III.2.7         Data Escrow and Backup (RFP Section D15.2.7)

JVTeam will back up the databases in our data centers in Sterling, VA and Chicago, IL, and will regularly place escrow copies of the backups in secure off-site locations. These procedures are essential elements of our realistic plans for continuity of operations in the event of system failures and natural or man-made disasters.

The goal of any data backup and recovery procedure is full recovery from failures without any loss of data.  Data backup strategies handle system hardware failures (e.g. loss of a processor or one or more disk drives) by reinstalling the data from daily backups, supplemented by the information on the “before” and “after” image-journal backup files that the database creates.

The conventional strategy for guarding against loss of the entire facility because of fire, flood, or other natural or man-made disaster is to provide off-site escrow of the registry data in a secure storage facility.  Even when successful, this recovery strategy does not prevent the loss of a certain volume of transactions between the time the data was backed up and the occurrence of the disaster. Users are subject to denial of service during the time required to recover the data-center database and/or reestablish operations at an alternate disaster-recovery site.  Relocating the data center normally requires at least 24 hours, and the escrowing of backups often is done only weekly, meaning that a disaster could result in substantial loss of both services and data.

JVTeam’s backup solution goes a step further. We propose two co-active SRS data centers, each capable of handling the entire workload should a major system failure or natural or man-made disaster occur at the other. The transactions from each data center are replicated in real time to the other over a redundant high-speed Virtual Private Network (VPN) telecommunications links. Each SRS data center also conducts independent backups, as described in the following paragraph. Since the two SRS data centers are co-active, our backup strategy maintains continuity of operations and enables full recovery of all transactions, even in the event of multiple hardware failures. 

III.2.7.1      Frequency and Procedures for Backup of Data 

Each co-active data center independently implements a zero-downtime/zero-impact incremental data backup each day, and a full data backup weekly. We place escrow copies of the backup tapes in a secure off-site storage facility operated by a third party whose business is data escrow. We copy static data (e.g., the operating systems, BIND software, applications software) to CD-ROMs for quick reload, should that become necessary.  We back up to DLT tape any dynamically changing files (e.g., log files vital to system maintenance and operation, database files, database-journal files, software configurations). Weekly, we perform full-system backups to DLT tape of all databases identified in Section III.2.3 (SRS DB, Whois, Billing).

Each data center uses on-line zero-downtime/zero-impact, backup procedures that include the following 4 steps:

1.       The database is put into backup mode to guarantee a consistent version of the data on the snapshot copy that is written to a RAID disk array for subsequent (slower-speed) copying to tape. While the database is in backup mode, the XRP, Whois, and Billing applications continue to function and to access the data.  The database normally is in backup mode for only about 5 to 10 minutes.

2.       The backup software writes the data to the RAID disk array.

3.       The backup software, which is located on a backup server independent from the application servers, creates the backup DLT Tape copy from the snap shot copy on the RAID disk array.

4.       When the backup is finished, the DLT Tapes are transported to the secure escrow facility.

III.2.7.2      Backup Hardware and Software Systems

Exhibit III.2-19 depicts the SRS data centers’ backup and recovery hardware and software. Each data center’s system includes two backup servers with DLT robotic tape libraries.  The data backup system uses the DLT IV data cartridge and the DLT 5 data format. To achieve zero-downtime/zero-impact backup, we use a RAID disk array and a high-speed-fibre, channel-bridge interconnect to the robotic tape libraries. The backup server copies not only the database-server’s backup files to the disk array, as discussed in the 4-step process already described, but also the backup files of the cluster servers. During the few minutes this process requires, applications still have access to the cluster servers and database server.  Then the backup server copies the files to the DLT Robotic tape device. This approach ensures that we can meet our Service Level Agreements (SLAs).

Due to the criticality of the database, the JVTeam proposes a fully redundant, fault-tolerant database management system. We will configure the database system as two independent database servers – primary and backup – with synchronous replication using two-way commits to maintain database synchronization. If one database server fails, the database system is sized so that the second server can process the entire load without degradation while the primary server is restored to service.

We will transportboth daily incremental backups of dynamically changing data and the weekly full backup to a secure escrow agent to be selected with the concurrence of ICANN.

III.2.7.3      Procedures for Retrieval of Data and Rebuild of the Database.

We maintain copies of the DLT tapes holding incremental data backups in a three tape rotation:

·         One DLT backup tape is in transit to the secure escrow facility.

·         A second DLT tape is in storage in the secure escrow facility

·         The third DLT tape is in the data center for reuse.

The full backup tapes are maintained in a 2-tape rotation, with one tape at the secure escrow facility and one at the data center for reuse. A copy of the static-data CD ROMs for the operating systems and applications are also maintained at the escrow facility.

Should the primary database server experience a catastrophic crash that necessitates a lengthy recovery process, data-center operations continue seamlessly on the backup database server that replicates all the data in the primary.  After the failed database server is repaired, we recover its data using the full backup tape and incremental backup tape that is retrieved from the escrow facility. We first restore the full backup files; then, the incremental files. We then synchronize the recovered database to the primary database. This procedure recovers the database to the last complete transaction processed by the primary database.

This backup procedure enables JVTeam to meet the service level agreements required for continuous availability and near-zero unplanned downtime, thereby improving the stability of the Internet, enhancing public confidence, and improving customer satisfaction.


III.2.8         Publicly Accessible Look Up/Whois Service (RFP Section D15.2.8)

JVTeam proposes a Whois service that will eliminate problems associated with the current multiple Whois systems.  The most serious of these problems is a genuine threat to the stability of the Internet: the possibility that relying on Whois information that can be at least 12 hours out of date could result in an erroneous change relating to the domain name of a large Internet site that performs millions of dollars worth of e-commerce transactions daily.

Whois is a database of information about Internet domain names.  JVTeam’s proposed registry will maintain a state-of-the-art, real-time Whois service that will make this information available on the common Whois port (Port 43).  Our registry will store all information relating to Whois data entities, including contact and authentication data. 

