Notices were addressed properly, based on LBI’s books and records. While using these addresses is required, “due process does not require that the interested party actually receive the notice.” SIPC v. Stellatos (In re Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.), 124 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Additionally, although notice by publication alone is insufficient for known creditors in bankruptcy, “[i]t is well settled that constructive notice of the claims bar date by publication satisfies the requirements of due process for unknown creditors.” In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 465 B.R. 38, 48 (Bankr.D.Del.2012) (citations omitted).

Notwithstanding the argument that for whatever reason the Mailed Notices of the Bar Date were not received by certain of the Respondents (and for purposes of this discussion, the Court assumes that such assertions are true without testing their credibility), the Trustee has shown his diligent compliance with the Claims Process Order and with the notice provisions of SIPA. Importantly, notice of the Bar Date is still adequate regardless of actual receipt by the Respondents because the Trustee properly relied upon addresses taken directly from LBI’s records and followed procedures that were “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 204 B.R. 99, 106–07 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2001) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).

The procedures for giving notice, both by mail and by publication, were entirely appropriate and were followed here in a manner that complied fully with the Claims Process Order. The Trustee did all that was required of him. From the point of view of the affected claimants, not having received the printed notice of the Bar Date (or perhaps not having paid attention to it and later recognizing the error) may well lead to a feeling that claim preclusion is unfair under the circumstances. But such a feeling, while an understandable personal reaction, disregards the policy goals embedded in the statute. The deadlines have been set purposefully, and equitable pleas for special exceptions are beyond the scope of the statutory language and are unavailing. No relief may be granted from the deadlines imposed in the Claims Process Order because the six-month time limitation for filing claims is fixed and the SIPA statute does not accommodate any of the excuses for failing to file a timely claim against LBI.

Respondents Are Not Entitled to Relief Under a Standard of “Manifest Injustice”

[15] The Monello Response and the Monello Cross–Motion argue that the Court can grant relief from the harsh consequences of the six-month time limitation in order to avoid a result that would be manifestly unjust. Monello submits that his confusion as to the separate filing deadlines in the LBHI and LBI cases and the fact that he did not receive
notice of the Bar Date due to persistent problems with his home mail delivery offer a reasonable excuse for the late filing of his claim and that the Court may grant him an exception from strict compliance with the Bar Date because it would be manifestly unfair under the circumstances to disallow his claim for deferred compensation owed to him by LBI. That argument relies upon language in *Miller v. Austin,* but misses the central point of that case. *Miller* stands for the proposition that bankruptcy courts do not have the discretion to override the clear time limitations imposed by SIPA.

In *Miller,* the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that it was error for a bankruptcy court to rely on bankruptcy precedent in allowing an extension of the deadline for filing claims in a SIPA case because doing so “disregards the long-established rule that except in the most unusual cases ... the equitable power should not be used to extend the statutory six months period fixed by Congress.” *Miller,* 72 B.R. at 898 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In *dicta,* the court does mention certain instances that might satisfy a manifest injustice standard in a bankruptcy case but did not state that an exception based on unusual circumstances or any other equitable concept is available in the context of a SIPA proceeding. *Id.* The court noted that in cases unrelated to SIPA, “courts have allowed the time period for filing to be extended in only two circumstances: (i) where the claimant received inadequate notice; and (ii) where an officer of the bankruptcy court committed an error relied upon by the claimant.” *Id.*

Mr. Monello contends that the analysis in *Miller* allows for the possibility that the period for filing a SIPA claim may be extended to prevent manifest injustice in appropriate cases and argues that his situation presents the kind of exceptional circumstances that would justify granting equitable relief from the harsh consequences of the Bar Date. But even if the Court were to accept the concept of an equitable remedy to deal with those extremely rare situations that seem to cry out for relief, FN3 none of the Respondents have shown that adherence to the time limitations prescribed by SIPA would be manifestly unjust under the relatively mundane circumstances that have been alleged here.

FN3. The Court does not wish to speculate regarding what would need to be shown by a claimant to demonstrate a right to an equitable exception based on manifest injustice. Conceivably, no sufficient showing can ever be made. However, if a case for an exception were to be seriously considered, something truly extraordinary would need to be shown involving an occurrence or circumstance that makes it virtually impossible or impracticable to file the claim on time. An example would be a disruptive event that temporarily impairs the claimant’s ability to manage his, her or its affairs (e.g., a life-threatening accident, an unexpected serious medical emergency or a major natural disaster that destroys business records and interrupts ordinary operations of a business). No such excuses have been shown by any of the Respondents.

Mr. Monello and the other Respondents have raised issues that arguably may fit within the category of excusable neglect but not the more exacting standard that would be invoked to prevent manifest injustice. The facts alleged are routine in nature and insufficient to support any finding of truly exceptional extenuating circumstances. Ordinary confusion about such things as the proper name of the Lehman affiliate that is obligated to the claimant, the filing of claims by mistake in the wrong cases or problems with mail delivery are not sufficient to justify any exceptions to the Bar Date. Like the factual circumstances in *Miller,* the Respondents have alleged the “types of occurrences [that] can be expected” in a SIPA liquidation. 72

B.R. at 899. Accordingly, equitable relief is not available, and the Bar Date will be enforced in accordance with its terms as to Mr. Monello and the other Respondents.

**Conclusion**

For the reasons stated, the six-month time limitation for filing claims in SIPA cases is mandatory and must be strictly construed. It would be an abuse of discretion*447 for the Court to grant the exceptional relief sought by the Respondents. The Motion is granted, and the late-filed claims of the Respondents are disallowed and expunged. The Trustee is directed to submit an order consistent with this Memorandum Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y., 2013
In re Lehman Brothers Inc.

END OF DOCUMENT
Annex 8
This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.


United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Barbara KANOFF, Appellant v. BETTER LIFE RENTING CORP.; Lefrak Organization, Inc.

No. 08-4489.
Filed: Oct. 28, 2009.

Background: After dismissal of her complaint, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Freda L. Wolfson, J., 2008 WL 4755343, denied plaintiff’s motion to extend time to file notice of appeal, and she appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeals, Chagares, Circuit Judge, held that district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that counsel’s failure to file notice of appeal electronically did not constitute excusable neglect.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes
Federal Courts 170B 669

170B Federal Courts
170BVIII Courts of Appeals
170BVIII(E) Proceedings for Transfer of Case
170Bk665 Notice, Writ of Error or Citation

170Bk669 k. Commencement and running of time for filing; extension of time. Most Cited Cases

Counsel’s failure to file notice of appeal electronically was not instance of excusable neglect, and thus did not warrant extension of time to file notice of appeal, even if counsel did not know that notices of appeal needed to be electronically filed, and appellee was not prejudiced by delay, where electronic filing requirement had been adopted three years earlier by standing order and local rule, and docket sheet warned counsel that “[c]ivil initial pleadings” had to be filed electronically.


James S. Richter, Esq., Winston & Strawn, Newark, NJ, for Better Life Renting Corp.; Lefrak Organization, Inc.

Before: MCKEE, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

**1 Barbara Kanoff appeals from the District Court’s order denying her motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). We will affirm.

I.

Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite the essential facts.

Kanoff filed a complaint against Better Life Renting Corp. alleging various claims, including a breach of contract claim. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Barbara Kanoff filed a notice of appeal on August 25, 2008. The district court held a hearing on the motion for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal on September 18, 2008. Counsel for Kanoff argued that the motion should be granted, despite the failure to file the notice of appeal electronically.

The district court denied Kanoff’s motion, finding that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

Kanoff argues that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

II.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

A. Excusable Neglect

A showing of excusable neglect requires a demonstration of (1) a reasonable basis for the delay; (2) good faith; and (3) due diligence. See United States v. 3445 E. 87th St., 279 Fed.Appx. 157 (2d Cir.2007).

B. Reasonable Basis

A reasonable basis for the delay includes circumstances outside counsel’s control. See United States v. 3445 E. 87th St., 279 Fed.Appx. 157 (2d Cir.2007).

C. Good Faith

Good faith includes a subjective determination of whether counsel acted reasonably and in good faith. See United States v. 3445 E. 87th St., 279 Fed.Appx. 157 (2d Cir.2007).

D. Due Diligence

Due diligence includes a determination of whether counsel exercised particularized care in the circumstances. See United States v. 3445 E. 87th St., 279 Fed.Appx. 157 (2d Cir.2007).

The district court found that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect. We agree.

Barbara Kanoff contends that the district court erred in finding that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

On appeal, Kanoff argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not excusable neglect.

We affirm.

Renting Corp. (“Better Life”). Better Life filed a motion to dismiss. On February 14, 2008, 2008 WL 442145, the District Court entered an order granting the motion.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), Kanoff had until March 17, 2008 to file a notice of appeal with the District Court. The local rules required that such notices be electronically filed. Kanoff's counsel attempted to file the notice in hardcopy form on March 11, 2008. The Clerk's Office received the hardcopy notice, but not until March 26, 2008, because Kanoff's secretary had included the wrong address on the envelope she mailed that contained the hardcopy notice. The Clerk docketed the notice and deemed it filed on March 26, 2008, but by that time, the notice was no longer timely.

On March 31, 2008, counsel filed a motion to extend the time to appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). He argued that his failure to file the notice of appeal electronically constituted “excusable neglect” within the meaning of that rule because he did not know that notices of appeal must be electronically filed. The District Court held that counsel's lack of knowledge of proper filing procedures did not constitute “excusable neglect” and denied the motion.

The District Court observed that the delay did not greatly prejudice Better Life, but held that “[f]ault in the delay remains an important factor—perhaps the most important single factor—in determining whether neglect is excusable.” Appendix (“App.”) at 3 (citing City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir.1994)). The District Court held that, in light of the fact that the electronic filing requirement was made publicly available via inclusion in District of New Jersey Local Civil Rules and was the subject of a District of New Jersey Standing Order, counsel's fault in failing to follow established filing requirements outweighed the absence of prejudice (as well as other countervailing factors) and therefore that counsel's neglect was not “excusable” within the meaning of Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii).

Kanoff then filed this appeal.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1291. We review the District Court's ruling that counsel's neglect that caused the notice of appeal not to be timely filed was not “excusable” within the meaning of Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) for abuse of discretion. Consol. Freightways, 827 F.2d at 918.

Rule 4(a)(1)(A) provides that a party has 10 days in which to file a notice of appeal from a District Court order. Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), however, allows a district court to extend that time if “that party shows excusable neglect....” FN1 The Supreme Court has explained that determining whether neglect is “excusable” requires weighing a number of factors, including “the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). These factors, however, do not establish a mathematical formula; “the determination is at bottom an equitable one....” Id. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489. FN2 Though no one factor is dispositive, “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect....” Id. at 392, 113 S.Ct. 1489. To summarize, “excusable neglect” describes situations “where the court, after weighing the relevant considerations is satisfied that counsel has exhibited substantial diligence, professional competence and has acted in good faith to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the rule, but as the result of some minor neglect, compliance was not achieved.” Consol. Freightways, 827 F.2d at 920.

FN1. A district court also may extend the
time in which to file a notice of appeal for “good cause,” but the “good cause” prong is reserved for events over which the filing party has no control. See Fed. R.App. P. 4 Advisory Committee Notes (“The excusable neglect standard applies in situations in which there is fault.... The good cause standard applies in situations in which there is no fault-excusable or otherwise.”).

