

1 Jeffrey A. LeVee (State Bar No. 125863)  
Courtney M. Schaberg (State Bar No. 193728)  
2 Sean W. Jaquez (State Bar No. 223132)  
JONES DAY  
3 555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4600  
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1025  
4 Telephone: (213) 489-3939  
Facsimile: (213) 243-2539

5 Joe Sims (admitted *pro hac vice*)  
6 JONES DAY  
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.  
7 Washington, D.C. 20001-2113  
Telephone: (202) 879-3939  
8 Fax: (202) 626-1700

9 Attorneys for Defendant  
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR  
10 ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

11  
12 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
13 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

14 VERISIGN, INC., a Delaware  
15 corporation,

16 Plaintiff,

17 v.

18 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR  
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS,  
19 a California corporation; DOES 1-50,

20 Defendants.

Case No. CV 04-1292 AHM (CTx)

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND  
MOTION TO DISMISS  
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST, SECOND,  
THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, AND  
SIXTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF  
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)  
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF  
CIVIL PROCEDURE;  
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS  
AND AUTHORITIES**

[Concurrently filed with Request  
for Judicial Notice]

Date: May 17, 2004

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Honorable A. Howard Matz

1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on May 17, 2004, at 10:00 a.m. or as soon  
2 thereafter as counsel may be heard at the courtroom of the Honorable A. Howard  
3 Matz, United States District Judge, located at 312 North Spring Street,  
4 Los Angeles, California, defendant Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and  
5 Numbers ("ICANN") will and hereby does move this Court, pursuant to Rule  
6 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order dismissing plaintiff  
7 VeriSign, Inc.'s ("VeriSign") first claim for relief for violation of section 1 of the  
8 Sherman Act, second claim for relief for injunctive relief for breach of contract,  
9 third claim for relief for damages for breach of contract, fourth claim for relief for  
10 interference with contractual relations, fifth claim for relief for specific  
11 performance of contract and injunctive relief, and sixth claim for relief for damages  
12 for breach of contract. None of these claims for relief states a claim upon which  
13 relief may be granted.

14 This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local  
15 Rule 7-3, which took place on March 24, 2004. Counsel were unable to reach any  
16 agreements that would obviate the need for the motion.

17 The motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the  
18 Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, the concurrently-filed  
19 Request for Judicial Notice, all the papers, pleadings, and records on file herein,  
20 and on such other matters as may properly come before the Court before or at the  
21 hearing.

22 Dated: April 5, 2004

JONES DAY

23  
24 By: \_\_\_\_\_  
25 Jeffrey A. LeVee

26 Attorneys for Defendant  
27 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR  
28 ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **INTRODUCTION**

3 This is a dispute about the interpretation of a contract, which VeriSign's  
4 seventh claim for relief appropriately seeks to resolve (at least in part). The first six  
5 claims, by contrast, seek to impose liability upon ICANN merely because ICANN  
6 reads the parties' contract differently than VeriSign does. Disagreeing with  
7 VeriSign is neither an antitrust violation nor a breach of contract, and thus none of  
8 the first six claims has merit.

9 First, none of the first six claims is ripe because they all rest on the  
10 assumption that ICANN's interpretation of the contract is wrong. Because that is  
11 the issue presented by the seventh claim, and because if ICANN is right none of the  
12 first six claims has any merit, these claims should all be dismissed and be addressed  
13 only when and if VeriSign's interpretation of the contract is authoritatively  
14 established to be correct.

15 Second, all of the claims rest on the assertion by ICANN of: (a) its  
16 interpretation of the contract, and (b) its stated intention to utilize the dispute  
17 resolution mechanism of the contract if VeriSign did not accept that interpretation.  
18 As a matter of law, such actions cannot violate the antitrust laws or amount to a  
19 breach of contract. VeriSign has always been free either to seek a judicial  
20 resolution of those disagreements, as the contract provided it could do, or to act in  
21 accordance with its own contract interpretation. VeriSign's voluntary actions to  
22 respond (on some but not all occasions) to ICANN's contract interpretation, as if it  
23 were correct, does not form the basis for any claims against ICANN.

24 Third, there are significant problems with many of the individual claims. For  
25 example, the first claim, for violation of the antitrust laws, does not sufficiently  
26 allege *any* of the necessary elements of an antitrust conspiracy. VeriSign has not  
27 (in its one conclusory paragraph (¶ 85)) sufficiently alleged that there is an antitrust  
28 conspiracy, that there has been any injury to competition, that it has antitrust

1 standing, or that it has sustained antitrust injury. The notion that ICANN is  
2 scheming to injure VeriSign is particularly ironic in view of the fact that ICANN  
3 has been successfully defending lawsuits brought *in this Court*<sup>1</sup> in order to *protect*  
4 VeriSign's ability to offer one of the services — the so-called "Wait Listing  
5 Service" or "WLS" — that VeriSign now alleges ICANN is conspiring to *prevent*.  
6 Compl. ¶¶ 40-47.

