22 OCTOBER 2015 BOARD MEETING
Reference Materials

TABLE OF CONTENTS – REFERENCE MATERIALS

Consent Agenda

GNSO gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group Charter Amendments (2015)........................................p. 2-25

Main Agenda

Section I: General Overview and Next Steps

In March 2015, the gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group (RySG) of the GNSO submitted a set of Charter revisions to the ICANN Staff for processing in compliance with Phase I of the Process For Amending GNSO Stakeholder Group and Constituency Charters. The RySG Charter changes included amendments designed to adjust to an evolving composition of membership and to enable the Stakeholder Group to more effectively undertake its policy development responsibilities. Among a number of amendments, the most substantial charter changes are in the following areas:

- Changes to the classifications of “active” and “inactive” RySG members;
- Adding the concept of “staggered” terms for RySG officers;
- Creation of a “Vice Chair of Policy” officer position;
- Creation of a “Vice Chair of Administration” officer position;
- Adjustments to the formula for calculating an RySG meeting quorum;
- Adding a new election nomination procedure; and
- Other minor format and non-substantive editorial changes.

As part of its Process Phase II assessment responsibilities, Staff determined and reported to the Board’s Structural Improvements Committee (SIC) that the proposed changes did not present any fiscal or liability concerns for the ICANN organization.

The ICANN Bylaws provide that "each GNSO Stakeholder Group ... and each of its associated Constituencies shall maintain recognition with the ICANN Board." To assist with its own review and analysis, the SIC subsequently directed Staff to open a Public Comment Forum to solicit community input concerning the RySG Charter amendments.

The Public Comment reply period closed on 16 June 2015 and Staff has prepared this summary of the community’s input.

Next Steps:
This report will be forwarded to the Structural Improvements Committee (SIC), which will provide a recommendation to the Board concerning the RySG Charter amendments. This report will also be published for the community’s review at the above link (see Important Information Links).

Section II: Contributors

At the time this report was prepared, a total of 2 community submissions had been posted to the Forum. The contributors are listed below in chronological order by posting date with initials noted. To the extent that quotations are used in the foregoing narrative (Section III), such citations will reference the contributor’s initials.

Organizations and Groups:

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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brand Registry Group</td>
<td>Philip Sheppard</td>
<td>BRG</td>
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<td>GNSO Business Constituency</td>
<td>Steve DelBianco</td>
<td>BC</td>
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Individuals:

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Section III: Summary of Comments

General Disclaimer: This section is intended to broadly and comprehensively summarize the comments submitted to this Forum, but not to address every specific position stated by each contributor. Staff recommends that readers interested in specific aspects of any of the summarized comments, or the full context of others, refer directly to the specific contributions at the link referenced above (View Comments Submitted).

For this Summary of Comments, the commenters’ feedback is divided into: Issue 1 – General but qualified support expressed by the commenters regarding the proposed charter revisions, and Issue 2 – enumerated reservations and concerns expressed by the commenters about the scope of the proposed charter changes and recommendations for additional areas of improvements.

Issue 1 – General Support For Proposed Charter Changes.

The brief comments submitted by the two community groups offer qualified support for the charter changes presented by the RySG. The BRG asserts that the charter changes “reflect the growth in the size of the RySG” and says it “supports the proposed changes”.

Noting that it has reservations about the proposed amendments, the BC states that it “supports the proposed revisions.” The BC notes that in the proposed amendments, the RySG is making several adjustments to its Charter in order to increase the efficiency of operating the group. The BC says it believes that the amendments will assist the RySG in “avoiding delays in its decision-making process.”
Issue 2 – Reservations about the scope of the proposed changes and recommendations for additional improvements

Both commenters express reservations about the scope of the presented charter changes and, notwithstanding their overall support, ask the Board to encourage the RySG to pursue additional charter development work on weighted voting and stakeholder group structure and membership matters.

Weighted Voting –

The BRG asserts “that there are two fundamental changes required to the RySG charter that are not covered by the current proposal” – “reform of the system of weighted voting” and the need “to allow membership of the RySG by associations of registries.”

The BRG says, “the reason that the RySG has weighted voting (as a function of second-level registrations) was identified in the RySG Evolution 1 working group. The BRG quotes that working group as stating, ‘Currently, the number of second-level registrations is a proxy measure for the economic and operational impact of policy outcomes.’” The BRG notes that the same RySG working group identified the limitations on this rationale in the future: “Registrations are not a proxy measure for the economic and operational impact of policy outcomes for some new types of registries such as .brands.” Following these observations, the BRG “calls on the ICANN Board to recognise the above and ask the RySG to bring forward proposals to reform weighted voting.”

Similarly, the BC states, that the RySG should have taken a serious look at eliminating the weighted voting procedure outlined in the current RySG Charter. The BC is mindful that one of the primary purposes of ICANN and the new gTLD program itself was to provide more choice for consumers as a benefit for the greater public interest.

Membership and Structural Issues -

The BRG says that “unlike the BC, IPC and NCSG, the RySG has no facility for association members.” The BRG notes, “this is another historic legacy issue. Yesterday there were no such associations. Today there are. The BRG is one such association”. The BRG says its members “tell us they want to join the BRG and expect focused .brand-relevant services filtering the complexity and customising information for them”. The BRG also notes that in addition to expanding participation of registries in ICANN, association membership will give the BRG “a home within the GNSO.” Specifically, the BRG “calls on the ICANN Board to recognise the above and ask the RySG to bring forward proposals to allow membership by associations representing registries.”

The BC notes that “the proposed amendments clarify the Observer status and the purpose of Interest Groups within the RySG.” However, the BC is concerned that “the RySG continues to ignore recognition of non-retail registries as a separate constituency from the retail registries. “

The BC believes “that a failure to allow for the formation of voting constituencies and the weighted voting provisions (even if only optional) will continue to allow RySG policy positions to be dominated by those registries with a for-profit, retail registry business model, to the disadvantage of smaller,
non-retail oriented registries.”

The BC asserts, “the failure to create a system that puts all registry business models on parity with the legacy registry business models is a serious flaw in the proposed amendments.”

### Section IV: Analysis of Comments

**General Disclaimer:** This section is intended to provide an analysis and evaluation of the comments received along with explanations regarding the basis for any recommendations provided within the analysis.

This Analysis of Comments is separated into **Topic 1** – General community reaction to the RySG Charter amendments as presented, and **Topic 2** – Specific community reservations and thoughts about expanding the scope of further RySG Charter improvements.

#### Topic 1: RySG Charter Amendments

Both commenters express qualified support for the RySG Charter amendments. The BRG notes that the amendments “reflect the growth in the size of the RySG” and states, “the BRG supports the proposed changes.” The BC states that notwithstanding reservations explained in its comments, “the BC supports the proposed revisions, but it strongly urges the Board to request that the RySG consider further revisions to address these serious issues in the very near future.”

#### Topic 2: Supplementary Concerns

Despite their qualified support, both commenters state they have concerns about the scope of the amendments and suggest additional areas for improvements to the RySG charter. Additional matters raised by the BRG and BC focus on the topics of weighted voting, as well as structure and membership issues – specifically the treatment of associations and the relative recognition and stature of non-retail registry operators who have joined the RySG.

**Weighted Voting –**

The BRG asserts “that there are two fundamental changes required to the RySG charter that are not covered by the current proposal” – “reform of the system of weighted voting” and the need “to allow membership of the RySG by associations of registries.”

The BRG says, “the reason that the RySG has weighted voting (as a function of second-level registrations) was identified in the RySG Evolution 1 working group. The BRG quotes that working group as stating, ‘Currently, the number of second-level registrations is a proxy measure for the economic and operational impact of policy outcomes.’” The BRG notes that the same RySG working group identified the limitations on this rationale in the future: “Registrations are not a proxy measure for the economic and operational impact of policy outcomes for some new types of registries such as .brands.” Following these observations, the BRG “calls on the ICANN Board to recognise the above and ask the RySG to bring forward proposals to reform weighted voting.”
Similarly, the BC states, that the RySG should have taken a serious look at eliminating the weighted voting procedure outlined in the RySG Charter. The BC is mindful that one of the primary purposes of ICANN and the new gTLD program itself was to provide more choice for consumers as a benefit for the greater public interest.”

Membership and Structure Issues -

The BRG says that “unlike the BC, IPC and NCSG, the RySG has no facility for association members.” The BRG notes, “this is another historic legacy issue. Yesterday there were no such associations. Today there are. The BRG is one such association”. The BRG says its members “tell us they want to join the BRG and expect focused .brand–relevant services filtering the complexity and customising information for them”. The BRG also notes that in addition to expanding participation of registries in ICANN, association membership will give the BRG a home within the GNSO.” Specifically, the BRG “calls on the ICANN Board to recognise the above and ask the RySG to bring forward proposals to allow membership by associations representing registries.”

The BC states that “the proposed amendments clarify the Observer status and the purpose of Interest Groups within the RySG.” However, the BC is concerned that “the RySG continues to ignore recognition of non-retail registries as a separate constituency from the retail registries.”

The BC believes “a failure to allow for the formation of voting constituencies and the weighted voting provisions (even if only optional) will continue to allow RySG policy positions to be dominated by those registries with a for-profit, retail registry business model, to the disadvantage of smaller, non-retail oriented registries.”

The BC asserts, “the failure to create a system that puts all registry business models on parity with the legacy registry business models is a serious flaw in the proposed amendments.”

Recommendations –

In light of the comments received, the Board seems to have the option available to it (among others) to approve the proposed amendments and to consider recommending further future charter changes (or examination of those ideas) consistent with the recommendations of the community commenters in this proceeding. Staff is aware that the RySG is continuing its evolution working group efforts/discussions within its community and that further amendments are or will be under consideration as part of those efforts. Board guidance – if thought appropriate by the SIC or the full Board – could have influence on those activities.

Staff also hopes to approach the SIC with an assessment of the time it takes to conduct the review of community governance document amendments. This proceeding reflects the third time this process has been utilized (once prior to formal process approval). Evidenced by the community input in this proceeding, community review and comment is a valuable resource for collecting input on changes proposed for community governance documents. Implementation experience also reveals that there may be opportunities to adjust or streamline the process in a way that maintains the important reviews aspects of the process while improving the “time to market” of community amendments.
Charter of the
gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group
[ Adopted by unanimous vote on 15 January 2015]
Approved by the ICANN Board of Directors.

I. Mission and Principles

A. The gTLD Registries Stakeholder Group (RySG) is a recognized entity within the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) formed according to Article X, Section 5 (September 2009) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Bylaws.

B. The primary role of the RySG is to represent the interests of gTLD registry operators (or sponsors in the case of sponsored gTLDs) ("Registries") that are:
   1. Currently under contract with ICANN to provide gTLD registry services in support of one or more gTLDs;
   2. Agree to be bound by consensus policies in that contract; and
   3. Voluntarily choose to be members of the RySG.

The RySG may include Interest Groups as defined by Article IV. The RySG represents the views of the RySG to the GNSO Council and the ICANN Board of Directors with particular emphasis on ICANN consensus policies that relate to interoperability, technical reliability and stable operation of the Internet or domain name system.

C. The guiding principles for the RySG, including its leaders and Interest Groups are fairness, openness, and transparency in all RySG policies, practices, and operations. The service standards for leadership positions include impartiality, accountability, and conflicts of interest declarations. The behavioral expectations of all RySG members, Interest Groups and participants include adhering to ICANN Bylaws and Policies; supporting the consensus model; treating others with dignity, respect, courtesy, and civility; listening attentively to understand others; acting with honesty, sincerity, and integrity; and maintaining community good standing.

II. RySG Membership

A. Eligibility

All Registries are eligible for membership in the RySG upon the “effective date” set forth in the Registry’s agreement with ICANN. For all purposes under this Charter (including voting), each operator or sponsor shall be considered a single Registry member of the RySG (whether providing registry services for one or more than one gTLD or IDN version of a gTLD). Further, in cases where an operator or sponsor has a controlling interest in another registry operator or sponsor, either
directly or indirectly, the controlled registry operator or sponsor shall not be considered a separate member of the RySG.

Membership shall be terminated if a member’s agreement with ICANN is terminated or a member voluntarily terminates its membership.

A Registry that is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership with, or affiliated with any entity that votes in another stakeholder group or constituency in either house of the GNSO is not eligible for voting membership in the RySG. Any question regarding eligibility or exceptions shall be determined by a vote of the RySG.

B. Observer Status

The RySG provides observer status for entities that may not be eligible for full membership because of the preceding paragraph and for entities that have applied, or have demonstrated both the intention and the means to apply, for a contract with ICANN to provide gTLD registry services in support of one or more gTLDs. Such entities are referred to as “Observers”. Observers have no voting rights in the RySG and are subject to the Protocol for Observer Status adopted by the RySG, effective 16 May 2012, or as subsequently amended.

C. Applications

1. Eligible Registries must apply for RySG membership by providing all required information on the application form provided by the RySG. Each eligible Registry must identify at least one Voting Delegate on its application and may also identify alternate Voting Delegates if desired. Eligible Registries may also designate up to five (5) non-voting delegates. Members may modify their delegations by written notice to the Secretariat or, absent a Secretariat, to the Chair. Registries that satisfy the membership criteria will be accepted as members immediately upon receipt of the initial dues and satisfactorily completed application form.

2. Entities eligible for Observer status must apply for Observer status by providing all required information on the application form provided by the RySG. Each eligible Observer must identify at least one Delegate on its application and may also designate up to three (3) additional delegates. Observers may modify their delegations by written notice to the Secretariat or, absent a Secretariat, to the Chair. Observers that satisfy the criteria for Observer status will be accepted as Observers immediately upon receipt of the initial dues and satisfactorily completed application form.

D. Membership Classification

Members shall be classified as “Active” or “Inactive”. An active member must meet eligibility requirements, must be current on dues, and must be a regular participant voter in RySG activities. A member shall be classified as Active unless it is classified as Inactive pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph. Members become Inactive by failing to participate in three consecutively scheduled consecutive RySG meetings or voting processes or both. An Inactive member shall continue to have membership rights and duties except being counted as present or absent in the determination of a quorum. An Inactive member immediately resumes Active status at any time by participating in a RySG meeting or by voting.
E. Voting Rights

All active members have voting rights except as provided in Article II.G. Membership may be suspended if a member does not pay its fees as previously invoiced within sixty (60) days after a written warning on nonpayment is sent to the member; suspension shall continue until such time as the fees have been paid. Suspension of membership for nonpayment of dues shall be accomplished by vote of a majority of the Active members upon a motion for that purpose. A member may request verification of member status prior to the initiation of any vote.

F. Membership Lists

The RySG shall collect, maintain, and publish on its website a list of Active and Inactive members, and Observers, with names identified by membership category or Observer status. The list shall be updated at least quarterly. In the case of corporate or organizational members or Observers, the list shall include contact information for the delegate(s) who represent each member or Observer. Personal contact data of delegates shall not be made publicly available, but that information shall be provided to ICANN staff when requested.

G. Member Participation

Each member of the RySG may participate in the RySG in accordance with this Charter. Only delegates are eligible to participate in RySG activities. Spokespersons of Interest Groups may participate in a non-voting capacity in RySG meetings, but only the delegate, or alternate authorized to vote, of each member of the RySG may vote as provided in Article X. No member that is entitled to vote, or has voted within the preceding three months, in any other GNSO Stakeholder Group or Constituency shall be entitled to vote in any RySG proceeding. No member that has transferred its voting rights from the RySG in the previous 6 months shall be entitled to vote in any RySG proceeding.

Each delegate who is affiliated, directly or indirectly, with another domain industry organization(s) in addition to the member or Observer by which such delegate has been appointed must maintain and file with the RySG Secretariat a current statement of interest (SoI) describing all such affiliations. The RySG Secretariat shall distribute copies of the SoIs to the delegate mailing list as they are filed. When the RySG is considering an issue that may be related to such affiliations, delegates must declare all associated interests before participating in the work.

At all times while participating in RySG activities, delegates are to represent the interests of their respective organizations and shall not compromise the ability of other delegates to do the same. Failure to comply with the provisions of this paragraph may result in exclusion from participation in some or all of RySG activities, including, but not limited to, exclusion from the mailing list, by vote of the RySG.

Each active member of the RySG shall have the right to:
Vote. Vote in all general elections of the RySG including, but not limited to officers and Council Representatives; and, whenever a general membership vote has been called by an authorized officer of the RySG.

Participate in Leadership Elections. Run for, or nominate other members to, RySG elected positions by complying with the procedures described in Article VIII, Elections;

Participate in Working Groups. To join any GNSO Working Group (WG) in an individual capacity;

Participate in Committees. To join any committee formed by the RySG.

Receive Communications.

- Have access to the RySG Website, Public List, and any other communications mechanisms established pursuant to Article VII, Communications; and
- Be given timely notice on the Public List of all scheduled meetings, policy development discussions, position paper developments, and votes.

Participate. Be afforded the opportunity to participate in RySG discussions, whether via teleconference, e-mail list, website, or in person, on all policy and administrative issues for which notice is given on the Public List;

Submit Agenda Items. Submit agenda items for RySG meetings. If there are too many agenda items to include in the time available, the Chair may limit the agenda to items to those submitted at least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled meeting and those seconded by a member of the applicable committee; and

Receive Mentoring. Upon request, a new RySG member will be assigned a mentor by the Chair to answer questions, offer guidance, and provide direction.

III. Structure of the RySG

A. Secretariat

The RySG shall have a Secretariat. The Secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that operational support is provided as needed for the RySG and the Executive Committee. Particular tasks may include but are not limited to:

- Processing membership applications
- Fulfilling administrative functions, including preparing and keeping minutes of meetings
- Coordinating email and web site service
- Coordinating and facilitating meetings
- Assisting with voting
- Maintaining member and delegate contact information
• Confirming member status (Active or Inactive) prior to each meeting.
• Maintaining delegate and member information for each Interest Group.
• Publishing on the RySG web site a list of all active and inactive Working Groups, Committees and Interest Groups and their minutes, action points, decisions, resolutions and final work products within a reasonable period of time after any given meeting.

Staffing of the Secretariat need not be from a member. The Chair shall appoint the Secretariat upon authorization by vote of the RySG.

B. Working Groups
The RySG may appoint individuals to be responsible for representing the RySG on Working Groups (WGs). Such appointments will be open to the entire membership. The RySG will publish and advise its members of calls for WG participants. Members designated to represent the RySG shall keep the RySG membership regularly apprised of the WG activity.

C. Committees
The RySG will advise its members of the formation of committees and publish a call for participants if applicable. Committee members shall keep the RySG membership regularly apprised of the committee activity.

D. Interest Groups
For the purposes of collaborating on issues of common interest within the RySG and coordinating efforts within it, RySG members may organize themselves into Interest Groups. An RySG member may join more than one Interest Group simultaneously. Membership in an Interest Group is voluntary. One person and one or more alternates may be designated by each Interest Group as spokespersons to represent all members of the Interest Group in RySG matters other than voting. An Interest Group does not have voting rights in the RySG.

The internal structures, leadership positions, and operations of each Interest Group will be left to its membership and the charter it creates. Each Interest Group will be expected to conform to the general principles set forth in Article I of this Charter.

Each Interest Group shall have the following special rights and responsibilities:

1. Develop and issue policy and position statements with particular emphasis on ICANN consensus policies that relate to interoperability, technical reliability and stable operation of the Internet or domain name system provided that opportunity is given to other RySG members to comment in advance and provided that any statement that is not an RySG position is clearly identified as such; and

2. Participate in the GNSO policy development processes.

Each Interest Group shall:

1. Notify the RySG of the effective dates of its formation and dissolution;
2. Provide the following information to the RySG:
   - A list of its members;
   - The names of persons designated as spokespersons for the Interest Group and alternates;
   - A copy of its charter; and
   - Changes in membership at least quarterly.

E. Observer Interest Groups

An Interest Group formed by Observers (“Observer Interest Group”) shall be subject to the same requirements as set forth in Paragraph III.D. above except for voting.

For the purposes of collaborating on issues of common interest within the RySG and coordinating efforts within it, Observers may organize themselves into Observer Interest Groups. An Observer may join more than one Interest Group simultaneously. Membership in an Observer Interest Group is voluntary. One person and one or more alternates may be designated by each Observer Interest Group as spokespersons to represent all members of the Observer Interest Group in RySG matters. An Observer Interest Group does not have voting rights in the RySG. All members of an Observer Interest Group must be Observers of the RySG, and may include members of the RySG.

The internal structures, leadership positions, and operations of each Observer Interest Group will be left to its membership and the charter it creates. Each Observer Interest Group will be expected to conform to the general principles set forth in Article I of this Charter.

Each Observer Interest Group shall have the rights and responsibilities related to development and issuance of policy and position statements.

Each Observer Interest Group shall:
1. Notify the RySG of the effective dates of its formation and dissolution;
2. Provide the following information to the RySG:
   - A list of its members;
   - The names of persons designated as spokespersons for the Observer Interest Group and alternates;
   - A copy of its charter; and
   - Changes in membership at least quarterly.

F. Rules of Procedure for Working Groups, Committees and Interest Groups

The procedures adopted by the GNSO Council for its Working Groups shall, to the extent applicable, be the rules of procedure for Working Groups, Committees and Interest Groups.

IV. Officers

A. General Provisions
Each officer of the RySG must be an authorized voting delegate (or alternate) of an Active Member.

Unless otherwise specified, each officer position shall be elected for a term of two years and shall hold office until a successor is elected or until the officer dies, resigns, is removed, becomes disqualified, or if the member that the officer represents is suspended or terminated.

The officer positions will have staggered terms. The Treasurer and Vice Chair of Administration will be elected in odd-numbered years while the Chair and Vice Chair of Policy will be elected in even-numbered years.

In the event of a vacancy occurring with any officer position, an election shall be held to elect a successor; any alternate position does not automatically succeed to the post.

No officer may serve in the same position for more than two full consecutive terms. A term of 18 months or more shall be deemed a full term. An officer who has served for two consecutive terms in the same position shall not be eligible for re-election to that position until after the expiration of one full term.

B. Chair

The RySG shall have a Chair who shall be elected at the RySG meeting following every other ICANN Annual meeting, in even-numbered years. The Chair shall act as the chief executive officer of the RySG.

C. Vice Chair of Policy

The RySG shall elect an Alternate Vice Chair of Policy who shall be elected at the RySG meeting following every other ICANN Annual meeting, in even-numbered years. The Alternate Vice Chair of Policy shall fulfill the duties of assist the Chair in conducting RySG business. Such duties would include, but are not limited to: chairing conference calls when needed; the Chair is unavailable; representing the RySG in Working Groups and any other duties supported by the RySG other ICANN-related meetings as necessary; managing the drafting, approval and submission of RySG public comments; and working with other members of the Executive Committee on RySG business as appropriate.

D. Vice Chair of Administration

The RySG shall elect a Vice Chair of Administration who shall be elected at the RySG meeting following the ICANN Annual meeting in odd-numbered years. The Vice Chair of Administration shall assist the Chair in conducting RySG business. Such duties would include, but are not limited to: chairing conference calls and/or representing the RySG in meetings when either the Chair or other Vice Chair are unavailable; managing RySG ballots and elections; conveying information to the members; performing the duties of the Vice Chair of Policy when necessary; and encouraging prospective members to join the RySG.

E. Treasurer
The RySG shall have a Treasurer who shall be elected at the RySG meeting following every other ICANN Annual meeting in odd-numbered years. The Treasurer will be responsible for ensuring that proper financial records are kept for the RySG, collecting membership fees assessed by the members and preparing and managing annual budgets. The Treasurer shall prepare an annual draft budget and submit it to the RySG for approval by vote. The Treasurer shall make disbursements in accordance with the approved budget, and may, from time to time, make additional disbursements if authorized by vote of the RySG.

**E.F. Assistant Treasurer**

The RySG shall elect an Assistant Treasurer at any RySG meeting. The Assistant Treasurer shall be elected for a term specified at the time of election. The Assistant Treasurer shall not be considered an Officer of the RySG for the purposes of this Charter. The Assistant Treasurer will be responsible for assisting the Treasurer in the Treasurer’s duties and responsibilities in such manner as the Treasurer shall direct.

**V. Executive Committee**

**A. Composition**

The RySG shall have an Executive Committee (EC) composed, ex officio, of the Chair, **Alternate Vice Chair of Policy, Vice Chair of Administration**, Treasurer, the RySG Representatives elected to the GNSO Council and the immediate past Chair of the RySG as a non-voting member for a term of one year following completion of his or her term as Chair.

**B. EC Responsibilities**

1. **Hold EC Meetings**
   
   a) The Chair shall call meetings as necessary (but no less than one meeting per year) to address the duties of the EC set forth in this Charter, and shall:
      
      1) Develop meeting agendas;
      2) Schedule and conduct EC meetings;
      3) Provide notice of meetings.
   
   b) The RySG Secretariat shall:
      
      1) Record EC meetings and decisions;
      2) Make publicly available on the RySG website or other public communication vehicle information regarding the EC meetings, and decisions; and
      3) Maintain an EC private communication vehicle if needed (e.g., mailing list, wiki, etc.) for administration purposes, which shall be archived and available to members of the RySG.
4) Use the services of the GNSO Secretariat for the above functions, to the extent that such services are available.

c) EC meetings may be conducted face-to-face, or through teleconference, email, wiki, or other online mechanisms.

2. Facilitate Policy Coordination Meetings

Upon request from a Member, the EC may invite all RySG Members to join in a meeting, held via whatever means is most convenient and allows all participants to communicate on an equal basis, to discuss GNSO policy development issues.

3. Manage and Administer Elections

When required according to the provisions of this Charter, the EC shall be responsible and accountable, with GNSO Secretariat assistance when available, for organizing, announcing, supervising, and operating elections for GNSO Council representative vacancies and RySG officer vacancies as prescribed in Article VIII, Elections.

4. Support the GNSO Council and the ICANN Board

The EC shall cooperate with and support the GNSO Council and the ICANN Board.

a) If requested by the ICANN Board, select Nominating Committee delegate(s) as directed by the RySG membership through consensus or a vote if required;

b) Encourage and support recruitment, outreach, and training efforts targeted at expanding the RySG through identification and introduction of new Members; and

c) Request ICANN Staff assistance when necessary to facilitate the goals, objectives, and duties of the RySG.