FN2. Our Court, in a case pre-dating Pioneer Investment Services, recited a similar list:

whether the inadvertence reflects professional incompetence such as ignorance of the rules of procedure ...; [ ] whether the asserted inadvertence reflects an easily manufactured excuse incapable of verification by the court ...; [ ] whether the tardiness results from counsel's failure to provide for a readily foreseeable consequence ...; [ ] whether the inadvertence reflects a complete lack of diligence ...; or [ ] whether the court is satisfied that the inadvertence resulted despite counsel's substantial good faith efforts toward compliance.

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 827 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir.1987).

**2** The District Court did not abuse its considerable discretion in ruling that counsel's*658 failure to file the notice of appeal electronically was not an instance of “excusable neglect” within the meaning of Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii).

First, the electronic filing was incorporated into at least two authorities that govern attorneys practicing in the District of New Jersey: Standing Order 05-1 and Local Civil Rule 5.2. Second, this requirement did not come into existence weeks or even months before counsel had the occasion to file the notice of appeal that is the subject of this case. It existed at least as early as January 31, 2005-more than three years before the District Order issued the order Kanoff attempted to appeal. See Standing Order 05-1. Third, even if counsel did not know that notices of appeal need to be electronically filed, he knew as early as May 21, 2007 that some documents which before could be filed in hardcopy had to be filed electronically. See App. 11 (District Court docket sheet reflecting warning to counsel that “[c]ivil initial pleadings” must be filed electronically).

Kanoff's reliance on Consolidated Freightways is misplaced. He correctly points out that in Consolidated Freightways, we held that merely failing to address an envelope correctly constituted “excusable neglect” within the meaning of Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). He then argues that, had his secretary correctly addressed the envelope containing Kanoff's notice of appeal, the Clerk's Office would have received it and docketed it by March 17, 2008 (the timeliness cut-off date). This argument is unavailing. In Consolidated Freightways, mailing a correctly-addressed envelope constituted complying with proper procedure. Had the Clerk there received the hardcopy notice of appeal in a timely fashion, the Clerk would have been obligated to docket that notice. Here, by contrast, mailing a correctly-addressed envelope *still* would have violated the District Court's directive that notices of appeal must be filed electronically. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Clerk would have docketed the non-compliant notice, even had it been timely received.

Put simply, this was not a case where “as the result of some minor neglect, compliance was not achieved.” Consol. Freightways, 827 F.2d at 920. Compliance was not achieved because counsel failed to educate himself about a sea change in filing requirements that had taken place more than three years before the relevant events of the instant case. The District Court acted within its discretion in declining to permit counsel to file a notice of appeal out of time.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

Kanoff v. Better Life Renting Corp,

END OF DOCUMENT
On January 24, 2011, the Court directed the plaintiff to file, on or before January 27, 2011, his motion to disqualify the law firms Sidley Austin LLP and Seyfarth Shaw LLP from representing, in this action, witnesses who are former employees of the defendant. The docket sheet maintained by the Clerk of Court indicates that the plaintiff filed his notice of motion on January 27, 2011, Docket Entry No. 85. However, the plaintiff filed his memorandum of law, declaration and exhibits in support of the motion as well as a corrected certificate of service, Docket Entry Nos. 86–88, on January 28, 2011.

On January 28, 2011, the plaintiff made a motion for an extension of time, nunc pro tunc, to file his motion to disqualify the above mentioned law firms. The motion is unopposed. The plaintiff’s counsel contends that, from January 24 to January 27, 2011, he was conducting depositions in Baltimore and New York, where he stayed in a hotel. He explains:

All documents would have been filed before midnight on January 27 if I had not made some mistake with the portable scanner that first caused it to stop working while I was trying to scan the signature page on my Declaration, and then freeze my laptop. I consulted the manual for the software and looked for a program that might start it up again, but was unsuccessful.... I was forced to reboot, which on my laptop takes five to ten minutes for the reloading of software, but the scanner still did not work after the reboot.... I attempted to use the hotel’s self-service business center to fax the signed page to my laptop so that I could use that signature, and spent at least ten minutes trying to get the hotel’s equipment to read or register my credit card. When it finally did get the information, the equipment still did not enable the fax machine, and I then had to spend several minutes trying to get my credit card information wiped clean from the machine.... The front desk ultimately faxed the signature page to me, but it came to my laptop precisely at midnight was of poor quality and a vertical stripe interfered with legibility.... I ultimately filed my Declaration with the “/s/ Richard T. Seymour” electronic signature used in the ECF system, to preserve legibility.... I had begun to upload the Motion and Memorandum while I was trying to solve the problem of the signature page on my Declaration, and attempted to upload my Declaration as soon as the Memorandum, was uploaded. However, one of the attached exhibits—Exhibit 14—had been scanned on a new machine in my office that tends to produce images taking much more storage space than usual. Exhibit 14 was over 2.9 MB in size.... The ECF system rejected the filing because Exhibit 14 exceeded the 2.5 MB limit for attachments. It required me to start from the beginning and reupload the Declaration and the 16 attachments ... My Adobe Acrobat program chose this time to stop performing the function of saving a PDF into a simpler form taking less space ... with the result that after a number of unsuccessful tries I had to split the exhibit into two parts.... The Declaration and all of its exhibits were ultimately uploaded, but it took 24 minutes past the deadline in order to do so.
Counsel contends that “[b]ecause of the technical difficulties” the motion to disqualify “was filed at 11:59 P.M. on January 27, 2011, the Memorandum was filed one minute later at midnight and came through the Court’s [electronic case filing (“ECF”) ] system marked as having been filed on January 28, 2011, at 00:00 A.M., and my Declaration in support was filed at 24 minutes past midnight.” According to counsel, he has “good cause for the brief extension of time” for filing of the motion to disqualify because “[d]epositions in cities away from one's office force counsel to depend on either portable equipment or the equipment that can be found in a hotel business center, and these can cease functioning for reasons beyond the control of an attorney.” Moreover, the defendant and its counsel, as well as Seyfarth Shaw LLP, “are unlikely to have suffered prejudice from the filing of the Declaration 24 minutes later than the midnight deadline.”

“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1). In determining whether the party's neglect is excusable, courts consider four factors: (1) the length of the delay and its impact on judicial proceedings; (2) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1498 (1993). In this circuit, courts have taken a “‘hard line’ [when] applying Pioneer that emphasizes the reason for the delay.” In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir.2005). The focus of the inquiry is on “the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant.” Id. at 122–23. (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498).

“[l]atency, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect” and “preoccupation or an excessive workload does not typically render a mistake excusable.” Id. at 126 (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392, 113 S.Ct. at 1496).

Here, although the length of delay is only one day, from January 27 to January 28, 2011, its impact on the fair administration of judicial proceedings cannot be dismissed, given that the discovery deadline was set for January 31, 2011, and the deadline for summary judgment motions was set for March 17, 2011. Any delay at this stage of the proceedings has the potential to prejudice the opposing party, no matter how small the prejudice. It appears that the plaintiff's counsel acted in good faith. Although counsel attempts to justify his neglect in filing the plaintiff's motion to disqualify timely, by arguing that, when he conducts business away from his office, he depends on portable equipment and the equipment of third parties, the malfunction of which is beyond his control, his declaration in support of the motion for an extension of time establishes that his circumstance was caused entirely by his own fault: “All documents would have been filed before midnight on January 27 if I had not made some mistake with the portable scanner.”


While counsel goes out of his way to explain the technical difficulties he encountered in his attempt to file his declaration and exhibits in connection with the plaintiff's motion to disqualify, he fails to explain why he: (a) waited until 11:59 p.m.,
on January 27, 2011, the filing deadline, to file his motion papers which exceeded 10 MB in size; (b) did not determine the size of Exhibit 14 before filing it; and (c) attempted to file Exhibit 14, despite its size exceeding 2.5 MB, when the ECF Rules do not permit single files to be larger than 2.5 MB.

“The user log-in and password required to submit documents to the ECF system serve as the Filing User’s signature on all electronic documents filed with the Court.... Electronically filed documents must include a signature block ... In addition, the name of the Filing User under whose log-in and password the document is submitted must be preceded by an “s/” typed in the space where the signature would otherwise appear ... Signatures for all other persons (clients, witnesses etc.) must be scanned in order to capture the actual ink signature.” ECF Rules §§ 8.1, 8.2, 13.20, available at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF_rules_SDNY_Aug08.pdf.

Counsel’s notice of the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify, filed on January 27, 2011, as well as the memorandum of law, declaration of counsel and the corrected certificate of service, filed on January 28, 2011, all bear the same signature block: “/s/ Richard T. Seymour.” It is not clear why counsel “was trying to scan the signature page on [his] Declaration,” where scanning is only required for documents containing signatures of persons other than the filing attorney, so that the actual ink signature can be captured. The signature block in a document is typed, not signed by hand, and counsel’s declaration is a document signed by counsel, who is the filing attorney, not by a person whose signature is required to be scanned. It is unclear, given that the signature block is the same on each document submitted in connection with the motion to disqualify, why counsel treated his declaration differently from other documents submitted on the motion, bearing the same signature block. Counsel’s argument that hotel equipment “can cease functioning for reasons beyond the control of an attorney” does not apply here, because counsel did not allege that any equipment in the hotel where he was staying actually ceased functioning, only that the hotel equipment was slow in reading or registering his credit card when he attempted to use the hotel's facsimile machine and that “the equipment still did not enable the fax machine.” Counsel admits that hotel personnel “ultimately faxed the signature page to me, but it came to my laptop precisely at midnight.” Counsel’s own equipment stopped functioning only after he “made some mistake with the portable scanner,” a reason not “beyond the control of an attorney.”

*4 In the circumstance of this case, counsel failed to show good cause that would justify his neglect in filing the plaintiff's motion to disqualify timely. The reason for the delay was within the reasonable control of counsel and the fault for the delay is entirely his. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion, Docket Entry No. 89, for a brief extension of time, nunc pro tunc, to file the plaintiff's motion to disqualify is denied, and the plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel, Docket Entry 85, is untimely because its filing was not completed on or before January 27, 2011, as directed by the Court.

SO ORDERED:

S.D.N.Y., 2011.
Graves v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 1044357 (S.D.N.Y.)

END OF DOCUMENT
Annex 10
Dear Hannah,

Please see the attached communication regarding the New gTLD Program Committee's recent resolution.

Kind regards,

Christine A. Willett  
Vice President, gTLD Operations  
ICANN
30 July 2013

Ms. Hannah Tümpel
International Centre for Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

Re: New gTLD Program Committee Resolution

Dear Ms. Hannah Tümpel:

Following on our recent message provided to all DRSPs regarding the recently published New gTLD Program Committee (NGPC) resolutions, we are forwarding to the ICC the attached letter for review in light of the NGPC’s resolution that “in the interests of fairness and reasonableness, notwithstanding the deadlines set out in the Applicant Guidebook, in the future, the DRSPs are permitted and encouraged to use their discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances of each matter, and in cases where it is shown that the affected party is making a good faith effort to comply with the deadlines, as to whether to grant extensions, or deviate from the deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook.”

The full resolution is available here: http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-new-gtld-13jul13-en.htm#1.b

Thank you, and please do not hesitate to let us know if you have any questions.

Best regards,

Christine A. Willett
Vice President, gTLD Operations
Annex 11
This document, concerning the management of the Internet Domain Name System, is a statement of policy. Though it is not intended or expected, should any discrepancy occur between the document here and that published in the Federal Register, the Federal Register publication controls. The paper is being made available through the Internet solely as a means to facilitate the public's access to this document.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Management of Internet Names and Addresses

Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02

AGENCY: National Telecommunications and Information Administration

ACTION: Statement of Policy

SUMMARY: On July 1, 1997, as part of the Clinton Administration's Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the domain name system (DNS) in a manner that increases competition and facilitates international participation in its management.