7 The first six claims should be dismissed.

### 8 BACKGROUND REGARDING ICANN

9 ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation organized under California law.  
10 Compl. ¶ 6. ICANN's mission "is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global  
11 Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and  
12 secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems." Bylaws, Art. 1, § 1.  
13 (The Bylaws are attached as Exhibit B to ICANN's RJN.) In November 1998, the  
14 United States Department of Commerce ("DOC") and ICANN entered into a  
15 Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"). Compl. ¶ 19. (The MOU is attached as  
16 Exhibit C to ICANN's RJN.) In the MOU, the DOC and ICANN agreed to "jointly  
17 design, develop and test the mechanisms, methods, and procedures that should be in  
18 place and the steps necessary to transition management responsibility for DNS  
19 [domain name system] functions now performed by, or on behalf of, the U.S.  
20 Government to a private-sector not-for-profit entity." MOU, § II.B. The MOU  
21 provides that the DOC will maintain oversight responsibility of the technical  
22 management of the domain name system until further agreements are arranged for  
23 the private sector to undertake that management. The DOC and ICANN have  
24 amended and extended the MOU several times; however, during the continuing

25 <sup>1</sup> See Judge Walter's order, dated November 10, 2003, denying plaintiffs'  
26 motion for preliminary injunction in the litigation styled *Dotster, Inc. et al. v.*  
27 *ICANN*, Case No. CV 03-5045 JFW (MANx), attached as Exhibit A to ICANN's  
28 concurrently filed request for judicial notice ("RJN"). The *Dotster* plaintiffs  
brought a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to stop ICANN from  
permitting VeriSign to proceed with WLS; ICANN vigorously opposed the motion,  
and, in a detailed opinion, Judge Walter denied it.

1 transition the DOC retains ultimate authority over the management of the domain  
2 name system. (The most recent amendment is attached as Exhibit D to ICANN's  
3 RJN; *see especially* Section V.B.11.)

4 ICANN's Board of Directors consists of fifteen directors. RJN, Ex. B, Art.  
5 VI. ICANN also has a staff, an Ombudsman, a Nominating Committee for  
6 directors, three Supporting Organizations that make recommendations to the Board  
7 on specific topics, and four Advisory Committees. *Id.*, Arts. V, VII-XI. Pursuant  
8 to its Bylaws, the directors are selected as follows: (a) eight directors selected by  
9 the Nominating Committee; (b) two directors selected by the Address Supporting  
10 Organization; (c) two directors selected by the Country-Code Names Supporting  
11 Organization; (d) two directors selected by the Generic Names Supporting  
12 Organization; and (e) the president *ex officio* (who also votes). RJN, Ex. B,  
13 Art. VI, §§ 1-2. ICANN does not have any "members." *Id.*, Art. XVII.

14 One of ICANN's Advisory Committees is the Governmental Advisory  
15 Committee or "GAC." *Id.*, Art. X, § 2.1. The GAC consists of representatives of  
16 national governments and multinational governmental organizations. The GAC  
17 considers and provides advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns  
18 of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between  
19 ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements. *Id.*

20 ICANN's Board has the final authority to accept or reject a recommendation  
21 from its supporting organizations or advisory committees. The Bylaws prohibit  
22 Board members from voting on matters if ICANN's decision would directly affect  
23 his or her own economic interests or those belonging to affiliated firms. *Id.*,  
24 Art. VI, § 6.

25 One of ICANN's functions has been to enter into contracts with the operators  
26 of various Internet "registries", those companies that maintain the "zone" or  
27 "master" file for the "top level domains" of the Internet. Internet registries are, in  
28 some senses, similar to telephone books in that the registry operators maintain a list

1 (and a variety of other relevant information) about each of the persons who registers  
2 an Internet domain name in that registry. ICANN presently has contracts with a  
3 number of registry operators, including VeriSign, the operator of the ".com" and  
4 ".net" registries, stating the manner in which the registries will be operated. Compl.  
5 ¶¶ 15, 22. The most recent registry agreement between VeriSign and ICANN is the  
6 contract for .com, entered into in May 2001 (the "Registry Agreement"). *Id.* ¶ 22;  
7 Registry Agreement (the Registry Agreement is attached to ICANN's RJN as  
8 Ex. E).

### 9 SUMMARY OF VERISIGN'S ALLEGATIONS

10 VeriSign's claims arise out of its efforts to change the manner in which it  
11 operates the .com registry, allegedly "to enhance the value and attractiveness of  
12 second-level domain names registered in the .com gTLD." Compl. ¶ 32. VeriSign  
13 alleges that none of these changes involves a "Registry Service" within the meaning  
14 of the Registry Agreement, or otherwise relates to the Agreement's requirements.  
15 *Id.* ¶¶ 36, 43, 51, 59. ICANN disagrees.

#### 16 Wildcard Allegations

17 When most users of the Internet type in an address that has not been  
18 registered in the registry, the users receive an "error" message or a "page cannot be  
19 displayed" message that states in effect that the Internet website does not exist.  
20 Compl. ¶ 34. (An example would be the response to typing in the address  
21 <http://www.noantitrustclaim.com>.) If, instead, a registry operator wants to redirect  
22 the Internet user to an Internet page established by the registry (with content  
23 supplied by the registry), the registry can insert what is known as a "wildcard" into  
24 the domain, which causes an Internet user who types in an address to be redirected  
25 to an Internet page established by the registry operator.