C. Executive Committee Rules of Procedure

1) Decision Making Process

All members of the RySG EC will participate in making decisions.

a) Decisions will be made by consensus whenever possible.

b) All significant decisions, whether by consensus or vote, require the participation of the full RySG membership.

c) Any RySG member may request the EC to assess consensus or conduct a vote on any decision or representation of a RySG position.

d) If the EC cannot resolve a decision by consensus, the Chair shall conduct a vote. If there is a tie, the matter shall be referred to the full RySG membership for a vote.

2) Announcement and Reporting of EC Meetings and Decisions

Wherever practicable, EC meetings will be recorded and posted in an easily accessible and identified manner on the RySG’s public communication vehicle.
a) EC decisions will be reported and published within two business days of the decision being fully ratified by RySG members as applicable and duly documented;
b) Each report will clearly reflect the EC members who participated in the process, their votes, and any supplemental statements they submitted for the record.

VI. Meetings

A. Scheduling

The RySG shall hold face-to-face meetings in conjunction with each public ICANN meeting unless otherwise decided by vote of the RySG. Other face-to-face meetings may be held if approved by vote of the RySG. The Secretariat shall provide at least thirty (30) days advance notice for all face-to-face meetings except in cases of urgent need. Whenever possible, the RySG shall provide the opportunity to participate in face-to-face meetings by teleconference from remote locations.

The RySG may also hold meetings by teleconference. Except in cases when the RySG votes to hold a meeting with shorter notice because of an urgent need to schedule a meeting, the Secretariat shall provide at least fourteen (14) days advance notice for all teleconference meetings. Any or all Interest Groups may consolidate all or a portion of any Interest Group meetings with the RySG.

B. Quorum

If a simple majority of the total number of all Active members is present at a meeting, quorum has been attained and voting the meeting shall proceed. If a quorum is not attained at a meeting, the meeting shall be adjourned. Whenever a vote will be taken and recorded of those Active members present, Active members not present at the meeting (or not voting) may vote by email for a period not to exceed fourteen days following the meeting (an “Extended Meeting”). At the end of the Extended Meeting, if the total number of Active members voting (including recorded abstentions) on any matter is less than a majority of the total number of all Active members, then a quorum does not exist, and the vote shall not be valid.

C. Record of Meetings

Minutes of all meetings shall be kept in electronic form or audio form, or both, if feasible, and copies of the minutes (if available) shall be sent to the membership as soon as conveniently possible after each meeting. Private deliberations and conversations need not be recorded.

The Secretariat shall publish on the RySG web site a list of all active and inactive Working Groups, Committees and Interest Groups and their minutes, action points, decisions, resolutions and final work products within a reasonable period of time after any given meeting.

D. Record Retention

All records that the ICANN Board asks GNSO structures to maintain must be retained by the RySG for at least a four-year period to ensure that a full three-year record is available for each renewal or reconfirmation period.
VII. Communications

A. Notices

All notices shall be sent to the RySG email list.

B. Mailing List

The RySG shall have a mailing list that is limited to delegates of members and Observers of the RySG. By vote of the RySG in any given case, the mailing list may be opened to members of the public. The RySG may have reserved lists if needed. Delegates will be automatically enrolled on the RySG email list but may opt out by notifying the Secretariat. Delegates must make reasonable efforts to notify the Secretariat of any email changes. A list of delegates subscribed to the RySG e-mail list and their member affiliations will be published by the Secretariat from time to time.

C. Publication

The outcome of all RySG policy decisions shall be open and publicly archived, with posting rights limited to members unless otherwise determined by vote of the RySG. RySG business, work products, finance and accounts, and submissions to Staff and other ICANN entities shall be made available to the entire RySG membership unless there are valid grounds for restricting distribution as determined by vote of the RySG.

D. Public Meetings

The RySG shall publish reports concerning what transpires at its public meetings (both regular and ad hoc). Prior notice shall be provided via a public calendar made available on the RySG web site. Meeting reports may take the form of MP3 files or other recordings, transcripts, minutes, summaries, or action item reports as determined by the RySG. At a minimum, every meeting report shall include attendance, an agenda of planned and actually discussed topics, and any decisions or actions items that stemmed from those discussions. If votes or consensus calls are taken at a meeting, the report shall indicate the outcomes as well as those meeting participants who offered positions. Individual records of specific votes cast or positions articulated are not required to be maintained unless so directed by the RySG.

E. Office Holders

The RySG shall publish on its website and maintain a list of all office holders, past and present, to inform members and to provide transparency for term limits.

F. Website

The RySG shall maintain a website on which it publishes the information as required in this Charter. The address of that website shall be publicized and linked to the main GNSO website. Information published on the website shall not include the mailing address, email address, physical address or telephone number of any person unless that person has given permission.
VIII. Elections

A. Nominating Procedure

Only an Active member’s authorized voting delegate (or alternate) may nominate a candidate for any Elections of Officers shall be conducted every two years at the first RySG meeting following the ICANN annual meeting. A different Active member’s authorized voting delegate (or alternate) must second the candidate within the publicized nominating period in order for that candidate to stand for election. The candidate must confirm their intention to run and offer a qualifications statement within the nominating period to be eligible to stand for election.

B. Officers

Elections shall be conducted in accordance with the voting procedures described in Article X below and in compliance with applicable provisions of the ICANN Bylaws then in effect, if any, including those relating to geographic diversity and eligibility. Officer terms are covered in Section IV.

C. RySG Representatives to the GNSO Council

The RySG shall elect such number of representatives (the “RySG Representatives”) to the GNSO Council as is set forth in the Bylaws of ICANN. Elections shall be conducted in accordance with the voting procedures described in Article X below and in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ICANN Bylaws then in effect, including those relating to geographic diversity and eligibility. In order to promote broad representational diversity in accordance with principles contained in the ICANN Bylaws, no more than one (1) of the elected RySG Representatives may come from the same geographic region as defined in the ICANN Bylaws.

Each RySG Representative shall be elected for a term of two years and shall hold office until his or her successor is elected or until he or she sooner dies, resigns, is removed, becomes disqualified, or if the member that the RySG Representative represents is suspended or terminated. The Bylaws and Operating Procedures of the GNSO shall govern term limits and eligibility of RySG Representatives. No person may serve as a RySG Representative and as an Officer of the RySG at the same time.

RySG Representative terms shall begin and end at the end of an annual ICANN meeting. No more than two terms shall end in the same year. Any vacancy occurring in a RySG Representative position shall be filled by election in accordance with this Article and Article X below, and the term of the RySG Representative elected to fill a vacancy shall be for the remainder of the original term. In the case of an election for an expiring term, the election process must be initiated at least 90 days prior to the end of such term. If a vacancy occurs within such 90 day period, the RySG may elect a Temporary Alternate to complete the term.

As provided in the ICANN Bylaws, the RySG is allotted three seats on the GNSO Council; those seats will be elected as follows in accordance with the voting procedures in Article IX: 7
1. In even numbered calendar years:
   a) One RySG Representative will be elected by a simple majority of all Active Members where each member receives one vote (Simple Vote).
   b) A second RySG Representative will be elected by a simple majority of all Active Members using the RySG Weighted Voting Model.
   c) Which voting method is used first shall be determined at random.

2. In odd numbered calendar years:
   a) One RySG Representative will be elected by a simple majority of Active Members of both a Simple Vote and a Weighted Vote.
   b) In the event there are opposing majorities on the Simple and Weighted Votes for the third councilor, the following will occur:
      1) A group of at least three and no more than five volunteers will form a working group and make every effort to identify a candidate that both the Simple Vote and Weighted Vote will support.
      2) While this search continues the outgoing RySG Representative will continue to present his or her vote in the GNSO Council on behalf of the RySG pursuant to Article X.
      3) The search will be limited to 10 calendar days. If after that time there is no agreement between the Simple and Weighted Vote on a new candidate, which shall be determined in a new vote, then the conflicting majorities will be resolved through the regular mechanism where the Simple and Weighted Vote are in conflict, i.e., the Weighted Vote shall prevail. However, the opposition of the Simple Vote will be noted and recorded in the RySG public record.

The RySG shall communicate the results of elections of RySG Representatives to the GNSO Council and to its members.

C.D. Other RySG Positions

Elections of persons to hold other positions established by ICANN Bylaws, including, without limitation, RySG representatives to the ICANN Nominating Committee, shall be conducted from time to time as required by the applicable ICANN Bylaws. Elections shall be conducted in accordance with the voting procedures described in Article XI below and in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ICANN Bylaws then in effect, including those relating to geographic diversity and eligibility.

IX. GNSO Council Representative Responsibilities

A. Responsibilities

Each RySG Representative is responsible for communicating to the GNSO Council the full range of views of the members of the RySG, including, but not limited to, RySG consensus positions.
If the RySG has not provided direction on a substantial issue, RySG Representatives shall either request deferral of the vote if possible or abstain from voting in the GNSO Council on that issue until direction is given by the RySG. In case of doubt whether an issue is substantial, each RySG Representative shall abstain from voting in the GNSO Council on that issue until direction is given by the RySG. In cases where a RySG position has not been formed or where there are minority positions, then an RySG Representative must state that and then share the minority positions as well as his or her own personal view (provided it is identified as such). The RySG Representative shall cast RySG votes as determined by the RySG if a vote has been taken. Article X, Voting, includes a table that identifies how RySG representatives are required to vote on the GNSO Council under various conditions.

RySG Council Representatives are expected to make best efforts to attend all RySG meetings, Executive Committee meetings, and GNSO Council meetings. In cases where they miss a RySG or Executive Committee meeting, they are responsible for obtaining the essential information from that meeting in a timely manner. In cases where they are unable to participate in a GNSO Council meeting, they are required to follow the GNSO Operating Procedures to ensure that all efforts are made to ensure that the RySG is represented in all votes for which the RySG has stated a position. Given the GNSO Council’s size and the voting thresholds that have been defined, it is important that votes of the RySG be registered, through RySG elected representatives, on every substantial issue that comes before the Council for action.

Councilors are expected to:

1. Actively participate in the regular affairs of the GNSO Council including, inter alia, attending its scheduled meetings, staying abreast of the technical and administrative agenda, engaging in relevant email and live discussions, reading minutes, evaluating reports, listening to meeting recordings (in the event of absence), asking questions that foster learning, voting responsibly on all matters before the Council, and periodically reviewing the performance of the Chair and Vice-Chairs.

2. Request and receive sufficient information, including support from the RySG in order to carry out their responsibilities. When a problem manifests itself or some issue does not make sense, a Councilor has a duty to inquire into the surrounding facts and circumstances and seek guidance.

B. Councilor Absences

1. **Planned:**

   a) If a GNSO Council member anticipates being unable to a regularly-scheduled GNSO Council meeting, the Councilor shall ensure that one of the applicable remedies in the GNSO Operating Procedures are followed so that the RySG does not lose a vote in any actions before the Council.

   b) If a GNSO Council member anticipates being unable to attend two or more regularly-scheduled GNSO Council meetings consecutively, the Councilor shall notify the RySG and
the GNSO Secretariat that a “Leave of Absence” is being requested and ensure that a remedy described in GNSO Operating Procedures is followed.

2. **Unplanned:**

When a GNSO Council member fails to attend two regularly-scheduled GNSO Council meetings consecutively without prior notification to the GNSO Secretariat, the GNSO Secretariat will advise the RySG that the Councilor has satisfied the conditions for an effective “Leave of Absence” at which time the remedy described in the GNSO Operating Procedures is available.

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**X. Voting**

**A. Consensus and Voting**

In general, the RySG should operate using a consensus approach. Every effort should be made to arrive at decisions that most or all of the members are willing to support. Voting should be used only in one or more of the following circumstances:

1. Reasonable effort has been made to reach consensus and there is agreement that it will not be possible to reach consensus in required timeframes.

2. An official vote is needed for the purposes of an election, action on a motion or determination of the level of support for a RySG position.

Whenever an election is to be held or a vote is to be taken on a RySG position, motion, Charter amendment or any other subject matter requiring a vote pursuant to this Charter, RySG voting will occur as follows except as noted elsewhere in this Charter for the election of GNSO Councilors:

1. There will first be a vote of all Active Members with each member receiving one vote (Simple Vote). Except under urgent circumstances, a period not to exceed four calendar days will be allowed for email voting.

2. Immediately after the Simple Vote, any Active Member may request alternate voting procedures (Weighted Vote).

   If there are no such requests, furthermore, the Chair, with general concurrence of the membership, may grant a period of time not to exceed four calendar days in which members may request a Weighted Vote.

3. If no member objects to the results of Simple Voting, then the Simple Vote will be used as applicable.

4. If any member requests a Weighted Vote, the Simple Vote will not be used and a Weighted Vote will occur as defined below.

**B. Weighted Vote Procedures**

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1. Note that a Weighted Vote is not an option in the case of a vote for the GNSO Council seat that requires a Simple Vote.
A Weighted Vote shall involve counting of votes in the following two ways, computing an average, and the result will be applied using the voting thresholds defined below: (1) one vote per member (Simple Vote); (2) one vote using Weighted Voting as defined in the following table.

Using data from the previous calendar year or such other period as the RySG may decide, each member will be assigned votes by taking the average of assigned values using the table below where voting tiers are defined both by 1) total number of domain names registered at the end of the period and 2) the total amount of ICANN fees paid (registrations and fees are aggregated to include all TLDs represented by the member pursuant to Section II.A. above).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Tiers</th>
<th>Assigned Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>49,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>99,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>499,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>999,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,999,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>4,999,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>9,999,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example:

If Registry A had 55,000 domain name registrations under management at the end of the previous calendar year and paid ICANN fees in the total amount of $40,000 for that year: 1) Registry A would be in the third voting tier for number of names registered (resulting in an assigned value of 10) and in the second voting tier for amount of fees paid (resulting in an assigned value of 3); 2) the average of 10 and 3 is 6.5 so Registry A would receive 6.5 votes under the Weighted Vote procedure.

For the sake of defining voting tiers as used in the table above, the "ten Largest Registries" are defined as the RySG members that have the ten highest numbers when each member’s aggregated total number of domain names registered at the end of the period is averaged with the aggregated total amount of ICANN fees paid by that member for the period. In the event that, whether by the addition of registries, consolidation of registries, change of fees or any other reason, the Ten Largest Registries have at least 50% of the total RySG registrations but less than 50% of allocated votes, then the ranked voting weights shall be adjusted so that the ten Largest Registries again have a majority of the voting rights.

C. Voting Thresholds

1. Election of RySG Officers and RySG motions not otherwise covered below: a simple majority of Active Member Simple Vote; if necessary, a simple majority of both the Simple and Weighted votes
2. Council Representative S: simple majority of Active Member Simple Vote
3. Council Representative R: simple majority of Active Member Weighted Vote
4. Council Representative C: simple majority of Active Members of both Simple Vote and Weighted Vote (aka, Special Vote). If a vote does not result in one person receiving a simple majority of Active Member votes using both a Simple Vote and a Weighted Vote, then a special meeting should be held where all interested parties cooperatively work together to develop a solution for resolving the election. If after reasonable efforts it does not seem possible to resolve the election, then the seat will be filled as follows:

If a candidate receives a supermajority of a Weighted Vote, that candidate will be elected.

If no candidate receives a supermajority of a Weighted Vote and a candidate receives at least 75% of a Simple Vote, then the latter candidate will be elected.

If no candidate receives a supermajority of a Weighted Vote or at least 75% of a Simple Vote, then the candidate receiving a simple majority Weighted Vote will be elected.

1. Supermajority: 2/3 of Active Members
2. RySG Supermajority policy statements: 2/3 of Active Members of both the Simple and Weighted votes (Note: this is for reporting purposes only.)
3. RySG Simple majority policy statements: simple majority of Active Members of both the Simple and Weighted votes
4. Partial policy statements:
   a) At least a simple majority of Active Member Simple Vote but not Weighted Vote.
   b) At least a simple majority of Weighted Vote but not Simple Vote

The following table summarizes how RySG Representatives are required to vote on the GNSO Council in response to the following conditions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote Type and Results</th>
<th>Rep S</th>
<th>Rep R</th>
<th>Rep C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple vote in favor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple vote opposed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special RySG Supermajority</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special RySG Simple Majority</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special: Majority of Simple but Weighted Opposed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special: Majority of Weighted but Simple Opposed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XI. Finances

A. Members

Each member shall pay (a) an initial membership fee upon joining the RySG, (b) a fixed annual membership fee, and (c) a variable annual membership fee according to a budget adopted by vote of the RySG no less frequently than on an annual basis. A member joining after the beginning of a year shall pay a prorated portion of the annual fees.

B. Records

The RySG shall maintain detailed records of funds received and disbursed on a calendar basis according to generally accepted accounting principles. That financial information shall be reported in a general way on the RySG web site (e.g. charts or tables as determined by the RySG) and updated at least annually. Specific requests for detailed financial information will be made available on a case by case basis to the ICANN Board or RySG members under appropriate nondisclosure terms.

XII. Amendments to Charter

The RySG may from time to time amend this Charter by vote as provided in Article X. Document change controls shall be used in circulating proposed amendments.

XIII. Transition Provisions

For the purposes of determining eligibility for election when this Charter takes effect, those Officers, RySG Representatives and any other persons holding positions established by ICANN Bylaws then holding office, who have not previously been subject to term limits, shall be deemed to be in their first terms in office.
REFERENCE MATERIALS – BOARD SUBMISSION NO. 2015.10.22.2b

TITLE: Consideration of Independent Review Panel’s Final Declaration in Vistaprint v. ICANN

Document/Background Links

The following attachment is relevant to the Board’s consideration of the Independent Review Panel’s Final Declaration in the independent review matter filed by Vistaprint Limited against ICANN.

Attachment A is the Final Declaration issued by the Independent Review Panel, dated 9 October 2015.

Submitted By: Amy A. Stathos, Deputy General Counsel
Date Noted: 13 October 2015
Email: amy.stathos@icann.org
Attachment A
IN THE MATTER OF AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Between:
Vistaprint Limited

Claimant

v.
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

Respondent

ICDR Case No. 01-14-0000-6505

FINAL DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL

IRP Panel:

Geert Glas
Siegfried H. Elsing
Christopher S. Gibson (Chair)
I. Introduction

1. This Final Declaration (“Declaration”) is issued in this Independent Review Process (“IRP”) pursuant to Article IV, §3 of the Bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“Bylaws”; “ICANN”). In accordance with the Bylaws, the conduct of this IPR is governed by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution’s (“ICDR”) International Dispute Resolution Procedures, amended and effective June 1, 2014 (“ICDR Rules”), as supplemented by the Supplementary Procedures for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Independent Review Process, dated December 21, 2011 (“Supplementary Procedures”).

2. Claimant, Vistaprint Limited (“Vistaprint”), is a limited company established under the laws of Bermuda. Vistaprint describes itself as “an Intellectual Property holding company of the publicly traded company, Vistaprint NV, a large online supplier of printed and promotional material as well as marketing services to micro businesses and consumers. It offers business and consumer marketing and identity products and services worldwide.”

3. Respondent, ICANN, is a California not-for-profit public benefit corporation. As stated in its Bylaws, ICANN’s mission “is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s system of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifier systems.” In its online Glossary, ICANN describes itself as “an internationally organized, non-profit corporation that has responsibility for Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation, protocol identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root server system management functions.”

4. As part of this mission, ICANN’s responsibilities include introducing new top-level domains (“TLDs”) to promote consumer choice and competition, while maintaining the stability and security of the domain name system (“DNS”). ICANN has gradually expanded the DNS from the original six generic top-level domains (“gTLDs”) to include 22 gTLDs and over 250 country-code TLDs. However, in June 2008, in a significant step ICANN’s Board of Directors (“Board”) adopted recommendations developed by one of its policy development bodies, the Generic Names Supporting Organization (“GNSO”), for

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5 The original six gTLDs consisted of .com; .edu; .gov; .mil; .net; and .org.
6 Request, ¶ 14.
introducing additional new gTLDs. Following further work, ICANN’s Board in June 2011 approved the “New gTLD Program” and a corresponding set of guidelines for implementing the Program – the gTLD Applicant Guidebook (“Guidebook”). ICANN states that “[t]he New gTLD Program constitutes by far ICANN’s most ambitious expansion of the Internet’s naming system.” The Guidebook is a foundational document providing the terms and conditions for new gTLD applicants, as well as step-by-step instructions and setting the basis for ICANN’s evaluation of these gTLD applications.8 As described below, it also provides dispute resolution processes for objections relating to new gTLD applications, including the String Confusion Objection procedure (“String Confusion Objection” or “SCO”).11 The window for submitting new gTLD applications opened on January 12, 2012 and closed on May 30, 2012, with ICANN receiving 1930 new gTLD applications.12 The final version of the Guidebook was made available on June 4, 2012.13

5. This dispute concerns alleged conduct by ICANN’s Board in relation to Vistaprint’s two applications for a new gTLD string, “.WEBS”, which were submitted to ICANN under the New gTLD Program. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board, through its acts or omissions in relation to Vistaprint’s applications, acted in a manner inconsistent with applicable policies, procedures and rules as set out in ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation (“Articles”) and Bylaws, both of which should be interpreted in light of the Affirmation of Commitments between ICANN and the United States Department of Commerce (“Affirmation of Commitments”).14 Vistaprint also states that because ICANN’s Bylaws require ICANN to apply established policies neutrally and fairly, the Panel must consider other ICANN policies relevant to the dispute, in particular, the policies in Module 3 of the Guidebook regarding ICANN’s SCO procedures, which Vistaprint claims were violated.15

6. Vistaprint requests that the IRP Panel provide the following relief:
   - Find that ICANN breached its Articles, Bylaws, and the Guidebook;
   - Require that ICANN reject the determination of the Third Expert in the String

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9 Response, ¶ 16.
10 Response, ¶ 16.
11 The Guidebook is organized into Modules. Module 3 (Objection Procedures) is of primary relevance to this IRP case.
13 gTLD Applicant Guidebook, Version 2012-06-04.
14 Affirmation of Commitments.
15 Request, ¶ 58; Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 34.
Confusion Objection proceedings involving Vistaprint ("Vistaprint SCO")\(^\text{16}\), which found that the two proposed gTLD strings – .WEBS and .WEB – are confusingly similar, disregard the resulting “Contention Set”, and allow Vistaprint’s applications for .WEBS to proceed on their own merits;

- In the alternative, require that ICANN reject the Vistaprint SCO determination and organize a new independent and impartial SCO procedure, according to which a three-member panel re-evaluates the Expert Determination in the Vistaprint SCO taking into account (i) the ICANN Board’s resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs\(^\text{17}\), as well as the Board’s resolutions on the DERCars SCO Determination, the United TLD Determination, and the Onlineshopping SCO Determination\(^\text{18}\), and (ii) ICANN’s decisions to delegate the .CAR and .CARS gTLDs, the .AUTO and .AUTOS gTLDs, the .ACCOUNTANT and ACCOUNTANTS gTLDs, the .FAN and .FANS gTLDs, the .GIFT and .GIFTS gTLDs, the .LOAN and .LOANS gTLDs, the .NEW and .NEWS gTLDs and the .WORK and .WORKS gTLDs;

- Award Vistaprint its costs in this proceeding; and

- Award such other relief as the Panel may find appropriate or Vistaprint may request.

7. ICANN, on the other hand, contends that it followed its policies and processes at every turn in regards to Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications, which is all that it is required to do. ICANN states its conduct with respect to Vistaprint’s applications was fully consistent with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws, and it also followed the procedures in the Guidebook. ICANN stresses that Vistaprint’s IRP Request should be denied.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

8. This section summarizes basic factual and procedural background in this case, while leaving additional treatment of the facts, arguments and analysis to be addressed in sections III (ICANN’s Articles, Bylaws, and Affirmation of Commitments), IV (Summary of Parties’ Contentions) and V (Analysis and Findings).

A. Vistaprint’s Application for .WEBS and the String Confusion Objection

9. Vistaprint’s submitted two applications for the .WEBS gTLD string, one a standard application and the other a community-based application.\(^\text{19}\) Vistaprint states that it applied to operate the .WEBS gTLD with a view to reinforcing the reputation of its website

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\(^{17}\) ICANN Board Resolution 2013.06.25.NG07.

\(^{18}\) ICANN Board Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02.

\(^{19}\) Request, Annex 1 (Application IDs: 1-1033-22687 and 1-1033-73917). A community-based gTLD is a gTLD that is operated for the benefit of a clearly delineated community. An applicant designating its application as community-based must be prepared to substantiate its status as representative of the community it names in the application. A standard application is one that has not been designated as community-based. Response, ¶ 22 n. 22; see also Glossary of commonly used terms in the Guidebook, at http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/glossary (last accessed on Sept. 13, 2015).
creation tools and hosting services, known under the identifier “Webs”, and to represent the “Webs” community. The .WEBS gTLD would identify Vistaprint as the Registry Operator, and the products and services under the .WEBS gTLD would be offered by and for the Webs community.

10. Seven other applicants applied for the .WEB gTLD string. Solely from the perspective of spelling, Vistaprint’s proposed .WEBS string differs by the addition of the letter “s” from the .WEB string chosen by these other applicants. On March 13, 2013, one of these applicants, Web.com Group, Inc. (the “Objector”), filed two identical String Confusion Objections as permitted under the Guidebook against Vistaprint’s two applications. The Objector was the only .WEB applicant to file a SCO against Vistaprint’s applications. The Objector argued that the .WEBS and .WEB strings were confusingly similar from a visual, aural and conceptual perspective. Vistaprint claims that the Objector’s “sole motive in filing the objection was to prevent a potential competitor from entering the gTLD market.”

11. As noted above, Module 3 of the Guidebook is relevant to this IRP because it provides the objection procedures for new gTLD applications. Module 3 describes “the purpose of the objection and dispute resolution mechanisms, the grounds for lodging a formal objection to a gTLD application, the general procedures for filing or responding to an objection, and the manner in which dispute resolution proceedings are conducted.” The module also discusses the guiding principles, or standards, that each dispute resolution panel will apply in reaching its expert determination. The Module states that “All applicants should be aware of the possibility that a formal objection may be filed against any application, and of the procedures and options available in the event of such an objection.”

12. Module 3, § 3.2 (Public Objection and Dispute Resolution Process) provides that

In filing an application for a gTLD, the applicant agrees to accept the applicability of this gTLD dispute resolution process. Similarly, an objector accepts the applicability of this gTLD dispute resolution process by filing its objection.