Accordingly, on July 2, 1997, the Department of Commerce issued a Request for Comments (RFC) on DNS administration. The RFC solicited public input on issues relating to the overall framework of the DNS administration, the creation of new top-level domains, policies for domain name registrars, and trademark issues. During the comment period, more than 430 comments were received, amounting to some 1500 pages.

On January 30, 1998, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, issued for comment, A Proposal to Improve the Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses. The proposed rulemaking, or "Green Paper," was published in the Federal Register on February 20, 1998, providing opportunity for public comment. NTIA received more than 650 comments, as of March 23, 1998, when the comment period closed.

The Green Paper proposed certain actions designed to privatize the management of Internet names and addresses in a manner that allows for the development of robust competition and facilitates global participation in Internet management. The Green Paper proposed for discussion a variety of issues relating to DNS management including private sector creation of a new not-for-profit corporation (the "new corporation") managed by a globally and functionally representative Board of Directors.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This general statement of policy is not subject to the delay in effective date required of substantive rules under 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). It does not contain mandatory provisions and does not itself have the force and effect of law. Therefore, the effective date
of this policy statement is [insert date of publication in the Federal Register].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karen Rose, Office of International Affairs (OIA), Rm 4701, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C., 20230. Telephone: (202) 482-0365. E-mail: dnspolicy@ntia.doc.gov


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background:

Domain names are the familiar and easy-to-remember names for Internet computers (e.g., "www.ecommerce.gov"). They map to unique Internet Protocol (IP) numbers (e.g., 98.37.241.30) that serve as routing addresses on the Internet. The domain name system (DNS) translates Internet names into the IP numbers needed for transmission of information across the network.

U.S. Role in DNS Development:

More than 25 years ago, the U.S. Government began funding research necessary to develop packet-switching technology and communications networks, starting with the "ARPANET" network established by the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the 1960s. ARPANET was later linked to other networks established by other government agencies, universities and research facilities. During the 1970s, DARPA also funded the development of a "network of networks;" this became known as the Internet, and the protocols that allowed the networks to intercommunicate became known as Internet protocols (IP).

As part of the ARPANET development work contracted to the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), Dr. Jon Postel, then a graduate student at the university, undertook the maintenance of a list of host names and addresses and also a list of documents prepared by ARPANET researchers, called Requests for Comments (RFCs). The lists and the RFCs were made available to the network community through the auspices of SRI International, under contract to DARPA and later the Defense Communication Agency (DCA) (now the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)) for performing the functions of the Network Information Center (the NIC).

After Dr. Postel moved from UCLA to the Information Sciences Institute (ISI) at the University of Southern California (USC), he continued to maintain the list of assigned Internet numbers and
names under contracts with DARPA. SRI International continued to publish the lists. As the lists grew, DARPA permitted Dr. Postel to delegate additional administrative aspects of the list maintenance to SRI, under continuing technical oversight. Dr. Postel, under the DARPA contracts, also published a list of technical parameters that had been assigned for use by protocol developers. Eventually these functions collectively became known as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).

Until the early 1980s, the Internet was managed by DARPA, and used primarily for research purposes. Nonetheless, the task of maintaining the name list became onerous, and the Domain Name System (DNS) was developed to improve the process. Dr. Postel and SRI participated in DARPA’s development and establishment of the technology and practices used by the DNS. By 1990, ARPANET was completely phased out.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) has statutory authority for supporting and strengthening basic scientific research, engineering, and educational activities in the United States, including the maintenance of computer networks to connect research and educational institutions. Beginning in 1987, IBM, MCI and Merit developed NSFNET, a national high-speed network based on Internet protocols, under an award from NSF. NSFNET, the largest of the governmental networks, provided a "backbone" to connect other networks serving more than 4,000 research and educational institutions throughout the country. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Department of Energy also contributed backbone facilities.

In 1991-92, NSF assumed responsibility for coordinating and funding the management of the non-military portion of the Internet infrastructure. NSF solicited competitive proposals to provide a variety of infrastructure services, including domain name registration services. On December 31, 1992, NSF entered into a cooperative agreement with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) for some of these services, including the domain name registration services. Since that time, NSI has managed key registration, coordination, and maintenance functions of the Internet domain name system. NSI registers domain names in the generic top level domains (gTLDs) on a first come, first served basis and also maintains a directory linking domain names with the IP numbers of domain name servers. NSI also currently maintains the authoritative database of Internet registrations.

In 1992, the U.S. Congress gave NSF statutory authority to allow commercial activity on the NSFNET. This facilitated connections between NSFNET and newly forming commercial network service providers, paving the way for today’s Internet. Thus, the U.S. Government has played a pivotal role in creating the Internet as we know it today. The U.S. Government consistently encouraged bottom-up development of networking technologies, and throughout the course of its development, computer scientists from around the world have enriched the Internet and facilitated exploitation of its true potential. For example, scientists at CERN, in Switzerland, developed software, protocols and conventions that formed the basis of today’s vibrant World Wide Web. This type of pioneering Internet research and development continues in cooperative organizations and consortia throughout the world.

DNS Management Today:
In recent years, commercial use of the Internet has expanded rapidly. As a legacy, however, major components of the domain name system are still performed by, or subject to, agreements with agencies of the U.S. Government.

1) Assignment of numerical addresses to Internet users.

Every Internet computer has a unique IP number. IANA, headed by Dr. Jon Postel, coordinates this system by allocating blocks of numerical addresses to regional IP registries (ARIN in North America, RIPE in Europe, and APNIC in the Asia/Pacific region), under contract with DARPA. In turn, larger Internet service providers apply to the regional IP registries for blocks of IP addresses. The recipients of those address blocks then reassign addresses to smaller Internet service providers and to end users.

2) Management of the system of registering names for Internet users.

The domain name space is constructed as a hierarchy. It is divided into top-level domains (TLDs), with each TLD then divided into second-level domains (SLDs), and so on. More than 200 national, or country-code, TLDs (ccTLDs) are administered by their corresponding governments or by private entities with the appropriate national government's acquiescence. A small set of gTLDs do not carry any national identifier, but denote the intended function of that portion of the domain space. For example, .com was established for commercial users, .org for not-for-profit organizations, and .net for network service providers. The registration and propagation of these key gTLDs are performed by NSI, under a five-year cooperative agreement with NSF. This agreement expires on September 30, 1998.

3) Operation of the root server system.

The root server system is a set of thirteen file servers, which together contain authoritative databases listing all TLDs. Currently, NSI operates the "A" root server, which maintains the authoritative root database and replicates changes to the other root servers on a daily basis. Different organizations, including NSI, operate the other 12 root servers. The U.S. Government plays a role in the operation of about half of the Internet's root servers. Universal name consistency on the Internet cannot be guaranteed without a set of authoritative and consistent roots. Without such consistency messages could not be routed with any certainty to the intended addresses.
4) Protocol Assignment.

The Internet protocol suite, as defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), contains many technical parameters, including protocol numbers, port numbers, autonomous system numbers, management information base object identifiers and others. The common use of these protocols by the Internet community requires that the particular values used in these fields be assigned uniquely. Currently, IANA, under contract with DARPA, makes these assignments and maintains a registry of the assigned values.

The Need for Change:

From its origins as a U.S.-based research vehicle, the Internet is rapidly becoming an international medium for commerce, education and communication. The traditional means of organizing its technical functions need to evolve as well. The pressures for change are coming from many different quarters:

- There is widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of competition in domain name registration.
- Conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders are becoming more common. Mechanisms for resolving these conflicts are expensive and cumbersome.
- Many commercial interests, staking their future on the successful growth of the Internet, are calling for a more formal and robust management structure.
- An increasing percentage of Internet users reside outside of the U.S., and those stakeholders want to participate in Internet coordination.
- As Internet names increasingly have commercial value, the decision to add new top-level domains cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by entities or individuals that are not formally accountable to the Internet community.
- As the Internet becomes commercial, it becomes less appropriate for U.S. research agencies to direct and fund these functions.

The Internet technical community has been actively debating DNS management policy for several years. Experimental registry systems offering name registration services in an alternative set of exclusive domains developed as early as January 1996. Although visible to only a fraction of Internet users, alternative systems such as the name.space, AlterNIC, and eDNS affiliated registries contributed to the community's dialogue on the evolution of DNS administration.

In May of 1996, Dr. Postel proposed the creation of multiple, exclusive, competing top-level
domain name registries. This proposal called for the introduction of up to 50 new competing domain name registries, each with the exclusive right to register names in up to three new top-level domains, for a total of 150 new TLDs. While some supported the proposal, the plan drew much criticism from the Internet technical community. The paper was revised and reissued. The Internet Society's (ISOC) board of trustees endorsed, in principle, the slightly revised but substantively similar version of the draft in June of 1996.

After considerable debate and redrafting failed to produce a consensus on DNS change, IANA and the Internet Society (ISOC) organized the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC or the Ad Hoc Committee) in September 1996, to resolve DNS management issues. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) participated in the IAHC. The Federal Networking Council (FNC) participated in the early deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The IAHC issued a draft plan in December 1996 that introduced unique and thoughtful concepts for the evolution of DNS administration. The final report proposed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that would have established, initially, seven new gTLDs to be operated on a nonexclusive basis by a consortium of new private domain name registrars called the Council of Registrars (CORE). Policy oversight would have been undertaken in a separate council called the Policy Oversight Committee (POC) with seats allocated to specified stakeholder groups. Further, the plan formally introduced mechanisms for resolving trademark/domain name disputes. Under the MoU, registrants for second-level domains would have been required to submit to mediation and arbitration, facilitated by WIPO, in the event of conflict with trademark holders.

Although the IAHC proposal gained support in many quarters of the Internet community, the IAHC process was criticized for its aggressive technology development and implementation schedule, for being dominated by the Internet engineering community, and for lacking participation by and input from business interests and others in the Internet community. Others criticized the plan for failing to solve the competitive problems that were such a source of dissatisfaction among Internet users and for imposing unnecessary burdens on trademark holders. Although the POC responded by revising the original plan, demonstrating a commendable degree of flexibility, the proposal was not able to overcome initial criticism of both the plan and the process by which the plan was developed. Important segments of the Internet community remained outside the IAHC process, criticizing it as insufficiently representative.

As a result of the pressure to change DNS management, and in order to facilitate its withdrawal from DNS management, the U.S. Government, through the Department of Commerce and NTIA, sought public comment on the direction of U.S. policy with respect to DNS, issuing the Green Paper on January 30, 1998. The approach outlined in the Green Paper adopted elements of other proposals, such as the early Postel drafts and the IAHC gTLD- MoU.
Comments and Response: The following are summaries of and responses to the major comments that were received in response to NTIA's issuance of A Proposal to Improve the Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses. As used herein, quantitative terms such as "some," "many," and "the majority of," reflect, roughly speaking, the proportion of comments addressing a particular issue but are not intended to summarize all comments received or the complete substance of all such comments.

1. Principles for a New System. The Green Paper set out four principles to guide the evolution of the domain name system: stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.

Comments: In general, commenters supported these principles, in some cases highlighting the importance of one or more of the principles. For example, a number of commenters emphasized the importance of establishing a body that fully reflects the broad diversity of the Internet community. Others stressed the need to preserve the bottom-up tradition of Internet governance. A limited number of commenters proposed additional principles for the new system, including principles related to the protection of human rights, free speech, open communication, and the preservation of the Internet as a public trust. Finally, some commenters who agreed that Internet stability is an important principle, nonetheless objected to the U.S. Government's assertion of any participatory role in ensuring such stability.