26 VeriSign alleges that, on or about September 15, 2003, VeriSign inserted its  
27 wildcard, which it called "Site Finder." *Id.* ¶¶ 33-34. VeriSign provided no notice  
28 to ICANN or to any users of the Internet that it would be adding the wildcard to the

1 .com registry. October 3 Letter (the October 3 Letter is attached as Exhibit F to  
2 ICANN's RJN). VeriSign then alleges that ICANN "wrongly" and "at the behest of  
3 others" demanded that VeriSign suspend its use of the wildcard. According to  
4 VeriSign, in the October 3 Letter, ICANN threatened that, unless the wildcard was  
5 suspended, ICANN would "initiate legal proceedings" against VeriSign. Compl.  
6 ¶ 37; RJN, Ex. F. VeriSign alleges that, as a result of the October 3 Letter,  
7 VeriSign was "forced to suspend" the wildcard. Compl. ¶ 38.<sup>2</sup>

### 8 WLS Allegations

9 Domain name subscriptions typically are for one or two years. At the end of  
10 that term, some domain name registrants elect not to renew their subscriptions,  
11 which causes those names to be deleted from the registry and permits others to  
12 register those names. VeriSign alleges that its WLS would allow a prospective  
13 domain name registrant to submit a request for an expired domain name on a first-  
14 come, first-serve basis through any of approximately 130 ICANN-accredited  
15 registrars (the entities that sell domain name subscriptions to consumers) for a  
16 domain name currently registered in the .com registry. *Id.* ¶ 41. If a domain name  
17 is thereafter deleted, the WLS subscription holder would become the registrant of  
18 the domain name. *Id.* ¶ 41.

19 VeriSign alleges that it would have been ready to offer WLS "in or before  
20 August 2002, and would have done so" had ICANN not acted wrongfully. *Id.* ¶ 45.  
21 VeriSign alleges that ICANN discussed WLS with VeriSign's competitors,  
22 including ICANN's registrar constituency, and then "announced that WLS is a  
23 Registry Service." *Id.* ¶ 44. It alleges that ICANN then wrongfully insisted that  
24 VeriSign comply with conditions that are not required by the Registry Agreement.  
25 *Id.* ¶¶ 44-46.<sup>3</sup>

26 <sup>2</sup> VeriSign's second, third, and fourth claims relate solely to its use of a  
27 wildcard in the .com domain. The remainder of its claims are directed to the  
28 wildcard as well as other topics.

<sup>3</sup> As noted above, several of ICANN's registrars have sued ICANN,  
demanding that ICANN not permit VeriSign to proceed with WLS. In the first of

1           ConsoliDate Allegations

2           VeriSign alleges that, in or about January 2003, it began offering  
3 ConsoliDate, which allowed .com registrants to add from 1 to 364 days to an  
4 existing domain name registration term in order to create a single anniversary date  
5 for their entire .com domain name registration portfolio. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 50.  
6 VeriSign concedes that, "ICANN provisionally supported the introduction of  
7 ConsoliDate," but alleges that ICANN has deprived VeriSign of revenues and  
8 deprived consumers of a beneficial new service. *Id.* ¶¶ 52, 55. ICANN has acted  
9 wrongfully, VeriSign alleges, by claiming that ConsoliDate is a Registry Service  
10 and conditioning permanent approval of ConsoliDate on VeriSign's entering into  
11 certain amendments to the Registry Agreement. *Id.* ¶¶ 52-54.

12           Internationalized Domain Name Allegations

13           VeriSign alleges that, in or about November 2000, it began an  
14 internationalized domain name ("IDN") service in a "third-level domain testbed  
15 environment." *Id.* ¶ 56. The IDN allows users of the Internet to use non-ASCII  
16 (non-English) character sets to register domain names in the .com registry. *Id.* ¶ 56.  
17 VeriSign alleges that it intended "to offer IDN on a permanent basis with respect to  
18 second-level domain names within the .com gTLD." *Id.* ¶ 56.

19           VeriSign alleges that "[a]n appendix to the 2001 .com Registry Agreement  
20 purports to 'reserve' to ICANN all 'tagged domain names' with 'hyphens in the third  
21 and fourth characters.'" *Id.* ¶ 61. VeriSign alleges that it "therefore sought  
22 ICANN's authorization to use domain names with an 'xn--' prefix to enable the .com  
23 gTLD registry to provide IDN service, as other competing ccTLD registries that are  
24 not under contract with ICANN are already doing or have publicly announced they

25  
26 \_\_\_\_\_  
(continued...)

27 those suits, the plaintiffs brought an unsuccessful motion for preliminary injunction  
28 seeking to block WLS. RJN, Ex. A. The second of those suits (Case No. CV 04-  
1368 ABC (CWx)) was filed on March 1, 2004.

1 intend to do." *Id.* ¶ 61. VeriSign alleges that IDN is not a "Registry Service," but  
2 that ICANN withheld its consent until VeriSign agreed to its "Guidelines for the  
3 Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names." *Id.* ¶¶ 59, 62.