13. A formal objection may be filed on any one of four grounds, of which the SCO procedure is relevant to this case:

String Confusion Objection – The applied-for gTLD string is confusingly similar to an existing TLD

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20 Request, ¶ 5.
21 Request, ¶ 17. Vistaprint states that the Webs community is predominantly comprised of non-US clients (54% non-US, 46% US).
22 Request, ¶ 5.
23 Request, ¶ 32.
24 Request, ¶ 32.
25 Request, ¶ 32.
26 Guidebook, Module 3, p. 3-2. Module 3 also contains an attachment, the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure (“New gTLD Objections Procedure”), which sets out the procedural rules for String Confusion Objections.
27 Guidebook, Module 3, p. 3-2.
14. According to the Guidebook, the ICDR agreed to serve as the dispute resolution service provider (“DRSP”) to hear String Confusion Objections. On May 6, 2013, the ICDR consolidated the handling of the two SCOs filed by the Objector against Vistaprint’s two .WEBS applications.

15. Section 3.5 (Dispute Resolution Principles) of the Guidebook provides that the “objector bears the burden of proof in each case” and sets out the relevant evaluation criteria to be applied to SCOs:

3.5.1 String Confusion Objection

A DRSP panel hearing a string confusion objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.


17. On June 28, 2013, the ICDR appointed Steve Y. Koh as the expert to consider the Objections (the “First Expert”). In this IRP Vistaprint objects that this appointment was untimely.

18. On 19 July 2013, the Objector submitted an unsolicited supplemental filing replying to Vistaprint’s response, to which Vistaprint objected. Vistaprint claims that the supplemental submission should not have been accepted by the First Expert as it did not comply the New gTLD Objections Procedure. The First Expert accepted the Objector’s submission and permitted Vistaprint to submit a sur-reply, which Vistaprint claims was subject to unfair conditions imposed by the First Expert. Vistaprint filed its sur-reply on

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28 Guidebook, § 3.2.1.
29 Guidebook, § 3.2.3.
30 Request, ¶ 23, n. 24. The ICDR consolidated the handling of cases nos. 50 504 T 00221 13 and 50 504 T 00246 13. The Guidebook provides in § 3.4.2 that “[o]nce the DRSP receives and processes all objections, at its discretion the DRSP may elect to consolidate certain objections.”
31 Guidebook, § 3.5. This standard is repeated in Article 20 of the Objection Procedure, which provides that “[t]he Objector bears the burden of proving that its Objection should be sustained in accordance with the applicable standards.”
32 Request, ¶ 33.
33 Response, ¶ 26.
34 Request, ¶ 42. Article 17 provides that “[t]he Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response.” Article 18 states that “[i]n order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost, procedures for the production of documents shall be limited. In exceptional cases, the Panel may require a party to provide additional evidence.”
35 Vistaprint states that “this surreply was not to exceed 5 pages and was to be submitted within 29 days. This page limit and deadline are in stark contrast with the 58 day period taken by [the Objector] to submit a 6-page (Continued...)”
On September 18, 2013 the ICDR informed the parties that the expert determination for the SCO case would be issued on or about October 4, 2013. Vistaprint claims that this extension imposed an unjustified delay beyond the 45-day deadline for rendering a determination.

On October 1, 2013, the ICDR removed the First Expert due to a conflict that arose. On October 14, 2013, the ICDR appointed Bruce W. Belding as the new expert (the “Second Expert”). Vistaprint claims that the New gTLD Objections Procedure was violated when the First Expert did not maintain his independence and impartiality and the ICDR failed to react to Vistaprint’s concerns in this regard.

On October 24, 2013, the Objector challenged the appointment of the Second Expert, to which Vistaprint responded on October 30, 2013. The challenge was based on the fact that the Second Expert had served as the expert in an unrelated prior string confusion objection, which Vistaprint maintained was not a reason for doubting the impartiality or independence of the Second Expert or accepting the challenge his appointment.

On November 4, 2013, the ICDR removed the Second Expert in response to the Objector’s challenge. On November 5, 2013, Vistaprint requested that the ICDR reconsider its decision to accept the challenge to the appointment of the Second Expert. On November 8, 2013, the ICDR denied this request. Vistaprint claims that the unfounded acceptance of the challenge to the Second Expert was a violation of the New gTLD Objections Procedure and the ICDR’s rules. The challenge was either unfounded and the ICDR should have rejected it, or it was founded, which would mean that the ICDR appointed the Second Expert knowing that justifiable doubts existed as to the Expert’s impartiality and independence.

On November 20, 2013, the ICDR appointed Professor Ilhyung Lee to serve as the expert (the “Third Expert”) to consider the Objector’s string confusion objection. No party objected to the appointment of Professor Lee.

Vistaprint considers that the principle of equality of arms was not respected by this decision.” Request, ¶ 42.

Vistaprint states that the Objector’s challenge was “based solely on the fact that Mr. Belding had served as the Panel in an unrelated string confusion objection” administered by ICDR. Request, ¶ 37. ICDR “was necessarily aware” that Mr. Belding had served as the Panel in the string confusion objection proceedings. “If [ICDR] was of the opinion that the fact that Mr. Belding served as the Panel in previous proceedings could give rise to justifiable doubts as to the impartiality and independence of the Panel, it should never have appointed him in the case between Web.com and Vistaprint.”

Response, ¶ 28; Request, ¶ 39, Annex 22.
23. On 24 January 2014, the Third Expert issued its determination in favor of the Objector, deciding that the String Confusion Objection should be sustained.\(^{45}\) The Expert concluded that

“the .webs string so nearly resembles .web – visually, aurally and in meaning – that it is likely to cause confusion. A contrary conclusion, the Panel is simply unable to reach.”\(^{46}\)

24. Moreover, the Expert found that

“given the similarity of .webs and .web..., it is probable, and not merely possible, that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. This is not a case of ‘mere association’.”\(^{47}\)

25. Vistaprint claims that the Third Expert failed to comply with ICANN’s policies by (i) unjustifiably accepting additional submissions without making an independent assessment, (ii) making an incorrect application of the burden of proof, and (iii) making an incorrect application of the substantive standard set by ICANN for String Confusion Objections.\(^{48}\) In particular, Vistaprint claims that ICANN has set a high standard for a finding of confusing similarity between two gTLD strings, and the Third Expert’s determination did not apply this standard and was arbitrary and baseless.\(^{49}\)

26. Vistaprint concludes that “[i]n sum, the cursory nature of the Decision and the arbitrary and selective discussion of the parties’ arguments by the [Third Expert] show a lack of either independence and impartiality or appropriate qualification.”\(^{50}\) Vistaprint further states that it took 216 days for the Third Expert to render a decision in a procedure that should have taken a maximum of 45 days.\(^{51}\)

27. The Guidebook § 3.4.6 provides that:

*The findings of the panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process.*\(^{52}\)

28. Vistaprint objects that ICANN simply accepted the Third Expert’s ruling on the String Confusion Objection, without performing any analysis as to whether the ICDR and the Third Expert complied with ICANN’s policies and fundamental principles, and without

\(^{45}\) Request, ¶ 39, Annex 24 (Expert Determination, Web.com Group, Inc. v. Vistaprint Limited, ICDR Case Nos. 50 504 221 13 and 50 504 246 13 (Consolidated) (Jan. 24, 2014)).

\(^{46}\) Request, Annex 24, p. 10.

\(^{47}\) Request, Annex 24, p. 11.

\(^{48}\) Request, ¶¶ 44-49.

\(^{49}\) Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶¶ 1-2.

\(^{50}\) Request, ¶ 49.

\(^{51}\) Request, ¶ 41; see New gTLD Objections Procedure, Art. 21(a).

\(^{52}\) Guidebook, § 3.4.6. The New gTLD Objections Procedure further provides in Article 2(d) that:

*The ‘Expert Determination’ is the decision upon the merits of the Objection that is rendered by a Panel in a proceeding conducted under this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).*
giving any rationale for doing so.\textsuperscript{53}

29. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board remains its ultimate decision-making body and that the Board should have intervened and “cannot blindly accept advice by third parties or expert determinations.”\textsuperscript{54} In this respect, Vistaprint highlights the Guidebook, which provides in Module 5 (Transition to Delegation) § 1 that:

\textit{ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application. For example, the Board might individually consider an application as a result … the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism.}\textsuperscript{55}

[Underlining added]

30. As a result of the Third Expert sustaining the Objector’s SCO, Vistaprint’s application was placed in a “Contention Set”. The Guidebook in § 3.2.2.1 explains this result:

\textit{In the case where a gTLD applicant successfully asserts string confusion with another applicant, the only possible outcome is for both applicants to be placed in a contention set and to be referred to a contention resolution procedure (refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures). If an objection by one gTLD applicant to another gTLD application is unsuccessful, the applicants may both move forward in the process without being considered in direct contention with one another.}\textsuperscript{56}

B. Request for Reconsideration and Cooperative Engagement Process

31. On February 6, 2014 Vistaprint filed a Request for Reconsideration (“Request for Reconsideration” or “RFR”).\textsuperscript{57} According to ICANN’s Bylaws, a RFR is an accountability mechanism which involves a review conducted by the Board Governance Committee (“BGC”), a sub-committee designated by ICANN’s Board to review and consider Reconsideration Requests.\textsuperscript{58} A RFR can be submitted by a person or entity that has been “adversely affected” by one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policies.\textsuperscript{59}

32. Article IV, §2.15 of ICANN’s Bylaws sets forth the BGC’s authority and powers for handling Reconsideration Requests. The BGC, at its own option, may make a final determination on the RFR or it may make a recommendation to ICANN’s Board for

\textsuperscript{53} Request, ¶ 50.
\textsuperscript{54} Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶¶ 29-30.
\textsuperscript{55} Guidebook, § 5.1.
\textsuperscript{56} Guidebook, § 3.2.2.1. Module 4 (String Contention Procedures) provides that “Contention sets are groups of applications containing identical or similar applied-for gTLD strings.” Guidebook, § 4.1.1. Parties that are identified as being in contention are encouraged to reach settlement among. Guidebook, § 4.1.3. It is expected that most cases of contention will be resolved through voluntary agreement among the involved applicants or by the community priority evaluation mechanism. Conducting an auction is a tie-breaker mechanism of last resort for resolving string contention, if the contention has not been resolved by other means. Guidebook, § 4.3.
\textsuperscript{57} Request, Annex 25.
\textsuperscript{58} Response, ¶ 29; Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.
\textsuperscript{59} Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.2.a.
consideration and action:

For all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction, the Board Governance Committee shall be delegated the authority by the Board of Directors to make a final determination and recommendation on the matter. Board consideration of the recommendation is not required. As the Board Governance Committee deems necessary, it may make recommendation to the Board for consideration and action. The Board Governance Committee's determination on staff action or inaction shall be posted on the Website. The Board Governance Committee's determination is final and establishes precedential value.

33. ICANN has determined that the reconsideration process can be invoked for challenges to expert determinations rendered by panels formed by third party dispute resolution service providers, such as the ICDR, where it can be stated that the panel failed to follow the established policies or processes in reaching the expert determination, or that staff failed to follow its policies or processes in accepting that determination. 60

34. In its RFR, Vistaprint asked ICANN to reject the Third Expert’s decision and to instruct a new expert panel to issue a new decision “that applies the standards defined by ICANN.” 61 Vistaprint sought reconsideration of the “various actions and inactions of ICANN staff related to the Expert Determination,” claiming that “the decision fails to follow ICANN process for determining string confusion in many aspects.” 62 In particular, Vistaprint asserted that the ICDR and the Third Expert violated the applicable New gTLD Objection Procedures concerning:

(i) the timely appointment of an expert panel;
(ii) the acceptance of additional written submissions;
(iii) the timely issuance of an expert determination;
(iv) an expert’s duty to remain impartial and independent;
(v) challenges to experts;
(vi) the Objector’s burden of proof; and
(vii) the standards governing the evaluation of a String Confusion Objection.

35. Vistaprint also argued that the decision was unfair, and accepting it creates disparate treatment without justified cause. 63

36. The Bylaws provide in Article IV, § 2.3, that the BGC “shall have the authority to”:

a. evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;
b. summarily dismiss insufficient requests;
c. evaluate requests for urgent consideration;
d. conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;
e. request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties;
f. make a final determination on Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without

61 Request, ¶ 51; Annex 25, p.7.
63 Request, Annex 25, p.6.
reference to the Board of Directors; and

g. make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request, as necessary.

37. On February 27, 2014 the BGC issued its detailed Recommendation on Reconsideration Request, in which it denied Vistaprint’s reconsideration request finding “no indication that the ICDR or the [Third Expert] violated any policy or process in reaching the Determination.”64 The BGC concluded that:

With respect to each claim asserted by the Requester concerning the ICDR’s alleged violations of applicable ICDR procedures concerning experts, there is no evidence that the ICDR deviated from the standards set forth in the Applicant Guidebook, the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, or the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections (Rules). The Requester has likewise failed to demonstrate that the Panel applied the wrong standard in contravention of established policy or procedure. Therefore, the BGC concludes that Request 14-5 be denied.65

38. The BGC explained what it considered to be the scope of its review:

In the context of the New gTLD Program, the reconsideration process does not call for the BGC to perform a substantive review of expert determinations. Accordingly, the BGC is not to evaluate the Panel’s substantive conclusion that the Requester’s applications for .WEBS are confusingly similar to the Requester’s application for .WEB. Rather, the BGC’s review is limited to whether the Panel violated any established policy or process in reaching that Determination.66

39. The BGC also stated that its determination on Vistaprint’s RFR was final:

In accordance with Article IV, Section 2.15 of the Bylaws, the BGC’s determination on Request 14-5 shall be final and does not require Board (or NGPC67) consideration. The Bylaws provide that the BGC is authorized to make a final determination for all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction and that the BGC’s determination on such matters is final. (Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.15.) As discussed above, Request 14-5 seeks reconsideration of a staff action or inaction. After consideration of this Request, the BGC concludes that this determination is final and that no further consideration by the Board is warranted.68

40. On March 17, 2014, Vistaprint filed a request for a Cooperative Engagement Process

64 BGC Determination, p. 18, Request, Annex 26.
67 The “NGPC” refers to the New gTLD Program Committee, which is a sub-committee of the Board and “has all the powers of the Board.” See New gTLD Program Committee Charter | As Approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on 10 April 2012, at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/charter-2012-04-12-en (last accessed Sept. 15, 2015).
68 BGC Determination, p. 19, Request, Annex 26. As noted, the BGC concluded that its determination on Vistaprint’s RFR was final and made no recommendation to ICANN’s Board for consideration and action. Article IV, §2.17 of ICANN’s Bylaws sets out the scope of the Board’s authority for matters in which the BGC decides to make a recommendation to ICANN’s Board:

The Board shall not be bound to follow the recommendations of the Board Governance Committee. The final decision of the Board shall be made public as part of the preliminary report and minutes of the Board meeting at which action is taken. The Board shall issue its decision on the recommendation of the Board Governance Committee within 60 days of receipt of the Reconsideration Request or as soon thereafter as feasible. Any circumstances that delay the Board from acting within this timeframe must be identified and posted on ICANN's website. The Board's decision on the recommendation is final.
Vistaprint stated in its letter:

*Vistaprint is of the opinion that the Board of Governance Committee’s rejection of Reconsideration Request 14-5 is in violation of various provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. In particular, Vistaprint considers this is in violation of Articles I, II(3), III and IV of the ICANN Bylaws as well as Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation. In addition, Vistaprint considers that ICANN has acted in violation of Articles 3, 7 and 9 of ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitment.*

41. The CEP did not lead to a resolution and Vistaprint thereafter commenced this IRP. In this regard, Module 6.6 of the Guidebook provides that an applicant for a new gTLD:

*MAY UTILIZE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM SET FORTH IN ICANN’S BYLAWS FOR PURPOSES OF CHALLENGING ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION.*

C. Procedures in this Case


43. On January 13, 2015, the ICDR confirmed that there were no objections to the constitution of the present IRP Panel ("IRP Panel" or "Panel"). The Panel convened a telephonic preliminary hearing with the parties on January 26, 2015 to discuss background and organizational matters in the case. Having heard the parties, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 1 permitting an additional round of submissions from the parties. The Panel received Vistaprint’s additional submission on March 2, 2015 (Vistaprint’s “First Additional Submission”) and ICANN's response on April 2, 2015 (ICANN’s “First Additional Response”).

44. The Panel then received further email correspondence from the parties. In particular, Vistaprint requested that the case be suspended pending an upcoming meeting of ICANN’s Board of Directors, which Vistaprint contended would be addressing matters informative for this IRP. Vistaprint also requested that it be permitted to respond to arguments and information submitted by ICANN in ICANN’s First Additional Response. In particular, Vistaprint stated that ICANN had referenced the Final Declaration of March 3, 2015 in the IRP case involving Booking.com v. ICANN (the “Booking.com Final Declaration”).

The Booking.com Final Declaration was issued one day after Vistaprint had submitted its First Additional Submission in this case. ICANN objected to Vistaprint’s requests, urging that there was no need for additional briefing and no justification for suspending the case.

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69 Request, Annex 27.
70 Request, Annex 27.
71 Guidebook, § 6.6.
45. On April 19, 2015, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 2, which denied Vistaprint’s request that the case be suspended and permitted Vistaprint and ICANN to submit another round of supplemental submissions. Procedural Order No. 2 also proposed two dates for a telephonic hearing with the parties on the substantive issues and the date of May 13, 2015 was subsequently selected. The Panel received Vistaprint’s second additional submission on April 24, 2015 (Vistaprint’s “Second Additional Submission”) and ICANN’s response to that submission on May 1, 2015 (ICANN’s “Second Additional Response”).

46. The Panel then received a letter from Vistaprint dated April 30, 2015 and ICANN’s reply of the same date. In its letter, Vistaprint referred to two new developments that it stated were relevant for this IRP case: (i) the Third Declaration on the IRP Procedure, issued April 20, 2015, in the IRP involving DotConnectAfrica Trust v. ICANN⁷³, and (ii) the ICANN Board of Director’s resolution of April 26, 2015 concerning the Booking.com Final Declaration. Vistaprint requested that more time be permitted to consider and respond to these new developments, while ICANN responded that the proceedings should not be delayed.

47. Following further communications with the parties, May 28, 2015 was confirmed as the date for a telephonic hearing to receive the parties’ oral submissions on the substantive issues in this case. On that date, counsel for the parties were provided with the opportunity to make extensive oral submissions in connection with all of the facts and issues raised in this case and to answer questions from the Panel.⁷⁴

48. Following the May 28, 2015 hearing, the Panel held deliberations to consider the issues in this IRP, with further deliberations taking place on subsequent dates. This Final Declaration was provided to the ICDR in draft form on October 5, 2015 for non-substantive comments on the text; it was returned to the Panel on October 8, 2015.

III. ICANN’s Articles, Bylaws, and Affirmation of Commitments

49. Vistaprint states that the applicable law for these IRP proceedings is found in ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. Both Vistaprint and ICANN make numerous references to these instruments. This section sets out a number of the key provisions of

⁷⁴ The Panel conducted these IRP proceedings relying on email and telephonic communications, with no objections to this approach from either party and in view of ICANN’s Bylaws, Article IV, § 3.12 (“In order to keep the costs and burdens of independent review as low as possible, the IRP Panel should conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible. Where necessary, the IRP Panel may hold meetings by telephone.”).
the Articles and the Bylaws, as they are relied upon by the parties in this IRP.\textsuperscript{75} Vistaprint also references the Affirmation of Commitments – relevant provisions of this document are also provided below.

A. Articles of Incorporation

50. Vistaprint refers to the Articles of Incorporation, highlighting Article IV’s references to “relevant principles of international law” and “open and transparent processes”. Article 4 of the Articles provides in relevant part:

\textit{The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets.}

[Underlining added]

51. Vistaprint states that general principles of international law – and in particular the obligation of good faith – serve as a prism through which the various obligations imposed on ICANN under its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws must be interpreted.\textsuperscript{76} The general principle of good faith is one of the most basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, and rules involving transparency, fairness and non-discrimination arise from it.\textsuperscript{77} Vistaprint also emphasizes that the principle of good faith includes an obligation to ensure procedural fairness by adhering to substantive and procedural rules, avoiding arbitrary action, and recognizing legitimate expectations.\textsuperscript{78} The core elements of transparency include clarity of procedures, the publication and notification of guidelines and applicable rules, and the duty to provide reasons for actions taken.\textsuperscript{79}

B. Bylaws

a. Directives to ICANN and its Board

52. The Bylaws contain provisions that address the role, core values and accountability of ICANN and its Board.

53. Article IV, § 3.2 specifies the right of “any person materially affected” to seek independent review (through the IRP) of a Board action alleged to be a violation of the

\textsuperscript{75} ICANN’s Articles are available at \url{https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/articles-en} (last accessed on Sept. 15, 2015). ICANN’s Bylaws are available at \url{https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en} (last accessed on Sept. 15, 2015).

\textsuperscript{76} Request, ¶ 55. Vistaprint also states that “U.S. and California law, like almost all jurisdictions, recognize obligations to act in good faith and ensure procedural fairness. The requirement of procedural fairness has been an established part of the California common law since before the turn of the 19th century.” Request, ¶ 60, n.8.

\textsuperscript{77} Request, ¶ 59.

\textsuperscript{78} Request, ¶ 60.

\textsuperscript{79} Request, ¶ 66.
Articles or Bylaws:

Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board’s alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board’s action.

54. Vistaprint has relied on certain of ICANN’s core values set forth in Article I, § 2 (Core Values) of the Bylaws. The sub-sections underlined below are invoked by Vistaprint as they relate to principles of promoting competition and innovation (Article I § 2.2, 2.5 and 2.6); openness and transparency (Article I § 2.7); neutrality, fairness, integrity and non-discrimination (Article I § 2.8); and accountability (Article I § 2.10). Article I § 2 provides in full:

Section 2. Core Values

In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN:

1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN’s activities to those matters within ICANN’s mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination.

3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties.

4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.

5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment.

6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness.

Vistaprint states that “[t]his requirement is also found in applicable California law, which requires that decisions be made according to procedures that are ‘fair and applied uniformly’, and not in an ‘arbitrary and capricious manner.’” Request, ¶ 62, n.9.
While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments’ or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

55. Vistaprint refers to Article II, § 3 in support of its arguments that the Board failed to act fairly and without discrimination as it considered Vistaprint’s two .WEBS applications and the outcome of the Vistaprint SCO case. Article II, § 3 provides:

Section 3 (Non-Discriminatory Treatment)

ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

56. Vistaprint refers to Article III (Transparency), § 1 of the Bylaws in reference to the principle of transparency:

Section 1. PURPOSE

ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness.

57. Vistaprint also refers Article IV (Accountability and Review), § 1 as it relates to ICANN’s accountability and core values, providing in relevant part:

In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws.

b. Directives for the IRP Panel

58. ICANN’s Bylaws also contain provisions that speak directly to the role and authority of the Panel in this IRP case. In particular, Articles IV of the Bylaws creates the IRP as an accountability mechanism, along with two others mechanisms: (i) the RFR process, described above and on which Vistaprint relied, and (ii) an unrelated periodic review of
ICANN’s structure and procedures.\(^{81}\)

59. Article IV, § 1 of the Bylaws emphasizes that the IRP is a mechanism designed to ensure ICANN’s accountability:

The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN’s structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws, including the transparency provisions of Article III and the Board and other selection mechanisms set forth throughout these Bylaws.\[^{Underlining added}\]

60. In this respect, the IRP Panel provides an independent review and accountability mechanism for ICANN and its Board. Vistaprint urges that IRP is the only method established by ICANN for holding itself accountable through independent third-party review of its decisions.\(^{82}\) The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.1 provides:

In addition to the reconsideration process described in Section 2 of this Article, ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.

61. ICANN states in its Response that “[t]he IRP Panel is tasked with determining whether the Board’s actions are consistent with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws.”\(^{83}\) ICANN also maintains that while the IRP is intended to address challenges to conduct undertaken by ICANN’s Board, it is not available as a mechanism to challenge the actions or inactions of ICANN staff or third parties that may be involved with ICANN’s activities.\(^{84}\)

62. In line with ICANN’s statement, the Bylaws provide in Article IV, § 3.4, that:

Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel"), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.\[^{Underlining added}\]

63. The Bylaws also include a standard of review in Article IV, § 3.4, providing that the Panel:

\(^{81}\) Note that Article V (Ombudsman) of the Bylaws also establishes the Office of Ombudsman to facilitate the fair, impartial, and timely resolution of problems and complaints for those matters where the procedures of the RFR or the IRP have not been invoked.

\(^{82}\) Request, ¶ 57.

\(^{83}\) Response, ¶ 33.

\(^{84}\) Response, ¶ 4.

\(^{85}\) Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4. The reference to “actions” of ICANN’s Board should be read to refer to both “actions or inactions” of the Board. See Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11(c) (“The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:…(c) declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws”); see also Supplementary Procedures, which define “Independent Review” as referring “to the procedure that takes place upon the filing of a request to review ICANN Board actions or inactions alleged to be inconsistent with ICANN's Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation.
“must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:
   a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;
   b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in
      front of them?; and
   c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be
      in the best interests of the company?\(^{86}\)

64. The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.11 set out the IRP Panel’s authority in terms of alternative
   actions that it may take once it is has an IRP case before it:

   The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:
   a. summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous
      or vexatious;
   b. request additional written submissions from the party seeking review, the Board, the Supporting
      Organizations, or from other parties;
   c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of
      Incorporation or Bylaws; and
   d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action,
      until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;
   e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently
      similar; and
   f. determine the timing for each proceeding.\(^{87}\)

65. Further, the Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.18 state that

   “[I]f the IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials,
   and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the
   prevailing party.”\(^{88}\)

   [Underlining added]

66. The Bylaws address the steps to be taken after the Panel issues a determination in the IRP.
   Article IV, § 3.21\(^{89}\) states that “declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent
   action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value”:

   Where feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board's next meeting. The
   declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent action on those declarations, are final and
   have precedential value.