The Whois service is intended as a directory service for registrants, as well as for any other individuals and businesses that want to query details of domain names or related data stored in the registry.  Our Whois data will be available in both conventional and machine-readable format, facilitating automation.  Further, the level of information displayed will be configurable.

Registrars will provide the front-end web interface to the Whois directory.  Because this interface will be a simple wrapper around the registry’s Whois service, the registrars will have complete control over the service’s look and feel and branding.  With this control, registrars will be able to comply with the privacy restrictions enacted by the countries where they operate.

Problems with Current TLD Whois Service

The current .com/.net/.org Whois service has caused many problems for both registrars and registrants.  The system has confused registrants, and its inherent problems have increased costs (and risk) to registrars, who had to provide manual processing or recovery from failures in automated processes.  Inherent system problems include the following:

·         Different protocols used (i.e., not all registrars use Whois on Port 43)

·         Different fields exposed

·         Different formatting of data

·         Timing inconsistencies (regarding adding, deleting, transfer of registrar, etc)

·         Not real time (Whois is updated only every 12 hours)

·         No standard machine-readable format

As a result of these system problems, records in a registrar’s Whois can contradict those in the registry’s Whois, or records in two registrars’ Whois services can contradict each other.  The most serious problem with the current system and an issue of serious concern relating to the stability of the Internet is that a gaining registrar uses the Whois service to determine if a Transfer of Registrar request is authentic.  If a mistake is made in the transfer of registrar, an incorrect owner could redelegate a domain name (or change ownership), potentially bringing down a large Internet site performing millions of dollars of e-commerce transactions per day.

Benefits of Proposed Solution

The system problems cited in the preceding paragraph could theoretically be solved with stronger enforcement of technical standards, such as protocols, fields, and data formatting.  JVTeam’s proposed solution centralizing the Whois data and providing access via registrars is more pragmatic and will solve all current problems.  Our solution would provide:

·         Central location for all authoritative TLD data

·         Standard protocol accessible over port 43

·         Consistent format (fields, formatting, etc) for all registrars

·         Machine-readable format (promotes automation)

·         Elimination of “timing” problems when modifying entities

·         Real-time update

·         Extensible field capability

III.2.8.1      Whois Service Functional Description

The Whois service will accommodate queries regarding the data entities listed in the following table.

Entities

Fields

Domain names

Attributes (Status)

Associated nameservers

Associated registrar

Associated registrant data

Nameserver

Attributes (Status)

Associated IP addresses

Associated registrar

Associated registrant data

IP Address

Attributes (Status)

Associated nameserver

Associated registrar

Associated registrant data

Registrar List

Registrar name

Registrars

Registrar name

Registrar contact details

Registrar URL (Home page)

Registrar Whois URL (Web Port 80)

Registrar Whois URL (Port 43, if applicable)

Attributes (Status)

Machine-Readable Format

JVTeam’s standardized Whois format will facilitate automated parsing of Whois information

Because the viewable data could be modified over time (e.g., new fields could be added), a more robust and formalized encoding mechanism is needed to provide the non-Registrar community reliable automated access to Whois data.

For example, an organization tracking trademark infringement might want to acquire the Whois data, automatically parse it, and store it in a tracking system.  To accommodate such organizations, which will not have access to the XRP protocol, the Whois information must be presented in a formal, extensible way that is compatible with automated processing.  To accomplish this, we will present the Whois data in an open, standard, XML-based, machine-readable format that we designate as the XWP (eXtensible Whois Protocol).  The information accessible via the XWP is inherently tied to the XRP (eXtensible Registry Protocol) data requirements, and thus, will be part of the same standardization process.  Just as we will do with the XRP, JVTeam commits to submitting the XWP to an industry standards body for adoption and future modification according to that body’s normal procedures.

Extensible-Field Capability

In the spirit of providing advanced services to the registrar community, JVTeam will introduce the ability for registrars to use XRP to add customized fields to a record in the registry database.  These fields will appear in an “additional information” section of the Whois data.  The maximum number of custom fields allowed per record is yet to be determined.

The extensible-field capability will eliminate the need for registrars to store additional information in their own local database, then combine it with the registry Whois information when they present it to end users.  The proposed capability will also ensure that end users will view the same information no matter which registrar they use to retrieve Whois data.

All custom fields would appear in a special additional information section at the end of the uniform Whois data.  In human-readable form, the customized fields could appear as follows:

Additional Information:

    <name>: <value>

    <name>: <value>

    …

In XWP format, the customized fields could appear as follows:

<additional>

    <custom name=”xxxxxx” value=”yyyyyy”/>

    <custom name=”xxxxxx” value=”yyyyyy”/>

</additional>

JVTeam intends to provide extensible-field functionality during any Sunrise period to support publishing of trademark (and associated) information.

Bulk-Access Program

Much of the load placed on the current .com/.net/.org Whois service is caused by automated programs mining for data.  Because Whois data is publicly accessible, this will always occur; however, JVTeam proposes to provide a data mart. that limits the recipient’s conditions of use.

The proposed data mart bulk-access program would:

·         Reduce the load that data mining currently imposes on the core Whois service

·         Contractually limit subscribers in the ways they can use the data

·         Provide a source of revenue to fund advanced service levels

·         Reduce the incentive to download entire database without legitimate purpose

·         Provide the entire database in a format that facilitates such data mining as conducting trademark searches, compiling industry statistics, and providing directory services.

The registry will make the Whois data available to registrars, who will conduct the actual bulk-access program.  Data will be exposed only within the privacy restrictions described in the following subsection.

Privacy Restrictions

A number of countries have enacted privacy laws (e.g., the European Union Privacy Directive) that restrict the information that can be presented in the Whois service.  Under the terms of its licensing agreement, JVTeam will bind registrars to comply with all applicable privacy laws while providing Whois services.

Each registrant account will have a privacy attribute that can be set to one of the following levels:

·         Unrestricted—Complete registrant details displayed

·         Restricted—Registrant name and address displayed

·         Private—No Registrant details displayed

Registrants in countries that have enacted privacy laws can select the privacy level permitted under law.  No matter which level they select, such details as the delegated nameservers and associated registrar will still be visible.