Response: The U.S. Government policy applies only to management of Internet names and addresses and does not set out a system of Internet "governance." Existing human rights and free speech protections will not be disturbed and, therefore, need not be specifically included in the core principles for DNS management. In addition, this policy is not intended to displace other legal regimes (international law, competition law, tax law and principles of international taxation, intellectual property law, etc.) that may already apply. The continued applicability of these systems as well as the principle of representation should ensure that DNS management proceeds in the interest of the Internet community as a whole. Finally, the U.S. Government believes that it would be irresponsible to withdraw from its existing management role without taking steps to ensure the stability of the Internet during its transition to private sector management. On balance, the comments did not present any consensus for amending the principles outlined in the Green Paper.

2. The Coordinated Functions. The Green Paper identified four DNS functions to be performed on a coordinated, centralized basis in order to ensure that the Internet runs smoothly:

1. To set policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks;

2. To oversee the operation of the Internet root server system;
3. To oversee policy for determining the circumstances under which new top level domains would be added to the root system; and

4. To coordinate the development of other technical protocol parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet.

Comments: Most commenters agreed that these functions should be coordinated centrally, although a few argued that a system of authoritative roots is not technically necessary to ensure DNS stability. A number of commenters, however, noted that the fourth function, as delineated in the Green Paper, overstated the functions currently performed by IANA, attributing to it central management over an expanded set of functions, some of which are now carried out by the IETF.

Response: In order to preserve universal connectivity and the smooth operation of the Internet, the U.S. Government continues to believe, along with most commenters, that these four functions should be coordinated. In the absence of an authoritative root system, the potential for name collisions among competing sources for the same domain name could undermine the smooth functioning and stability of the Internet.

The Green Paper was not, however, intended to expand the responsibilities associated with Internet protocols beyond those currently performed by IANA. Specifically, management of DNS by the new corporation does not encompass the development of Internet technical parameters for other purposes by other organizations such as IETF. The fourth function should be restated accordingly:

· to coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet.

3. Separation of Name and Number Authority.

Comments: A number of commenters suggested that management of the domain name system should be separated from management of the IP number system. These commenters expressed the view that the numbering system is relatively technical and straightforward. They feared that tight linkage of domain name and IP number policy development would embroil the IP numbering system in the kind of controversy that has surrounded domain name issuance in recent months. These commenters also expressed concern that the development of alternative name and number systems could be inhibited by this controversy or delayed by those with vested interests in the existing system.

Response: The concerns expressed by the commenters are legitimate, but domain names and IP numbers must ultimately be coordinated to preserve universal connectivity on the Internet. Also, there are significant costs associated with establishing and operating two
separate management entities.

However, there are organizational structures that could minimize the risks identified by commenters. For example, separate name and number councils could be formed within a single organization. Policy could be determined within the appropriate council that would submit its recommendations to the new corporation’s Board of Directors for ratification.

4. Creation of the New Corporation and Management of the DNS. The Green Paper called for the creation of a new private, not-for-profit corporation\(^{(17)}\) responsible for coordinating specific DNS functions for the benefit of the Internet as a whole. Under the Green Paper proposal, the U.S. Government\(^{(18)}\) would gradually transfer these functions to the new corporation beginning as soon as possible, with the goal of having the new corporation carry out operational responsibility by October 1998. Under the Green Paper proposal, the U.S. Government would continue to participate in policy oversight until such time as the new corporation was established and stable, phasing out as soon as possible, but in no event later than September 30, 2000. The Green Paper suggested that the new corporation be incorporated in the United States in order to promote stability and facilitate the continued reliance on technical expertise residing in the United States, including IANA staff at USC/ISI.

Comments: Almost all commenters supported the creation of a new, private not-for-profit corporation to manage DNS. Many suggested that IANA should evolve into the new corporation. A small number of commenters asserted that the U.S. Government should continue to manage Internet names and addresses. Another small number of commenters suggested that DNS should be managed by international governmental institutions such as the United Nations or the International Telecommunications Union. Many commenters urged the U.S. Government to commit to a more aggressive timeline for the new corporation’s assumption of management responsibility. Some commenters also suggested that the proposal to headquarter the new corporation in the United States represented an inappropriate attempt to impose U.S. law on the Internet as a whole.

Response: The U.S. Government is committed to a transition that will allow the private sector to take leadership for DNS management. Most commenters shared this goal. While international organizations may provide specific expertise or act as advisors to the new corporation, the U.S. continues to believe, as do most commenters, that neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should participate in management of Internet names and addresses. Of course, national governments now have, and will continue to have, authority to manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs.

The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains, an "outside" date.

IANA has functioned as a government contractor, albeit with considerable latitude, for some time now. Moreover, IANA is not formally organized or constituted. It describes a function more than an entity, and as such does not currently provide a legal foundation for the new
corporation. This is not to say, however, that IANA could not be reconstituted by a broad-based, representative group of Internet stakeholders or that individuals associated with IANA should not themselves play important foundation roles in the formation of the new corporation. We believe, and many commenters also suggested, that the private sector organizers will want Dr. Postel and other IANA staff to be involved in the creation of the new corporation.

Because of the significant U.S.-based DNS expertise and in order to preserve stability, it makes sense to headquarter the new corporation in the United States. Further, the mere fact that the new corporation would be incorporated in the United States would not remove it from the jurisdiction of other nations. Finally, we note that the new corporation must be headquartered somewhere, and similar objections would inevitably arise if it were incorporated in another location.

5. Structure of the New Corporation. The Green Paper proposed a 15-member Board, consisting of three representatives of regional number registries, two members designated by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), two members representing domain name registries and domain name registrars, seven members representing Internet users, and the Chief Executive Officer of the new corporation.

Comments: Commenters expressed a variety of positions on the composition of the Board of Directors for the new corporation. In general, however, most commenters supported the establishment of a Board of Directors that would be representative of the functional and geographic diversity of the Internet. For the most part, commenters agreed that the groups listed in the Green Paper included individuals and entities likely to be materially affected by changes in DNS. Most of those who criticized the proposed allocation of Board seats called for increased representation of their particular interest group on the Board of Directors. Specifically, a number of commenters suggested that the allocation set forth in the Green Paper did not adequately reflect the special interests of (1) trademark holders, (2) Internet service providers, or (3) the not-for-profit community. Others commented that the Green Paper did not adequately ensure that the Board would be globally representative.

Response: The Green Paper attempted to describe a manageably sized Board of Directors that reflected the diversity of the Internet. It is probably impossible to allocate Board seats in a way that satisfies all parties concerned. On balance, we believe the concerns raised about the representation of specific groups are best addressed by a thoughtful allocation of the "user" seats as determined by the organizers of the new corporation and its Board of Directors, as discussed below.

The Green Paper identified several international membership associations and organizations to designate Board members such as APNIC, ARIN, RIPE, and the Internet Architecture Board. We continue to believe that as use of the Internet expands outside the United States, it is increasingly likely that a properly open and transparent DNS management entity will have board members from around the world. Although we do not set any mandatory minimums for global representation, this policy statement is designed to identify global representativeness as an important priority.

6. Registrars and Registries. The Green Paper proposed moving the system for registering
Second level domains and the management of generic top-level domains into a competitive
environment by creating two market-driven businesses, registration of second level domain
names and the management of gTLD registries.

**a. Competitive Registrars. Comments:** Commenters strongly supported establishment of a
competitive registrar system whereby registrars would obtain domain names for customers in
any gTLD. Few disagreed with this position. The Green Paper proposed a set of requirements
to be imposed by the new corporation on all would-be registrars. Commenters for the most
part did not take exception to the proposed criteria, but a number of commenters suggested
that it was inappropriate for the United States government to establish them.

**Response:** In response to the comments received, the U.S. Government believes that the new
corporation, rather than the U.S. Government, should establish minimum criteria for registrars
that are pro-competitive and provide some measure of stability for Internet users without being
so onerous as to prevent entry by would-be domain name registrars from around the world.
Accordingly, the proposed criteria are not part of this policy statement.

**b. Competitive Registries. Comments:** Many commenters voiced strong opposition to the
idea of competitive and/or for-profit domain name registries, citing one of several concerns.
Some suggested that top level domain names are not, by nature, ever truly generic. As such,
they will tend to function as "natural monopolies" and should be regulated as a public trust
and operated for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole. Others suggested that
even if competition initially exists among various domain name registries, lack of portability in
the naming systems would create lock-in and switching costs, making competition
unsustainable in the long run. Finally, other commenters suggested that no new registry could
compete meaningfully with NSI unless all domain name registries were not-for-profit and/or
noncompeting.

Some commenters asserted that an experiment involving the creation of additional for-profit
registries would be too risky, and irreversible once undertaken. A related concern raised by
commenters addressed the rights that for-profit operators might assert with respect to the
information contained in registries they operate. These commenters argued that registries
would have inadequate incentives to abide by DNS policies and procedures unless the new
corporation could terminate a particular entity's license to operate a registry. For-profit
operators, under this line of reasoning, would be more likely to disrupt the Internet by resisting
license terminations.

Commenters who supported competitive registries conceded that, in the absence of domain
name portability, domain name registries could impose switching costs on users who change
domain name registries. They cautioned, however, that it would be premature to conclude that
switching costs provide a sufficient basis for precluding the proposed move to competitive
domain name registries and cited a number of factors that could protect against registry
opportunism. These commenters concluded that the potential benefits to customers from
enhanced competition outweighed the risk of such opportunism. The responses to the Green
Paper also included public comments on the proposed criteria for registries.
Response: Both sides of this argument have considerable merit. It is possible that additional discussion and information will shed light on this issue, and therefore, as discussed below, the U.S. Government has concluded that the issue should be left for further consideration and final action by the new corporation. The U.S. Government is of the view, however, that competitive systems generally result in greater innovation, consumer choice, and satisfaction in the long run. Moreover, the pressure of competition is likely to be the most effective means of discouraging registries from acting monopolistically. Further, in response to the comments received, the U.S. government believes that new corporation should establish and implement appropriate criteria for gTLD registries. Accordingly, the proposed criteria are not part of this policy statement.

7. The Creation of New gTLDs. The Green Paper suggested that during the period of transition to the new corporation, the U.S. Government, in cooperation with IANA, would undertake a process to add up to five new gTLDs to the authoritative root. Noting that formation of the new corporation would involve some delay, the Green Paper contemplated new gTLDs in the short term to enhance competition and provide information to the technical community and to policy makers, while offering entities that wished to enter into the registry business an opportunity to begin offering service to customers. The Green Paper, however, noted that ideally the addition of new TLDs would be left to the new corporation.

Comments: The comments evidenced very strong support for limiting government involvement during the transition period on the matter of adding new gTLDs. Specifically, most commenters -- both U.S. and non-U.S.-- suggested that it would be more appropriate for the new, globally representative, corporation to decide these issues once it is up and running. Few believed that speed should outweigh process considerations in this matter. Others warned, however, that relegating this contentious decision to a new and untested entity early in its development could fracture the organization. Others argued that the market for a large or unlimited number of new gTLDs should be opened immediately. They asserted that there are no technical impediments to the addition of a host of gTLDs, and the market will decide which TLDs succeed and which do not. Further, they pointed out that there are no artificial or arbitrary limits in other media on the number of places in which trademark holders must defend against dilution.