   [Underlining added]

C. Affirmation of Commitments

67. Vistaprint claims that ICANN violated the ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments, in
   particular Articles 3, 7 and 9. This Affirmation of Commitments is instructive, as it
   explains ICANN’s obligations in light of its role as regulator of the DNS. Article 3, 7 and
   9 are set forth below in relevant part:

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\(^{86}\) Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4.
\(^{87}\) Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11.
\(^{88}\) Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.18.
\(^{89}\) This section was added by the amendments to the Bylaws on April 11, 2013.
3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.

* * * * *

7. ICANN commits to adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting processes, fact-based policy development, cross-community deliberations, and responsive consultation procedures that provide detailed explanations of the basis for decisions, including how comments have influenced the development of policy consideration, and to publish each year an annual report that sets out ICANN's progress against ICANN's bylaws, responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans. In addition, ICANN commits to provide a thorough and reasoned explanation of decisions taken, the rationale thereof and the sources of data and information on which ICANN relied.

9. Recognizing that ICANN will evolve and adapt to fulfill its limited, but important technical mission of coordinating the DNS, ICANN further commits to take the following specific actions together with ongoing commitment reviews specified below:

9.1 Ensuring accountability, transparency and the interests of global Internet users: ICANN commits to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders by: (a) continually assessing and improving ICANN Board of Directors (Board) governance which shall include an ongoing evaluation of Board performance, the Board selection process, the extent to which Board composition meets ICANN's present and future needs, and the consideration of an appeal mechanism for Board decisions; (b) assessing the role and effectiveness of the GAC and its interaction with the Board and making recommendations for improvement to ensure effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the DNS; (c) continually assessing and improving the processes by which ICANN receives public input (including adequate explanation of decisions taken and the rationale thereof); (d) continually assessing the extent to which ICANN's decisions are embraced, supported and accepted by the public and the Internet community; and (e) assessing the policy development process to facilitate enhanced cross community deliberations, and effective and timely policy development. ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above commitments no less frequently than every three years. .... Each of the foregoing reviews shall consider the extent to which the assessments and actions undertaken by ICANN have been successful in ensuring that ICANN is acting transparently, is accountable for its decision-making, and acts in the public interest. Integral to the foregoing reviews will be assessments of the extent to which the Board and staff have implemented the recommendations arising out of the other commitment reviews enumerated below.

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9.3 Promoting competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice: ICANN will ensure that as it contemplates expanding the top-level domain space, the various issues that are involved (including competition, consumer protection, security, stability and resiliency, malicious abuse issues, sovereignty concerns, and rights protection) will be adequately addressed prior to implementation. If and when new gTLDs (whether in ASCII or other language character sets) have been in operation for one year, ICANN will organize a review that will examine the extent to which the introduction or expansion of gTLDs has promoted competition, consumer trust and consumer choice, as well as effectiveness of (a) the application and evaluation process, and (b) safeguards put in place to mitigate issues involved in the introduction or expansion. ICANN will organize a further review of its execution of the above commitments two years after the first review, and then no less frequently than every four years.... Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations.

[Underlining added]
IV. Summary of Parties’ Contentions

68. This presentation of the parties’ contentions is intended to provide a summary to aid in understanding this Final Declaration. It is not an exhaustive recitation of the entirety of the parties’ allegations and arguments. Additional references to the parties’ assertions are included in sections II (Factual and Procedural Background), III (ICANN’s Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments) and V (Analysis and Findings).

69. The IRP Panel has organized the parties’ contentions into three categories, based on the areas of claim and dispute that have emerged through the exchange of three rounds of submissions between the parties and the Panel. The first section relates to the authority of the Panel, while the second and third sections address the allegations asserted by Vistaprint, which fall into two general areas of claim. In this regard, Vistaprint claims that the ICDR and Third Expert made numerous errors of procedure and substance during the String Confusion Objection proceedings, which resulted in Vistaprint being denied a fair hearing and due process. As a result of the flawed SCO proceedings, Vistaprint alleged that ICANN through its Board (and the BGC), in turn: (i) violated its Articles, Bylaws and the Guidebook (e.g., failed to act in good faith, fairly, non-arbitrarily, with accountability, due diligence, and independent judgment) by accepting the determination in the Vistaprint SCO and failing to redress and remedy the numerous alleged process and substantive errors in the SCO proceedings, and (ii) discriminated against Vistaprint, in violation of its Articles and Bylaws, by delaying Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications and putting them into a Contention Set, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation, or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

70. Thus, the three primary areas of contention between the parties are as follows:

- **IRP Panel’ Authority:** The parties have focused on the authority of the IRP Panel, including the standard of review to be applied by the Panel, whether the Panel’s IRP declaration is binding or non-binding on ICANN, and, on a very closely related point, whether the Panel has authority to award any affirmative relief (as compared to issuing only a declaration as to whether or not ICANN has acted in a manner that is consistent or not with its Articles and Bylaws).

- **SCO Proceedings Claim:** Vistaprint claims ICANN’s failed to comply with the obligations under its Articles and Bylaws by accepting the Third Expert’s SCO determination and failing to provide a remedy or redress in response to numerous alleged errors of process and substance in the Vistaprint SCO proceedings. As noted above, Vistaprint claims there were process and substantive violations, which resulted in Vistaprint not being accorded a fair hearing and due process. Vistaprint states that because ICANN’s Bylaws require ICANN to apply established policies neutrally and fairly, therefore, the Panel should also consider the policies in Module 3 of the
Guidebook concerning the String Confusion Objection procedures. Vistaprint objects to the policies themselves as well as their implementation through the ICDR and the Third Expert. Vistaprint claims that ICANN’s Board, acting through the BGC or otherwise, should have acted to address these deficiencies and its choice not to intervene violated the Articles and Bylaws.

- **Disparate Treatment Claim:** Vistaprint claims ICANN discriminated against Vistaprint through ICANN’s (and the BGC’s) acceptance of the Third Expert’s allegedly baseless and arbitrary determination in *Vistaprint SCO*, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation, or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

### A. Vistaprint’s Position

#### a. IRP Panel’s Authority

71. **Standard of review:** Vistaprint emphasizes that ICANN is accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with the Article and Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of the Bylaws. To achieve this required accountability, the IRP Panel is “charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.”

Vistaprint states that the IRP Panel’s fulfillment of this core obligation is crucial to ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The IRP is the only method established by ICANN for holding itself accountable through third-party review of its decisions.

72. Vistaprint contends that ICANN is wrong in stating (in its Response) that a deferential standard of review applies in this case. No such specification is made in ICANN’s Bylaws or elsewhere, and a restrictive interpretation of the standard of review would be inappropriate. It would fail to ensure accountability on the part of ICANN and would be incompatible with ICANN’s commitment to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability, as required by Article 9.1 of ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments and ICANN’s core values, which require ICANN to “remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness.”

73. Vistaprint states further that the most recent version of ICANN’s Bylaws, amended on

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90 Request, ¶ 55-56 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, §§1 & 3.4).
91 Request, ¶ 57.
92 Response, ¶ 33.
93 Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 36.
94 Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶¶ 36-37; Request, ¶ 57.
April 11, 2013, require that the IRP Panel focus on whether ICANN’s Board was free from conflicts of interest and exercised an appropriate level of due diligence and independent judgment in its decision making.\textsuperscript{95} Vistaprint asserts, however, that these issues are mentioned by way of example only. The Bylaws do not restrict the IRP Panel’s remit to these issues alone, as the Panel’s fundamental task is to determine whether the Board has acted consistently with the Articles and Bylaws\textsuperscript{96}.

74. **IRP declaration binding or non-binding:** Vistaprint contends that the outcome of this IRP is binding on ICANN and that any other outcome “would be incompatible with ICANN’s obligation to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability.”\textsuperscript{97}

75. Vistaprint states that since ICANN’s amendment of its Bylaws, IRP declarations have precedential value.\textsuperscript{98} Vistaprint asserts the precedential value – and binding force – of IRP declarations was confirmed in a recent IRP panel declaration,\textsuperscript{99} which itself has precedential value for this case. Vistaprint argues that any other outcome would effectively grant the ICANN Board arbitrary and unfettered discretion, something which was never intended and would be incompatible with ICANN’s obligation to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability.\textsuperscript{100}

76. Vistaprint contends that the IRP is not a mere "corporate accountability mechanism" aimed at ICANN's internal stakeholders.\textsuperscript{101} The IRP is open to any person materially affected by a decision or action of the Board\textsuperscript{102} and is specifically available to new gTLD applicants, as stated in the Guidebook, Module 6.4. Vistaprint claims that internally, towards its stakeholders, ICANN might be able to argue that its Board retains ultimate decision-making power, subject to its governing principles. Externally, however, the ICANN Board's discretionary power is limited, and ICANN and its Board must offer redress when its decisions or actions harm third parties.\textsuperscript{103}

77. Vistaprint argues further that the IRP has all the characteristics of an international arbitration.\textsuperscript{104} The IRP is conducted pursuant to a set of independently developed

\textsuperscript{95} Bylaws, Article IV, § 3.4.
\textsuperscript{96} Vistaprint’s First Additional submission, ¶ 35.
\textsuperscript{97} Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 37.
\textsuperscript{98} Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 37 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV § 3.21).
\textsuperscript{99} See DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure, ¶ 131 (the panel ruled that “[b]ased on the foregoing and the language and content of the IRP Procedure, the Panel concludes that this Declaration and its future Declaration on the Merits of this case are binding on the Parties”).
\textsuperscript{100} Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 37.
\textsuperscript{101} Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 29.
\textsuperscript{102} Bylaws, Article IV § 3.2 (“Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action.”).
\textsuperscript{103} Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 15.
\textsuperscript{104} Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 27.
international arbitration rules: the ICDR Rules, as modified by the Supplementary Procedures. The IRP is administered by the ICDR, which is a provider of international arbitration services. The decision-maker is not ICANN, but a panel of neutral individuals selected by the parties in consultation with the ICDR, and appointed pursuant to the ICDR Rules.

78. Vistaprint provides further detailed argument in its Second Additional Submission that the IRP is binding in view of ICANN’s Bylaws, the ICDR Rules and the Supplementary Procedures, and that any ambiguity on this issue should weigh against ICANN as the drafter and architect of the IRP:

31. As mentioned in Vistaprint’s Reply, a previous IRP panel ruled that "[v]arious provisions of ICANN’s Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures support the conclusion that the [IRP] Panel's decisions, opinions and declarations are binding" and that "[t]here is certainly nothing in the Supplementary Rules that renders the decisions, opinions and declarations of the [IRP] Panel either advisory or non-binding" (RM 32, para 98).

32. Indeed, as per Article IV(3)(8) of the ICANN Bylaws, the ICANN Board has given its approval to the ICDR to establish a set of operating rules and procedures for the conduct of the IRP. The operating rules and procedures established by the ICDR are the ICDR Rules as referred to in the preamble of the Supplementary Procedures (RM 32, para. 101). The Supplementary Procedures supplement the ICDR Rules (Supplementary Procedures, Preamble and Section 2). The preamble of the ICDR Rules provides that "[a] dispute can be submitted to an arbitral tribunal for a final and binding decision". Article 30 of the ICDR Rules specifies that "[a]wards shall be made in writing by the arbitral tribunal and shall be final and binding on the parties". No provision in the Supplementary Procedures deviates from the rule that the Panel's decisions are binding. On the contrary, Section 1 of the Supplementary Procedures defines an IRP Declaration as a decision/opinion of the IRP Panel. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures requires that IRP Declarations i) are made in writing, and ii) specifically designate the prevailing party. Where a decision must specifically designate the prevailing party, it is inherently binding. Moreover the binding nature of IRP Declarations is further supported by the language and spirit of Section 6 of the Supplementary Procedures and Article IV(3)(11)(a) of the ICANN Bylaws. Pursuant to these provisions, the IRP Panel has the authority to summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious. Surely, such a decision, opinion or declaration on the part of the IRP Panel would not be considered advisory (RM 32, para. 107).

33. Finally, even if ICANN’s Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures are ambiguous - quod non - on the question of whether or not an IRP Declaration is binding, this ambiguity would weigh against ICANN. The relationship between ICANN and Vistaprint is clearly an adhesive one. In such a situation, the rule of contra proferentem applies. As the drafter and architect of the IRP Procedure, it was possible for ICANN, and clearly within its power, to adopt a procedure that expressly and clearly announced that the decisions, opinions and declarations of IRP Panels were advisory only. ICANN did not adopt such a procedure (RM 32, paras. 108-109).

79. Finally, Vistaprint contends that ICANN conceived of the IRP as an alternative to dispute

105 Citing DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure, ¶ 98.
resolution by the courts. To submit a new gTLD application, Vistaprint had to agree to terms and conditions including a waiver of its right to challenge ICANN's decisions on Vistaprint's applications in a court, provided that as an applicant, Vistaprint could use the accountability mechanisms set forth in ICANN's Bylaws. Vistaprint quotes the *DCA Third Declaration on Procedure*, in which the IRP panel stated:

> assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, the ultimate 'accountability' remedy for [Vistaprint] is the IRP.\(^{106}\)

80. **Authority to award affirmative relief:** Vistaprint makes similar arguments in support of its claim that the IRP Panel has authority to grant affirmative relief. Vistaprint quotes the *Interim Declaration on Emergency Request for Interim Measures of Protection in Gulf Cooperation Council v. ICANN* (“GCC Interim IRP Declaration”),\(^{107}\) where that panel stated that the right to an independent review is

> a significant and meaningful one under the ICANN's Bylaws. This is so particularly in light of the importance of ICANN's global work in overseeing the DNS for the Internet and also the weight attached by ICANN itself to the principles of accountability and review which underpin the IRP process.

81. Accordingly, Vistaprint argues that the IRP Panel's authority is not limited to declare that ICANN breached its obligations under the Articles, Bylaws and the Guidebook. To offer effective redress to gTLD applicants, the Panel may indicate what action ICANN must take to cease violating these obligations. The point is all the stronger here, as ICANN conceived the IRP to be the sole independent dispute resolution mechanism available to new gTLD applicants.\(^{108}\)

b. **SCO Proceedings Claim**

82. Vistaprint states that this case relates to ICANN’s handling of the determination in the Vistaprint SCO proceedings following String Confusion Objections to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, but does not relate to the merits of that SCO determination.\(^{109}\)

83. Vistaprint’s basic claim here is that given the errors of process and substance in those proceedings, Vistaprint was not given a fair opportunity to present its case. Vistaprint was deprived of procedural fairness and the opportunity to be heard by an independent panel applying the appropriate rules. Further, Vistaprint was not given any meaningful opportunity for remedy or redress once the decision was made, and in this way ICANN’s Board allegedly violated its Articles and Bylaws.\(^{110}\)

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106 *DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure*, ¶ 40.
107 *Interim Declaration on Emergency Request for Interim Measures of Protection in Gulf Cooperation Council v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 01-14-0002-1065, ¶ 59 (February 12, 2015) (“GCC Interim IRP Declaration”).
108 Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 24.
109 Request, ¶ 4.
110 Request, ¶ 71.
84. Although Vistaprint challenged the SCO decision through ICANN’s Request for Reconsideration process, ICANN refused to reconsider the substance of the challenged decision, or to take any action to remedy the lack of due process. In doing so, Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to act in a fair and non-arbitrary manner, with good faith, accountability, due diligence and independent judgment, as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles. ICANN’s acceptance of the SCO determination and refusal to reverse this decision was an abdication of responsibility and contrary to the evaluation policies ICANN had established in the Guidebook.

85. A number of Vistaprint’s contentions regarding the alleged violations of process and substance in SCO proceedings are described in part II.A above addressing Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications and the SCO proceedings. Vistaprint’s alleges as follows:

(i) ICDR’s appointment of the First Expert was untimely, in violation of Article 13(a) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
(ii) the First Expert (and Third Expert) improperly accepted and considered unsolicited supplemental filings, violating Articles 17 and 18 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
(iii) ICDR violated Article 21 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure by failing to ensure the timely issuance of an expert determination in the SCO;
(iv) the First Expert failed to maintain independence and impartiality, in violation of Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
(v) ICDR unjustifiably accepted a challenge to the Second Expert (or created the circumstances for such a challenge), in violation of Article 2 of the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections (Rules);
(vi) the Determination of the Third Expert was untimely, in violation of Article 21(a) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure;
(vii) the Third Expert incorrectly applied the Objector’s burden of proof, in violation of section 3.5 of the Guidebook and Article 20(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, which place the burden of proof on the Objector; and

111 Request, ¶ 71.
112 Request, ¶ 8.
113 Article 13(a) of the Procedure provides: “The DRSP shall select and appoint the Panel of Expert(s) within thirty (30) days after receiving the Response.”
114 Request, ¶ 42. Article 17 provides that “[t]he Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response.” Article 18 states that “[i]n order to achieve the goal of resolving disputes over new gTLDs rapidly and at reasonable cost, procedures for the production of documents shall be limited. In exceptional cases, the Panel may require a party to provide additional evidence.”
115 Article 21(a) of the Procedure provides that “[t]he DSRP and the Panel shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the Expert Determination is rendered within forty-five (45) days of the constitution of the Panel.”
116 Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure provides that “[a]ll Experts acting under this Procedure shall be impartial and independent of the parties.” Section 3.4.4 of the Guidebook provides that the ICDR will “follow its adopted procedures for requiring such independence, including procedures for challenging and replacing an expert for lack of independence.”
(viii) the Third Expert incorrectly applied ICANN’s substantive standard for evaluation of String Confusion Objections, as set out in Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook, in particular the standards governing the evaluation of a string confusion objection.

86. Based on these alleged errors in process and substance, Vistaprint concludes in its Request:

49. *In sum, the cursory nature of the Decision and the arbitrary and selective discussion of the parties’ arguments by the Panel show a lack of either independence and impartiality or appropriate qualification on the fact of the Panel. The former is contrary to Article 13 of the Procedure; the latter is contrary to the Applicant Guidebook, Module 3-16, which requires that a panel (ruling on a string confusion or other objection) must consist of “appropriately qualified experts appointed to each proceeding by the designated DRSP”.*

87. Vistaprint states that ICANN’s Board disregarded these accumulated infringements and turned a blind eye to the Third Expert’s lack of independence and impartiality. Vistaprint asserts that ICANN is not entitled to blindly accept expert determinations from SCO cases; it must verify whether or not, by accepting the expert determination and advice, it is acting consistent with its obligations under its Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments. Vistaprint further claims ICANN would be in violation of these obligations if it were to accept an expert determination or advice in circumstances where the ICDR and/or the expert had failed to comply with the New gTLD Objections Procedure and/or the ICDR Rules for SCOs, or where a panel – even if it had been correctly appointed – had failed to correctly apply the standard set by ICANN.

88. Vistaprint states that following ICANN’s decision to accept the Vistaprint SCO determination, Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request detailing how ICANN’s acceptance of the Third Expert’s determination was inconsistent with ICANN’s policy and obligations under its Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments. Background on the RFR procedure is provided above in part II.B. Despite this, Vistaprint states that ICANN refused to reverse its decision.

89. The IRP Panel has summarized as follows Vistaprint’s SCO Proceedings Claim concerning ICANN’s alleged breaches of its obligations under the Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments:

(1) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article 4 of the Articles and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws to act in good faith with due diligence and independent judgment by failing to provide due process to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications. Good faith encompasses the obligation to ensure procedural fairness and due process, including equal and fair treatment of the parties, fair notice, and a fair opportunity to present one’s case. These are more than just formalistic procedural requirements. The opportunity must be meaningful: the party must be given adequate notice of the relevant

117 Request, ¶ 49.
118 Request, ¶ 6.
119 Request, ¶ 6.
120 Request, ¶¶ 69-71.
rules and be given a full and fair opportunity to present its case. And the mechanisms for redress must be both timely and effective.

Vistaprint claims that it was not given a fair opportunity to present its case; was deprived of procedural fairness and the opportunity to be heard by an independent panel applying the appropriate rules; and was not given any meaningful opportunity for remedy or redress once the SCO determination was made, even in the RFR procedure. Thus, ICANN’s Board failed to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and to act in good faith as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles.

(2) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article I § 2.8 to neutrally, objectively and fairly apply documented policies as established in the Guidebook and Bylaws.121 Vistaprint argues that there is no probability of user confusion if both .WEBS and .WEB were delegated as gTLD strings. Vistaprint states expert evidence confirms that there is no risk that Internet users will be confused and the Third Expert could not have reasonably found that the average reasonable Internet user is likely to be confused between the two strings. As confirmed by the Objector,122 the average reasonable Internet user is used to distinguishing between words (and non-words) that are much more similar than the strings, .WEBS and .WEB. Since these strings cannot be perceived confusingly similar by the average reasonable Internet user, the Vistaprint SCO determination that they are confusingly similar is contradictory to ICANN’s policy as established in the Guidebook.

(3) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to act fairly and with due diligence and independent judgment as called for under Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation, Articles I § 2.8 and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws by accepting the SCO determination made by the Third Expert, who was allegedly not independent and impartial.123 Vistaprint claims that the Third Expert was not independent and impartial and/or is not appropriately qualified. However, Vistaprint claims this did not prevent ICANN from accepting the determination by the Third Expert, without even investigating the dependence and partiality of the Expert when serious concerns were raised to the ICANN Board in the RFR. This is a failure of ICANN to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and to act in good faith as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles.

(4) ICANN failed to comply with its obligations under the Article 4 of the Articles, and Article I §§ 2.7 and 2.8 and Article III § 1 of the Bylaws (and Article 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) to act fairly and transparently by failing to disclose/perform any efforts to optimize the service that the ICDR provides in the New gTLD Program.124 Vistaprint contends that the BGC’s determination on Vistaprint’s RFR shows that the BGC made no investigation into Vistaprint’s fundamental questions about the Panel’s arbitrariness, lack of independence, partiality, inappropriate

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121 Request, ¶ 72.
122 Request, Annex 10.
123 Request, ¶ 73.
124 Request, ¶¶ 52 and 77.
qualification. In addition, rather than identifying the nature of the conflict that forced the First Expert to step down, the BGC focused on developing hypotheses of reasons that could have led to this expert to stepping down. According to Vistaprint, this shows that the BGC did not exercise due diligence in making its determination and was looking for unsubstantiated reasons to reject Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request rather than making a fair determination.

In addition, as it is ICANN’s responsibility to ensure that its policies and fundamental principles are respected by its third party vendors, ICANN had agreed with the ICDR that they were going to “communicate regularly with each other and seek to optimize the service that the ICDR provides as a DRSP in the New gTLD Program” and that ICANN was going to support the ICDR “to perform its duties…in a timely and efficient manner”. However, ICANN has failed to show that it sought in any way to optimize the ICRD’s service vis-à-vis Vistaprint or that it performed any due diligence in addressing the concerns raised by Vistaprint. Instead, the BGC denied Vistaprint’s RFR without conducting any investigation.

(5) ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to remain accountable under Articles I § 2.10 and IV § 1 of the Bylaws (and Articles 3(a) and 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) by failing to provide any remedy for its mistreatment of Vistaprint’s gTLD applications. Vistaprint claims that because of ICANN’s unique history, role and responsibilities, its constituent documents require that it operate with complete accountability. In contrast to this obligation, throughout its treatment of Vistaprint’s applications for .WEBS, ICANN has acted as if it and the ICDR are entitled to act with impunity. ICANN adopted the Third Expert’s determination without examining whether it was made in accordance with ICANN’s policy and fundamental principles under its Articles and Bylaws. When confronted with process violations, ICANN sought to escape its responsibilities by relying on unrealistic hypotheses rather than on facts that should have been verified. Additionally, ICANN has not created any general process for challenging the substance of SCO expert determinations, while acknowledging the need for such a process by taking steps to develop a review process mechanism for certain individual cases involving SCO objections.

(6) ICANN failed to promote competition and innovation under Articles I § 2.2 (and Article 3(c) of the Affirmation of Commitments) by accepting the Third Expert’s determination. Vistaprint’s argues that the Objector’s sole motive in filing the SCO against Vistaprint was to prevent a potential competitor from entering the gTLD market. This motive is contrary to the purpose of ICANN’s New gTLD Program. The Board’s acceptance of the determination in the Vistaprint SCO, which was filed with an intent contrary to the interests of both competition and consumers, was contrary to ICANN’s Bylaws.

c. Disparate Treatment Claim

125 Request, ¶¶ 52.
126 Request, ¶¶ 78-79.
127 Request, ¶ 80.
90. Vistaprint claims that ICANN’s Board discriminated against Vistaprint through the Board’s (and the BGC’s) acceptance of the Third Expert’s allegedly baseless and arbitrary determination in the Vistaprint SCO, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation, or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

91. Vistaprint states that the “IRP Panel’s mandate includes a review as to whether or not ICANN’s Board discriminates in its interventions on SCO expert determinations,” and contends that “[d]iscriminating between applicants in its interventions on SCO expert determinations is exactly what the Board has done with respect to Vistaprint’s applications.”

92. Vistaprint asserts that in contrast to the handling of other RFRs, the BGC did not give the full ICANN Board the opportunity to consider the Vistaprint SCO matter and did not provide detailed minutes of the meeting in which the BGC’s decision was taken. Vistaprint states this is all the more striking as, in other matters related to handling of SCOs with no concerns about the impartiality and independence of the expert or the procedure, the Board considered potential paths forward to address perceived inconsistencies in expert determinations in the SCO process, including implementing a review mechanism. The Board also directed ICANN’s President and CEO, or his designee, to publish this proposed review mechanism for public comment. Vistaprint emphasizes that ICANN’s Board took this decision the day before Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request regarding the Vistaprint SCO. However, this did not prevent the BGC from rejecting Vistaprint’s RFR without considering whether such a review mechanism might also be appropriate for dealing with the allegedly unfair and erroneous treatment of the SCO related to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications.

93. The core of Vistaprint’s discrimination and disparate treatment claims is stated in its First Additional Submission:

7. Other applicants have equally criticized SCO proceedings. In a letter to ICANN’s CEO, United TLD Holdco, Ltd. denounced the process flaws in the SCO proceedings involving the strings .com and .cam. DERCars, LCC filed an RFR, challenging the expert determination in the SCO proceedings relating to the strings .car and .cars. Amazon EU S.a.r.l. filed an RFR, challenging the expert determination in the SCO proceedings relating to the strings .shop and .通販 (which means ‘online shopping’ in Japanese). The ICANN Board took action in each of these matters.