Private information will be released only under court order or the direction of some other authority that has legal jurisdiction to demand such release.

Restricting private data will not create problems for registrars’ “Transfers of Change of Ownership” transactions because these operations will be conducted using the centralized authentication mechanism.

III.2.8.2      Whois System Architecture

JVTeam will deliver a Whois service that incorporates semi-real-time update, scalable infrastructure, and multiple layers of redundancy.   We will initially deploy the Whois servers at the two co-active SRS data centers shown previously in Exhibit III.2-1.  The software architecture will enable us to deploy Whois infrastructure to any number of additional JVTeam data centers.  As the registry grows, we will deploy additional Whois infrastructure as appropriate to increase geographic dispersion, enhance the level of service in particularly geographic regions, and reduce the load on the SRS data centers.  We are willing to negotiate with ICANN about adding and siting additional Whois services.

Exhibit III.2-20 illustrates the Whois architecture.  At each Whois site, incoming queries are distributed by a load balancer to a cluster of Whois servers, which are, in turn, connected to a backend database cluster.  This configuration will provide both redundancy and scalability through the addition of servers to either cluster.

Each Whois server will cache common requests in memory and query the back-end database cluster only on a cache miss.  We can configure the duration that Whois information is cached before being deleted (e.g., 10 minutes); after deletion, the server must query the database for the information.  Each Whois server will be configured with at least 2 GB of high-speed memory, sufficient to hold at least one million of the most commonly queried Whois records. 

Exhibit III.2-21 depicts the update of the Whois databases.  As the SRS database is updated, the system will also update the Whois distribution database server in real time.  This database will be replicated to the Whois databases within defined service levels (e.g., 10 minutes).  Replication between data centers always occurs over a VPN or a dedicated link, and the registry will digitally sign update packages. 



The proposed Whois service offers the following benefits:

·         Service can be scaled by adding servers to each Whois cluster

·         Databases can be scaled by adding machines to each database cluster

·         Service can be scaled by deploying Whois infrastructure to additional data centers

·         Inherent redundancy ensures high availability

·         Update process ensures near-real-time availability of the latest information

·         Caching of common queries provides superb response time.

III.2.8.3      Network Speed and Proposed Service Levels

The large volume of Whois queries places a significant network-connectivity burden on the registry.  Based on the assumption that each Whois query will generate approximately 10 Kbits of network traffic, we will use the following engineering guidelines for provisioning bandwidth:

·         Initially, we will provide 25 Mbits per data center.  The total of 50 Mbits will support approximately 5,000 queries per second (approximately 430 million requests per day).

·         As the volume of registrations grows, we will extend the service at a rate of 10 Mbits per one million domain-name registration records under our management.  For example: when the registry manages 20 million domain names, we will dedicate 200 Mbits of Whois bandwidth, which will support nearly two billion Whois queries per day.

These guidelines will be compared with actual usage data and adjusted accordingly.

We will engineer the Whois service to provide the following average service levels, and are willing to negotiate service levels:

·         400 million queries per day (90% cache hits, 10% cache misses, which must be forwarded to database file).  We will increase this query-service demand based on the total number of domain name registrations managed by the registry, as previously discussed.

·         200-millisecond latency for cache hits (after the request reaches the data center).

·         500-millisecond latency for cache misses (after the request reaches data center).

We will configure the Whois service to limit connections based on the following criteria:

·         1000 queries per minute from any single IP address

·         20,000 queries per minute for requests originating from designated registrar subnets

·         An “acceptable use” policy that we will negotiate with ICANN and the registrar community.

We will scale the exact number of Whois and database servers deployed in each cluster and at each data center to maintain the specified service levels.

III.2.9         System Security (RFP Section D15.2.9)

JVTeam is currently operating successful data centers for various telecommunications and domain-name  registry services.  This experience has familiarized us with security risks, as well as with the most current and effective means of thwarting such risks.  ICANN can be assured that our comprehensive security provisions will protect the TLD infrastructure, operations, and data.

Shared Registration System (SRS) and nameserver data centers are subject to a wide range of security threats, including hacking, break-ins, data tampering, denial of service, and physical attacks against the facility.  The recent denial-of-service attacks against important government and dot-com sites point to the technical capabilities of some hackers and the lengths to which they will go to attack the Internet community.  Further, because the Registry will contain proprietary data from competing registrars, security procedures must incorporate user-authentication procedures that ensure that each registrar’s files are available only to its own personnel.

Failure to address these security threats creates the risks of unscheduled down time and the disruption or denial of services.

This section describes system-security features that we will implement in our networks, servers, and applications for the SRS data centers and nameserver data centers.

III.2.9.1      System Security

JVTeam offers ICANN comprehensive system security for our networks, servers, applications, and customer support services. Our security architecture is a policy-based, multi-tiered structure based on industry standards and on evolving new IEFT standards for registry-to-registrar security and secure DNS. Our solution integrates the following security features to provide assurance that multiple security threats or attacks will be unsuccessful:

·         Perimeter protection for Whois and DNS applications

·         C-2-level controlled access at the server operating systems

·         Applications-level security features for XRP, Billing & Collection, and customer-service applications

·         Connection security

·         Data security

·         Intrusion detection

·         User identification and authentication

·         Continuity of operations

·         Physical security. 

Exhibit III.2-22 depicts our implementation of these security features to prevent system break-ins, data tampering, and denial-of-service attacks.

III.2.9.1.1    Shared Registration System Data Center Security

The SRS provides three layers of security to protect the registry subsystems: (1) network security, (2)server security, and (3) application security. Each security layer addresses a specific security threat as discussed below.

Network Security

Edge routers, firewalls, and load balancers provide perimeter protection for the data-center network and applications systems, guarding against unauthorized access from the Internet.

·         Edge Router—The first security layer is the edge routers, which employ IP-packet filtering. 

·         Firewall—The second layer of perimeter security is a firewall that provides policy-based IP filtering to protect against system hacks, break-ins, and denial of service attacks. The firewall also includes network-based intrusion detection to protect against Internet hackers.