Response: The challenge of deciding policy for the addition of new domains will be formidable. We agree with the many commenters who said that the new corporation would be the most appropriate body to make these decisions based on global input. Accordingly, as supported by the preponderance of comments, the U.S. Government will not implement new gTLDs at this time.

At least in the short run, a prudent concern for the stability of the system suggests that expansion of gTLDs proceed at a deliberate and controlled pace to allow for evaluation of the impact of the new gTLDs and well-reasoned evolution of the domain space. New top level domains could be created to enhance competition and to enable the new corporation to evaluate the functioning, in the new environment, of the root server system and the software systems that enable shared registration.

8. The Trademark Dilemma. When a trademark is used as a domain name without the
trademark owner's consent, consumers may be misled about the source of the product or service offered on the Internet, and trademark owners may not be able to protect their rights without very expensive litigation. For cyberspace to function as an effective commercial market, businesses must have confidence that their trademarks can be protected. On the other hand, management of the Internet must respond to the needs of the Internet community as a whole, and not trademark owners exclusively. The Green Paper proposed a number of steps to balance the needs of domain name holders with the legitimate concerns of trademark owners in the interest of the Internet community as a whole. The proposals were designed to provide trademark holders with the same rights they have in the physical world, to ensure transparency, and to guarantee a dispute resolution mechanism with resort to a court system.

The Green Paper also noted that trademark holders have expressed concern that domain name registrants in faraway places may be able to infringe their rights with no convenient jurisdiction available in which the trademark owner could enforce a judgment protecting those rights. The Green Paper solicited comments on an arrangement whereby, at the time of registration, registrants would agree to submit a contested domain name to the jurisdiction of the courts where the registry is domiciled, where the registry database is maintained, or where the "A" root server is maintained.

**Comments:** Commenters largely agreed that domain name registries should maintain up-to-date, readily searchable domain name databases that contain the information necessary to locate a domain name holder. In general commenters did not take specific issue with the database specifications proposed in Appendix 2 of the Green Paper, although some commenters proposed additional requirements. A few commenters noted, however, that privacy issues should be considered in this context.

A number of commenters objected to NSI's current business practice of allowing registrants to use domain names before they have actually paid any registration fees. These commenters pointed out that this practice has encouraged cybersquatters and increased the number of conflicts between domain name holders and trademark holders. They suggested that domain name applicants should be required to pay before a desired domain name becomes available for use.

Most commenters also favored creation of an on-line dispute resolution mechanism to provide inexpensive and efficient alternatives to litigation for resolving disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. The Green Paper contemplated that each registry would establish specified minimum dispute resolution procedures, but remain free to establish additional trademark protection and dispute resolution mechanisms. Most commenters did not agree with this approach, favoring instead a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes.

Some commenters noted that temporary suspension of a domain name in the event of an objection by a trademark holder within a specified period of time after registration would significantly extend trademark holders' rights beyond what is accorded in the real world. They argued that such a provision would create a de facto waiting period for name use, as holders would need to suspend the use of their name until after the objection window had passed to
forestall an interruption in service. Further, they argue that such a system could be used anti-competitively to stall a competitor’s entry into the marketplace.

The suggestion that domain name registrants be required to agree at the time of registration to submit disputed domain names to the jurisdiction of specified courts was supported by U.S. trademark holders but drew strong protest from trademark holders and domain name registrants outside the United States. A number of commenters characterized this as an inappropriate attempt to establish U.S. trademark law as the law of the Internet. Others suggested that existing jurisdictional arrangements are satisfactory. They argue that establishing a mechanism whereby the judgment of a court can be enforced absent personal jurisdiction over the infringer would upset the balance between the interests of trademark holders and those of other members of the Internet community.

Response: The U.S. Government will seek international support to call upon the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to initiate a balanced and transparent process, which includes the participation of trademark holders and members of the Internet community who are not trademark holders, to (1) develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy (as opposed to conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate competing rights), (2) recommend a process for protecting famous trademarks in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate the effects, based on studies conducted by independent organizations, such as the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution procedures on trademark and intellectual property holders. These findings and recommendations could be submitted to the board of the new corporation for its consideration in conjunction with its development of registry and registrar policy and the creation and introduction of new gTLDs.

In trademark/domain name conflicts, there are issues of jurisdiction over the domain name in controversy and jurisdiction over the legal persons (the trademark holder and the domain name holder). This document does not attempt to resolve questions of personal jurisdiction in trademark/domain name conflicts. The legal issues are numerous, involving contract, conflict of laws, trademark, and other questions. In addition, determining how these various legal principles will be applied to the borderless Internet with an unlimited possibility of factual scenarios will require a great deal of thought and deliberation. Obtaining agreement by the parties that jurisdiction over the domain name will be exercised by an alternative dispute resolution body is likely to be at least somewhat less controversial than agreement that the parties will subject themselves to the personal jurisdiction of a particular national court. Thus, the references to jurisdiction in this policy statement are limited to jurisdiction over the domain name in dispute, and not to the domain name holder.

In order to strike a balance between those commenters who thought that registrars and registries should not themselves be engaged in disputes between trademark owners and domain name holders and those commenters who thought that trademark owners should have access to a reliable and up-to-date database, we believe that a database should be maintained that permits trademark owners to obtain the contact information necessary to protect their trademarks.
Further, it should be clear that whatever dispute resolution mechanism is put in place by the new corporation, that mechanism should be directed toward disputes about cybersquatting and cyberpiracy and not to settling the disputes between two parties with legitimate competing interests in a particular mark. Where legitimate competing rights are concerned, disputes are rightly settled in an appropriate court.

Under the revised plan, we recommend that domain name holders agree to submit infringing domain names to the jurisdiction of a court where the "A" root server is maintained, where the registry is domiciled, where the registry database is maintained, or where the registrar is domiciled. We believe that allowing trademark infringement suits to be brought wherever registrars and registries are located will help ensure that all trademark holders - both U.S. and non-U.S. - have the opportunity to bring suits in a convenient jurisdiction and enforce the judgments of those courts.

Under the revised plan, we also recommend that, whatever options are chosen by the new corporation, each registrar should insist that payment be made for the domain name before it becomes available to the applicant. The failure to make a domain name applicant pay for its use of a domain name has encouraged cyberpirates and is a practice that should end as soon as possible.

9. Competition Concerns.

Comments: Several commenters suggested that the U.S. Government should provide full antitrust immunity or indemnification for the new corporation. Others noted that potential antitrust liability would provide an important safeguard against institutional inflexibility and abuses of power.

Response: Applicable antitrust law will provide accountability to and protection for the international Internet community. Legal challenges and lawsuits can be expected within the normal course of business for any enterprise and the new corporation should anticipate this reality.

The Green Paper envisioned the new corporation as operating on principles similar to those of a standard-setting body. Under this model, due process requirements and other appropriate processes that ensure transparency, equity and fair play in the development of policies or practices would need to be included in the new corporation's originating documents. For example, the new corporation's activities would need to be open to all persons who are directly affected by the entity, with no undue financial barriers to participation or unreasonable restrictions on participation based on technical or other such requirements. Entities and individuals would need to be able to participate by expressing a position and its basis, having that position considered, and appealing if adversely affected. Further, the decision making process would need to reflect a balance of interests and should not be dominated by any single interest category. If the new corporation behaves this way, it should be less vulnerable to antitrust challenges.
10. The NSI Agreement.

**Comments:** Many commenters expressed concern about continued administration of key gTLDs by NSI. They argued that this would give NSI an unfair advantage in the marketplace and allow NSI to leverage economies of scale across their gTLD operations. Some commenters also believe the Green Paper approach would have entrenched and institutionalized NSI's dominant market position over the key domain name going forward. Further, many commenters expressed doubt that a level playing field between NSI and the new registry market entrants could emerge if NSI retained control over .com, .net, and .org.

**Response:** The cooperative agreement between NSI and the U.S. Government is currently in its ramp down period. The U.S. Government and NSI will shortly commence discussions about the terms and conditions governing the ramp-down of the cooperative agreement. Through these discussions, the U.S. Government expects NSI to agree to take specific actions, including commitments as to pricing and equal access, designed to permit the development of competition in domain name registration and to approximate what would be expected in the presence of marketplace competition. The U.S. Government expects NSI to agree to act in a manner consistent with this policy statement, including recognizing the role of the new corporation to establish and implement DNS policy and to establish terms (including licensing terms) applicable to new and existing gTLD registries under which registries, registrars and gTLDs are permitted to operate. Further, the U.S. Government expects NSI to agree to make available on an ongoing basis appropriate databases, software, documentation thereof, technical expertise, and other intellectual property for DNS management and shared registration of domain names.

11. A Global Perspective

**Comments:** A number of commenters expressed concern that the Green Paper did not go far enough in globalizing the administration of the domain name system. Some believed that international organizations should have a role in administering the DNS. Others complained that incorporating the new corporation in the United States would entrench control over the Internet with the U.S. Government. Still others believed that the awarding by the U.S. Government of up to five new gTLDs would enforce the existing dominance of U.S. entities over the gTLD system.

**Response:** The U.S. Government believes that the Internet is a global medium and that its technical management should fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users. We recognize the need for and fully support mechanisms that would ensure international input into the management of the domain name system. In withdrawing the U.S. Government from DNS management and promoting the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names and addresses, a key U.S. Government objective has been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in decisions affecting the Internet's technical management.

We believe this process has reflected our commitment. Many of the comments on the Green
Paper were filed by foreign entities, including governments. Our dialogue has been open to all Internet users - foreign and domestic, government and private - during this process, and we will continue to consult with the international community as we begin to implement the transition plan outlined in this paper.

12. The Intellectual Infrastructure Fund.

In 1995, NSF authorized NSI to assess domain name registrants a $50 fee per year for the first two years, 30 percent of which was to be deposited in the Intellectual Infrastructure Fund (IIF), a fund to be used for the preservation and enhancement of the intellectual infrastructure of the Internet.

Comments: Very few comments referenced the IIF. In general, the comments received on the issue supported either refunding the IIF portion of the domain name registration fee to domain registrants from whom it had been collected or applying the funds toward Internet infrastructure development projects generally, including funding the establishment of the new corporation.

Response: As proposed in the Green Paper, allocation of a portion of domain name registration fees to this fund terminated as of March 31, 1998. NSI has reduced its registration fees accordingly. The IIF remains the subject of litigation. The U.S. Government takes the position that its collection has recently been ratified by the U.S. Congress,\(^{(19)}\) and has moved to dismiss the claim that it was unlawfully collected. This matter has not been finally resolved, however.

13. The .us Domain.

At present, the IANA administers .us as a locality-based hierarchy in which second-level domain space is allocated to states and U.S. territories.\(^{(20)}\) This name space is further subdivided into localities. General registration under localities is performed on an exclusive basis by private firms that have requested delegation from IANA. The .us name space has typically been used by branches of state and local governments, although some commercial names have been assigned. Where registration for a locality has not been delegated, the IANA itself serves as the registrar.