#### 4 Marketing Program Allegations

5 VeriSign alleges that, in or about November 2001, it launched an incentive  
6 promotion program through which participating registrars displayed a VeriSign  
7 advertisement for .com domain names on their websites in exchange for "placement  
8 fees" and "other consideration." *Id.* ¶ 66. VeriSign alleges that ICANN improperly  
9 "demanded that VeriSign cease the program on the ground that it had not been  
10 approved by ICANN," and that ICANN threatened to "declare VeriSign in formal  
11 breach of the 2001 .com Registry Agreement unless the program was suspended."  
12 *Id.* ¶ 67. VeriSign alleges that this has "deprived VeriSign of the ability to promote  
13 and market its services in the manner best designed to enhance its business." *Id.*  
14 ¶ 68.

### 15 **LEGAL STANDARD**

16 Although this Court must accept as true material factual allegations in the  
17 complaint, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are  
18 insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." *Anderson v.*  
19 *Clow (In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig.)*, 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal  
20 quotation omitted). To withstand scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint  
21 "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material  
22 elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." *Scheid v. Fanny*  
23 *Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations  
24 omitted). In undertaking this analysis, the Court is not required to "accept as true  
25 allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit."  
26 *Sprewell v. Golden St. Warriors*, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). If the  
27 complaint fails on a motion to dismiss, it should be dismissed with prejudice if  
28

1 amendment would be futile. *See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.*, 912 F.2d 291, 296  
2 (9th Cir. 1990).

### 3 ARGUMENT

#### 4 I. VERISIGN'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A 5 SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1 CLAIM.

6 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . . or  
7 conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1. To survive a Rule 12 motion,  
8 VeriSign must plead that: (1) there was a contract, combination or conspiracy;  
9 (2) the contract or conspiracy unreasonably restrained trade; and (3) the restraint  
10 affected commerce. *Tanaka v. University of S. Cal.*, 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.  
11 2001).

12 Apart from a very narrow category of *per se* unlawful conduct, such as naked  
13 price fixing, section 1 claims are evaluated under the "rule of reason." *See, e.g.*,  
14 *Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.*, 472 U.S.  
15 284, 289 (1985). As discussed below, VeriSign's claim that ICANN has conspired  
16 to injure VeriSign would be evaluated under the rule of reason. To succeed in a  
17 rule of reason case, a section 1 claimant must establish three elements: "(1) an  
18 agreement or conspiracy among two or more persons or distinct business entities;  
19 (2) by which the persons or entities intend to harm or restrain competition; and  
20 (3) which actually injures competition." *See Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Hot*  
21 *Rod Ass'n*, 884 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1989); *Kingray, Inc. v. Nat'l Basketball*  
22 *Ass'n*, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1187, 1196-1197 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing  
23 complaint for failure to adequately allege conspiracy, intent to harm competition,  
24 and actual harm to competition). VeriSign has not alleged *any* of the requisite  
25 elements of a section 1 claim.

#### 26 A. VeriSign Has Failed to Allege Any Facts that Support Its 27 Section 1 Claim.

1 VeriSign's basic antitrust theory is really one of exclusion (*i.e.*, Sherman Act  
2 section 2) rather than collusion (Sherman Act section 1). The reason VeriSign  
3 strains to fit its theory into section 1 is that the law completely forecloses the  
4 section 2 theory it would like to assert. ICANN conducts no commercial business  
5 and does not compete with VeriSign, let alone possess monopoly power in the  
6 market of registry operations (a market ICANN is not permitted to participate in  
7 under its Bylaws). Therefore, VeriSign could never state a section 2 claim against  
8 ICANN. *See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563 (1966); *Official*  
9 *Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC*, 630 F.2d 920, 927-928 (2nd Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*,  
10 450 U.S. 917 (1981).

11 VeriSign is thus required to manufacture a "collusion" theory, but a section 1  
12 plaintiff must allege *facts* sufficient to establish each element of its claim. *See*  
13 *Les Shockley Racing, Inc.*, 884 F.2d at 506, 508; *Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo*  
14 *Winery*, 829 F.2d 729, 736 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, the essential elements "must  
15 be alleged in more than vague and conclusory terms." *Found. for Interior Design*  
16 *Educ. Research v. Savannah College of Art & Design*, 244 F.3d 521, 530 (6th Cir.  
17 2001).<sup>4</sup>

### 18 **1. VeriSign's "Conspiracy" Allegations Are Insufficient.**

19 Co-conspirators may be left unnamed in a section 1 complaint only under  
20 limited circumstances and only if a plaintiff describes the specific involvement of  
21 the unnamed claimed conspirators. Bare allegations that a defendant conspired  
22 with someone, somewhere, sometime, are not enough. *See, e.g., Estate Constr.*

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>4</sup> It is not proper to assume that the defendants have violated the antitrust  
25 laws in ways that have not been alleged. *See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal.*  
26 *State Council of Carpenters*, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). When the elements of an  
27 antitrust claim are lacking, the costs of antitrust litigation and the increasing  
28 caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discovery.  
*Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); *see also*  
*Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research*, 244 F.3d at 530 ("the price of entry,  
even to discovery, is for the plaintiff to allege a factual predicate concrete enough to  
warrant further proceedings, which may be costly and burdensome.") (citation  
omitted.)

1 *Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co.*, 14 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 1994) (some details  
2 of the conspiracy's time, place and alleged effect required); *Aquatherm Indus.,*  
3 *Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.*, 971 F. Supp. 1419, 1429-39 (M.D. Fla. 1997)  
4 (conclusory conspiracy allegations insufficient; listing cases); *Newport*  
5 *Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs. (U.S.A.), Inc.*, 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1546  
6 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (plaintiff must allege facts constituting the conspiracy, the  
7 conspiracy's object, and its accomplishment).