- With respect to the Expert Determination finding .cam confusingly similar to .com, the ICANN Board ordered that an appeals process be developed to address the “perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determination”.
- With regard to the Expert Determination finding .cars confusingly similar to .car, the ICANN Board ordered its staff to propose a review mechanism. DERCars decided to withdraw its

128 Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 20-21.
129 Request, ¶ 52.
130 Request, ¶ 52 (referencing NGPC Resolution 2014.02.05.NG02).
131 Request, ¶ 52.
application for .cars before the review mechanism was implemented. As a result, it was no longer necessary for the ICANN Board to further consider the proposed review process.

- With regard to the Expert Determination finding .通販 confusingly similar to .shop, the ICANN Board ordered that an appeals process be developed to address the “perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determination”.

8. While the ICANN Board took action in the above-mentioned matters, it did not do so with respect to the .webs / .web determination. However, the .webs / .web determination was equally unreasonable, and at least equally serious substantive and procedural errors were made in these SCO proceedings. There is no reason for ICANN to treat the .webs / .web determination differently.

* * * * *

12. When there are clear violations of the process and the outcome is highly objectionable (all as listed in detail in the request for IRP), the ICANN Board must intervene, as it has done with regard to other applications. The ICANN Board cannot justify why it intervenes in certain cases (.cars / .car, .cam / .com and .通販 / .shop), but refuses to do so in another case (.webs / .web). This is a clear violation of its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. The Panel in the current IRP has authority to order that ICANN must comply with its Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation and must disregard the expert determination in relation to Vistaprint’s .webs applications.\(^{132}\)

* * * * *

31. When the ICANN Board individually considers an application, it must make sure that it does not treat applicants inequitably and that it does not discriminate among applicants. Article II, Section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws provides that “ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition”. However, with regard to the SCO proceedings, the ICANN Board has done the exact opposite. It created the opportunity for some aggrieved applicants to participate in an appeals process, while denying others.

32. As explained above, there is no justification for this disparate treatment, and the ICANN Board has not given any substantial and reasonable cause that would justify this discrimination.

94. Vistaprint also contends that ICANN cannot justify the disparate treatment:

22. ICANN’s attempt to justify the disparate treatment of Vistaprint’s applications is without merit. ICANN argues that its Board only intervened with respect to specific expert determinations because there had been several expert determinations regarding the same strings that were seemingly inconsistent (fn. omitted). Vistaprint recognizes that the ICANN Board intervened to address “perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO Expert Determinations” (fn. omitted). However, ICANN fails to explain why the SCO Expert Determination on Vistaprint’s .webs applications was not just as unreasonable as the SCO Expert Determinations involving .cars/.car, .cam/.com and .通販/.shop. Indeed, the determination concerning Vistaprint’s .webs applications expressly relies on the determination concerning .cars/.car, that was considered inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable by the ICANN Board that rejected the reasoning applied in the two other .cars/.car expert determinations (fn. omitted).

23. Therefore, Vistaprint requests the IRP Panel to exercise its control over the ICANN Board and to declare that ICANN discriminated Vistaprint’s applications.

95. Timing: Vistaprint contends that the objections it raises in this IRP concerning the Third Expert’s SCO determination and the Guidebook and its application are timely.\(^{133}\) While

\(^{132}\) Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 12.
\(^{133}\) Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶¶ 8-12.
ICANN argues that the time for Vistaprint to object to the SCO procedures as established in the Guidebook has long passed. Vistaprint responds that the opportunity to challenge the erroneous application of the Guidebook in violation of ICANN's fundamental principles only arose when the flaws in ICANN's implementation of the Guidebook became apparent. At the time of the adoption of the Guidebook, Vistaprint was effectively barred from challenging it by the fact that it could not – at that time – show any harm. Further, to raise an issue at that time would have required Vistaprint to reveal that it was contemplating making an application for a new gTLD string, which might have encouraged opportunistic applications by others seeking to extract monetary value from Vistaprint. Although the IRP panel in the Booking.com v. ICANN IRP raised similar timing concerns, it did not draw the distinction between the adoption of the general principles and their subsequent implementation.

B. ICANN’s Position

a. IRP Panel’s Authority

96. Standard of review: ICANN describes the IRP as a unique mechanism available under ICANN’s Bylaws. The IRP Panel is tasked with determining whether the Board’s actions are consistent with ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws. ICANN states that its Bylaws specifically identify a deferential standard of review that the IRP Panel must apply when evaluating the actions of the ICANN Board, and the rules are clear that the IRP Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board. In particular, ICANN cites to Article IV, § 3.4 of the Bylaws indicating the IRP Panel is to apply a defined standard of review to the IRP Request, focusing on:

   a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;
   b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and
   c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

97. Further, ICANN states that the IRP addresses challenges to conduct undertaken by ICANN’s Board of Directors; it is not a mechanism to challenge the actions or inactions of ICANN staff or third parties that may be involved with ICANN’s activities. The IRP is also not an appropriate forum to challenge the BGC’s ruling on a Reconsideration Request in the absence of some violation by the BGC of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws.

98. IRP Declaration binding or non-binding: ICANN states that the IRP “is conducted pursuant to Article IV, section 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws, which creates a non-binding method

135 Response, ¶ 32.
136 Response, ¶ 33; ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 10.
137 Response, ¶ 4.
138 Response, ¶ 12.
of evaluating certain actions of ICANN’s Board. The Panel has one responsibility – to “declar[e] whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of [ICANN’s] Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.” The IRP is not an arbitration process, but rather a means by which entities that participate in ICANN’s processes can seek an independent review of decisions made by ICANN’s Board.

99. ICANN states that the language of the IRP provisions set forth in Article IV, section 3 of the Bylaws, as well as the drafting history of the development of the IRP provisions, make clear that IRP panel declarations are not binding on ICANN. ICANN explains as follows in its First Additional Response:

35. First, the Bylaws charge an IRP panel with "comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws." The Board is then obligated to "review[]" and "consider" an IRP panel's declaration at the Board's next meeting "where feasible." The direction to "review" and "consider" an IRP panel's declaration means that the Board has discretion as to whether it should adopt that declaration and whether it should take any action in response to that declaration; if the declaration were binding, there would be nothing to review or consider, only a binding order to implement.

100. ICANN contends that the IRP Panel’s declaration is not binding because the Board is not permitted to outsource its decision-making authority. However, the Board will, of course, give serious consideration to the IRP Panel’s declaration and, “where feasible,” shall consider the IRP Panel’s declaration at the Board’s next meeting.

101. As to the drafting process, ICANN provides the following background in its First Additional Response:

36. Second, the lengthy drafting history of ICANN's independent review process confirms that IRP panel declarations are not binding. Specifically, the Draft Principles for Independent Review, drafted in 1999, state that "the ICANN Board should retain ultimate authority over ICANN's affairs – after all, it is the Board...that will be chosen by (and is directly accountable to) the membership and supporting organizations (fn. omitted). And when, in 2001, the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform (ERC) recommended the creation of an independent review process, it called for the creation of "a process to require non-binding arbitration by an international arbitration body to review any allegation that the Board has acted in conflict with ICANN's Bylaws" (fn. omitted). The individuals who actively participated in the process also agreed that the review process would not be binding. As one participant stated: IRP "decisions will be nonbinding, because the Board will retain final decision-making authority” (fn. omitted).

139 Response, ¶ 2.
140 Response, ¶ 2 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4).
141 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 34.
142 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 35 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11.d).
143 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 35 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.21).
144 Response, ¶ 35.
145 Response, ¶ 35 (quoting Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.21).
37. In February 2010, the first IRP panel to issue a final declaration, the ICM IRP Panel, unanimously rejected the assertion that IRP panel declarations are binding and recognized that an IRP panel's declaration "is not binding, but rather advisory in effect." Nothing has occurred since the issuance of the ICM IRP Panel's declaration that changes the fact that IRP panel declarations are not binding. To the contrary, in April 2013, following the ICM IRP, in order to clarify even further that IRPs are not binding, all references in the Bylaws to the term "arbitration" were removed as part of the Bylaws revisions. ICM had argued in the IRP that the use of the word "arbitration" in the portion of the Bylaws related to Independent Review indicated that IRPs were binding, and while the ICM IRP Panel rejected that argument, to avoid any lingering doubt, ICANN removed the word "arbitration" in conjunction with the amendments to the Bylaws.

38. The amendments to the Bylaws, which occurred following a community process on proposed IRP revisions, added, among other things, a sentence stating that "declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board's subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value" (fn. omitted). Vistaprint argues that this new language, which does not actually use the word "binding," nevertheless provides that IRP panel declarations are binding, trumping years of drafting history, the sworn testimony of those who participated in the drafting process, and the plain text of the Bylaws. This argument is meritless.

39. First, relying on the use of the terms "final" and "precedential" is unavailing — a declaration clearly can be both non-binding and also final and precedential:....

40. Second, the language Vistaprint references was added to ICANN's Bylaws to meet recommendations made by ICANN's Accountability Structures Expert Panel (ASEP). The ASEP was comprised of three world-renowned experts on issues of corporate governance, accountability, and international dispute resolution, and was charged with evaluating ICANN's accountability mechanisms, including the Independent Review process. The ASEP recommended, among other things, that an IRP should not be permitted to proceed on the same issues as presented in a prior IRP. The ASEP's recommendations in this regard were raised in light of the second IRP constituted under ICANN's Bylaws, where the claimant presented claims that would have required the IRP Panel to reevaluate the declaration of the IRP Panel in the ICM IRP. To prevent claimants from challenging Board action taken in direct response to a prior IRP panel declaration, the ASEP recommended that "[f]he declarations of the IRP, and ICANN's subsequent actions on those declarations, should have precedential value" (fn. omitted).

41. The ASEP’s recommendations in this regard did not convert IRP panel declarations into binding decisions (fn. omitted). One of the important considerations underlying the ASEP's work was the fact that ICANN, while it operates internationally, is a California non-profit public benefit corporation subject to the statutory law of California as determined by United States courts. As Graham McDonald, one of the three ASEP experts, explained, because California law requires that the board "retain responsibility for decision-making," the Board has "final word" on "any recommendation that ... arises out of [an IRP]" (fn. omitted). The ASEP's recommendations were therefore premised on the understanding that the declaration of an IRP panel is not "binding" on the Board.

102. Authority to award affirmative relief: ICANN contends that any request that the IRP Panel grant affirmative relief goes beyond the Panel’s authority. ICANN contends that any request that the IRP Panel grant affirmative relief goes beyond the Panel’s authority.147 The Panel does not have the authority to award affirmative relief or to require ICANN to undertake specific

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146 Declaration of IRP Panel, ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, ¶ 133 (Feb. 19, 2010) (“ICM Registry Final Declaration”).
147 Response, ¶ 78.
conduct. The Panel is limited to declaring whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles or Bylaws, and recommending that the Board stay any action or decision, or take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the Panel.\textsuperscript{148} ICANN adds that the IRP panel in \textit{ICM Registry Declaration} found that

\[
\text{``[t]he IRP cannot `order' interim measures but do no more than `recommend' them, and this until the Board `reviews' and `acts upon the opinion' of the IRP.''}\textsuperscript{149}
\]

\section*{b. SCO Proceedings Claim}

103. ICANN states that Vistaprint is using this IRP as a means to challenge the merits of the Third Expert’s determination in the \textit{Vistaprint SCO}.\textsuperscript{150} As ICANN states in its Response:

\begin{quote}
\textit{12. Ultimately, Vistaprint has initiated this IRP because Vistaprint disagrees with the Expert Panel’s Determination and the BGC’s finding on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request. ICANN understands Vistaprint’s disappointment, but IRPs are not a vehicle by which an Expert Panel’s determination may be challenged because neither the determination, nor ICANN accepting the determination, constitutes an ICANN Board action. Nor is an IRP the appropriate forum to challenge a BGC ruling on a Reconsideration Request in the absence of some violation by the BGC of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws. Here, ICANN followed its policies and processes at every turn with respect to Vistaprint, which is all it is required to do.}
\end{quote}

104. ICANN states that the IRP Panel has one chief responsibility – to “determine whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of [ICANN’s] Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.”\textsuperscript{151} With respect to Vistaprint’s claim that ICANN’s Board violated its Articles and Bylaws by “blindly accepting” the Third Expert’s SCO determination without reviewing its analysis or result, ICANN responds that there is no requirement for the Board to conduct such an analysis. “Accepting” or “reviewing” the Expert’s determination is not something the Board was tasked with doing or not doing. Per the Guidebook, the “findings of the panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process.”\textsuperscript{152} The Guidebook further provides that “[i]n a case where a gTLD applicant successfully asserts string confusion with another applicant, the only possible outcome is for both applicants to be placed in a contention set and to be referred to a contention resolution procedure (refer to Module 4, String Contention Procedures).”\textsuperscript{153} This step is a result not of any ICANN Board action, but a straightforward application of Guidebook provisions for SCO determinations.

105. ICANN states the Board thus took no action with respect to the Third Expert’s determination upon its initial issuance, because the Guidebook does not call for the Board to take any action and it is not required by any Article or Bylaw provision. Accordingly, it cannot be a violation of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws for the Board to not conduct a

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{148} ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 33 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, §§ 3.4 and 3.11(d)).
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{ICM Registry Final Declaration}, ¶ 133.
\textsuperscript{150} Response, ¶ 12; ICANN’s First Additional submission, ¶ 4.
\textsuperscript{151} Response, ¶ 2 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.4).
\textsuperscript{152} Response, ¶ 9 (citing Guidebook, § 3.4.6).
\textsuperscript{153} Response, ¶ 9 (citing Guidebook, § 3.2.2.1).
\end{footnotes}
substantive review of an expert’s SCO determination. And as such, there is no Board action in this regard for the IRP Panel to review.

106. ICANN states that “the sole Board action that Vistaprint has identified in this case is the BGC’s rejection of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request. However, ICANN maintains that nothing about the BGC’s handling of the RFR violated ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws.”

107. In this regard, ICANN states that the BGC was not required, as Vistaprint contends, to refer Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request to the entire ICANN Board. The Bylaws provide that the BGC has the authority to “make a final determination of Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without reference to the Board of Directors.” Because Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request was a challenge to alleged staff action, the BGC was within its authority, and in compliance with the Bylaws, when it denied Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request without making a referral to the full Board.

108. ICANN states that the BGC did what it was supposed to do in reviewing Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request – it reviewed the Third Expert’s and ICANN staff’s compliance with policies and procedures, rather than the substance of the Third Expert’s SCO determination, and found no policy or process violations. ICANN urges that Vistaprint seeks to use the IRP to challenge the substantive decision of the Third Expert in the Vistaprint SCO. However, this IRP may only be used to challenge ICANN Board actions on the grounds that they do not comply with the Articles or Bylaws, neither of which is present here.

109. ICANN nevertheless responds to Vistaprint’s allegations regarding errors of process and substance in the SCO proceedings, and contends that the BGC properly handled its review of the Vistaprint SCO. ICANN’s specific responses on these points are as follows:

(i) As to Vistaprint’s claim that the ICDR’s appointment of the First Expert was untimely, missing the deadline by 5 days, ICANN states that the BGC determined that Vistaprint failed to provide any evidence that it contemporaneously challenged the timeliness of the ICDR’s appointment of the First Expert, and that a Reconsideration Request was not the appropriate mechanism to raise the issue for the first time. In addition, the BGC concluded that Vistaprint had failed to show that it was “materially” and “adversely” affected by the brief delay in appointing the First Expert, rendering reconsideration inappropriate.

(ii) Regarding Vistaprint’s claim that the First Expert (and Third Expert) improperly accepted and considered unsolicited supplemental filings, violating Articles 17 and 18 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, ICANN states that Article 17 provides the

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154 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 4.
155 Response, ¶ 43.
156 Response, ¶ 44 (citing Bylaws, Art. IV, § 2.3(f)).
157 Response, ¶ 11.
expert panel with the discretion to accept such a filing.\textsuperscript{158} “The Panel may decide whether the parties shall submit any written statements in addition to the Objection and the Response, and it shall fix time limits for such submissions.”\textsuperscript{159} Thus, as the BGC correctly found, it was not the BGC’s place to second-guess the First (or Third) Expert’s exercise of permitted discretion.

(iii) As to Vistaprint’s claim that the ICDR violated Article 21 of the New gTLD Objections Procedure by failing to ensure the timely issuance of an expert SCO determination, ICANN contends that the BGC properly determined that Vistaprint’s claims in this regard did not support reconsideration for two reasons. First, on October 1, 2013, before the determination was supposed to be issued by the First Expert, the ICDR removed that expert. The BGC therefore could not evaluate whether the First Expert rendered an untimely determination in violation of the Procedure. Second, the BGC correctly noted that 45-day timeline applies to an expert’s submission of the determination “in draft form to the [ICDR’s] scrutiny as to form before it is signed” and the ICDR and the Expert are merely required to exercise “reasonable efforts” to issue a determination within 45 days of the constitution of the Panel.\textsuperscript{160}

(iv) Regarding Vistaprint’s claim that the First Expert failed to maintain independence and impartiality, in violation of Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, ICANN argues this claim is unsupported.\textsuperscript{161} As the BGC noted, Vistaprint provided no evidence demonstrating that the First Expert failed to follow the applicable ICDR procedures for independence and impartiality. Rather, all indications are that the First Expert and the ICDR complied with these rules as to this “new conflict,” which resulted in a removal of the First Expert. Further, Vistaprint presented no evidence of being materially and adversely affected by the First Expert’s removal, which is another justification for the BGC’s denial of the Reconsideration Request.

(v) Vistaprint claimed that the ICDR unjustifiably accepted a challenge to the Second Expert (or created the circumstances for such a challenge), in violation of Article 2 of the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections.\textsuperscript{162} ICANN contends that the BGC properly determined that this claim did not support reconsideration. The ICRD Rules for SCOs make clear that the ICDR had the “sole discretion” to review and decide challenges to the appointment of expert panelists. While Vistaprint may disagree with the ICDR’s decision to accept the Objector’s challenge, it is not the BGC’s role to second guess the ICDR’s discretion, and it was

\textsuperscript{158} Response, ¶ 50.
\textsuperscript{159} New gTLD Objections Procedure, Art. 17.
\textsuperscript{160} Response, ¶ 53, citing New gTLD Objections Procedure, Art. 21(a)-(b).
\textsuperscript{161} Response, ¶¶ 54-56.
\textsuperscript{162} Article 2, § 3 of the ICDR’s Supplementary Procedures for String Confusion Objections provides that:

\emph{Upon review of the challenge the DRSP in its sole discretion shall make the decision on the challenge and advise the parties of its decision. [Underlining added]}

Page 63/99
not a violation of the Articles or Bylaws for the BGC to deny reconsideration on this ground.

(vi) Vistaprint claimed that the determination of the Third Expert was untimely, in violation of Article 21(a) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure. ICANN claims that the BGC properly held that this claim did not support reconsideration. On November 20, 2013, the ICDR appointed the Third Expert. Vistaprint claimed in its Reconsideration Request that pursuant to Article 21, the determination therefore “should have been rendered by January 4, 2014,” which was forty-five (45) days after the Panel was constituted. Because “it took this Panel until January 24, 2014 to render the Decision,” Vistaprint contended that the determination was untimely because it was twenty days late. ICANN states that, according to the Procedure, the Expert must exercise “reasonable efforts” to ensure that it submits its determination “in draft form to the DRSP’s scrutiny as to form before it is signed” within forty-five (45) days of the Expert Panel being constituted. As the BGC noted, there is no evidence that the Third Expert failed to comply with this Procedure, and reconsideration was therefore unwarranted on this ground.

(vii) ICANN responded to Vistaprint’s claim that the Third Expert incorrectly applied the Objector’s burden of proof, in violation of section 3.5 of the Guidebook and Article 20(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure (which place the burden on the Objector). Vistaprint claimed that the Third Expert contravened ICANN’s process because the Expert did not give an analysis showing that the Objector had met the burden of proof. ICANN states that the BGC found the Expert extensively detailed support for the conclusion that the .WEBS string so nearly resembles .WEB – visually, aurally and in meaning – that it is likely to cause confusion. The BGC noted that the Expert had adhered to the procedures and standards set forth in the Guidebook relevant to determining string confusion and reconsideration was not warranted on this basis.

(viii) Finally, as to Vistaprint’s claim that the Third Expert incorrectly applied ICANN’s substantive standard for evaluation of String Confusion Objections (as set out in Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook), ICANN contends the BGC properly found that reconsideration was not appropriate. Vistaprint contended that the Expert failed to apply the appropriate high standard for assessing likelihood of confusion. ICANN states that Section 3.5.1 of the Guidebook provides that

“[f]or the likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user.”

ICANN claims that disagreement as to whether this standard should have resulted in a finding in favor of Vistaprint does not mean that the Third Expert violated any policy or process in reaching his decision. Vistaprint also claimed that the Third

163 Response, ¶¶ 61-62.
164 Response, ¶¶ 63-64.
165 Response, ¶¶ 65-68.
166 Request, ¶ 47.
Expert “failed to apply the burden of proof and the standards imposed by ICANN” because the Expert questioned whether the co-existence between Vistaprint’s domain name, <webs.com>, and the Objector’s domain name, <web.com> for many years without evidence of actual confusion is relevant to his determination. ICANN states that, as the BGC noted, the relevant consideration for the Expert is whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion, not whether there is confusion between second-level domain names. Vistaprint does not cite any provision of the Guidebook, the Procedure, or the Rules that have been contravened in this regard.

110. In sum, ICANN contends that the BGC did its job, which did not include evaluating the merits of Third Expert’s determination, and the BGC followed applicable policies and procedures in considering the RFR.167

111. Regarding Vistaprint’s claims of ICANN’s breach of various Articles and Bylaws, ICANN responds as follows in its Response:

71. First, Vistaprint contends that ICANN failed to comply with the general principle of “good faith.” But the only reason Vistaprint asserts ICANN failed to act in good faith is in “refus[ing] to reconsider the substance” of the Determination or to “act with independent judgment” (fn. omitted). The absence of an appeal mechanism by which Vistaprint might challenge the Determination does not form the basis for an IRP because there is nothing in ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation requiring ICANN to provide one.

72. Second, Vistaprint contends that ICANN failed to apply its policies in a neutral manner. Here, Vistaprint complains that other panels let other applications proceed without being placed into a contention set, even though they, in Vistaprint’s opinion, presented “at least equally serious string similarity concerns” as .WEBS/.WEB (fn. omitted). Vistaprint’s claims about ICDR’s treatment of other string similarity disputes cannot be resolved by IRP because there is nothing in ICANN’s Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation requiring ICANN to provide one.

73. Third, Vistaprint contends that the ICANN Board violated its obligation to act transparently for not investigating the “impartiality and independence” of the Expert Panel and thereby “did not seek to communicate with [ICDR] to optimize [its] service” (fn. omitted). Aside from the disconnect between the particular Bylaws provision invoked by Vistaprint requiring ICANN’s transparency, and the complaint that the ICDR did not act transparently, Vistaprint fails to identify any procedural deficiency in the ICDR’s actions regarding the removal of the First Expert, as set forth above. Moreover, Vistaprint cites no obligation in the Articles or Bylaws that the ICANN Board affirmatively investigate the impartiality of an Expert Panel, outside of the requirement that the ICDR follow its policies on conflicts, which the ICDR did.

74. Fourth, Vistaprint contends that ICANN “has not created any general process for challenging the substance of the so-called expert determination,” and thus has “brashly flouted” its obligation to remain accountable (fn. omitted). But again, Vistaprint does not identify any provision of the Articles or Bylaws that requires ICANN to provide such an appeals process.

75. Fifth, Vistaprint “concludes” that the ICANN Board neglected its duty to promote competition and innovation (fn. omitted) when it failed to overturn the Expert Panel’s Determination. Vistaprint claims that the Objector’s “motive in filing the objection was to prevent a potential competitor from entering

167 Response, ¶ 69.
the gTLD market” and therefore ICANN’s “acceptance” of the objection purportedly contravenes ICANN’s core value of promoting competition. But every objection to a gTLD application by an applicant for the same string seeks to hinder a competitor’s application. By Vistaprint’s logic, ICANN’s commitment to promoting competition requires that no objections ever be sustained and every applicant obtains the gTLD it requests. There is no provision in the Articles or Bylaws that require such an unworkable system.

76. All in all, Vistaprint’s attempt to frame its disappointment with the Expert Panel’s decision as the ICANN Board’s dereliction of duties does not withstand scrutiny.

c. Disparate Treatment Claim

112. ICANN states that Vistaprint objects to the Board’s exercise of its independent judgement in determining not to intervene further (beyond the review of the BGC) with respect to the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, as the Board did with respect to expert determinations on String Confusion Objections regarding the strings (1) .COM/.CAM, (2) .CAR/.CARS, and (3) .SHOP/.通販 (online shopping in Japanese).168

113. ICANN states that the Guidebook provides that in “exceptional circumstances,” such as when accountability mechanisms like RFR or IRP are invoked, “the Board might individually consider an application”169 and that is precisely what occurred in Vistaprint’s case. Because Vistaprint sought reconsideration, the BGC considered Vistaprint's Reconsideration Request and concluded that the ICDR and Third Expert had not violated any relevant policy or procedure in rendering the Expert’s determination.