Comments: Many commenters suggested that the pressure for unique identifiers in the .com gTLD could be relieved if commercial use of the .us space was encouraged. Commercial users and trademark holders, however, find the current locality-based system too cumbersome and complicated for commercial use. They called for expanded use of the .us TLD to alleviate some of the pressure for new generic TLDs and reduce conflicts between American companies and others vying for the same domain name. Most commenters support an evolution of the .us domain designed to make this name space more attractive to commercial users.
Response: Clearly, there is much opportunity for enhancing the .us domain space, and .us could be expanded in many ways without displacing the current structure. Over the next few months, the U.S. Government will work with the private sector and state and local governments to determine how best to make the .us domain more attractive to commercial users. Accordingly, the Department of Commerce will seek public input on this important issue.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REQUIREMENTS:

On February 20, 1998, NTIA published for public comment a proposed rule regarding the domain name registration system. That proposed rule sought comment on substantive regulatory provisions, including but not limited to a variety of specific requirements for the membership of the new corporation, the creation during a transition period of a specified number of new generic top level domains and minimum dispute resolution and other procedures related to trademarks. As discussed elsewhere in this document, in response to public comment these aspects of the original proposal have been eliminated. In light of the public comment and the changes to the proposal made as a result, as well as the continued rapid technological development of the Internet, the Department of Commerce has determined that it should issue a general statement of policy, rather than define or impose a substantive regulatory regime for the domain name system. As such, this policy statement is not a substantive rule, does not contain mandatory provisions and does not itself have the force and effect of law.

The Assistant General Counsel for Legislation and Regulation, Department of Commerce, certified to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business Administration, that, for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., the proposed rule on this matter, if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The factual basis for this certification was published along with the proposed rule. No comments were received regarding this certification. As such, and because this final rule is a general statement of policy, no final regulatory flexibility analysis has been prepared.

This general statement of policy does not contain any reporting or record keeping requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. ch. 35 (PRA). However, at the time the U.S. Government might seek to enter into agreements as described in this policy statement, a determination will be made as to whether any reporting or record keeping requirements subject to the PRA are being implemented. If so, the NTIA will, at that time, seek approval under the PRA for such requirement(s) from the Office of Management and Budget.

This statement has been determined to be not significant for purposes of Office of Management and Budget review under Executive Order 12866, entitled Regulatory Planning and Review.

REVISED POLICY STATEMENT:

This document provides the U.S. Government's policy regarding the privatization of the domain name system in a manner that allows for the development of robust competition and
that facilitates global participation in the management of Internet names and addresses.

The policy that follows does not propose a monolithic structure for Internet governance. We doubt that the Internet should be governed by one plan or one body or even by a series of plans and bodies. Rather, we seek a stable process to address the narrow issues of management and administration of Internet names and numbers on an ongoing basis.

As set out below, the U.S. Government is prepared to recognize, by entering into agreement with, and to seek international support for, a new, not-for-profit corporation formed by private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet name and address system. Under such agreement(s) or understanding(s), the new corporation would undertake various responsibilities for the administration of the domain name system now performed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government or by third parties under arrangements or agreements with the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government would also ensure that the new corporation has appropriate access to needed databases and software developed under those agreements.

The Coordinated Functions

Management of number addresses is best done on a coordinated basis. Internet numbers are a unique, and at least currently, a limited resource. As technology evolves, changes may be needed in the number allocation system. These changes should also be coordinated.

Similarly, coordination of the root server network is necessary if the whole system is to work smoothly. While day-to-day operational tasks, such as the actual operation and maintenance of the Internet root servers, can be dispersed, overall policy guidance and control of the TLDs and the Internet root server system should be vested in a single organization that is representative of Internet users around the globe.

Further, changes made in the administration or the number of gTLDs contained in the authoritative root system will have considerable impact on Internet users throughout the world. In order to promote continuity and reasonable predictability in functions related to the root zone, the development of policies for the addition, allocation, and management of gTLDs and the establishment of domain name registries and domain name registrars to host gTLDs should be coordinated.

Finally, coordinated maintenance and dissemination of the protocol parameters for Internet addressing will best preserve the stability and interconnectivity of the Internet. We are not, however, proposing to expand the functional responsibilities of the new corporation beyond those exercised by IANA currently.

In order to facilitate the needed coordination, Internet stakeholders are invited to work together to form a new, private, not-for-profit corporation to manage DNS functions. The following discussion reflects current U.S. Government views of the characteristics of an appropriate management entity. What follows is designed to describe the characteristics of an appropriate
entity generally.

**Principles for a New System.** In making a decision to enter into an agreement to establish a process to transfer current U.S. government management of DNS to such a new entity, the U.S. will be guided by, and consider the proposed entity's commitment to, the following principles:

1. Stability

The U.S. Government should end its role in the Internet number and name address system in a manner that ensures the stability of the Internet. The introduction of a new management system should not disrupt current operations or create competing root systems. During the transition and thereafter, the stability of the Internet should be the first priority of any DNS management system. Security and reliability of the DNS are important aspects of stability, and as a new DNS management system is introduced, a comprehensive security strategy should be developed.

2. Competition.

The Internet succeeds in great measure because it is a decentralized system that encourages innovation and maximizes individual freedom. Where possible, market mechanisms that support competition and consumer choice should drive the management of the Internet because they will lower costs, promote innovation, encourage diversity, and enhance user choice and satisfaction.

3. Private, Bottom-Up Coordination.

Certain management functions require coordination. In these cases, responsible, private-sector action is preferable to government control. A private coordinating process is likely to be more flexible than government and to move rapidly enough to meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. The private process should, as far as possible, reflect the bottom-up governance that has characterized development of the Internet to date.

4. Representation.

The new corporation should operate as a private entity for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole. The development of sound, fair, and widely accepted policies for the management of DNS will depend on input from the broad and growing community of Internet users. Management structures should reflect the functional and geographic diversity of the Internet and its users. Mechanisms should be established to ensure international participation in decision making.

**Purpose.** The new corporation ultimately should have the authority to manage and perform a specific set of functions related to coordination of the domain name system, including the
authority necessary to:

1) set policy for and direct allocation of IP number blocks to regional Internet number registries;

2) oversee operation of the authoritative Internet root server system;

3) oversee policy for determining the circumstances under which new TLDs are added to the root system; and

4) coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet.

**Funding.** Once established, the new corporation could be funded by domain name registries, regional IP registries, or other entities identified by the Board.

**Staff.** We anticipate that the new corporation would want to make arrangements with current IANA staff to provide continuity and expertise over the course of transition. The new corporation should secure necessary expertise to bring rigorous management to the organization.

**Incorporation.** We anticipate that the new corporation's organizers will include representatives of regional Internet number registries, Internet engineers and computer scientists, domain name registries, domain name registrars, commercial and noncommercial users, Internet service providers, international trademark holders and Internet experts highly respected throughout the international Internet community. These incorporators should include substantial representation from around the world.

As these functions are now performed in the United States, by U.S. residents, and to ensure stability, the new corporation should be headquartered in the United States, and incorporated in the U.S. as a not-for-profit corporation. It should, however, have a board of directors from around the world. Moreover, incorporation in the United States is not intended to supplant or displace the laws of other countries where applicable.

**Structure.** The Internet community is already global and diverse and likely to become more so over time. The organization and its board should derive legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders. Since the organization will be concerned mainly with numbers, names and protocols, its board should represent membership organizations in each of these areas, as well as the direct interests of Internet users.

The Board of Directors for the new corporation should be balanced to equitably represent the interests of IP number registries, domain name registries, domain name registrars, the technical community, Internet service providers (ISPs), and Internet users (commercial, not-for-
profit, and individuals) from around the world. Since these constituencies are international, we
would expect the board of directors to be broadly representative of the global Internet
community.

As outlined in appropriate organizational documents, (Charter, Bylaws, etc.) the new
corporation should:

1) appoint, on an interim basis, an initial Board of Directors (an Interim Board) consisting
of individuals representing the functional and geographic diversity of the Internet
community. The Interim Board would likely need access to legal counsel with expertise in
corporate law, competition law, intellectual property law, and emerging Internet law. The
Interim Board could serve for a fixed period, until the Board of Directors is elected and
installed, and we anticipate that members of the Interim Board would not themselves
serve on the Board of Directors of the new corporation for a fixed period thereafter.

2) direct the Interim Board to establish a system for electing a Board of Directors for the
new corporation that insures that the new corporation's Board of Directors reflects the
geographical and functional diversity of the Internet, and is sufficiently flexible to permit
evolution to reflect changes in the constituency of Internet stakeholders. Nominations to
the Board of Directors should preserve, as much as possible, the tradition of bottom-up
governance of the Internet, and Board Members should be elected from membership or
other associations open to all or through other mechanisms that ensure broad
representation and participation in the election process.

3) direct the Interim Board to develop policies for the addition of TLDs, and establish the
qualifications for domain name registries and domain name registrars within the system.

4) restrict official government representation on the Board of Directors without precluding
governments and intergovernmental organizations from participating as Internet users or
in a non-voting advisory capacity.

Governance. The organizing documents (Charter, Bylaws, etc.) should provide that the new
corporation is governed on the basis of a sound and transparent decision-making process,
which protects against capture by a self-interested faction, and which provides for robust,
professional management of the new corporation. The new corporation could rely on separate,
diverse, and robust name and number councils responsible for developing, reviewing, and
recommending for the board's approval policy related to matters within each council's
competence. Such councils, if developed, should also abide by rules and decision-making
processes that are sound, transparent, protect against capture by a self-interested party and
provide an open process for the presentation of petitions for consideration. The elected Board
of Directors, however, should have final authority to approve or reject policies recommended
by the councils.
**Operations.** The new corporation's processes should be fair, open and pro-competitive, protecting against capture by a narrow group of stakeholders. Typically this means that decision-making processes should be sound and transparent; the basis for corporate decisions should be recorded and made publicly available. Super-majority or even consensus requirements may be useful to protect against capture by a self-interested faction. The new corporation does not need any special grant of immunity from the antitrust laws so long as its policies and practices are reasonably based on, and no broader than necessary to promote the legitimate coordinating objectives of the new corporation. Finally, the commercial importance of the Internet necessitates that the operation of the DNS system, and the operation of the authoritative root server system should be secure, stable, and robust.

The new corporation's charter should provide a mechanism whereby its governing body will evolve to reflect changes in the constituency of Internet stakeholders. The new corporation could, for example, establish an open process for the presentation of petitions to expand board representation.

**Trademark Issues.** Trademark holders and domain name registrants and others should have access to searchable databases of registered domain names that provide information necessary to contact a domain name registrant when a conflict arises between a trademark holder and a domain name holder. To this end, we anticipate that the policies established by the new corporation would provide that following information would be included in all registry databases and available to anyone with access to the Internet:

- up-to-date registration and contact information;
- up-to-date and historical chain of registration information for the domain name;
- a mail address for service of process;
- the date of domain name registration;
- the date that any objection to the registration of the domain name is filed; and
- any other information determined by the new corporation to be reasonably necessary to resolve disputes between domain name registrants and trademark holders expeditiously.

Further, the U.S. Government recommends that the new corporation adopt policies whereby:

1) Domain registrants pay registration fees at the time of registration or renewal and
agree to submit infringing domain names to the authority of a court of law in the jurisdiction in which the registry, registry database, registrar, or the "A" root servers are located.

2) Domain name registrants would agree, at the time of registration or renewal, that in cases involving cyberpiracy or cybersquatting (as opposed to conflicts between legitimate competing rights holders), they would submit to and be bound by alternative dispute resolution systems identified by the new corporation for the purpose of resolving those conflicts. Registries and Registrars should be required to abide by decisions of the ADR system.

3) Domain name registrants would agree, at the time of registration or renewal, to abide by processes adopted by the new corporation that exclude, either pro-actively or retroactively, certain famous trademarks from being used as domain names (in one or more TLDs) except by the designated trademark holder.

4) Nothing in the domain name registration agreement or in the operation of the new corporation should limit the rights that can be asserted by a domain name registrant or trademark owner under national laws.