·         Load Balancer—The third layer of protection is provided by load balancers within each data center.  Load balancing protects our application servers from common denial-of-service attacks; e.g., SYN floods, ping floods, and “smurfs” attacks. Security policies can be based on any combination of source address, destination address, and protocol type or content.

·         Virtual Private Network (VPN)—The registry network will use VPN technology to perform database updates at the nameservers, network-based backup/restore, remote system/network management, and system administration.  Our goal is to operate the nameserver data centers sites in a “lights out” (unmanned) mode. VPN technology achieves secure data transfer through encrypted data-communications links.

Server Security

The SRS operating systems provide C-2-level access protection through a user login procedure and through file-level access-control lists. These access-control mechanisms perform the following functions:

·         User-account security, which establishes the access capabilities of a specific authenticated user. After authenticating a user, each application’s security-data tables control access to information.  Access is based not only on user-id, but also on the type of application being used; e.g., XRP, Billing and Collection, etc. The application server uses user-id to provide precise control of access privileges to – and uses of (read, write, execute) – all system resources: screens, menus, transactions, data fields, database tables, files, records, print facilities, tape facilities, software tools, and software executables.

·         Group-level security, which establishes the access capabilities of all users within a specific group.  All users belong to one or more access-control groups.  Access control is identical to that for individual users.  

·         System Administration-level security, which restricts access to system administration tools, including the ability to change resource-access privileges. SRS system-administration staff use dedicated links on an internal LAN/WAN to access administrative functions that are off-limits to others.  There is no external access to this LAN.  All sessions require user identification by user name and password; access control lists determine what resources a user or user group is allowed to access and use.

The SRS operating systems will perform security-relevant logging functions, including:

·         User Login—Whenever a user login is attempted, whether successful or not, the event is logged.  The logged information includes the user-id, time, and device requested.

·         User Accounting—“User Accounting” logs every process executed by every user.  The output includes date and time, user-id, point of entry, process, resources accessed, and result of the operations.   This log may be selectively viewed for actions performed by a specific user or users.

·         System Logging—This inherent, configurable logging capability permits monitoring the kernel, user processes, mail system, authorization system, etc.  In addition, the operating system detects when file-access privileges have been changed, and also audits the use of telnet, finger, rsh, exec, talk, and similar operations.

The following provisions apply to passwords:

·         Passwords must be at least six alphanumeric characters in length.  At least one character must be alphabetic; at least one must be a numeric or punctuation character.

·         If a user forgets his/her password, the system administrator verifies the user’s identity, and then provides the user with a temporary password that enables him/her to log on only to the site where users create their own new passwords.

·         Passwords are valid only for a pre-established duration (typically 90 days, but re-configurable).  Prior to password expiration, the system instructs the user to create a new password. 

·         When a user changes his/her password, the system first re-authenticates the existing password, and then requires the user to verify the new password before accepting the change. The system will not accept, as a user’s new password, either of that user’s two most recent passwords.

·         Passwords are encrypted and stored in an inaccessible system file. 

Application Security

Each SRS application will have its own set of security processes and technical controls. The SRS applications that interface with the registrars (e.g., the XRP and the Secure Web Customer Service portal) employ the SSL (secure sockets layer) protocol element that uses public-key exchange and RC4 encryption.  Public services (e.g., Whois, DNS queries, and the public Internet Web portal) rely on the previously discussed network perimeter-security devices – edge routers, firewalls, and load balancers – to protect the internal LAN and applications servers.

·         XRP Applications Security—JVTeam’s XRP server authenticates against a series of security controls before granting service, as follows:

1.       The registrar’s host initiates a SSL session with the XRP server

2.       The XRP server receives the registrar’s private key with the incoming message and authenticates it against the registrar’s public key, which is stored in the registry’s XRP server. 

3.       After the XRP server verifies the key exchange, it completes the SSL initialization to establish a secure, encrypted channel between itself and the registrar’s host computer.  This secure, encrypted channel ensures the integrity of the registrar’s session with registry applications.

4.       In combination with completing the SSL connection, the XRP server authenticates an X.509 digital certificate to verify the registrar’s identity. Digital certificates are maintained in the SRS authentication server database. 

5.       The registrar logs on to the XRP server using a userid and password that determines access privileges.  We will provide each registrar with multiple userids and password pairs, so that each can establish its own group of authorized users.

·         Whois Application SecurityAlthough any Internet user has read-only access to the Whois server, JVTeam’s perimeter-security mechanisms—edge routers, firewalls, and load-balancers—will protect it against denial-of-service attacks. A designated registry administrator performs common database-administration tasks on the Whois database, including monitoring its performance.

·         Nameserver SecurityJust as they have with the Whois servers, all Internet users have read-only access to the nameservers.  Similarly, the edge router, firewall, and load-balancers protect the nameservers as they do the Whois servers.

·         Secure-Web Customer-Service PortalThe secure-web customer-service portal uses the same security mechanisms employed by the XRP server; namely, SSL session encryption, digital certificates, and userid and password between the SRS secure web server and the registrars’ Web browsers. In addition, e-mail messages are encrypted with a Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) public-key-infrastructure implementation. Digital certificates are maintained in the authentication server.

The following table summarizes the benefits of each security mechanism that we employ at the data centers to prevent system hacking , break-ins, and denial-of-service attacks..

Security System
Element

Features and Benefits

Server Operating-System Security

User ID and password; file-level access-control lists

Ensures that the user can access authorized functions, but no others, and can perform only authorized operations within these functions.  For example, the registrar of a registered domain name is authorized to query it and then renew or cancel it or change its nameservers, but cannot query domain names held by other registrars.


 

Database Security

User ID and password; user profiles

·         Limits database access to pre-authorized users.

·         Retains the last two passwords and disallows their usage.

·         Rejects simultaneous sessions by an individual user.

·         Stores user profiles.

·         Limits access rights to database objects and functions to a specified user or user group.

·         Rejects unauthorized access attempts.  Automatically revokes identification codes after a pre-established number of unsuccessful attempts.

·         Provides a non-technical user interface to facilitate the on-line administration of user privileges.

Application Security

SSL v3.0 protocol

HTTPS encryption ensures that messages between the registry and registrars can be read only by the intended receiver.