8 For example, *Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.* 753 F.2d 974 (11th Cir.  
9 1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986), affirmed the dismissal of a section 1  
10 claim where the plaintiff identified unnamed co-conspirators only as the defendant's  
11 "dealers and others at this time unknown to Lombard's." *Id.* at 975. Similarly, in  
12 *Newport Components*, the court held inadequate allegations of a conspiracy with  
13 "'other entities and individuals,' including, but not limited to both foreign and  
14 domestic authorized distributors" of defendants. *Newport Components*, 671  
15 F. Supp. at 1545-46.

16 VeriSign's meager allegation of a conspiracy falls far short. VeriSign  
17 identifies ICANN's alleged co-conspirators only as "its members, including  
18 constituent groups within ICANN and the members of those groups." Compl. ¶ 85.  
19 This allegation is useless. ICANN *has* no members (RJN, Ex. B, Art. XVII), and  
20 VeriSign offers no explanation of what it means by that term. Presumably, it could  
21 include any person or entity in the global Internet community that has participated  
22 in the ICANN process. Compl. ¶ 18. But since participation in ICANN is open to  
23 any person or entity, the number of possible co-conspirators equals the population  
24 of the earth.

25 As to the alleged *conduct* of these unnamed co-conspirators, VeriSign again  
26 leaves ICANN and the Court guessing: VeriSign does not allege *any* conduct of  
27 *anyone* other than ICANN. Indeed, the only conduct alleged in furtherance of the  
28 conspiracy is alleged to have been undertaken by ICANN's Board. Compl. ¶¶ 18

1 ("ICANN is governed by and acts through an international Board of Directors");  
2 ¶ 85 (complaining about "[t]he acts of ICANN"). VeriSign's allegation that ICANN  
3 "frequently carries out its activities . . . through the collective action" of an unlisted  
4 and unlimited set of "others" is not sufficient to state an antitrust claim. *Id.* ¶ 18.

5 Moreover, VeriSign's pleading deficiencies are incurable. Leave to amend  
6 the complaint would be pointless for several reasons.

7 First, it is hornbook antitrust law that a company cannot conspire with itself.  
8 *Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp.*, 467 U.S. 752 (1984); *Columbia River*  
9 *People's Utility Dist. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co.*, 217 F.3d 1187, 1190 n.4 (9th Cir.  
10 2000). Yet, the gravamen of VeriSign's claim is that: (a) "ICANN's acts" have  
11 violated section 1; (b) ICANN acts "through its Board of Directors"; and (c) the  
12 conspiracy involved "ICANN and its members." Complaint ¶¶ 18, 85. These  
13 allegations concede that the alleged conspirators are subsumed within the formal  
14 decisionmaking structure of ICANN. *See Healthamerica Pennsylvania, Inc. v.*  
15 *Susquehanna Health Sys.*, 278 F. Supp. 2d 423, 435 (M.D. Penn. 2003) (non-profit  
16 with sole authority for management of defendant hospitals, including establishment  
17 of overall policy, acted as single entity "guided 'not by two separate corporate  
18 consciousnesses, but one'."). In short, VeriSign's Sherman Act allegations do not  
19 state a claim under *Copperweld*.

20 Second, since ICANN and VeriSign do not compete, VeriSign cannot allege  
21 a section 1 claim against ICANN. In *Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians*  
22 *& Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery*, 185 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1999), the court  
23 held that an association cannot conspire with its members as a matter of law  
24 because the association "does not compete with its member[s], . . . therefore  
25 antitrust concerns are not raised." *Id.* at 620-21. Some courts have recognized a  
26 narrow exception to this rule where a standard-setting organization acts as a result  
27 of being "captured" by competitors of the plaintiff. But VeriSign makes no  
28 allegations supporting any "capture" theory, nor could it.

1 In determining whether activity by a standard-setting organization violates  
2 section 1, courts look to the structure of the organization and the decision-making  
3 process the organization utilizes.<sup>5</sup> Generally, courts inquire whether: (1) the  
4 organization is in competition with plaintiff; (2) the members of the organization  
5 have control over the organization so extensive that the organization is no longer  
6 operating as an independent body; and (3) the organization has a personal stake in  
7 the outcome of the litigation. None of these factors is present with respect to  
8 ICANN.

9 First, ICANN's Bylaws prohibit ICANN from competing against VeriSign.  
10 RJN, Ex. B at Art. II, § 2.<sup>6</sup> The fact that ICANN conducts no commercial activity  
11 of any kind and has no financial interest in the actions of VeriSign or any of its  
12 competitors strongly undermines any notion of an antitrust conspiracy. *See Allied*  
13 *Tube*, 486 U.S. at 510 n.13 (noting that standard-setting associations consisting of  
14 members without economic interest in suppressing competition enjoy greater leeway  
15 under the antitrust laws); *Moore v. Boating Industry Ass'ns.*, 819 F.2d 693, 703, 712  
16 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendants did not compete with plaintiff, they had no incentive to  
17 exclude plaintiff's product). In *Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*,  
18 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.C. N.J. 1998), the court dismissed the section 1 claim on a  
19 Rule 12(b)(6) motion because "[t]he Sherman Act is aimed 'primarily at combinations  
20 having *commercial* objectives and is applied to a very limited extent to  
21 organizations . . . which normally have other objectives.'" *Id.* at 497 (quoting *Klor's*  
22 *Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.*, 359 U.S. 207, 214 (1959)).<sup>7</sup>

23  
24 <sup>5</sup> *See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 492, 501  
25 (1988); *Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst.*, 287 F. Supp. 2d  
26 1038, 1049 (D. Az. 2003).