114. ICANN states that the ICANN Board only intervened with respect to these other expert determinations because there had been several independent expert determinations regarding the same strings that were seemingly inconsistent with one another. That is not the case with respect to Vistaprint’s applications – no other expert determinations were issued regarding the similarity of .WEB and .WEBS.170 “Unlike .WEB/.WEBS, the COM/.CAM, .CAR/.CARS, and .SHOP/.通販 strings were all the subject of several, seemingly inconsistent determinations on string confusion objections by different expert panels. So, for example, while one expert upheld a string confusion objection asserting that .CAM was confusingly similar to .COM, another expert overruled a separate string confusion objection asserting precisely the same thing.”171

115. Further, ICANN explains that

16. Given what were viewed by some as inconsistent determinations, the BGC requested that ICANN staff draft a report for the ICANN Board’s New gTLD Program Committee (“NGPC”), "setting out

168 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 14.
169 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 5 (citing Guidebook, § 5.1). ICANN quotes the Booking.com Final Declaration, where the IRP Panel stated in relation to § 5.1 “the fact that the ICANN Board enjoys such discretion [to individually consider an application for a New gTLD] and may choose to exercise it at any time does not mean that it is bound to exercise it, let alone at the time and in the manner demanded by Booking.com.”
170 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 5.
171 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 15.
options for dealing...[with] differing outcomes of the String Confusion Objection Dispute Resolution process in similar disputes..."172 The NGPC subsequently considered potential approaches to addressing perceived inconsistent determinations on string confusion objections, including possibly implementing a new review mechanism.173 ICANN staff initiated a public comment period regarding framework principles of a potential such review mechanism.174 Ultimately, having considered the report drafted by ICANN staff, the public comments received, and the string confusion objection process set forth in the Guidebook, the NGPC determined that the inconsistent expert determinations regarding .COM/.CAM and .SHOP/.通販 were "not[] in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community" and directed ICANN staff to establish a process whereby the ICDR would appoint a three-member panel to re-evaluate those expert determinations.175

116. ICANN contends that Vistaprint has identified no Articles or Bylaws provision violated by the Board in exercising its independent judgment to intervene with respect to inconsistent determinations in certain SCO cases, but not with respect to the single expert SCO determination regarding .WEBS/.WEB. The Board was justified in exercising its discretion to intervene with respect to the inconsistent expert determinations regarding .COM/.CAM, .CAR/.CARS and .SHOP/.通販 - the Board acted to bring certainty to multiple and differing expert determinations regarding the same strings.176 That justification was not present with respect to the single Vistaprint SCO determination at issue here. Thus, ICANN contends Vistaprint was not treated differently than other similarly-situated gTLD applicants.

117. Timing: Finally, ICANN also states that the time for Vistaprint to challenge the Guidebook and its standards has past. The current version of the Guidebook was published on June 4, 2012 following an extensive review process, including public comment on multiple drafts.177 Despite having ample opportunity, Vistaprint did not object to the Guidebook at the time it was implemented. If Vistaprint had concerns related to the issues it now raises, it should have pursued them at the time, not years later and only after receiving the determination in the Vistaprint SCO. ICANN quotes the Booking.com Final Declaration, where the IRP stated,

"the time has long since passed for Booking.com or any other interested party to ask an IRP panel to review the actions of the ICANN Board in relation to the establishment of the string similarity review process, including Booking.com's claims that specific elements of the process and the Board decisions to implement those elements are inconsistent with ICANN's Articles and Bylaws. Any such claims, even if they had any merit, are long since time-barred by the 30-day limitation period set out in Article IV, Section 3(3) of the Bylaws."178

118. ICANN states that while the Guidebook process at issue in this case is different for the

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172 See BGC Determination on Reconsideration Request 13-10, at 11.
175 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 16; see NGPC Resolution 2014.1 0.12.NG02, at https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-new-gtld-2014-1.0-12-en#2.b (last accessed Sept. 15, 2015).
176 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 18.
177 ICANN’s First Additional Response, ¶ 27.
178 Booking.com final Declaration, ¶ 129.
process at issue in the Booking.com IRP – the SCO process rather than the string similarity review process – the Booking.com IRP panel's reasoning applies equally. ICANN argues that because both processes were developed years ago, as part of the development of the Guidebook, challenges to both are time-barred. 179

V. Analysis and Findings

a. IRP Panel’s Authority

119. Standard of Review: The IRP Panel has benefited from the parties submissions on this issue, noting their agreement as to the Panel’s primary task: comparing contested actions (or inactions)180 of ICANN’s Board to its Articles and Bylaws and declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with them. Yet when considering this Panel’s comparative task, the parties disagree as to the level of deference to be accorded by the Panel in assessing the Board’s actions or inactions.

120. Vistaprint has sought independent review through this IRP, claiming that it has been “harmed” (i.e., its .WEBS application has not been allowed to proceed and has been placed in a Contention Set) by the Board’s alleged violation of the Articles and Bylaws. In accordance with Article IV, § 3.2 of the Bylaws:

Any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board’s alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board’s action.

121. As noted above, Article IV, § 1 of the Bylaws emphasizes that the IRP is an accountability mechanism:

The provisions of this Article, creating processes for reconsideration and independent review of ICANN actions and periodic review of ICANN's structure and procedures, are intended to reinforce the various accountability mechanisms otherwise set forth in these Bylaws.

122. The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.4 detail the IRP Panel’s charge and issues to be considered in a defined standard of review:

Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel (“IRP Panel”), which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:

a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;

b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and

179 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 28.
180 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11(c) (“The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:...(c) declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws” (underlining added).
c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?\textsuperscript{181}

[Underlining added]

123. The Bylaws state the IRP Panel is “charged” with “comparing” contested actions of the Board to the Articles and Bylaws and “declaring” whether the Board has acted consistently with them. The Panel is to focus, in particular, on whether the Board acted without conflict of interest, exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it, and exercised independent judgment in taking a decision believed to be in the best interests of ICANN. In the IRP Panel’s view this more detailed listing of a defined standard cannot be read to remove from the Panel’s remit the fundamental task of comparing actions or inactions of the Board with the Articles and Bylaws and declaring whether the Board has acted consistently or not. Instead, the defined standard provides a list of questions that can be asked, but not to the exclusion of other potential questions that might arise in a particular case as the Panel goes about its comparative work. For example, the particular circumstances may raise questions whether the Board acted in a transparent or non-discriminatory manner. In this regard, the ICANN Board’s discretion is limited by the Articles and Bylaws, and it is against the provisions of these instruments that the Board’s conduct must be measured.

124. The Panel agrees with ICANN’s statement that the Panel is neither asked to, nor allowed to, substitute its judgment for that of the Board. However, this does not fundamentally alter the lens through which the Panel must view its comparative task. As Vistaprint has urged, the IRP is the only accountability mechanism by which ICANN holds itself accountable through independent third-party review of its actions or inactions. Nothing in the Bylaws specifies that the IRP Panel’s review must be founded on a deferential standard, as ICANN has asserted. Such a standard would undermine the Panel’s primary goal of ensuring accountability on the part of ICANN and its Board, and would be incompatible with ICANN’s commitment to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability, as required by ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments, Bylaws and core values.

\textsuperscript{181} The Supplementary Rules provide similarly in section 1 that the IRP is designed “to review ICANN Board actions or inactions alleged to be inconsistent with ICANN's Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation” with the standard of review set forth in section 8:

8. Standard of Review

The IRP is subject to the following standard of review: (i) did the ICANN Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision; (ii) did the ICANN Board exercise due diligence and care in having sufficient facts in front of them; (iii) did the ICANN Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

If a requestor demonstrates that the ICANN Board did not make a reasonable inquiry to determine it had sufficient facts available, ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest in participating in the decision, or the decision was not an exercise in independent judgment, believed by the ICANN Board to be in the best interests of the company, after taking account of the Internet community and the global public interest, the requestor will have established proper grounds for review.
125. The IRP Panel is aware that three other IRP panels have considered this issue of standard of review and degree of deference to be accorded, if any, when assessing the conduct of ICANN’s Board. All of them have reached the same conclusion: the Board’s conduct is to be reviewed and appraised by the IRP Panel using an objective and independent standard, without any presumption of correctness. As the IRP Panel reasoned in the *ICM Registry Final Declaration*:

> ICANN is no ordinary non-profit California corporation. The Government of the United States vested regulatory authority of vast dimension and pervasive global reach in ICANN. In “recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization” – including ICANN – ICANN is charged with “promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet...” ICANN “shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law...” Thus, while a California corporation, it is governed particularly by the terms of its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, as the law of California allows. Those Articles and Bylaws, which require ICANN to carry out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, do not specify or imply that the International Review Process provided for shall (or shall not) accord deference to the decisions of the ICANN Board. The fact that the Board is empowered to exercise its judgment in the application of ICANN’s sometimes competing core values does not necessarily import that that judgment must be treated deferentially by the IRP. In the view of the Panel, the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be reviewed and appraised by the Panel objectively, not deferentially. The business judgment rule of the law of California, applicable to directors of California corporations, profit and nonprofit, in the case of ICANN is to be treated as a default rule that might be called upon in the absence of relevant provisions of ICANN’s Articles and Bylaws and of specific representations of ICANN...that bear on the propriety of its conduct. In the instant case, it is those Articles and Bylaws, and those representations, measured against the facts as the Panel finds them, which are determinative.

126. The IRP Panel here agrees with this analysis. Moreover, Article IV, §3.21 of the Bylaws provides that “declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value” (underlining added). The IRP Panel recognizes that there is unanimity on the issue of degree of deference, as found by the three IRP panels that have previously considered it. The declarations of those panels have precedential value. The Panel considers that the question on this issue is now settled. Therefore, in this IRP the ICANN Board’s conduct is to be reviewed and appraised by this Panel objectively and independently, without any presumption of correctness.

127. On a related point as to the scope of the IRP Panel’s review, the Panel agrees with ICANN’s point of emphasis that, because the Panel’s review is limited to addressing challenges to conduct by ICANN’s Board, the Panel is not tasked with reviewing the

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182 *ICM Registry Final Declaration*, ¶ 136 (“the judgments of the ICANN Board are to be reviewed and appraised by the Panel objectively, not deferentially”); *Booking.com final Declaration*, ¶ 111 (“the IRP Panel is charged with ‘objectively’ determining whether or not the Board’s actions are in fact consistent with the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook, which the Panel understands as requiring that the Board’s conduct be appraised independently, and without any presumption of correctness.”); Final Declaration of the IRP Panel in *DotConnectAfrica Trust v. ICANN*, ICDR Case No. 50-2013-001083, ¶ 76 (July 9, 2015) (“DCA Final Declaration”), at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-declaration-2-redacted-09jul15-en.pdf (last accessed on Sept. 15, 2015) (“The Panel therefore concludes that the “standard of review” in this IRP is a de novo, objective and independent one, which does not require any presumption of correctness”).

183 *ICM Registry Final Declaration*, ¶ 136.
actions or decisions of ICANN staff or other third parties who may be involved in ICANN activities or provide services to ICANN (such as the ICDR or the experts in the *Vistaprint SCO*). With this in mind, and with the focus on the Board, the only affirmative action of the Board in relation to Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD application was through the BGC, which denied Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request. ICANN states that “the sole Board action that Vistaprint has identified in this case is the Board Governance Committee’s (‘BGC’) rejection of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request, which sought reconsideration of the Expert Determination.” It appears that ICANN’s focus in this statement is on affirmative action taken by the BGC in rejecting Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request; however, this does not eliminate the IRP Panel’s consideration of whether, in the circumstances, inaction (or omission) by the BGC or the full ICANN Board in relation to the issues raised by Vistaprint’s application would be considered a potential violation of the Articles or Bylaws.

128. As discussed below, the Panel considers that a significant question in this IRP concerns one of “omission” – the ICANN Board, through the BGC or otherwise, did not provide relief to Vistaprint in the form of an additional review mechanism, as it did to certain other parties who were the subject of an adverse SCO determination.

129. IRP declaration binding or non-binding: As noted above, Vistaprint contends that the outcome of this IRP is binding on ICANN, and that any other result would be incompatible with ICANN’s obligation to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for accountability. ICANN, on the other hand, contends that the IRP Panel’s declaration is intended to be advisory and non-binding.

130. In analyzing this issue, the IRP Panel has carefully reviewed the three charter instruments that give the Panel its authority to act in this case: the Bylaws, the Supplementary Procedures, and the ICDR Rules. The Panel views that it is important to distinguish between (i) the findings of the Panel on the question of whether the ICANN Board’s conduct is consistent (or not) with the Articles and Bylaws, and (ii) any consequent remedial measures to be considered as a result of those findings, at least insofar as those

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184 The BGC is a committee of the Board established pursuant to Article XII, § 1 of the Bylaws. Article IV, § 2.3 of the Bylaws provide for the delegation of the Board’s authority to the BGC to consider Requests for Reconsideration and indicate that the BGC shall have the authority to:

- evaluate requests for review or reconsideration;
- summarily dismiss insufficient requests;
- evaluate requests for urgent consideration;
- conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate;
- request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from other parties;
- make a final determination on Reconsideration Requests regarding staff action or inaction, without reference to the Board of Directors; and
- make a recommendation to the Board of Directors on the merits of the request, as necessary.

The BGC has discretion to decide whether to issue a final decision or make a recommendation to ICANN’s Board. In this case, the BGC decided to make a final determination on Vistaprint’s RFR.

185 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 4. By contrast to the IRP Panel’s focus on the Board’s conduct, the BGC in its decision on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration request considered the action or inaction of ICANN staff and third parties providing services to ICANN (i.e., the ICDR and SCO experts).
measures would direct the Board to take or not take any action or decision. The Panel considers that, as to the first point, the findings of the Panel on whether the Board has acted in a manner that is consistent (or not) with the Articles or Bylaws is akin to a finding of breach/liability by a court in a contested legal case. This determination by the Panel is “binding” in the sense that ICANN’s Board cannot overrule the Panel’s declaration on this point or later decide for itself that it disagrees with the Panel and that there was no inconsistency with (or violation of) the Articles and Bylaws. However, when it comes to the question of whether or not the IRP Panel can require that ICANN’s Board implement any form of redress based on a finding of violation, here, the Panel believes that it can only raise remedial measures to be considered by the Board in an advisory, non-binding manner. The Panel concludes that this distinction – between a “binding” declaration on the violation question and a “non-binding” declaration when it comes to recommending that the Board stay or take any action – is most consistent with the terms and spirit of the charter instruments upon which the Panel’s jurisdiction is based, and avoids conflating these two aspects of the Panel’s role.

131. The IRP Panel shares some of Vistaprint’s concerns about the efficacy of the IRP as an accountability mechanism if any affirmative relief that might be considered appropriate by the Panel is considered non-binding on ICANN’s Board (see discussion below); nevertheless, the Panel determines on the basis of the charter instruments, as well as the drafting history of those documents, that its declaration is binding only with respect to the finding of compliance or not with the Articles and Bylaws, and non-binding with respect to any measures that the Panel might recommend the Board take or refrain from taking. The Panel’s Declaration will have “precedential value” and will possibly be made publicly available on ICANN’s website. Thus, the declaration of violation (or not), even without the ability to order binding relief vis-à-vis ICANN’s Board, will carry more weight than would be the case if the IRP was a confidential procedure with decisions that carried no precedential value.

132. To the extent that there is ambiguity on the nature of the IRP Panel’s declaration (which perhaps could have been avoided in the first place), it is because there is ambiguity and an apparent contradiction created by some of the key terms of the three charter instruments – the Bylaws, the Supplementary Procedures, and the ICDR Rules. In terms of a potential interpretive hierarchy for these documents – to the extent that such hierarchy is relevant – the Bylaws can be said to have created the IRP and its terms of reference: the IRP is established as an accountability mechanism pursuant to the Bylaws, Article IV, § 3 (Independent Review of Board Actions). Article IV, § 3.8 of the Bylaws, in turn, delegates to the “IRP Provider” the task of establishing rules and procedures that are supposed to be consistent with Article IV, § 3:

Subject to the approval of the Board, the IRP Provider shall establish operating rules and procedures.

186 The Panel observes the final declarations in all previous IRPs that have gone to decision, as well as declarations concerning procedure and interim relief, have been posted on ICANN’s website. In this respect, Supplementary Procedures, Rule 10(c) provides that a “Declaration may be made public only with the consent of all parties or as required by law”. However, ICANN has also agreed in Rule 10(c) that subject to the redaction of confidential information or unforeseen circumstances, “ICANN will consent to publication of a Declaration if the other party so requests.”
133. Thus, the Supplementary Procedures and ICDR Rules were established pursuant to Article IV, § 3.8 of the Bylaws; however, the requirement of consistency as between the texts was imperfectly implemented, at least with respect to the ICDR Rules, as discussed below. As between the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules, the Supplementary Procedures will control, as provided in Supplementary Rule 2:

In the event there is any inconsistency between these Supplementary Procedures and the Rules, these Supplementary Procedures will govern.

134. The Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.4 provide that the Panel shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to the Articles and Bylaws, and with “declaring” whether the Board has acted consistently with them. The IRP panel in the ICM Registry Final Declaration stressed that the IRP panel’s task is “to ‘declare’, not to ‘decide’ or to ‘determine’.”\textsuperscript{187} However, the word “declare”, alone, does not conclusively answer the question of whether the IRP’s declaration (or any part of it) is binding or not. “To declare” means “to announce or express something clearly and publicly, especially officially.”\textsuperscript{188} Declarations can and do serve as the predicate for binding or non-binding consequences in different contexts. For example, a declaratory relief action – in which a court resolves legal uncertainty by determining the rights of parties under a contract or statute without ordering anything be done or awarding damages – can have a binding result because it may later preclude a lawsuit by one of the parties to the declaratory lawsuit. Further, in a non-legal context, “declaring” a state of emergency in a particular state or country can have binding consequences. Thus, the word “declare,” in itself, does not answer the issue.

135. Moreover, nothing in the Bylaws, Supplementary Procedures or ICDR Rules suggests that the IRP Panel’s declaration is non-binding with respect to the Panel’s core task of deciding whether the Board did, or did not, comply the Articles or Bylaws. There is no provision that states the ICANN Board can reconsider this independent and important declaration. To the contrary, the ICDR Rules, which apply to the IRP proceedings, can be read to suggest that both the Panel’s finding of compliance (or not) by ICANN’s Board, and the Panel’s possible reference to any remedial measures, are binding on ICANN. As Vistaprint indicates, the preamble of the ICDR Rules provide that “[a] dispute can be submitted to an arbitral tribunal for a final and binding decision,” and Article 30(1) of those Rules specifies that “[a]wards shall be made in writing by the arbitral tribunal and shall be final and binding on the parties” (emphasis added).

136. However, these terms in the ICDR Rules arguably contradict specific provisions of the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures, at least to the extent that they are read to cover any measures that the IRP Panel would direct the ICANN Board to take or not take. In this way, if there is a contradiction between the texts, the Bylaws and Supplemental rules would govern. However, focusing on the relief that the Panel is authorized to grant

\textsuperscript{187} ICM Registry Final Declaration, ¶ 133.
\textsuperscript{188} Cambridge English Online Dictionary (United States version).
provides a decisive clue as to the question of whether the IRP declaration, or any part of it, is binding or non-binding, and produces a faithful and harmonized reading of all the texts. While the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures say nothing to limit the binding effect of the IRP Panel’s “liability” declaration, they both contain provisions that expressly indicate the Panel may only “recommend” that the Board stay or take any action or decision. In particular, the Bylaws in Article IV, § 3.11 sets out the IRP Panel’s authority in terms of alternative actions that it may take once it is has an IRP case before it:

The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:

a. **summarily dismiss requests** brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious;

b. **request additional written submissions from the party seeking review**, the Board, the Supporting Organizations, or from other parties;

c. declare whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; and

d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP;

e. consolidate requests for independent review if the facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar; and

f. determine the timing for each proceeding.

[Underlining added]

137. Article IV, § 3.11(a) provides that the Panel may summarily dismiss an IRP request in certain circumstances. A fair reading of this term is that an IRP panel’s dismissal of a case pursuant to § 3.11(a) would be a binding decision, both for the party who brought the IRP request and for ICANN. In other words, ICANN could not require that the IRP panel take-up the case again once it has been dismissed by the panel. Further, the IRP panel can “request additional written submissions” from the parties (including the Board) or certain third parties. Here again, a fair reading of this term is that it is not subject to any review by ICANN Board before it can be implemented and is therefore binding on those who receive such a request.

138. By comparison, any form of relief whereby the IRP Panel would direct the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision, as specified in § 3.11(d), must be “recommend[ed]” to the Board, which then “reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.” The Panel’s authority is thus limited (and in this sense non-binding) when it

189 Bylaws, Art. IV, § 3.11.

190 Supplementary Rule 6 provides similarly that:

An IRP Panel may summarily dismiss any request for Independent Review where the requestor has not demonstrated that it meets the standing requirements for initiating the Independent Review.

Summary dismissal of a request for Independent Review is also appropriate where a prior IRP on the same issue has concluded through Declaration.

An IRP Panel may also dismiss a querulous, frivolous or vexatious request for Independent Review.

191 Supplementary Rule 7 provides similarly (as regards interim measures of protection) that:

An IRP Panel may recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the IRP declaration. Where the IRP (Continued...)
comes to providing ICANN’s Board with potential courses of action or inaction in view of Board’s non-compliance with the Articles or Bylaws.\footnote{192}

139. Several other provisions of the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures can be fairly read to relate to decisions of the IRP panel that would be considered binding, even as to ICANN’s Board. Article IV, § 3.18 provides “[t]he IRP Panel shall make its declaration based solely on the documentation, supporting materials, and arguments submitted by the parties, and in its declaration shall specifically designate the prevailing party.” There is no mechanism for the Board to overrule the IRP panel’s designation as to which party is the prevailing party. Article IV, § 3.20 provides “[t]he IRP Panel may, in its discretion, grant a party’s request to keep certain information confidential, such as trade secrets.” A fair reading of this provision is that the IRP panel’s decision concerning such questions of confidentiality would be binding on all parties (including ICANN) in the IRP procedure. Consolidating IRP requests and determining the timing for each IRP proceeding are also decisions of the panel that are binding and not subject to review. Finally, Supplemental Procedures, Rule 11, directs that “[t]he IRP Panel shall fix costs in its Declaration.” Here too, this decision of the IRP panel can be fairly read to be binding on the parties, including the Board.

140. Thus, the IRP Panel’s authority to render binding or non-binding decisions, orders or relief can be considered in relation to four basic areas:

(i) \textbf{summary dismissals} by the IRP Panel (for different reasons as stated in the Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures) are final and binding on the parties. There is no mechanism for appeal of such dismissals and they have precedential value.

(ii) \textbf{the designation of prevailing party, fixing costs for the IRP, and other orders in support of the IRP proceedings} (e.g., timing of proceedings, confidentiality, requests for additional submissions, consolidation of IRP cases) are binding decisions of the IRP Panel, with no review by the Board or any other body.

(iii) the IRP Panel’s declaration of whether or not the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles and Bylaws is final and binding, in the sense that there is no appeal on this point to ICANN’s Board or any other body; it is a final determination and has precedential value.

(iv) any form of relief in which the IRP Panel would direct the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision is only a recommendation to the Board. In this sense,

\footnote{192}{The word “recommend” is also not free of ambiguity. For example, Article 47 of the ICSID Convention (concerning investor-State arbitration) provides in relevant part that “the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, \textit{recommend} any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party” (emphasis added). The use of the word “recommend” in this context may refer to an order of the Tribunal that is intended to be binding on the parties. Nevertheless, in the context of the IRP, the Panel considers that use of the word “recommend” conveys that the Panel’s direction of any action or inaction on the part of the Board is a non-binding reference.}
such a recommendation is not binding on the Board. The Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures provide specific and detailed guidance in this key area – i.e., relief that would require the Board to take or refraining from taking any action or decision – where the IRP Panel’s decisions would not be binding on the Board, but would serve only as a recommendation to be reviewed and acted upon by the Board.

141. The other decisions of the IRP panel, as outlined above and including the declaration of whether or not the Board violated the Articles and Bylaws, would be binding, consistent with the Bylaws, Supplementary Procedures and ICDR Rule Article 30(1). This approach provides a reading that harmonizes the terms of the three charter instruments. It also provides interpretive context for Article IV, § 3.21 of the Bylaws, providing that “[w]here feasible, the Board shall consider the IRP Panel declaration at the Board’s next meeting.” The IRP panel in the ICM Registry Final Declaration stated that “[t]his relaxed temporal proviso to do no more than ‘consider’ the IRP declaration, and to do so at the next meeting of the Board ‘where feasible’, emphasizes that it is not binding.”\textsuperscript{193} However, consistent with the analysis above, the IRP Panel here reads this statement in the ICM Registry Final Declaration to relate only to an IRP panel’s decision to “recommend” that the Board take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision. It does not relate to the other decisions or duties of the IRP panel, as explained above.

142. Vistaprint contends that the second sentence in Article IV, § 3.21 – providing “[t]he declarations of the IRP Panel, and the Board’s subsequent action on those declarations, are final and have precedential value” – which was added in April 2013 after the issuance of ICM Registry Final Declaration, was a change that supports the view that the IRP panel’s outcome, including any references to remedial relief, is binding. However, the Panel agrees with ICANN’s view that “a declaration clearly can be both non-binding and also final and precedential.”\textsuperscript{194} Further, the preparatory work and drafting history for the relevant provisions of the Bylaws relating to the IRP procedure indicate the intention for a non-binding procedure with respect to the Panel’s authority to advise the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision. As summarized in ICANN’s contentions above, ICANN has submitted evidence that those who were initially involved in establishing the IRP considered that it should be an advisory, non-binding procedure in relation to any policies that the Board might be requested to consider and implement by the IRP panel.\textsuperscript{195}

143. Thus, the Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures draw a line: when the measures that an IRP panel might consider as a result of its core task require that the Board take or refrain from taking any action or decision, the panel may only “recommend” this course of action. On the other hand, if the IRP panel decides that the Board had violated its Articles or Bylaws, or if the panel decides to dismiss the IRP request, designate a prevailing party,

\textsuperscript{193} ICM Registry Final Declaration, ¶ 133.
\textsuperscript{194} ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 39.
\textsuperscript{195} ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 38, n 53 (Vint Cerf, the former Chair of ICANN’s Board, testified in the ICM IRP that the independent review panel "is an advisory panel. It makes recommendations to the board but the board has the ultimate responsibility for deciding policy for ICANN" (italics added)). ICM v. ICANN, Hearing Transcript, September 23, 2009, at 592:7-11).
set conditions for confidentiality, consolidate IRP requests, request additional written submissions or fix costs, a fair reading of the Bylaws, Supplementary Procedures and ICDR Rules relevant to these determinations would be that the IRP panel’s decisions on these matters are binding on both parties, including ICANN.

144. Finally, in view of Article IV, § 3.21 providing that the declarations of IRP panels are final and have precedential value, the IRP Panel here recognizes that, in addition to the ICM Registry Final Declaration, two other IRP panels have considered the question of the IRP panel’s authority. In the Booking.com Final Declaration, the IRP panel focused on the independent and objective standard of review to be applied to the panel’s core task of assessing whether the Board’s actions were consistent with the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook. However, the IRP panel in Booking.com, as ICANN acknowledges in its Second Additional Response, did not directly address whether an IRP panel may issue a binding declaration (although ICANN contends that the panel implicitly acknowledged that it cannot).