Digital signatures

Issued by an X.509 authentication server, digital signatures ensure that the incoming data actually has come from the purported sender, and also provide non-repudiation.

User id and password

Ensures that the user can access authorized functions, but no others, and can perform only authorized operations within these functions.  For example, the registrar of a registered domain name is authorized to query it and then renew or cancel it or change its nameservers, but cannot query domain names held by other registrars.

Network Security

Router

Permits only DNS UDP/TCP packets to enter the name servers, thus isolating the system from most potentially damaging messages.

Firewall

Guards the secure TLD LAN from the non-secure Internet by permitting the passage of only packet flows whose origins and destinations comply with pre-established rules.

Intrusion Detection

Detects intrusion at the LAN level.  Displays an alert at the SRS network operations center workstation and creates a log entry.

Load Balancer

Implements security policies to prevent denial of service attacks; e.g.,  SYN floods, ping floods, and “smurfs”

Virtual Private Network

Provides secure network for updating nameservers, remote system administration, remote backup/recovery, and network/system management.

III.2.9.1.2    Nameserver Data Center Security

The JVTeam’s approach to nameserver security is a subset of the security mechanisms we employ at the SRS data centers. Nameserver data center security also relies on multi-layer perimeter protection, controlled access, enforcement of applications security features, and strong physical security protection.

Network Security

The same mechanisms used for the SRS data center are employed at the Zone Nameserver data centers. Edge routers and firewalls provide perimeter protection for the data-center network and applications systems, guarding against unauthorized access from the Internet.

·         Edge Router—The first security layer is the edge routers, which employs IP-packet filtering to allow only DNS UDP/TCP packets to pass into and out of the perimeter network. 

·         Firewall—The second layer of perimeter security is a firewall that provides policy-based IP filtering to protect against system hacks, break-ins, and denial of service attacks. The firewall also includes network-based intrusion detection to protect against Internet hackers.

·         Load Balancer—The third layer of protection is server load which protects our application servers from common denial-of-service attacks; e.g., SYN floods, ping floods, and “smurfs” attacks. Security policies can be based on any combination of source address, destination address, and protocol type or content.

·         Virtual Private Network (VPN)—The registry network will use VPN technology to perform database updates at the zone nameservers, network-based backup/restore, remote system/network management, and system administration.  Our goal is to operate the zone nameserver data centers sites in a “lights out” (unmanned) mode. VPN technology achieves secure data transfer through encrypted data-communications links.

Server Security

The Zone Nameserver operating systems provide C-2-level access protection for remote system administration through a user login procedure and through file-level access-control lists. These access-control mechanisms perform the following functions:

·         User-account security, which establishes the access capabilities of a specific system administration authenticated user. After authenticating the user, the operating system’s access control lists control access to information.

·         System Administrator level security restricts access to system administration tools, including the ability to change resource-access privileges. Nameserver system-administration staff use dedicated links on an internal LAN/WAN to access administrative functions that are off-limits to others.  There is no external access to this LAN.  All sessions require user identification by user name and password; access control lists determine what resources a user or user group is allowed to access and use.

The Zone Nameserver operating systems will perform security-relevant logging functions, including:

·         User LoginWhenever a user login is attempted, whether successful or not, the event is logged.  The logged information includes the user-id, time, and device requested.

·         User Accounting—“User Accounting” logs every process executed by every user.  The output includes date and time, user-id, point of entry, process, resources accessed, and result of the operations.   This log may be selectively viewed for actions performed by a specific user or users.

·         System Logging—This inherent, configurable logging capability permits monitoring the kernel, user processes, mail system, authorization system, etc.  In addition, the operating system detects when file-access privileges have been changed, and also audits the use of telnet, finger, rsh, exec, talk, and similar operations.

Application Security

The zone nameserver essentially enables the public, via the Internet, to make DNS queries. Public services, such DNS queries, rely on the previously discussed network perimeter-security devices – edge routers, firewalls, and load balancers – to protect the internal LAN and applications servers.

III.2.9.2      Physical Security

JVTeam vigorously enforces physical-security measures, controlling all access to our facilities.  Throughout normal working hours, security personnel stationed at each building entrance verify that employees are displaying proper identification badges and control access by non-employees.  Non-employees must sign in to gain entrance; the sign-in books are stored for a period of one year.  If the purpose of his/her visit is found to be valid, the non-employee is issued a temporary badge; otherwise, he or she is denied entrance.

At all times while they are in the facility, visitors must display their badges and must be escorted by a JVTeam employee.  We also strictly enforce the policy that employees must wear their badges prominently displayed at all times while in the facility.

During off-hours (6:30pm to 6:30am and all day on weekends and major holidays), individuals must use the proper-electronic key cards to gain access to the building.  We issue electronic-key cards only to employees who need access for business purposes.  Further, any room housing sensitive data or equipment is equipped with a self-closing door that can be opened only by individuals who activate a palm-print reader.  Senior managers establish the rights of employees to access individual rooms, and ensure that each reader is programmed to pass only those authorized individuals.  We grant access rights only to individuals whose duties require them to have hands-on contact with the equipment housed in the controlled space; administrative and customer-service staffs normally do not require such access.  The palm readers compile and maintain a record of those individuals who enter controlled rooms. 

In addition to being stationed at building entrances during normal working hours, on-site security personnel are on duty 24 hours a day and 7 days a week to monitor the images from closed-circuit television cameras placed strategically throughout the facilities.

The following table lists salient facts about our physical-security mechanisms.

 

Physical Security
Mechanism

Remarks

Security guards

Physically prevent intruder access; verify employee badges

Closed-circuit video-surveillance cameras

Extend capabilities of security guards; maintain access records

Intrusion-detection systems

Provide audible and visual alarms to notify security personnel in the event of unauthorized entry

Identity badges

Permanent badges for employees; easily recognizable temporary badges for visitors

Sign-in registers

Maintained as permanent records for at least one year

Electronic key badges

Control physical access during off-hours; maintain access records

Palm readers

Restrict physical access to mission-critical rooms within our facilities; maintain access records

Self-closing doors

Restrict physical access to mission-critical rooms within our facilities

III.2.10       Peak Capacities (RFP Section D15.2.10)

JVTeam proposes a highly scalable Shared Registration System (SRS) and nameserver systems that are initially sized for a peak load of three times the average projected workload. The peak load capacity and built-in scalability of the registry system architecture ensures ICANN that adequate capacity is available during initial peak-usage periods, and that as usage grows over the life of the registry operations, the SRS system infrastructure can scale up smoothly without service disruption.