27 <sup>6</sup> *See Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc.*, 704 F.2d 1449, 1453  
28 (9th Cir. 1983) (no Section 1 liability because none of the defendant Foundation  
officers was a veterinarian (as was the plaintiff)).

<sup>7</sup> Mere communications within trade associations and standard-setting  
organizations are not enough to establish antitrust liability. *Consolidated Metal*  
*Prods. v. American Petroleum Inst.*, 846 F.2d 284, 293-95 (5th Cir. 1988).

1 Second, VeriSign could not allege that ICANN's Board has been "captured"  
2 by its membership and is void of independent decision-making. This analysis  
3 would require a showing that the actions of some or all of those participating in the  
4 various ICANN processes should be vicariously imputed to ICANN, but there is no  
5 such allegation because the complaint concedes that the only entity qualified to take  
6 action on behalf of ICANN is its Board. Compl. ¶ 18.

7 In *Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n. v. Medical Service Ass'n. of Pennsylvania*, 745  
8 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1984), the court found that there was no structural conspiracy  
9 because there was no control by member dentists over an organizational board.  
10 Defendant's bylaws provided for management by a board of directors, consisting of at  
11 least half lay people and up to half professionals. At the time of the appeal, only two  
12 of the thirty-two board members were in competition with the plaintiffs. *Id.* at 253,  
13 258. The court found that, while either the board or management could refer certain  
14 matters to its standing committees, the "board of directors has ultimate responsibility  
15 for Blue Shield's business decisions," and the dentists did not control the defendant  
16 association. *Id.* at 258. "[W]e conclude that these committees were advisory only,  
17 that they were constituted and utilized as a resource to the board, that they participated  
18 in no activities anathematic to antitrust precepts, and rendered advice only when  
19 particularly solicited by the board." *Id.* "To give advice when asked by the  
20 decisionmaker is not equivalent to being the decisionmaker itself." *Id.* at 259.

21 As noted above, ICANN's Board has fifteen voting members who are  
22 selected from several different constituencies. The Board has the final authority to  
23 accept or reject a recommendation from its supporting organizations and advisory  
24 committees, and no Board member is permitted to vote on matters that could  
25 directly affect his or her own financial interests. Thus, any assertion that ICANN's  
26 Board has been "captured" by some portion of those who offer advice to the Board  
27 and also are VeriSign's competitors would be ludicrous.<sup>8</sup>

28 <sup>8</sup> While not relevant for purposes of this motion, the facts also would show  
that nearly all of the members of the ICANN Board are not associated with

1           Moreover, when the government encourages private standard-setting — or  
2 takes the analogous step as was done here — this factor also weighs against assuming  
3 a conspiracy. *See Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n*, 261  
4 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D. Or. 1966) ("A Commercial Standard must reflect a state of  
5 mind in the affected industry. The Department of Commerce will not publish one  
6 which is not accepted as satisfactory by the producers and users."), *aff'd*, 399 F.2d  
7 155, 156 (9th Cir. 1968); *Nat'l Ass'n of Review Appraisers & Mortgage Underwriters*  
8 *v. Appraisal Found.*, 64 F.3d 1130, 1134 (8th Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs' contention that the  
9 Foundation should not have membership standards was "clearly not what Congress  
10 intended when it vested the Foundation with the authority to establish standards" after  
11 the savings and loan crisis).

12                           **2. VeriSign's Allegations of Anticompetitive Effect Are**  
13                           **Insufficient.**

14           Allegations of "impact upon *competitive conditions* in the relevant market"  
15 are "absolutely essential" to stating a section 1 claim. *McGlinchy v. Shell Chem.*  
16 *Co.*, 845 F.2d 802, 812-813 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added); *Tanaka*, 252 F.3d at  
17 1064 (same). Thus, a section 1 claimant may not merely recite the bare legal  
18 conclusion that competition has been unreasonably restrained. *See Les Shockley*  
19 *Racing, Inc.*, 884 F.2d at 507. While VeriSign's complaint is replete with  
20 allegations that it has been "singled out" by arbitrary and discriminatory acts  
21 against it (*see, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 70, 115), these allegations do not support an injury to  
22 competition; by definition, they assert injury only to VeriSign. *See Rutman Wine*  
23 *Co.*, 829 F.2d at 736 ("if the facts do not at least outline or adumbrate a violation of  
24 the Sherman Act, the plaintiff will get nowhere merely by dressing them up in the  
25 language of antitrust.") (citation omitted.) "The elimination of a single competitor,

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 (continued...)

28 VeriSign's competitors (however defined) and would have no financial incentive to injure VeriSign.

1 without more, does not prove anticompetitive effect." *McGlinchy*, 845 F.2d at 812-  
2 813.