THE TRANSITION

Based on the processes described above, the U.S. Government believes that certain actions should be taken to accomplish the objectives set forth above. Some of these steps must be taken by the government itself, while others will need to be taken by the private sector. For example, a new not-for-profit organization must be established by the private sector and its Interim Board chosen. Agreement must be reached between the U.S. Government and the new corporation relating to transfer of the functions currently performed by IANA. NSI and the U.S. Government must reach agreement on the terms and conditions of NSI's evolution into one competitor among many in the registrar and registry marketplaces. A process must be laid out for making the management of the root server system more robust and secure. A relationship between the U.S. Government and the new corporation must be developed to transition DNS management to the private sector and to transfer management functions.

During the transition the U.S. Government expects to:

1) ramp down the cooperative agreement with NSI with the objective of introducing competition into the domain name space. Under the ramp down agreement NSI will agree to (a) take specific actions, including commitments as to pricing and equal access, designed to permit the development of competition in domain name registration and to approximate what would be expected in the presence of marketplace competition, (b) recognize the role of the new corporation to establish and implement DNS policy and to establish terms (including licensing terms) applicable to new and existing gTLDs and registries under which registries, registrars and gTLDs are permitted to operate, (c) make available on an ongoing basis appropriate databases, software, documentation thereof, technical expertise, and other intellectual property for DNS management and shared
registration of domain names;

2) enter into agreement with the new corporation under which it assumes responsibility for management of the domain name space;

3) ask WIPO to convene an international process including individuals from the private sector and government to develop a set of recommendations for trademark/domain name dispute resolutions and other issues to be presented to the Interim Board for its consideration as soon as possible;

4) consult with the international community, including other interested governments as it makes decisions on the transfer; and

5) undertake, in cooperation with IANA, NSI, the IAB, and other relevant organizations from the public and private sector, a review of the root server system to recommend means to increase the security and professional management of the system. The recommendations of the study should be implemented as part of the transition process; and the new corporation should develop a comprehensive security strategy for DNS management and operations.

ENDNOTES


3. The RFC, the Green Paper, and comments received in response to both documents are available on the Internet at the following address: <http://www.ntia.doc.gov>. Additional comments were submitted after March 23, 1998. These comments have been considered and treated as part of the official record and have been separately posted at the same site, although the comments were not received by the deadline established in the February 20, 1998 Federal Register Notice.


7. For further information about these systems see: name.space: <http://namespace.pgmedia.net>; AlterNIC: <http://www.alternic.net>; eDNS: <http://www.edns.net>. Reference to these organizations does not constitute an endorsement of their commercial activities.

8. Lengthy discussions by the Internet technical community on DNS issues generally and on the Postel DNS proposal took place on the newdom, com-priv, ietf and domain-policy Internet mailing lists.


10. For further information about the IAHC see: <http://www.iahc.org> and related links. Reference to this
organization does not constitute an endorsement of the commercial activities of its related organizations.


14. For a discussion, see Congressional testimony of Assistant Secretary of Commerce Larry Irving, Before the House Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Basic Research, September 25, 1997 available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/email>.


17. As used herein, the term "new corporation" is intended to refer to an entity formally organized under well recognized and established business law standards.

18. As noted in the Summary, the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize DNS in a manner that increases competition and facilitates international participation in its management. Accordingly, the Department of Commerce will lead the coordination of the U.S. government's role in this transition.


21. These databases would also benefit domain name holders by making it less expensive for new registrars and registries to identify potential customers, enhancing competition and lowering prices.

Comments concerning the layout, construction and functionality of this site should be sent to webmaster@icann.org.

Page Updated 22-July-2000

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September 13, 2013

Dr. Bruce Tonkin, Chair
ICANN Board Governance Committee
4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
Marina del Rey, CA 90292
USA

By regular mail and by e-mail:
reconsideration@icann.org

Re: Merck KGaA’s Request for Reconsideration of NGPC’s 13 July 2013 Resolution (2013.07.13.NG04)

Dear Dr. Tonkin:

We refer to the Request for Reconsideration dated 30 August 2013 from Merck KGaA with respect to the decision taken by the New gTLD Program Committee (NGPC) in its Resolution of 13 July 2013 (2013.07.13.NG04) (“Resolution”) and to yesterday’s (12 September 2013) communication from Ana Sylvia Prado, Deputy Manager of the ICC International Centre for Expertise, attached hereto.

Shortly after adoption by the NGPC of its 13 July 2013 Resolution, and pursuant to the terms of that Resolution, we submitted to the ICC International Centre for ADR (“Centre”), with a copy to counsel for Merck KGaA, a request for reconsideration by the Centre’s Standing Committee of the Centre’s previous rejection of two community objections filed by our law firm on behalf of Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck & Co.”) against two applications submitted by Merck KGaA (for .MERCK (application 1-980 7217) and .EMERCK (application 1-980-60636)). By letter dated 20 August 2013 from the Centre, both Merck & Co. and Merck KGaA were given until on or before 27 August 2013 to file further comments regarding Merck & Co.’s request to the Centre. Both parties did so and, as confirmed by a letter from the Centre dated 30 August 2013, the Centre then invited its Standing Committee to take a decision on whether to reconsider the Centre’s prior decision not to register Merck & Co.’s community objections.

However, also on 30 August 2013, Merck KGaA filed with the ICANN Board Governance Committee the above referenced Request for Reconsideration regarding the NGPC’s 13 July Resolution and, yesterday, on 12 September 2013, we were informed by the Centre that Merck & Co.’s request for reconsideration by the Centre of its previous rejection of Merck & Co.’s two community objections would be held in abeyance, pending notification by ICANN as to whether it will revise the NGPC Resolution.

Merck & Co notes the allegations made in Merck KGaA’s Request for Reconsideration against Merck & Co, and its outside counsel, as well as against ICANN and the New gTLD Program Committee, and
wishes to state that Merck & Co remains fully available to respond robustly to the false accusations made by Merck KGaA should the BGC or the ICANN Board wish.

For now, however, Merck & Co respectfully requests that until both Merck KGaA’s Request for Reconsideration of the Resolution and Merck & Co.‘s request to the Centre concerning rejection of its Community Objections are finally resolved, the related .emerck and .merck applications not move forward in the contracting/delegation process.

Yours faithfully,

Judith L. Harris

JLH:lsj

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Cherine Chalaby, BGC (by regular mail and by e-mail at cherine.chalaby@icann.org) Ms. Ana Sylvia Prado, Deputy Manager, ICC International Centre for Expertise (by e-mail at expertise@iccwbo.org and adr@iccwbo.org).
EXP/522/ICANN/137
MERCK & CO., INC. (USA) vs/ MERCK KGAA (GERMANY)

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12 September 2013

Dear Madam, Dear Sir,

The Centre acknowledges receipt of Mr. Torsten Bettinger’s email dated 30 August 2013, sent on behalf of the Applicant, a copy of which was sent directly to the Objector.

The Centre has also taken note of the documents attached to Mr. Bettinger’s email, in particular the Applicant’s formal request for reconsideration of the NGPC Resolution dated 13 July 2013, addressed to the ICANN Governance Board.

With reference to the Objector’s request for reconsideration of the Centre’s prior decision not to register this matter dated 16 August 2013 and the Centre’s recent correspondence in this matter with the parties, we note that Objector’s request for reconsideration is inter alia based on the above-referenced NGPC Resolution.

Accordingly, the Centre shall not invite the Standing Committee to decide whether to reconsider the Centre’s previous decision in this matter until ICANN has informed the Centre whether it will revise the NGPC Resolution.

.../...
As soon as the Centre has received the above-mentioned information from ICANN, it will inform the parties accordingly.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Ana Sylvia Prado
Deputy Manager
ICC International Centre for Expertise
On 30 August 2013, Merck KGaA submitted a reconsideration request (“Request”). The Request asked the Board to reconsider the 13 July 2013 resolution of the New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”) that permitted and encouraged dispute resolution panels to use discretion in enforcing the deadlines set forth in the New gTLD Applicant Guidebook. Specifically, the Request challenges the NGPC resolution as it relates to Merck & Co. Inc.’s (“the Objector”) community objection to Merck KGaA’s application for .MERCK, which was rejected by the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) for being filed after the published closing deadline.

I. Relevant Bylaws

Article IV, Section 2.2 of ICANN’s Bylaws states in relevant part that any entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction to the extent that it has been adversely affected by:

(a) one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or

(b) one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act; or

(c) one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that are taken as a result of the Board's reliance on false or inaccurate material information.

Dismissal of a request for reconsideration is appropriate if the Board Governance Committee (“BGC”) recommends, and the NGPC agrees, that the requesting party does not have standing because the party failed to satisfy the criteria set forth in the Bylaws. These standing
requirements are intended to protect the reconsideration process from abuse and to ensure that it is not used as a mechanism simply to challenge an action with which someone disagrees.

For reconsideration requests that challenge Board actions, requests must be submitted to the BGC within fifteen days after the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a resolution with an accompanying rationale. Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.5.

The Request was received on 30 August 2013. The challenged NGPC resolution was published on 14 July 2013, which would render the Request untimely under the Bylaws. However, it appears that Merck KGaA did not become “adversely affected” by the challenged resolution until 16 August 2013, when the Objector, based on the discretion afforded to the ICC under the 13 July 2013 resolution, submitted a request for rehearing of the ICC’s previous rejection of its community objection to Merck KGaA’s application for .MERCK. Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2. Because the Request was received within fifteen days of the Objector’s submission of its request for rehearing, the BGC will consider the merits of Merck KGaA’s Request.

II. Background

A. Filing An Objection To A New gTLD Application

The New gTLD Program includes an objection procedure pursuant to which objections to applications for new gTLDs are submitted to an independent dispute resolution service provider (“DRSP”). The objection procedures are set out in Module 3 of the Applicant Guidebook (http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb/objection-procedures-04jun12-en.pdf) and the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (the “Procedure”) attached thereto.

To initiate a dispute resolution proceeding, an objection must comply with the procedures set out in Articles 5-8 of the Procedure. This includes the requirement that objections be filed with the appropriate DRSP before the published closing date for the objection filing period. (Applicant Guidebook, Section 3.2.3; Procedure, Art. 7(a).) Before an objection will be
registered for processing, the DRSP will conduct an administrative review to verify compliance with Articles 5-8 of the Procedures and the applicable DRSP Rules. (Procedure, Art. 9(a).)

B. The Objection to Merck KGaA’s Application for .MERCK

The Objector attempted to file two community objections to Merck KGaA’s applications for .MERCK and .EMERCK.¹ The objections were transmitted to the ICC “ten and eleven minutes” past the 8:00 pm Eastern Standard Time filing deadline on 15 March 2013. (Request, Pg. 3 and Annex 1 to Request.) The next morning, the Objector’s counsel sent an email to ICANN’s Ombudsman indicating that there was an Internet outage that caused the objections to be filed late and inquiring whether there was a process for determining whether the objections were accepted by the ICC. (Annex 1 to Request.) The Objector’s counsel further indicated that the filing fees for the objections were paid via wire transfer earlier in the day before the filing deadline. (Annex 1 to Request.) Counsel also inquired whether, should the ICC reject the objections, there was a process for appealing that rejection based on technical difficulties. (Annex 1 to Request.) In an email response to the Objector’s counsel, ICANN’s Ombudsman stated that the Objector should wait to see whether the objections are accepted by the ICC before starting an official investigation through the Ombudsman. (Annex 1 to Request). Merck KGaA was not included on the correspondence between the Ombudsman and the Objector. (Request, Pg. 7.)