To avoid creating bottlenecks for SRS, Whois, and nameserver services, JVTeam will engineer for peak usage volumes.  In addition, JVTeam will deploy redundant co-active SRS data centers a network of nameserver data centers that are sized to handle the projected initial peak volumes. Subsequently, we will add additional zone nameservers to handle the anticipated growth. Our SRS, Whois, and nameserver architecture are designed with highly scalable server clusters and connected through networks that can be smoothly scaled up without disrupting the system.  Expansion provisions include the following:

·         Servers scale from Intel SMP machines to high-end RISC SMP database platforms with shared-memory architectures

·         Server processors scale from 2-way to 6-way SMP for the Intel machines, and from 2-way to 32-way SMP for the high-end RISC database machines

·         The number of servers in a cluster which uses cluster management software scales from 2 to 32 to give near-linear processing scalability

·         The number of servers in a cluster that does not use cluster management software can conceivable scale beyond 32 servers

·         The external telecommunications-network connectivity to the SRS and nameserver data centers scales from dual T-3 to quad T-3 to hex T-3 connectivity and more as a function of the SRS transaction load and the Whois and DNS query loads

·         The internal SRS and nameserver LANs consist of a switched Gigabit Ethernet backbone fabric with extensive port expandability

This subsection describes the peak capacities of the SRS, Whois, and nameserver subsystems in terms of the network, server, and database platforms initial sizing and scalability. JVTeam central backup/recovery systems, escrow systems, system/network management, and system administration systems are enterprise strength hardware and software platforms that can easily handle these management and administrative functions throughout the entire registry operations lifespan. Additional desktops/workstations can be added to accommodate growth in staff and registry workload as usage increases and the registry infrastructure grows. Our maintenance support, help desk, and technical support functions are staffed for the initial peak usage period, and staff can be increased to handle workload surges caused by registry marketing and promotional events.     

III.2.10.1    SRS Peak Capacity

The SRS provides the core subsystems that handle registrar transaction based services, including XRP processing, billing and collection, Secure Web portal, and backend database system services. This subsection describes the SRS subsystems peak capacity in terms of the initial sizing and scalability of the network, server, and database platforms.

Network

The XRP average steady-state transaction load is projected to be 350 transactions per second (tps), or more than 30 million transactions per day.  Since peak transactions are six times the average, we designed for a peak transaction load of 2100 tps. The average transaction size is 5,000 bits, which translates to a required telecommunication capacity of 10.5 MBPS.  The external communication-network connectivity to the Internet is initially sized at two T-3 Internet Service Provider (ISP) 45-MBPS local-access links, for a total of 90 MBPS to handle XRP transactions and Whois queries.  The registry’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) between the sites is two T-1 1.544 MBPS.  The VPN handles zone-database updates, server backup/restore, system/network management, and system-administration functions. 

Server Clusters

The XRP-server cluster and the associated applications-server clusters are front-ended with load balancers that distribute the transaction-processing workload across the servers in each cluster. Distribution algorithms include least connections, weighted least connections, round robin, and weighted round robin.

The XRP-server and applications-server clusters are initially sized to handle six times the projected steady-state workload, or 2100 peak transactions per second.  The processing capacity can grow linearly by adding additional servers to the cluster. The total system capacity is a cluster size of 32 SMP 8-way RISC servers. 

The Billing and Collection system is sized to handle 350 peak transactions per second, because not every XRP transaction results in a billable service.

Database System

The database system consists of dual high-end RISC machines, each with 2- to 32-way SMP scalability. The initial processing capacity of the database system is 4-way SMP, sized in terms of the Transaction Processing Council (TPC) C On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) benchmark of TPC-C 2500 transactions per second (tpsC).

The database system can grow to handle eight times the initial projected volume of transaction loads. JVTeam will closely monitor system usage, and will scale the database capacity correspondingly.

III.2.10.2    Whois Peak Capacity

A large percentage of the load on the current registry’s Whois server is caused by data mining.  JVTeam will increase network bandwidth and add high-performance database capabilities to the Whois-service infrastructure.  Our proposed bulk-access services will reduce the Whois load by as much as two-thirds.  This subsection describes the Whois-subsystems peak capacity in terms of initial sizing and scalability of the network, server, and database platforms. 

Network

The peak Whois transaction rate is estimated to be 5,000 queries per second, with an estimated packet size of 10,000 bits. This produces a maximum load of 50 MBPS.  Initially, we will provide communication-network connectivity for Whois queries between the Internet and each data center as two T-3 Internet Service Provider (ISP) local-access links.  Although these links initially will not be used at full capacity, they ultimately can carry 90 MBPS per data center before we upgrade to larger links.

Whois Server Cluster

Our Whois server cluster is front-ended with load balancers to distribute the transaction-processing workload across the servers in each cluster. Distribution algorithms include least connections, weighted least connections, round robin, and weighted round robin.

The Whois server cluster is initially sized to handle three times the projected steady state workload, or 5000 peak transactions per second.  To improve query response time and lighten the load on the database, the Whois servers cache frequently accessed domain names.

The processing capacity can grow linearly by adding additional servers to the cluster. The total system capacity is a cluster size of 32 SMP 6-way Intel servers.  JVTeam will closely monitor Whois usage and will increase the system’s capacity to accommodate increasing demand.

Database System

Behind the Whois servers are dual mid-range RISC machines, each with 2- to 8-way SMP scalability.  Initial processing capacity will be 4-way SMP at 500 tpsC, scalable to 1000 tpsC.  (tpsC is Transaction Processing Council (TPC) On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) benchmark C workload.)