3 VeriSign's own allegations are inconsistent with any allegation of harm "to  
4 competition." For example, VeriSign alleges in paragraph 39 that "ICANN's  
5 improper conduct has deprived consumers of a beneficial new service and VeriSign  
6 of revenues and profits it would generate from and in connection with" VeriSign's  
7 wildcard. Yet, just four paragraphs earlier, VeriSign alleges that "[o]ther gTLD and  
8 ccTLD registries that compete with the .com gTLD . . . are currently offering  
9 services similar to" VeriSign's wildcard. Compl. ¶ 35; *see also* ¶ 69 (prior to  
10 October 3 Letter, wildcard "enabled VeriSign to compete more effectively with  
11 operators of competitive gTLD and ccTLD registries that are offering or intend to  
12 offer a similar service"). Even taking these allegations at face value, the  
13 elimination of a single potential competitor does not equate to the "effect on  
14 competition" that is required to allege a violation of section 1. *McGlinchy*, 845  
15 F.2d at 812-813; *see Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co.*,  
16 141 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (no injury to competition from temporary decline  
17 in the number of competitors).

### 18 **3. VeriSign Has Not Alleged Antitrust Standing Or Antitrust** 19 **Injury.**

20 Private antitrust plaintiffs must establish "antitrust standing." *Associated*  
21 *Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.*, 459 U.S. at 529-35. The most important element of  
22 antitrust standing is the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate "antitrust injury,  
23 which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and  
24 that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." *Brunswick Corp. v.*  
25 *Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.*, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). "To show antitrust injury, a  
26 plaintiff must prove that his loss flows from an anticompetitive aspect or effect of  
27 the defendant's behavior." *Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 51 F.3d 1421, 1433  
28 (9th Cir. 1995).

1 VeriSign has not alleged facts sufficient to show that anticompetitive  
2 consequences flowed from ICANN's alleged conduct, or that ICANN's alleged  
3 conduct is the kind of conduct that the antitrust laws are intended to prevent.  
4 Indeed, all VeriSign has alleged is that *it* has been "prevented from competing"  
5 because ICANN has misinterpreted the contract.

6 Numerous dismissals of antitrust claims have been premised on similar, self-  
7 centered allegations. For example, in *McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co.*, 845 F.2d  
8 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff alleged that it was driven from the market by  
9 its various competitors in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth  
10 Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for failure to allege  
11 antitrust injury because it "is injury to the market or to competition in general, not  
12 merely injury to individuals or individual firms that is significant," and plaintiff's  
13 own allegations showed that its rivals were thriving. *Id.* at 812-13; *McDaniel v.*  
14 *Appraisal Inst.*, 117 F.3d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1997) (competition not harmed by  
15 plaintiff's competitive disadvantage relative to market's many competitors).

16 VeriSign also has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that whatever  
17 injuries VeriSign has incurred proximately flow from any acts of ICANN that are  
18 even arguably anticompetitive. Even if VeriSign has been injured — an allegation  
19 ICANN disputes — VeriSign still would have to show that its injuries were the  
20 result of ICANN's anticompetitive acts. This is the concept of "antitrust injury" as  
21 opposed to some other form of injury. *See Heary Bros. Lightning Protection Co.,*  
22 *Inc.*, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1050 (citing *Brunswick*, 429 U.S. at 489 (1977) and  
23 stating Ninth Circuit requires but-for causation). But VeriSign has alleged only that  
24 its injuries have flowed from its own *voluntary acquiescence* to ICANN's  
25 interpretation of the Registry Agreement. Until the filing of this complaint,  
26 VeriSign has never sought to utilize the dispute resolution provisions of the contract  
27 in order to establish that ICANN's expressed views on these subjects were wrong.  
28 Instead, VeriSign made entirely voluntary decisions sometimes to defer to ICANN's

1 contractual interpretation and other times to act in spite of ICANN's views. Thus,  
2 any injury that VeriSign might have suffered was caused entirely by VeriSign's own  
3 conduct. *Serpa Corp. v. McWane, Inc.*, 199 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1999)  
4 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of antitrust injury where  
5 plaintiff's injuries flowed from a contract termination, not defendants'  
6 anticompetitive acts); *SouthTrust Corp. v. Plus Sys.*, 913 F. Supp. 1517, 1522 (N.D.  
7 Ala. 1995) (plaintiff did not establish antitrust injury from a contract plaintiff  
8 voluntarily executed and abided by).

9 \* \* \* \* \*

10 In summary, VeriSign has not adequately pled an antitrust claim against  
11 ICANN and could never do so, for all the reasons set forth above.

12 **II. VERISIGN'S SECOND THROUGH SIXTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**  
13 **SHOULD BE DISMISSED.**

14 VeriSign's second through sixth claims for relief are all premised on the  
15 allegation that ICANN's assertion of its interpretation of the parties' contract can  
16 somehow constitute a breach of contract or a tort. As a matter of law, it cannot.  
17 Moreover, VeriSign's allegations that its new services *are not even subject* to the  
18 Registry Agreement demonstrate the absurdity of its claim that ICANN has  
19 breached the agreement.