145. In the DCA Final Declaration, the IRP panel addressed directly the question of whether or not the panel’s declaration was binding. The panel ruled that its declarations, both as to the procedure and the merits of the case, were binding. The IRP panel in that case raised some of the same concerns that Vistaprint has raised here:

110. ICANN points to the extensive public and expert input that preceded the formulation of the Supplementary Procedures. The Panel would have expected, were a mere advisory decision, opinion or declaration the objective of the IRP, that this intent be clearly articulated somewhere in the Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures. In the Panel’s view, this could have easily been done.

111. The force of the foregoing textual and construction considerations as pointing to the binding effect of the Panel’s decisions and declarations are reinforced by two factors: 1) the exclusive nature of the IRP whereby the non-binding argument would be clearly in contradiction with such a factor; and, 2) the special, unique, and publicly important function of ICANN. As explained before, ICANN is not an ordinary private non-profit entity deciding for its own sake who it wishes to conduct business with, and who it does not. ICANN rather, is the steward of a highly valuable and important international resource.

[...]

115. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it is acceptable for ICANN to adopt a remedial scheme with no teeth, the Panel is of the opinion that, at a minimum, the IRP should forthrightly explain and acknowledge that the process is merely advisory. This would at least let parties know before embarking on a potentially expensive process that a victory before the IRP panel may be ignored by ICANN. And, a straightforward acknowledgment that the IRP process is intended to be merely advisory might lead to a legislative or executive initiative to create a truly independent compulsory process.

146. The IRP panel in the DCA Final Declaration also emphasized that, according to the terms of the Guidebook, applicants for a new gTLD string waive their right to resort to the courts

196 Booking.com Final Declaration, ¶¶ 104-115.
197 ICANN’s Second Additional Response, ¶ 29.
198 DCA Final Declaration, ¶ 23 (quoting DCA Declaration on the IRP Procedure (Aug. 14, 2014)).
and therefore the IRP serves as the ultimate accountability mechanism for them:199

15. The IRP is the only independent third party process that allows review of board actions to ensure their consistency with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As already explained in this Panel’s 14 August 2014 Declaration on the IRP Procedure (“August 2014 Declaration”), the avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do not include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN’s Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

“Applicant hereby releases ICANN [...] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN [...] in connection with ICANN’s review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant’s gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM.”

Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, then the only and ultimate “accountability” remedy for an applicant is the IRP.

147. The IRP Panel in this case considers that the IRP panel in the DCA Final Declaration, and Vistaprint, have made several forceful arguments in favor of why the outcome of the IRP should be considered binding, especially to ensure the efficacy of the IRP as an accountability mechanism. Vistaprint has also urged that the IRP, at least with respect to applicants for new gTLD strings, is not merely a corporate accountability mechanism aimed at internal stakeholders, but operates to assess ICANN’s responsibilities in relation to external third parties. And the outcome of the IRP is binding on these third parties, even if it is not binding on ICANN and its Board. In similar circumstances, it would not be uncommon that individuals, companies or even governments, would agree to participate in dispute resolution processes with third parties that are binding, at least inter partes.

148. However, as explained above, the IRP Panel concludes that the distinction between a “binding” declaration on the violation/liability question (and certain other matters as discussed above), on the one hand, and a “non-binding” declaration when it comes to recommending that the Board take or refrain from taking any action or decision, on the other hand, is most faithful to the terms and spirit of the charter instruments upon which the Panel’s jurisdiction is based. To the extent that there is any disagreement with this approach, it is for ICANN to consider additional steps to address any ambiguities that might remain concerning the authority of the IRP panel and the legal effect of the IRP declaration.

149. Authority to award affirmative relief: The IRP Panel’s analysis on this issue is closely related to, and dependent upon, its analysis of the binding vs. non-binding issue

199 DCA Final Declaration, ¶ 38 (quoting DCA Third Declaration on IRP Procedure).
immediately above. To the extent that the IRP Panel renders any form of relief whereby the Panel would direct the Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision, that relief must be “recommend[ed]” to the Board, which then “reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP,” as specified in § 3.11(d) of the Bylaws. Relatedly, Supplementary Rule 7 provides that an “IRP Panel may recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the IRP declaration.” Consequently, the IRP Panel finds that it does not have authority to render affirmative relief requiring ICANN’s Board to take, or refrain from taking, any action or decision.

b. SCO Proceedings Claim

150. The IRP Panel has carefully reviewed Vistaprint’s arguments concerning ICANN’s alleged violation of its Articles and Bylaws in relation to this SCO Proceedings Claim. However, as stated above, the IRP Panel does not review the actions or inactions of ICANN’s staff or any third parties, such as the ICDR or SCO experts, who provided services to ICANN. Instead, the IRP Panel’s focus is on ICANN’s Board and the BGC, which was delegated responsibility from the full Board to consider Vistaprint’s Request for Reconsideration.\textsuperscript{200}

151. The core of Vistaprint SCO Proceedings Claim is that ICANN’s Board improperly disregarded accumulated errors made by the ICDR and the SCO experts (especially the Third Expert) during the Vistaprint SCO proceedings, and in this way ICANN violated Article IV of the Articles of Incorporation and certain provisions of the Bylaws, as well as the Guidebook.

152. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board must verify whether or not, by accepting the SCO expert determination, it is acting consistent with its obligations under its Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments,\textsuperscript{201} and that ICANN would be in violation of these obligations if it were to blindly accept an expert determination in circumstances where the ICDR and/or the expert had failed to comply with the Guidebook and the New gTLD Objections Procedure and/or the ICDR Rules for SCOs, or where a panel had failed to correctly apply the standard set by ICANN.\textsuperscript{202}

153. The IRP Panel disagrees with Vistaprint’s contention on this point. Although the Guidebook provides in § 5.1 that ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program, there is no affirmative duty stated in the Articles, Bylaws or

\textsuperscript{200} Article IV, §2.15 of ICANN’s Bylaws provides that:

\begin{quote}
For all Reconsideration Requests brought regarding staff action or inaction, the Board Governance Committee shall be delegated the authority by the Board of Directors to make a final determination and recommendation on the matter. Board consideration of the recommendation is not required. As the Board Governance Committee deems necessary, it may make recommendation to the Board for consideration and action. The Board Governance Committee’s determination on staff action or inaction shall be posted on the Website. The Board Governance Committee’s determination is final and establishes precedential value.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{201} Request, ¶ 6.
\textsuperscript{202} Request, ¶ 6.
Guidebook that the Board must to review the result in each and every SCO case. Instead, the Guidebook § 3.4.6 provides that:

\[\text{The findings of the [SCO] panel will be considered an expert determination and advice that ICANN will accept within the dispute resolution process.}\] \[\text{[Underlining added]}\]

154. In the case of an adverse SCO determination, the applicant for a new gTLD string is not left without any recourse. Module 6.6 of the Guidebook provides that an applicant “MAY UTILIZE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM SET FORTH IN ICANN’S BYLAWS FOR PURPOSES OF CHALLENGING ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION” (no emphasis added).

155. The Reconsideration Request is an “accountability mechanism” that can be invoked by a gTLD applicant, as it was used by Vistaprint, to challenge the result in SCO proceedings. Article IV, § 2.2 of the Bylaws provides that:

Any person or entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction (“Reconsideration Request”) to the extent that he, she, or it have been adversely affected by:

a. one or more staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or

b. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act; or

c. one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that are taken as a result of the Board's reliance on false or inaccurate material information.

156. In line with Article IV, § 2.2 of the Bylaws, Vistaprint submitted its Reconsideration Request to challenge actions of the ICDR and SCO experts, claiming their conduct contradicted ICANN policies. While Guidebook, § 5.1 permits ICANN’s Board to individually consider new gTLD applications, such as through the RFR mechanism, it does not require that the Board do so in each and every case, sua sponte. The Guidebook, § 5.1, provides in relevant part that:

ICANN’s Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for the New gTLD Program. The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application. For example, the Board might individually consider an application as a result ... the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism.

157. The IRP Panel determines that in the absence of a party’s recourse to an accountability

\[\text{[Guidebook, § 3.4.6. The New gTLD Objections Procedure further provides in Article 2(d) that:}\]

The ‘Expert Determination’ is the decision upon the merits of the Objection that is rendered by a Panel in a proceeding conducted under this Procedure and the applicable DRSP Rules that are identified in Article 4(b).

\[\text{[Guidebook, § 6.6.}\]

\[\text{[Guidebook, § 5.1.]}\]
mechanism such as the RFR, the ICANN Board has no affirmative duty to review the result in any particular SCO case.

158. In this case, Vistaprint did submit a Reconsideration Request and the BGC did engage in a detailed review of the alleged errors in process and procedures raised by Vistaprint. The BGC explained what it considered to be the scope of its review, which is consistent with the mandate in Article IV, § 2.2 of the Bylaws for review of “staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policies”:

In the context of the New gTLD Program, the reconsideration process does not call for the BGC to perform a substantive review of expert determinations. Accordingly, the BGC is not to evaluate the Panel’s substantive conclusion that the Requester’s applications for .WEBS are confusingly similar to the Requester’s application for .WEB. Rather, the BGC’s review is limited to whether the Panel violated any established policy or process in reaching that Determination.

159. In contrast to Vistaprint’s claim that the BGC failed to perform its task properly and “turned a blind eye to the appointed Panel’s lack of independence and impartiality”, the IRP Panel finds that the BGC provided in its 19-page decision a detailed analysis of (i) the allegations concerning whether the ICDR violated its processes or procedures governing the SCO proceedings and the appointment of, and challenges to, the experts, and (ii) the questions regarding whether the Third Expert properly applied the burden of proof and the substantive standard for evaluating a String Confusion Objection. On these points, the IRP Panel finds that the BGC’s analysis shows serious consideration of the issues raised by Vistaprint and, to an important degree, reflects the IRP Panel’s own analysis.

160. For example, in relation to Vistaprint’s contention that the First Expert failed to maintain independence and impartiality, in violation of Article 13(c) of the New gTLD Objections Procedure, the BGC reasoned:

The only evidence the [Vistaprint] cites in support of its argument that Mr. Koh failed to maintain his independence during the proceeding is the ICDR’s statement that it had decided to remove Mr. Koh “due to a new conflict.” (Request, Section 10, Pgs. 9-10.) The ICDR did not provide any further information as to the nature of the conflict. Conflicts can take many forms, such as scheduling or personal conflicts unrelated to the proceedings. There is no evidence that the conflict that inflicted

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207 Vistaprint also asserted that based on the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, the Third Expert lacked impartiality and independence, or alternatively lacked qualification. On a complete review of the entire record in this case, including the SCO proceedings and the Reconsideration Request before the BGC, the IRP Panel has found no foundation for these allegations against the Third Expert, and no violation of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws in the manner in which the BGC handled these assertions. The BGC found that these assertions were insufficient to merit reconsideration, as stated in its RFR decision, in footnote 10:

[Vistaprint] concludes with the following claim: “The cursory nature of the Decision and the arbitrary and selective discussion of the parties’ arguments by the Panel show the lack of either the Panel’s independence and impartiality or the Panel’s appropriate qualifications.” (Request, Section 10, Pg. 23.) [Vistaprint’s] assertion is not accompanied by any discussion or further explanation for how ICANN processes were purportedly violated. [Vistaprint’s] summary conclusions are without merit and insufficient to warrant reconsideration. Furthermore, [Vistaprint’s] claim that the Determination was “cursory” and only contained “selective discussion of the parties’ arguments” is unsupported. The Determination was eighteen pages long and contained more than six pages of discussion of the parties’ arguments and evidence.
Mr. Koh was related to the instant proceedings or otherwise impacted Mr. Koh’s ability to remain impartial and independent.

Furthermore, [Vistaprint] neither claims to have been, nor presents any evidence of being, materially and adversely affected by Mr. Koh’s removal. Indeed, had [Vistaprint] successfully challenged Mr. Koh for lack of independence at the time he was removed, the remedy under the applicable ICDR procedures would have been the removal of Mr. Koh, which was the result here.\textsuperscript{208}

161. The BGC concluded that Vistaprint provided no evidence of being materially and adversely affected by the First Expert’s removal. Moreover, to the extent that there was an impact due to the First Expert stepping down, this conduct was attributable to the First Expert, not to the ICDR. As the BGC states, had there been a concern about the First Expert’s lack of independence, the remedy under the applicable ICDR procedures would have been the removal of that expert, which is what actually occurred.

162. Vistaprint also argued that the BGC conducted no investigation as to the nature of the new conflict that confronted the First Expert and instead “developed baseless hypotheses for the other reasons that could have led to this Panel stepping down.”\textsuperscript{209} In this respect, perhaps the BGC could have sought to develop evidence on this issue by inquiring with the ICDR about the circumstances concerning the First Expert. Article IV, § 2.13 of the Bylaws provides the BGC “may also request information relevant to the request from third parties,” but it does not require that the BGC do so. However, it would not have changed the outcome, as noted above. It is also noteworthy that Article IV, § 2.2(b) of the Bylaws provides that a party may submit a Reconsideration Request to the extent that the party has been adversely affected by:

\textit{one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information, except where the party submitting the request could have submitted, but did not submit, the information for the Board's consideration at the time of action or refusal to act.}

163. Here, there was no showing that Vistaprint attempted to develop information concerning how the removal of the First Expert might have had a material and adverse impact on Vistaprint, or information concerning the reasons for the First Expert stepping down.

164. Vistaprint also alleged that the ICDR unjustifiably accepted a challenge to the Second Expert, or created the circumstances for such a challenge. As the BGC noted, the procedure governing challenges to experts is set forth in Article 2 § 3 of the ICDR’s New gTLD Objections Procedure, which provides:

\textit{Upon review of the challenge the DRSP in its sole discretion shall make the decision on the challenge and advise the parties of its decision.}

165. The BGC reasoned that while Vistaprint may disagree with the ICDR’s decision to accept the challenge to the Second Expert, that decision was in the “sole discretion” of the ICDR and it was not the BGC’s role to second guess the ICDR’s discretion in this regard.\textsuperscript{210} The IRP Panel finds that the BGC violated no Article, Bylaw or the Guidebook by taking this

\textsuperscript{208} BGC Determination, p. 12, Request, Annex 26.

\textsuperscript{209} Request, ¶ 77.

\textsuperscript{210} BGC Determination, p. 12, Request, Annex 26.
view. However, it does appear that the ICDR might have avoided the challenge situation in the first place by appointing someone other than the Second Expert – who had served as the expert panel in previous SCO case administered by the ICDR – given that the basis for the challenge against him, which the ICDR accepted, was his involvement in the previous case.

166. Vistaprint also claimed that the Third Expert incorrectly applied both the burden of proof and the substantive criteria for evaluating the String Confusion Objection. The BGC rejected these contentions and the IRP Panel agrees. The BGC’s decision looked closely at the standard to be applied in String Confusion Objection proceedings, as well as how the Third Expert extensively detailed the support for his conclusion that the .WEBS string so nearly resembles .WEB – visually, aurally and in meaning – that it is likely to cause confusion. In this respect, the BGC did not violate ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws by determining that the Third Expert properly applied the relevant Guidebook policy for String Confusion Objections. As the BGC noted,

_The Requester’s disagreement as to whether the standards should have resulted in a finding in favor of Requester’s application does not mean that the panel violated any policy or process in reaching the decision._

167. The Guidebook provides that the following evaluation standard is be applied in String Confusion Objection proceedings:

3.5.1 String Confusion Objection

A DRSP panel hearing a string confusion objection will consider whether the applied-for gTLD string is likely to result in string confusion. String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

168. Vistaprint in its Request emphasized that ICANN has indicated that the SCO test sets a high bar:

_22. At various times, ICANN has indicated that the string confusion test sets a high bar:_

- “_The standard indicates that confusion must be probable, not merely possible, in order for this sort of harm to arise. Consumers also benefit from competition. For new gTLDs, the similarity test is a high bar, as indicated by the wording of the standard[...]. Therefore, while the objection and dispute resolution process is intended to address all types of similarity, the process is not intended to hobble competition or reserve a broad set of string [sic] for a first mover._” (fn. omitted)

- “Policy discussions indicate that the most important reason to disallow similar strings as top-level domain names is to protect Internet users from the increased exposure to fraud and other risks that could ensue from confusion of one string for another. This reasoning must be balanced against unreasonable exclusion of top-level labels and denial of applications where considerable investment


213 Request, ¶¶ 22-23.
has already been made. As the top-level grows in number of registrations, drawing too large a circle of “similarity protection” around each existing string will quickly result in the unnecessary depletion of available names. The unnecessary exclusion of names would also tend to stifle the opportunity of community representation at the top-level and innovation.” (fn. omitted)

23. ICANN’s high standard for dealing with string confusion objections has been explicitly confirmed by the NGPC, which states that in the Applicant Guidebook ‘similar’ means:

“strings so similar that they create a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated into the root zone. During the policy development and implementation design phases of the New gTLD Program, aural and conceptual string similarities were considered. These types of similarity were discussed at length, yet ultimately not agreed to be used as a basis for the analysis of the string similarity panels’ consideration because on balance, this could have unanticipated results in limiting the expansion of the DNS as well as the reach and utility of the Internet. [...] The NGPC reflected on existing string similarity in the DNS and considered the positive and negative impacts. The NGPC observed that numerous examples of similar strings, including singulars and plurals exist within the DNS at the second level. Many of these are not registered to or operated by the same registrant. There are thousands of examples [...]” (NGPC Resolution 2014.02.056. NG02).

169. The passages quoted by Vistaprint, referencing ICANN materials and a resolution of the NGPC, arguably provide useful context in applying the test for String Confusion Objections. After citing these passages, however, Vistaprint contends in its Request that

“[a]s a result, two strings should only be placed in a contention set if they are so similar that they would create a probability of user confusion were both to be delegated into the root zone, and the finding of confusing similarity must be balanced against the risk of unreasonable exclusion of top-level labels and the denial of applications” (no underlining added).

170. However, the problem with the test as posited by Vistaprint is that it would add a balancing element that is not in the Guidebook’s standard: according to Vistaprint the finding of confusing similarity must be balanced against the risk of unreasonable exclusion of top-level labels and the denial of applications. This part of the standard (as advanced by Vistaprint) is not in the Guidebook, although the concerns it represents were reflected in the other ICANN materials. The Guidebook standard is as follows:

String confusion exists where a string so nearly resembles another that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. For a likelihood of confusion to exist, it must be probable, not merely possible that confusion will arise in the mind of the average, reasonable Internet user. Mere association, in the sense that the string brings another string to mind, is insufficient to find a likelihood of confusion.

171. There is no reference in this standard to balancing the likelihood of confusion against the needs to promote competition and to guard against the unreasonable exclusion of top-level strings. While it might be advisable to consider whether the standard for String Confusion Objections should be revised to incorporate such a balancing test, these elements were not in the policy that was applied by the Third Expert. Nor was there a violation, by the BGC or the ICANN Board, of any Articles or Bylaws in formulating the SCO standard as it was formulated (based on community input), and in determining that the Third Expert properly applied this policy.

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214 Request, ¶ 24.
172. ICANN has argued that the time for Vistaprint to have objected to the Guidebook and its SCO policy has long since passed. Vistaprint has responded that it contests the implementation of the Guidebook and its policies, not just the policies themselves. Even assuming that the Guidebook’s policies could be challenged at this point, the IRP Panel finds that the relevant policies, such as the standard for evaluating String Confusion Objections, do not violate any of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws reflecting principles such as good faith, fairness, transparency and accountability. However, the Panel does agree with ICANN that the time for challenging the Guidebook’s standard for evaluating String Confusion Objections – which was developed in an open process and with extensive input – has passed.

173. Vistaprint has also complained that it was not provided with the opportunity to appeal the Third Expert’s decision on the merits, such that the BGC or some other entity would re-evaluate the Expert’s string confusion determination. As noted above, the BGC’s review focused on whether the ICDR and the Third Expert properly applied the relevant rules and policies, not on whether the BGC, if it had considered the matter de novo, would have found string confusion as between the .WEBS and .WEB strings.

174. The IRP Panel finds that the lack of an appeal mechanism to contest the merits of the Third Expert’s SCO determination is not, in itself, a violation of ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws. ICANN’s commitment through its Articles and Bylaws to act in good faith and with accountability and transparency, and to apply documented policies neutrally, objectively and fairly, does not require that it must have designed the SCO mechanism so that the result of a string confusion determination would be subject to a right of appeal. Other significant dispute resolution systems – such as the international legal regime for commercial arbitration regarding awards as final and binding\(^\text{215}\) – do not normally provide for a right of appeal on the merits.

175. In respect of Vistaprint’s SCO Proceedings Claim, the IRP Panel denies each of Vistaprint’s claims concerning ICANN’s alleged breaches of obligations under the Articles, Bylaws and Affirmation of Commitments, as follows:

(1) Vistaprint claims that ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article 4 of the Articles and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws to act in good faith with due diligence and independent judgment by failing to provide due process to Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications.\(^\text{216}\) The IRP Panel denies Vistaprint’s claim that Vistaprint was not given a fair opportunity to present its case; was deprived of procedural fairness and the opportunity to be heard by an independent panel applying the appropriate rules; and was not given any meaningful opportunity for remedy or redress once the SCO determination was made, even in the RFR procedure.

(2) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to comply with its obligation under Article I § 2.8 to neutrally, objectively and fairly apply documented policies as established in the

\(^{215}\text{See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958).}\)

\(^{216}\text{Request, ¶¶ 69-71.}\)
Guidebook and Bylaws. As discussed above, the IRP Panel rejects Vistaprint’s claim that the Vistaprint SCO determination – finding that the .WEBS and .WEB gTLD strings are confusingly similar – is contradictory to ICANN’s policy for String Confusion Objections as established in the Guidebook.

(3) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to act fairly and with due diligence and independent judgment as called for under Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation, Articles I § 2.8 and IV § 3.4 of the Bylaws by accepting the SCO determination made by the Third Expert, who was allegedly not independent and impartial. As noted above, the IRP Panel finds that there was no failure of the BGC to act with due diligence and independent judgment, and to act in good faith as required by ICANN’s Bylaws and Articles, when it determined that Vistaprint’s claim – that the Third Expert was not independent and impartial and/or was not appropriately qualified – did not merit reconsideration.

(4) Vistaprint claims that ICANN failed to comply with its obligations under the Article 4 of the Articles, and Article I §§ 2.7 and 2.8 and Article III § 1 of the Bylaws (and Article 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) to act fairly and transparently by failing to disclose/perform any efforts to optimize the service that the ICDR provides in the New gTLD Program. The IRP Panel rejects Vistaprint’s contention that the BGC’s Reconsideration determination shows that the BGC made no investigation into Vistaprint’s fundamental questions about the Third Expert’s arbitrariness, lack of independence, partiality, inappropriate qualification, or that the BGC did not exercise due diligence in making its determination on this issue.

(5) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to comply with its obligation to remain accountable under Articles I § 2.10 and IV § 1 of the Bylaws (and Articles 3(a) and 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments) by failing to provide any remedy for its mistreatment of Vistaprint’s gTLD applications. The IRP Panel disagrees with Vistaprint’s claim that ICANN’s Board and the BGC adopted the Third Expert’s SCO determination without examining whether it was made in accordance with ICANN’s policy and fundamental principles under its Articles and Bylaws. In particular, as described above, the IRP Panel rejects Vistaprint’s claim that the Vistaprint SCO determination is contradictory to ICANN’s policy as established in the Guidebook and agrees with the BGC’s analysis on this issue. Regarding Vistaprint’s contention that ICANN should have created a review mechanism for challenging the substance of SCO expert determinations, as discussed above, the IRP Panel finds that the lack of such a general appeal mechanism creates no inconsistency with ICANN’s Articles or Bylaws.

(6) Vistaprint claims ICANN failed to promote competition and innovation under Articles I § 2.2 (and Article 3(c) of the Affirmation of Commitments) by accepting the Third

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217 Request, ¶ 72.
218 Request, ¶ 73.
219 Request, ¶¶ 52 and 77.
220 Request, ¶¶ 78-79.
Finally, the IRP Panel disagrees with Vistaprint’s contention that the Board’s acceptance of the determination in the Vistaprint SCO was contrary to ICANN’s Bylaws because it was contrary to the interests of competition and consumers.

c. Disparate Treatment Claim

176. Vistaprint’s final claim is one that raises a close question for this IRP Panel. Vistaprint contends that ICANN’s Board discriminated against Vistaprint through the Board’s (and the BGC’s) acceptance of the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, while allowing other gTLD applications with equally serious string similarity concerns to proceed to delegation\(^{222}\), or permitting still other applications that were subject to an adverse SCO determination to go through a separate additional review mechanism.

177. The IRP Panel agrees with Vistapprint’s statement that the “IRP Panel’s mandate includes a review as to whether or not ICANN’s Board discriminates in its interventions on SCO expert determinations.”\(^{223}\) As discussed above, in the Guidebook, § 5.1, ICANN has reserved the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community:

    ...The Board reserves the right to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community. Under exceptional circumstances, the Board may individually consider a gTLD application....\(^{224}\)

178. However, as a counterbalance against this reserved power to individually consider new gTLD applications, the ICANN Board must also comply with Article II, § 3 of ICANN’s Bylaws, providing for non-discriminatory treatment:

    Section 3 (Non-Discriminatory Treatment)

    ICANN shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.

179. As Vistaprint maintains in its First Additional Submission, “[w]hen the ICANN Board individually considers an application, it must make sure that it does not treat applicants inequitably and that it does not discriminate among applicants.”\(^{225}\)

180. As discussed above in relation to standard of review, the IRP Panel considers that the Board’s actions or omissions in this area of alleged non-discriminatory treatment bear the scrutiny of independent and objective review, without any presumption of correctness. Moreover, ICANN’s Bylaws in Article I, § 2 set out its core values that should guide the

\(^{221}\) Request, ¶ 80.
\(^{222}\) ICANN has permitted the delegation of the .car and .cars gTLDs, the .auto and .autos gTLDs, the .accountant and .accountants gTLDs, the .fan and .fans gTLDs, the .gift and .gifts gTLDs, the .loan and .loans gTLDs, the .new and .news gTLDs and the .work and .works gTLDs.
\(^{223}\) Vistaprint’s Second Additional Submission, ¶ 20.
\(^{224}\) Guidebook, § 5.1.
\(^{225}\) Vistaprint’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 31.
decisions and actions of ICANN, including the requirement, when balancing among competing core values, to exercise judgment to determine which core values are the most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances at hand. Of particular relevance to Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim are the core values set out in §§ 2.8 and 2.9:

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

181. Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim is based on the following allegations:

- On June 25, 2013, the NGPC, a sub-committee of ICANN’s Board, determined in Resolution 2013.06.25.NG07 that no changes were needed to the existing mechanisms in the Guidebook to address potential consumer confusion from allowing singular and plural versions of the same gTLD string. The NGPC had addressed this issue in response to advice from the ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (“GAC”) that due to potential consumer confusion, the Board should “reconsider its decision to allow singular and plural version of the same strings.”