JVTeam is implementing a Whois bulk-load data-mart service that will enable the registrars to provide their customers with OLTP bulk query services for data mining of domain names.

III.2.10.3    DNS-Query Peak Capacity

During the initial land rush period when registrars are marketing the new TLD domain name extensions, DNS query traffic is expected to be moderate because of less caching further down the DNS hierarchy.  Moreover, the query load won’t approach current .com/.net/.org levels until more than five million names are registered.

JVTeam’s registry handles DNS queries at the nameservers.  This subsection describes the nameservers’ peak capacity in terms of the network, server, and database platforms initial sizing and scalability.  JVTeam’s design will easily scale as load increases. 

Network

JVTeam anticipates a peak load of 10,000 DNS queries per second at each nameserver data center, and estimates the average query-package size to be 1,600 bits. This load produces a required telecommunications-network bandwidth for DNS queries of 16 MBPS.  To provide this bandwidth, we will provision two T-3 access links to the Internet at each zone nameserver site. The Phase I nameserver data centers will easily process a peak load of 80,000 queries per second, with more than 200 % reserve capacity.

Zone Nameservers

Our DNS nameserver cluster will be front-ended with load balancers to distribute the transaction-processing workload across the nameservers in the cluster.  Distribution algorithms including least connections, weighted least connections, round robin, and weighted round robin.

The nameserver cluster is initially sized to handle three times the projected steady-state workload, or 10,000 queries per second.  To improve query response, the entire zone will be held memory resident.

Processing power can grow linearly by adding additional servers to the cluster up to its total system capacity: a cluster size of 32 SMP 6-way Intel servers.  JVTeam will closely monitor system usage, and will scale up as required.

Database System

The nameserver database update systems use Intel machines with up to 6-way SMP scalability to perform snapshot replication of updates to the nameserver database. Since the snapshot replication is triggered at regular intervals, the initial nameserver database update system is sized as a 2-way SMP database server, which is more than adequate to distribute the zone file updates.


III.2.11       System Reliability (RFP Section D15.2.11)

To provide continuous access to TLD registry data and applications, JVTeam proposes the use of two co-active data centers, geographically separated and continuously on-line. Each data center incorporates redundancy and non-stop, high-availability features in their hardware and software configurations. We propose a service-level availability of 99.95% for the SRS services and 99.999% for the DNS-query services. The benefit to ICANN is reliable registry operations with negligible unplanned downtime.

Today, business lives in an environment of global economies, increasing competition, ever-changing technologies and markets, population mobility, and other uncertainties.  It becomes increasingly evident that the ability of a business to quickly and intelligently respond to these changing conditions depends directly on the availability, timeliness, and integrity of its information resources. The Information Technology industry has responded to this need with a variety of high-availability systems whose costs depend on the size of the necessary databases and on service-level agreements covering system availability. Thus, a TLD registry’s selection of a high-availability solution is not only a significant investment, but also a crucial decision that can determine the registry’s success or failure.

TLD applicants must realize that few businesses can afford to be without access to mission critical applications, nor can they tolerate system failures that lead to excessive downtime and denial of service. Furthermore, few end-users would consider a system to be “available” if system performance drops below some acceptable level or if the system is only available to some subset of the user community. How useful is the fact that a system can perform a zillion tpm or execute a query in milliseconds without knowing its availability and the cost of achieving its performance and availability?

JVTeam is proposing two co-active data centers for TLD registry operations and a network of nameservers.  These facilities are geographically dispersed to minimize the possibility of outages caused by natural or man-made disasters. The nameservers are dual-homed to each data center via a Virtual Private network (VPN) backhaul link. As Exhibit III.2-23 indicates, the two data centers are interconnected by high-speed, alternate-routed VPN links. The VPN network-management system includes a “heartbeat” signal from each data center.  If it detects a failed heartbeat at one data center, it automatically routes all traffic to the other.

Each data center will have redundant network components, high-availability server clusters, and fault-tolerant database servers to eliminate single points of failure. All critical telecommunications access links and network components – e.g.,  routers, firewalls, LAN switches, and server NIC cards will be redundant. Anything less would be inadequate to provide the service levels that ICANN and the industry requires.


 

III.2.11.1    Defining and Quantifying Quality of Service

JVTeam defines quality of service as the high-availability aspect of the entire TLD registry system as perceived by the registrars, registrants, and other end users. In this context, system availability is a function of both reliability (of hardware and software components) and performance (response time, throughput, etc.). Other related factors include system management, diagnostics, and maintenance; software QA; and database backup and recovery procedures. 

JVTeam has developed the following list of service level requirements:

Service Availability, SRS—The amount of time in a month that registrars are able to initiate sessions with the registry and perform standard daily functions such as; add a domain name, transfer a domain name, etc.  JVTeam is engineering the SRS service for 99.95% availability.

Service Availability, Nameserver—The amount of time in a month that internet users are able to resolve DNS queries to the TLD nameserver network.  JVTeam is engineering the nameserver service for 99.999% availability.

Service Availability, Whois—The amount of time in a month that internet users are able to initiate a Whois query to the TLD Whois service and receive a successful response.  JVTeam is engineering the Whois service for 99.95% availability.

Update Frequency, Zone File—The amount of time it takes for a successful change to zone file data to be propagated throughout the TLD nameserver network.   JVTeam is engineering the updates to take place in near real-time and no longer than 10 minutes.  An SLR for this service would be crafted in the following manner; 15 minutes or less for 95% of the updates.  

Update Frequency, Whois—The amount of time it takes for a successful change to Whois data to be propagated throughout the TLD Whois Databases.   JVTeam is engineering the updates to take place in near real-time and no longer than 10 minutes.  An SLR for this service would be crafted in the following manner; 15 minutes or less for 95% of the updates.  

Processing Time; Add, Modify, Delete—The time from when the registry receives an add, modify or delete action to when it acknowledges the action.  JVTeam is engineering for 500 milliseconds. 

Processing Time; Query a Name—The time from when a registry receives a query to when it returns a response.  JVTeam is engineering for 100 milliseconds. 