¹ The Request is directed only at the objection to .MERCK. As a result, this Recommendation will only refer to the .MERCK objection. However, to the extent an analysis applies to the objection to .MERCK, it equally applies to the analysis of the objection to .EMERCK.
In the weeks that followed, the ICC requested comments from the Objector and Merck KGaA, and ultimately rejected the two community objections to .MERCK and .EMERCK for being untimely. (Request, Pg. 7.)

C. The NGPC Resolution Giving DRSPs Discretion in Enforcing Deadlines

On 13 July 2013, the NGPC adopted three resolutions relating to deadlines found in the dispute resolution procedures of the Applicant Guidebook. (http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-new-gtld-13jul13-en.htm (hereinafter “13 July 2013 Resolutions”).) The NGPC resolutions were taken following receipt of two separate reports and recommendations issued by ICANN’s Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman’s first report to the Board (dated 7 June 2013) addressed an objection from Axis Communication AB (“Axis”) to the Saudi Telecom Company’s (“STC”) application for .AXIS (the “.AXIS Report”). See Meeting of the NGPC, Briefing Materials 2 (“NGPC Briefing Materials”) available at http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/briefing-materials-2-13jul13-en.pdf. According to the .AXIS Report, STC filed its response to Axis’ objection two days after the filing deadline and the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) did not accept the response.2 (NGPC Briefing Material, Pgs. 12-13.) The Ombudsman expressed concern that, under the circumstances of that particular matter, the rejection of STC’s response could be unfair, and therefore recommended that the Board (or NGPC in this case) ask WIPO to reconsider its stance.

2 Article 11(b) of the Procedures provides that an applicant must file a response to an objection within thirty days of receiving notice of the objection from the DRSP. (Procedure, Art. 11(b).) If an applicant fails to provide a response within the thirty-day period, the applicant is deemed to be in default and the objection will be sustained. (Procedure, Art. 11(g).)
with regard to the rejection of STC’s response in light of the facts and analysis stated in
the .AXIS Report. (NPGC Briefing Material, Pg. 15.)

The Ombudsman’s second report to the Board (dated 1 July 2013) addressed an objection
to .GAY by GOProud (the “.GAY Report”). (NPGC Briefing Material, Pg. 10-11.) According
to the .GAY Report, GoProud’s objection was timely filed but was not accepted because it was
too long. The Ombudsman suggested that the notice of the rejection was sent to an email address
that was not the one used to file the objection, therefore GOProud did not see it within the time
permitted to amend the objection, and so the objection was rejected. (NPGC Briefing Material,
Pg. 10.) Based on the facts available to him, the Ombudsman expressed concerns about the
fairness of the decision to reject GOProud’s objection and recommended that the Board (or
NGPC in this case) ask the ICC to revisit its decision. (NPGC Briefing Material, Pg. 11.)

Upon consideration of the Ombudsman’s reports, the NGPC resolved as follows:

(i) (2013.07.13.NG02) The NGPC directs the President of the Generic Domains Division (or his designee) to forward the .AXIS Report to WIPO and ask WIPO to reconsider its stance with regard to the rejection of STC’s response in view of the facts and analysis in the .AXIS Report;

(ii) (2013.07.13.NG03) The NGPC directs the President of the Generic Domains Division (or his designee) to forward the .GAY Report to the ICC and ask the ICC to revisit its decision in view of the facts and analysis in the .GAY Report; and

(iii) (2013.07.13.NG04) In the interests of fairness and reasonableness, notwithstanding the deadlines set out in the Applicant Guidebook, in the future, the DRSPs are permitted and encouraged to use their discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances of each matter, and in cases where it is shown that the affected party is making a good faith effort to comply with the deadlines, as to whether to grant extensions, or deviate from the deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook.

(13 July 2013 Resolutions.)

In the rationale for the three resolutions, the NGPC acknowledged that, beyond the two
Ombudsman reports, ICANN has received several other inquiries from objectors, applicants, and
the DRSPs about issues related to late filing and whether the DRSPs have the discretion to deviate from the deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook. (13 July 2013 Resolutions.) The NGPC concluded that notwithstanding the deadlines in the Guidebook, in the interests of fairness and reasonableness the DRSPs should have discretion to provide extensions of those deadlines, on case-by-case bases depending on the circumstances, and in cases where it is shown that the affected party is making a good faith effort to comply. (13 July 2013 Resolutions.)

D. The Objector’s Request for Rehearing with ICC on Rejected Objection

On 16 August 2013, the Objector, citing the NGPC’s 13 July 2013 Resolutions, submitted a request to the ICC that it rehear its previous rejection of the .MERCK objection. Both the Objector and Merck KGaA timely filed additional comments regarding the Objector’s request for rehearing, and on 30 August 2013, the ICC’s Standing Committee was invited to issue a decision on the issue. However, having received a copy of Merck KGaA’s Reconsideration Request, the ICC has since indicated that it will not rule on the Objector’s request for rehearing until after ICANN determines whether it is going to reconsider and/or revise the 13 July 2013 resolutions. See Letter from Judith Harris to the BGC, available at http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/governance/reconsideration/harris-to-bgc-13sep13-en.pdf.3

3 A letter from the Objector’s counsel, Judith Harris, was received on 13 September 2013. The letter included as an attachment a letter from the ICC indicating that the ICC would not rule on the Objector’s request for rehearing until after ICANN determined whether it was going to reconsider the NGPC resolution. The Objector’s letter, as well as the attached letter from the ICC, have been reviewed and given appropriate consideration in connection with this Recommendation.
III. Analysis of Merck KGaA’s Request for Reconsideration – The NGPC Did Not Fail To Consider Material Information In Adopting The Challenged Resolution

Merck KGaA seeks reconsideration of the NGPC’s 13 July 2013 resolution that generally gives DRSPs discretion in enforcing deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook (hereinafter, the “Resolution”).

In its Request, Merck KGaA claims that the NGPC failed to consider material information in that the challenged Resolution was based on “incomplete, and improperly compiled, reports by the ICANN Ombudsman.” (Request, Pg. 16.) Specifically, Merck KGaA claims that the Ombudsman denied Merck KGaA’s right to be heard and issued its recommendations to the NGPC on the basis of unilateral communications with only the Objector’s position being presented. (Request, Pg. 5.) Merck KGaA’s claims are not supported.

ICANN’s Ombudsman issued only two reports to the Board – the .AXIS Report and the .GAY Report – relating to purportedly missed deadlines found in the dispute resolution procedures of the Applicant Guidebook. (NPGC Briefing Material.) Each report addressed a particular complaint to the Ombudsman and made a recommendation to the Board (or NGPC in this instance). Neither report addressed, nor were they intended to address, the Objector’s complaint to the Ombudsman regarding the ICC’s rejection of the objection to .MERCK. (NPGC Briefing Material.) Because neither report addressed the Objector’s complaint to the Ombudsman – or, otherwise reflected a recommendation to the NGPC on how to resolve the

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4 To the extent that the Request purports to raise concerns about ICANN Ombudsman’s performance of his duties, a review of the Ombudsman is not within the scope of the Reconsideration process. However, the Board is authorized to, and does regularly evaluate the Ombudsman’s performance and whether he is following his mandate and Framework. The BGC will ask that the issues raised in this Request be taken into consideration in the Board’s evaluation of the Ombudsman.
Objector’s complaint – there is no support for Merck KGaA’s assertion that the NGPC failed to consider material information relating to the Objector’s complaint.

Based on the .AXIS Report and the .GAY Report, the NGPC adopted two very specific resolutions asking the respective DRSPs to reconsider/revisit their decisions relating to the relevant filings about those strings. In addition to the resolutions that specifically address the .AXIS and .GAY strings, the NGPC adopted a resolution that generally permits and encourages DRSPs to exercise discretion in enforcing the deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook. (13 July 2013 Resolutions.) This more general resolution is not directed towards any one specific DRSP or any one specific dispute resolution proceeding or Ombudsman’s complaint, including the complaint relating to the .MERCK objection.

In its published rationale for the Resolution, the NGPC acknowledged that, beyond the two Ombudsman reports, ICANN received several other inquiries from objectors, applicants, and the DRSPs about issues related to late filings and whether the DRSPs have the discretion to deviate from the specific deadlines set forth in the Applicant Guidebook. The NGPC concluded, in the interests of fairness and reasonableness, that it is appropriate for the DRSPs to exercise discretion in enforcing dispute resolution deadlines. (13 July 2013 Resolutions.) This grant of discretion is just that, it does not direct any DRSP to reverse any specific decision to accept or reject a late filing. Rather, the Resolution is intended to provide further guidance to the DRSPs on the issue of late submissions.5

In view of the above, there is no support for Merck KGaA’s claim that the NGPC failed to consider material information at the time of adopting the challenged Resolution. The

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5 To address potential technical inconsistencies, the DRSPs had previously agreed to accept objections up to five minutes after the deadline in the Guidebook. (Annex 4 to Request.)
challenged Resolution was a general grant of discretion to the DRSPs and not specifically directed towards the .MERCK objection. Merck KGaA’s suggestion that the NGPC was lacking specific information relating to the objection to Merck KGaA’s application for .MERCK is not well founded and should be rejected.

IV. Merck KGaA’s Other Alleged Violations of ICANN Policy and Procedure Are Not Proper Bases for Reconsideration.

A challenge of a Board action (or inaction) must be based upon the Board taking an action (or inaction) without consideration of material information or as a result of the Board’s reliance on false or inaccurate material information. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.)

In its Request, Merck KGaA seeks reconsideration of the challenged Resolution on the additional grounds that: (i) the NGPC lacks the jurisdiction to “oversee, appeal or challenge” the procedural decisions of the DRSPs (Request, Pg. 2.); and (ii) the NGPC’s actions constitute breaches of ICANN’s Core Values, including the requirement to make “decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness,” and the requirement to employ “open and transparent policy development mechanisms that … ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process” (Bylaws, Art. 1, §§ 2.7 & 2.8.) (Request, Pg. 4.) Neither of the stated grounds is a proper basis for Reconsideration under ICANN’s Bylaws and need not be considered.

Even if these were proper bases for Reconsideration, the above-stated grounds do not support reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction, Article 23(a), clearly provides ICANN with the jurisdiction to modify the procedures governing the dispute resolution process. Article 23(a) states: “ICANN may from time to time, in accordance with its Bylaws, modify this Procedure.” (Procedures, Art. 23(a).) Thus, even if the challenged Resolution was considered a modification
to the Procedure, the NGPC has the authority to make such modifications, provided the modifications are in accordance with ICANN’s Bylaws.

With respect to the purported violations of ICANN’s Core Values, Merck KGaA’s assertions are similarly unsupported. As explained above, the .MERCK complaint to the Ombudsman was not before the NGPC. The NGPC adopted two resolutions specifically addressing issues surrounding objections to the applied-for .AXIS and .GAY strings, and adopted a third resolution generally permitting and encouraging DRSPs to exercise discretion in enforcing dispute resolution procedure deadlines. (13 July 2013 Resolutions.) This general grant of discretion is to be applied neutrally and objectively. Both the .AXIS Report and .GAY Report are publicly posted, and the NGPC clearly stated and published its rationale for the Resolution (13 July 2013 Resolutions). The NGPC’s actions – both the evaluation of the issues and its ultimate resolutions – were at all times open, transparent, and in good faith. Accordingly, there is no support for Merck KGaA’s claim that the NGPC’s actions were somehow inconsistent with ICANN’s Core Values.

V. Recommendation and Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the BGC concludes that Merck KGaA has not stated proper grounds for reconsideration. Accordingly, we recommend that Merck KGaA’s Request be denied and the Request not be considered further.