- On February 5, 2014, the day before Vistaprint submitted its Reconsideration Request to the BGC on February 6, 2014, the NGPC approved Resolution 2014.02.05.NG02, which directed ICANN’s President to initiate a public comment period on framework principles of a potential review mechanism to address perceived inconsistent String Confusion Objection expert determinations. The NGPC resolution provides in relevant part:

  Whereas, on 10 October 2013 the Board Governance Committee (BGC) requested staff to draft a report for the NGPC on String Confusion Objections “setting out options for dealing with the situation raised within this Request, namely the differing outcomes of the String Confusion Objection Dispute Resolution process in similar disputes involving Amazon’s Applied-for String and TLDH's Applied-for String.”

  Whereas, the NGPC is considering potential paths forward to address the perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations from the New gTLD Program String Confusion Objections process, including implementing a review mechanism. The review will be limited to the String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations for .CAR/.CARS and .CAM/.COM.

  Whereas, the proposed review mechanism, if implemented, would constitute a change to the current String Confusion Objection process in the New gTLD Applicant Guidebook.

  Whereas, the NGPC is undertaking this action pursuant to the authority granted to it by the
Board on 10 April 2012, to exercise the ICANN Board's authority for any and all issues that may arise relating to the New gTLD Program.

Resolved (2014.02.05.NG02), the NGPC directs the President and CEO, or his designee, to publish for public comment the proposed review mechanism for addressing perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations from the New gTLD Program String Confusion Objections process.

Vistaprint emphasizes that ICANN’s Board (through the NGPC) took this decision the day before Vistaprint filed its Reconsideration Request; however, this did not prevent the BGC from denying Vistaprint’s RFR less than one month later without considering whether such a review mechanism might also be appropriate for dealing with the SCO determination involving .WEBS/.WEB. 226

Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request and the BGC’s decision on that Request rendered on February 27, 2014 contain no reference to the concerns that had been raised both by the BGC (on October 10, 2013 in a prior RFR determination) and the NGPC in its February 5, 2014 resolution concerning inconsistent expert SCO determinations, some of which involved plural and singular versions of the same gTLD string. Neither Vistaprint nor the BGC raised any discussion of disparate treatment at that time. The BGC’s determined that its decision on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request “shall be final and does not require Board (or NGPC) consideration.” 227

On October 12, 2014, approximately 8 months after the BGC’s decision on Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request, and after Vistaprint had filed its Request in this IRP (in June 2014), the NGPC approved Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02, in which it identified certain SCO expert determinations “as not being in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community,” and directed ICANN’s President to establish processes and procedures to re-evaluate certain previous SCO expert determinations. Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02 also stated in its rationale:

The NGPC also considered whether there was a reasonable basis for certain perceived inconsistent Expert Determinations to exist, and particularly why the identified Expert Determinations should be sent back to the ICDR while other Expert Determinations should not. The NGPC notes that while on their face some of the Expert Determinations may appear inconsistent, including other SCO Expert Determinations, and Expert Determinations of the Limited Public Interest and Community Objection processes, there are reasonable explanations for these seeming discrepancies, both procedurally and substantively.

First, on a procedural level, each expert panel generally rests its Expert Determination on materials presented to it by the parties to that particular objection, and the objector bears the burden of proof. Two panels confronting identical issues could — and if appropriate should — reach different determinations, based on the strength of the materials presented.

Second, on a substantive level, certain Expert Determinations highlighted by the community that purportedly resulted in “inconsistent” or “unreasonable” results, presented nuanced distinctions

226 Request, ¶ 52.
relevant to the particular objection. These nuances should not be ignored simply because a party to the dispute disagrees with the end result. Further, the standard guiding the expert panels involves some degree of subjectivity, and thus independent expert panels would not be expected to reach the same conclusions on every occasion. However, for the identified Expert Determinations, a reasonable explanation for the seeming discrepancies is not as apparent, even taking into account all of the previous explanations about why reasonably "discrepancies" may exist. To allow these Expert Determinations to stand would not be in the best interests of the Internet community.

The NGPC considered whether it was appropriate, as suggested by some commenters, to expand the scope of the proposed review mechanism to include other Expert Determinations, such as some resulting from Community and Limited Public Objections, as well as other String Confusion Objection Expert Determinations, and possibly singular and plural versions of the same string. The NGPC determined that to promote the goals of predictability and fairness, establishing a review mechanism more broadly may be more appropriate as part of future community discussions about subsequent rounds of the New gTLD Program. Applicants have already taken action in reliance on many of the Expert Determinations, including signing Registry Agreements, transitioning to delegation, withdrawing their applications, and requesting refunds. Allowing these actions to be undone now would not only delay consideration of all applications, but would raise issues of unfairness for those that have already acted in reliance on the Applicant Guidebook.

It should also be noted that in response to advice from the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), the NGPC previously considered the question of whether consumer confusion may result from allowing singular and plural versions of the same strings. On 25 June 2013, the NGPC adopted a resolution resolving "that no changes [were] needed to the existing mechanisms in the Applicant Guidebook to address potential consumer confusion resulting from allowing singular and plural versions of the same string" http://www.icann.org /en/groups/board/ documents/resolutions-new-gtld-25jun13-en.htm#2.d. The NGPC again notes that the topic of singular and plural versions of the same string also may be the subject of further community discussion as it relates to future rounds of the New gTLD Program.

The NGPC considered community correspondence on this issue in addition to comments from the community expressed at the ICANN meetings. The concerns raised in the ICANN meetings and in correspondence have been factored into the deliberations on this matter.

- In view of the NGPC’s Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02, Vistaprint describes its disparate treatment claim in its First Additional Submission as follows:

13 .... Since the filing of Vistaprint’s request for IRP, the ICANN Board clarified how the string similarity standard must be applied. In its resolutions of 12 October 2014, the ICANN Board identified certain SCO determinations “as not being in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community” and set out the rules for a re-evaluation of these SCO determinations (fn. omitted):

- A first SCO determination that needed re-evaluation is the SCO determination in which ICDR’s expert accepted Verisign Inc.’s objection to United TLD Holdco Ltd. (‘United TLD’)’s application for .cam. We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘United TLD Determination’. In the United TLD Determination, ICDR’s appointed expert found United TLD’s application for .cam confusingly similar to Verisign Inc.’s .com gTLD (RM 23). The ICANN Board decided that (i) the United TLD Determination was not in the best interest of the New gTLD Program and the Internet community and (ii) a new three-member panel must be established to re-evaluate the United TLD Determination (fn. omitted).

VeriSign had also raised a SCO on the basis of its .com gTLD against the application for .cam by Dot Agency Limited and the application for .cam by AC Webconnecting Holding B.V. In both cases, the appointed experts determined that no confusing similarity existed between the .cam and .com strings (fn. omitted). We refer to these SCO determinations as the ‘Related .cam/.com Determinations’. The ICANN Board decided that the Related .cam/.com Determinations need no
re-evaluation. In addition, the ICANN Board recommended that the three-member panel charged with re-evaluating the United TLD Determination must review the Related .cam/.com Determinations as background (fn. omitted).

- Another SCO determination that needed re-evaluation is the determination in which ICDR’s appointed expert accepted Commercial Connect LLC’s objection to Amazon EU S.à.r.l. (‘Amazon’)’s application for .通販 (which means .onlineshopping in Japanese) (fn. omitted). We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘Onlineshopping Determination’. ICDR’s appointed expert found in the Onlineshopping Determination that Amazon’s application for .通販 was confusingly similar to Commercial Connect LLC’s application for .shop. Commercial Connect LLC also invoked its application for .shop in a SCO against Top Level Domain Holdings Limited’s application .购物 (which means ‘shop’ in Chinese). ICDR’s appointed expert rejected the latter SCO (fn. omitted). We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘Related shop/.shop Determination’. The ICANN Board decided that a three-member panel needs to re-evaluate the Onlineshopping Determination and that no re-evaluation is needed for the Related shop/.shop Determination. The ICANN Board decided that the Related shop/.shop Determination must be reviewed as background by the three-member panel that is charged with re-evaluating the Onlineshopping Determination (fn. omitted).

14. The ICANN Board’s recommendations to the three-member panels charged with the re-evaluation of the United TLD Determination and the Onlineshopping Determination are clear. Related determinations – involving the same gTLD string(s) and finding that there is no confusing similarity – will not be re-evaluated and must be taken into account in the re-evaluations.

15. Upon instigation of the ICANN Board, ICANN had developed the same process for re-evaluating the SCO determination in which ICDR’s appointed expert accepted Charleston Road Registry Inc. (‘CRR’)’s objection to DERCars, LLC’s application for .cars. We refer to this SCO determination as the ‘DERCars Determination’. In the DERCars Determination, ICDR’s appointed expert found DERCars, LLC’s application for .cars confusingly similar to CRR’s application for .car. CRR had also objected to the applications for .cars by Uniregistry, Corp. and Koko Castle, LLC, claiming confusing similarity with CRR’s application for .car. The latter objections by CRR were not successful. ICANN decided that DERCars, LLC should be given the option of having the DERCars Determination reviewed. ICANN was not allowing a review of other SCO determinations involving .car and .cars (fn. omitted).

16. The above shows that ICANN and its Board have always decided in favor of co-existence of ‘similar’ strings. The ICANN Board explicitly allowed singular and plural gTLD strings to co-exist (fn. omitted). To support this view, the ICANN Board referred to the existence of thousands of examples of singular and plurals within the DNS at second level, which are not registered to or operated by the same registrant. The ICANN Board inter alia referred to the co-existing car.com and cars.com (fn. omitted).

17. Why did the ICANN Board intervene in the DERCar determination – involving the strings .car and .cars – but refused to intervene in the SCO Determination involving .web and .webs? In view of the small number of SCO Determinations finding confusing similarity between two strings (fn. omitted), it is a true mystery why the ICANN Board intervened in some matters, but refused to do so in the SCO determinations on Vistaprint’s applications for .webs.

18. If anything, the .webs/web string pair is less similar than the .cars/car string pair. Cars is commonly used as the plural for car. Web, however, commonly refers to the world wide web, and as such, it is not normally a word where the plural form would be used.

182. Vistaprint contends that ICANN cannot justify the disparate treatment described above. While Vistaprint recognizes that ICANN’s Board intervened to address perceived inconsistent or otherwise unreasonable SCO expert determinations, ICANN failed to explain why the SCO determination on Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications was not just as unreasonable as the SCO expert determinations involving .cars/car, .cam/.com, and .通販
183. In response to Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim, ICANN contends that ICANN’s Board only intervened with respect to certain SCO expert determinations because there had been several independent expert determinations regarding the same strings that were seemingly inconsistent with one another. ICANN states that is not the case with respect to Vistaprint's applications, as no other expert determinations were issued regarding the similarity of .WEB and .WEBS. ICANN further urges that the Board was justified in exercising its discretion to intervene with respect to the inconsistent SCO expert determinations regarding .COM/.CAM, .CAR/.CARS and .SHOP/.通販, because the Board acted to bring certainty to differing SCO expert determinations regarding the same strings. However, this justification was not present with respect to the single Vistaprint SCO.

184. Finally, ICANN stated that “Vistaprint has identified no Articles or Bylaws provision violated by the ICANN Board in exercising its independent judgment to intervene with respect to certain inconsistent expert determinations on string confusion objections unrelated to this matter, but not with respect to the single Expert Determination regarding .WEB/.WEBS” (italics added).

185. The IRP Panel has considered carefully the parties’ contentions regarding Vistaprint’s disparate treatment claim. The Panel finds that, contrary to what ICANN has stated above, ICANN’s Board did not have an opportunity to “exercise its independent judgment” – in particular, in view of its decisions to implement an additional review mechanism for certain other inconsistent SCO expert determinations – to consider specifically whether it should intervene with respect to the adverse SCO expert determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications.

186. It is clear that ICANN’s Board, through the BGC and the NGPC, was aware of the concerns involving inconsistent decisions in SCO proceedings when it decided Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request in February 2014. The NGPC, on the day (February 5, 2014) before Vistaprint filed is Reconsideration Request and in response to a request from the BGC, initiated a public comment period on framework principles for a potential review mechanism to address perceived inconsistent SCO expert determinations. However, the BGC’s decision on the Reconsideration Request rendered on February 27, 2014 made no mention of these issues. By comparison, there is no evidence that

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228 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 5.
229 ICANN’s First Additional Submission, ¶ 18.
230 ICANN’s Second Additional submission, ¶ 21.
231 In this regard, the IRP panel in the Booking.com final Declaration (¶ 119) quoted Mr. Sadowsky, a member of the Board’s NGPC committee, commenting on the Reconsideration process as follows:

The reconsideration process is a very narrowly focused instrument, relying solely upon investigating deviations from established and agreed upon process. As such, it can be useful, but it is limited in scope. In particular, it does not address situations where process has in fact been followed, but the results of such process have been regarded, sometimes quite widely, as being contrary to what might be best for significant or all segments of the...community and/or Internet users in general.
Vistaprint was aware of these issues at the time it filed its Reconsideration Request on February 6, 2014. Vistaprint has raised them for the first time in a timely manner during the pendency of this IRP.

187. In accordance with Article 1, § 2 of the Bylaws, the Board shall exercise its judgment to determine which competing core values are most relevant and how they apply to arrive at a defensible balance among those values in relation to the case at hand. Given the timing of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request, and the timing of ICANN’s consultation process for potential review mechanisms to address inconsistent SCO expert determinations, this exercise of judgment by the Board has not yet occurred in the case of Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications.

188. Here, ICANN is subject to the requirements of Article II, § 3 of its Bylaws regarding non-discriminatory treatment, providing that it shall not apply its “standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause.” ICANN has provided additional relief to certain gTLD applicants who were subject to adverse decisions in String Confusion Objection cases. In those cases, the differences in the gTLD strings at issue were not too dissimilar from the .WEBS/.WEB gTLD strings. One of the cases in which ICANN agreed to provide an additional mechanism for review involved a string confusion objection for the .CAR/.CARS strings, which involve the singular vs. plural of the same string. Meanwhile, many other singular and plural variations of the same gTLD strings have been permitted to proceed to delegation, including AUTO and .AUTOS; .ACCOUNTANT and ACCOUNTANTS; .FAN and .FANS; .GIFT and .GIFTS; .LOAN and .LOANS; .NEW and .NEWS; and .WORK and .WORKS.

189. This IRP Panel, among its three members, could not agree – in regards to the specific circumstances of Vistaprint’s gTLD applications – whether the reasons offered by ICANN in its Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02 for refusing the “to expand the scope of the proposed review mechanism to include other [SCO] Expert Determinations” would meet the standard of non-discrimination imposed by Article II, § 3 of the Bylaws, as well as the relevant core values in Article 1, § 2 of the Bylaws (e.g., applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness). For instance, one view is that limiting the additional review mechanism to only those SCO cases in which there were inconsistent decisions is a sufficient reason for intervening in these cases, but not in other SCO cases involving similar singular vs. plural gTLD strings were the applicant received an adverse decision. On the other hand, another view is that the real focus should be on the developments involving single vs. plural gTLDs strings, including the inconsistency of decisions and the offering of additional review mechanism in certain cases, and the delegation of so many other single/plural variations of the same gTLD strings, which are, at least in this way, similarly situated to the circumstances of the .WEBS/.WEB strings.232

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232 Regarding inconsistent decisions, Vistaprint quoted the statement dated October 8, 2014, of ICANN’s former Chief Strategy Officer and Senior Vice President of Stakeholders Relations, Kurt Pritz, who had apparently been leading the introduction of the New gTLD Program, concerning ICANN’s objection procedure:

(Continued...)
190. The IRP Panel is mindful that it should not substitute its judgment for that of ICANN’s Board. The Board has not yet considered Vistaprint’s claim of disparate treatment, and the arguments that ICANN makes through its counsel in this IRP do not serve as a substitute for the exercise of independent judgment by the Board. Without the exercise of judgment by ICANN’s Board on this question of whether there is any inequitable or disparate treatment regarding Vistaprint’s .WEBS gTLD applications, the Board would risk violating its Bylaws, including its core values. As the Emergency IRP Panel found in the GCC Interim IRP Declaration:

The ICANN Board does not have an unfettered discretion in making decisions. In bringing its judgment to bear on an issue for decision, it must assess the applicability of different potentially conflicting core values and identify those which are most important, most relevant to the question to be decided. The balancing of the competing values must be seen as "defensible", that is it should be justified and supported by a reasoned analysis. The decision or action should be based on a reasoned judgment of the Board, not on an arbitrary exercise of discretion.

This obligation of the ICANN Board in its decision making is reinforced by the standard of review for the IRP process under Article IV, Section 3.4 of the Bylaws, quoted at paragraph 42 b. above, when the action of the Board is compared to the requirements under the Articles and Bylaws. The standard of review includes a consideration of whether the Board exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts before them and also whether the Board exercised its own independent judgment. 233

191. Here, the IRP Panel finds that due to the timing and scope of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request (and this IRP proceeding), and the timing of ICANN’s consultation process and subsequent NGPC resolution authorizing an additional review mechanism for certain gTLD applications that were the subject of adverse SCO decisions, the ICANN Board has not had the opportunity to exercise its judgment on the question of whether, in view of ICANN’s Bylaw concerning non-discriminatory treatment and based on the particular

There is no doubt that the New gTLD Program objection results are inconsistent, and not predictable. The fact is most easily demonstrated in the ‘string confusion,’ objections where challenges to exactly the same strings yielded different results. [...] With globally diverse, multiple panelists invoking untried standards and questions of first impression in an industry with which they were not familiar and had little training, the panelists were bound to deliver inconsistent, unpredictable results. ICANN put no mechanism into place to rationalize or normalize the answers. [...] It is my opinion that ICANN, having proven in the initial evaluation context that it could do so, should have implemented measures to create as much consistency as possible on the merits in the objection rulings, requiring DRSPs to educate and train their experts as to the specific (and only) standards to employ, and to review and correct aberrant results. The failure to do so resulted in violation of the overarching policy articulated by the GNSO and adopted by the Board at the outset of the new gTLD Program, as well as policies stated in the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation concerning on discrimination, application of document policies neutrally, objectively and fairly, promotion of competition, and accountability.” (fn. omitted).

233 See GCC Interim IRP Declaration, ¶¶ 76-77 (“Upon completion of the various procedures for evaluation and for objections under the Guidebook, the question of the approval of the applied for domain still went back to the NGPC, representing the ICANN Board, to make the decision to approve, without being bound by recommendation of the GAC, the Independent Objector or even the Expert Determination. Such a decision would appear to be caught by the requirements of Article 1, Section 2 of the Bylaws requiring the Board or the NGPC to consider and apply the competing values to the facts and to arrive at a defensible balance among those values” ¶ 90 (underlining added).
circumstances and developments noted above, such an additional review mechanism is appropriate following the SCO expert determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications. Accordingly, it follows that in response to Vistaprint’s contentions of disparate treatment in this IRP, ICANN’s Board – and not this Panel – should exercise its independent judgment on this issue, in light of all of the foregoing considerations.

VI. Prevailing Party; Costs

192. Article IV, § 3.18 of ICANN’s Bylaws requires that the IRP Panel "specifically designate the prevailing party." This designation is relevant to the allocation of costs, given that the same section of the Bylaws provides that the “party not prevailing shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the IRP Provider.”

193. Article IV, § 3.18 of the Bylaws also states that "in an extraordinary case the IRP Panel may in its declaration allocate up to half of the costs of the IRP Provider to the prevailing party based upon the circumstances, including a consideration of the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their contribution to the public interest. Each party to the IRP proceedings shall bear its own expenses."

194. Similarly, the Supplementary Procedures provide in Rule 11:

The IRP Panel shall fix costs in its Declaration. The party not prevailing in an IRP shall ordinarily be responsible for bearing all costs of the proceedings, but under extraordinary circumstances the IRP Panel may allocate up to half of the costs to the prevailing party, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their contribution to the public interest.

In the event the Requestor has not availed itself, in good faith, of the cooperative engagement or conciliation process, and the requestor is not successful in the Independent Review, the IRP Panel must award ICANN all reasonable fees and costs incurred by ICANN in the IRP, including legal fees.

195. Here, Vistaprint engaged in the Cooperative Engagement Process, although the process did not resolve the issues between the parties. The "IRP Provider" is the ICDR, and, in accordance with the ICDR Rules, the costs to be allocated between the parties – what the

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234 The IRP Panel observes that the NGPC, in its Resolution 2014.10.12.NG02, sought to address the issue of why certain SCO expert determinations should be sent back to the ICDR while others should not. In that resolution, the NGPC determined that to promote the goals of predictability and fairness, establishing a review mechanism more broadly may be appropriate as part of future rounds in the New gTLD Program. The NGPC stated that applicants may have already taken action in reliance on SCO expert determinations, including signing Registry Agreements, transitioning to delegation, withdrawing their applications, and requesting refunds. However, in this case Vistaprint does not fall within the category of applicants who have taken such actions in reliance. Instead, it is still asserting its claims in this IRP proceeding. In accordance with the Bylaws, Vistaprint is entitled to an exercise of the Board’s independent judgment to determine, based on the facts of the case at hand and in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning non-discriminatory treatment and core values, whether Vistaprint should be entitled to the additional review mechanism that was made available to certain other gTLD applicants.
Bylaws call the "costs of the IRP Provider", and the Supplementary Procedures call the “costs of the proceedings” – include the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and of the ICDR.

196. ICANN is the prevailing party in this IRP. This designation is confirmed by the Panel’s decisions concerning Vistaprint’s requests for relief in this IRP:

- Vistaprint requests that the Panel find ICANN breached its Articles, Bylaws, and the Guidebook. The Panel declares that ICANN’s Board (including the BGC) did not violate the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook.

- Vistaprint requests that the Panel require ICANN to reject the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, disregard the resulting “Contention Set”, and allow Vistaprint’s applications for .WEBS to proceed on their merits. The Panel determines that it does not have authority to order the relief requested by Vistaprint. In addition, the Panel declares that the Board (through the BGC) did not violate the Articles, Bylaws and Guidebook in regards to the BGC’s handling of Vistaprint’s Reconsideration Request.

- Vistaprint requests, in the alternative, that the Panel require ICANN to reject the Vistaprint SCO determination and organize a new procedure, in which a three-member panel would re-evaluate the Third Expert’s decision taking into account (i) the ICANN Board’s resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, as well as the Board’s resolutions on the DERCars SCO Determination, the United TLD Determination, and the Onlineshopping SCO Determination, and (ii) ICANN’s decisions to delegate the following gTLDs: .CAR and .CARS; .AUTO and .AUTOS; .ACCOUNTANT and ACCOUNTANTS; .FAN and .FANS; .GIFT and .GIFTS; .LOAN and .LOANS; .NEW and .NEWS; and .WORK and .WORKS. The Panel determines that it does not have authority to order the relief requested by Vistaprint. In addition, the Panel recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings.

197. The IRP Panel also recognizes that Vistaprint, through its Request and submissions, raised certain complex and significant issues and contributed to the “public interest” involving the New gTLD Program and the Independent Review Process. It is therefore appropriate and reasonable to divide the IRP costs over the parties in a 60% (Vistaprint) / 40% (ICANN) proportion.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the IRP Panel hereby:

(1) Declares that Vistaprint’s IRP Request is denied;

(2) Designates ICANN as the prevailing party;
(3) Recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings;

(4) In view of the circumstances, Vistaprint shall bear 60% and ICANN shall bear 40% of the costs of the IRP Provider, including the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and the fees and expenses of the ICDR. The administrative fees and expenses of the ICDR, totaling US$4,600.00 as well as the compensation and expenses of the Panelists totaling US$229,167.70 are to be borne US$140,260.62 by Vistaprint Limited and US$93,507.08 by ICANN. Therefore, Vistaprint Limited shall pay to ICANN the amount of US$21,076.76 representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by ICANN upon demonstration that these incurred fees and costs have been paid; and

(5) This Final Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final Declaration of this IRP Panel.

Siegfried H. Elsing
Date:

Geert Glas
Date:

Christopher Gibson
Chair of the IRP Panel
Date: 9 Oct. 2015
(3) Recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings;

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Siegfried H. Elsing
Date: 9 October 2015

Geert Glas
Date:

Christopher Gibson
Chair of the IRP Panel
Date:
(3) Recommends that ICANN’s Board exercise its judgment on the question of whether an additional review mechanism is appropriate to re-evaluate the Third Expert’s determination in the Vistaprint SCO, in view of ICANN’s Bylaws concerning core values and non-discriminatory treatment, and based on the particular circumstances and developments noted in this Declaration, including (i) the Vistaprint SCO determination involving Vistaprint’s .WEBS applications, (ii) the Board’s (and NGPC’s) resolutions on singular and plural gTLDs, and (iii) the Board’s decisions to delegate numerous other singular/plural versions of the same gTLD strings;

(4) In view of the circumstances, Vistaprint shall bear 60% and ICANN shall bear 40% of the costs of the IRP Provider, including the fees and expenses of the IRP Panel members and the fees and expenses of the ICDR. The administrative fees and expenses of the ICDR, totaling US$4,600.00 as well as the compensation and expenses of the Panelists totaling US$229,167.70 are to be borne US$140,260.62 by Vistaprint Limited and US$93,507.08 by ICANN. Therefore, Vistaprint Limited shall pay to ICANN the amount of US$21,076.76 representing that portion of said fees and expenses in excess of the apportioned costs previously incurred by ICANN upon demonstration that these incurred fees and costs have been paid; and

(5) This Final Declaration may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute the Final Declaration of this IRP Panel.

Siegfried H. Elsing
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