Processing Time; Whois—The time from when the registry receives a Whois query to when it returns a response.  JVTeam is engineering for 300 milliseconds. 

In addition to these SLRs there should also be SLRs for administrative functions such as abandonded call rates, scheduled service unavailability notification, unscheduled service unavailability notification, etc. 

Because these service levels are so important to ICANN and the internet community JVTeam is willing to negotiate and report on a regular basis a list of service level agreements (SLA) with ICANN.  We are confident that our experience, engineering and operations expertise will deliver the highest reasonable level of service attainable for such a complex and important service. 

III.2.11.2    Analyzing Quality of Service

JVTeam uses system/network-monitoring capabilities and cluster-management fault-detection services to gather systems and network performance statistics and to track device/process/interface availabilities.  The system stores this data in a local database, then generates a wide variety of pre-programmed and custom reports that enable us to:

·         Track system compliance with SLAs

·         Perform performance management and track system performance and resource utilization

·         Perform trend analyses

·         Perform capacity planning. 

We will provide ICANN with detailed reports on component availability, circuit-utilization levels, and CPU loads at the servers and routers. We summarize performance data and compare it to SLAs.  We will make performance statistics for the previous year available online; for earlier years, from backups.

For the TLD registry service, JVTeam will also employ the statistics-generating and reporting capabilities inherent in BIND version 9.  BIND 9’s statistics-logging function reports, at selected intervals, the number of queries processed by each server, categorized by query type.  We will automatically collect and generate online reports for ICANN, detailing DNS query/response loads both on individual servers and the entire system.  By deploying application-, systems-, and network-level statistics-collection and capacity-planning tools, JVTeam can provide comprehensive reporting and trending information to ICANN.

III.2.12       System Outage Prevention (RFP Section D15.2.12)

The JVTeam’s co-active redundant data centers and high-availability server cluster architecture will maintain continuous operations with no disruptions in service. The benefit to ICANN is improved system availability, minimum downtime, and high confidence in the Internet registry services.

The Internet community requires outage-prevention measures specifically designed to minimize system downtime. Downtime can be categorized as either unplanned or planned:

·         Unplanned downtime is caused by failures; e.g., external telecommunications failures, power failures, or internal-network or computer-equipment failures.

·         Planned downtime occurs when the system is unavailable due to scheduled maintenance; e.g., software or hardware upgrades and system backups.  Planned downtime is normally minimized in two ways:

-        By performing backups, maintenance, and upgrades while the system remains operational (hot)

-        By reducing the time required to perform tasks that can be performed only while the system is down. 

In addition to employing the preceding measures for minimizing planned downtime, system designers may use redundancy and high-availability system architectures designed to minimize unplanned outages. Many data-management operations will also have disaster recovery agreements with a business-continuity provider who provides a disaster recovery site geographically separated from the operational data center.  The intent is to maintain continuity of operations in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

JVTeam believes these approaches alone, although commendable, are insufficient to meet the high service levels expected by ICANN and the registrar community. For example, the registry services are so specialized and component intensive that no business-continuity provider is likely to be capable of resuming services without a lengthy outage period.  We contend that the only way to satisfy the service level requirements is through a combination of approaches, including:

·         Co-active redundant data centers with two-way transaction replication

·         High availability server cluster architecture

·         Hot backup and recovery

·         Automated disaster recovery provisions.


Procedures for Problem Detection and Resolution

To best meet data center requirements for availability, flexibility, and scalability, JVTeam has designed a high availability architecture that will combine multiple computers into a cluster. Nodes in the cluster will be loosely coupled, with each node maintaining its own processor, memory, operating system, and network connectivity. Our system/network-management and cluster management tools will automatically detect and compensate for system and network faults and notify system operators.

At five-minute intervals, the network management system will “ping” network devices with Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) for availability and poll them for performance statistics.  Event threshold violations or error conditions will initiate a sequence of alerting events, including visual notifications via a topology map, an entry into a trap log of event records, emails to a bulletin board, and notices to technical support staff. The goal is to detect and repair potential problems before services are disrupted.

An SNMP daemon will be configured to periodically check the status and health of vital server processes.  In the event of a critical process failure, the SNMP agent will send a trap to the network management system, initiating an alert to the technical support staff.  Our network management software will include remote monitoring and management of operations, so technical support staff can easily diagnose and troubleshoot network faults, either from the Network Operations Center or remotely. Once a problem is detected, it will be resolved using our proven problem management process. In conjunction with this problem management process, we will employ proactive performance management and trend analysis processes to do root cause analysis and discover performance and utilization trends that could lead to potential problems.

The cluster management software will organize multiple nodes (up to 16) into a high availability cluster that delivers application processing support to LAN/WAN attached clients. The cluster software, which will monitor the health of each node and quickly respond to failures to eliminate application downtime, will automatically detect and respond to failures in the following components:

·         System processors

·         System memory

·         LAN media and adapters

·         System processes

·         Applications processes

·         Disk drives.

Since high availability is a primary design goal, a cluster cannot have a single point of failure; accordingly, we will employ RAID mirrored disk drives and multiple LAN connections. The cluster software will monitor these hardware and software component and respond by allocating new resources when necessary to support applications processing. The process of detecting failures and restoring the applications service will be completely automated—no operator intervention will be required.

Redundancy of Data Centers and Systems

JVTeam is proposing redundant co-active data centers: one in Sterling, VA; the second, in Chicago IL. These data centers  will be interconnected by redundant, high-speed, and  secure VPN telecommunications links to provide two-way replication of all registry database transactions. A heartbeat monitor will determine the on-line status of each data center and enable the services be provided entirely from the second data center if one is lost.

Within each data center, the system will be redundantly configured so that failure of any system component will leave a configuration of surviving system components capable of executing the entire workload within 95 percent of the previous performance for at least 90 percent of users.  To achieve no-single-point-of-failure architecture, JVTeam will replicate all components and configure the system for automatic failover.

The following table describes system architecture redundancy we will employ at each SRS data center to meet 99.9+ percent service availability levels.

SYSTEM REDUNDANCY ELEMENTS

Issue

Redundancy Solution

Benefit