20 **A. There Is No Violation By Merely Asserting A Contractual**  
21 **Position.**

22 The common theme to VeriSign's allegations about ICANN's actions  
23 regarding VeriSign's new services is that, contrary to ICANN's interpretation,  
24 ICANN was "unauthorized to act" under the Registry Agreement. Compl. ¶ 31. As  
25 a matter of law, this cannot support a claim by VeriSign that ICANN has breached  
26 the contract or interfered with a separate VeriSign contract.

1           **1.     Asserting ICANN's Contract Interpretation Is Not A Breach.**

2           VeriSign's second, third, fifth and sixth claims allege that ICANN breached  
3 the Registry Agreement. Compl. ¶¶ 94, 101, 115, 124. In order to establish a claim  
4 for breach of contract, VeriSign must allege facts demonstrating a breach of the  
5 contract. *Hentzel v. Singer Co.*, 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 305 (1982). But the thrust  
6 of VeriSign's breach allegations is that ICANN was not authorized to hold a  
7 different view of the Registry Agreement from VeriSign, much less to threaten to  
8 enforce its interpretation of the agreement. Nothing in VeriSign's complaint alleges  
9 any action that could amount to a breach of the contract by ICANN.

10           VeriSign first claims that ICANN breached the parties' agreement by  
11 announcing that it would seek to enforce VeriSign's obligations under the parties'  
12 agreement unless VeriSign suspended the wildcard. Compl. ¶¶ 94, 101. Sending a  
13 letter complaining that the other party to a contract has breached its obligations, and  
14 threatening to utilize the dispute resolution provisions of the contract if necessary,  
15 cannot constitute a breach of the contract.<sup>9</sup> The October 3 Letter did not *force*  
16 VeriSign to suspend the wildcard; rather, VeriSign elected to suspend the service  
17 voluntarily (presumably because it recognized the strength of ICANN's position).  
18 A threat to do that which one has the legal right to do is not actionable by itself.  
19 *See Konecko v. Konecko*, 164 Cal. App. 2d 249 (1958).<sup>10</sup>

20           <sup>9</sup> *See Bill's Coal Co. v. Bd. of Public Utilities*, 682 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir.  
21 1982) (holding that the urging of a particular interpretation of a contract clause,  
22 even if in bad faith, "is neither a failure to perform contract obligations (breach) nor  
23 an indication those obligations will not be performed in the future (repudiation).");  
24 *Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.*, 71 F.2d 921, 923 (10th Cir. 1934) (holding  
25 that an offer to perform in accordance with the promisor's interpretation does not  
26 give rise to a breach: "If this were not the law, it would be a dangerous thing to  
stand upon a controverted construction of a contract. Every man would act at his  
peril in such cases, and be subjected to the alternative of acquiescing in the  
interpretation adopted by his opponent, or putting to hazard his entire interest in the  
contract. The courts have never imposed terms so harsh . . . It would amount to a  
virtual denial of the right to insist upon an honest, but erroneous, interpretation.")  
(citation omitted).

27           <sup>10</sup> VeriSign's second claim for injunctive relief should also be dismissed on  
28 the independent ground that VeriSign's alleged injuries are not irreparable. In order  
to establish a claim for injunctive relief, a complaint must allege irreparable injury  
and inadequacy of legal remedies. *Stanley v. University of S. Cal.*, 13 F.3d 1313,

1 Further, for VeriSign to demonstrate that the alleged threat breached the  
2 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, VeriSign must allege that ICANN  
3 agreed in the Registry Agreement that ICANN would not make threats to enforce  
4 its contractual rights (or even assert that VeriSign had breached the agreement).  
5 *Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc.*, 24 Cal. 4th 317, 349-50 (2000) ("The covenant of good  
6 faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one  
7 contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive *the*  
8 *benefits of the agreement actually made* . . . It cannot impose substantive duties or  
9 limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of  
10 their agreement." (emphasis in original)). But the agreement does not contain such  
11 terms, and it would be shocking if it did. How else, after all, can *ICANN* receive its  
12 benefits under the agreement if it cannot seek to enforce it? *See Pulver v. Avco*  
13 *Financial Services*, 182 Cal. App. 3d 622, 636 (1986) (dismissing claim for breach  
14 of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where plaintiff failed to  
15 demonstrate that the purpose behind the contract was to prevent defendant from  
16 threatening to take action or make statements).

17 VeriSign's remaining allegations of breach are premised mostly on ICANN's  
18 assertion that certain services VeriSign has offered or wishes to offer are subject to  
19 the Registry Agreement because they are "Registry Services." Compl. ¶¶ 72-76.  
20 VeriSign disagrees, and this disagreement can be resolved pursuant to the

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 (continued...)

23 1320 (9th Cir. 1994). An injury that was in part self-inflicted cannot be considered  
24 irreparable. *Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey*, 68 F.3d 828, 839  
25 (3rd Cir. 1995) ("If the harm complained of is self-inflicted, it does not qualify as  
26 irreparable"); *Ventura County Christian High Sch. v. City of San Buenaventura*, 233  
27 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1253 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (plaintiffs' "financial peril is due in part to  
28 their own failure to obtain a judicial determination of their rights and obligations at  
some earlier point in time. [Citation.] If the harm complained of is self-inflicted, it  
does not qualify as irreparable."). VeriSign's second claim for relief asserts that  
ICANN demanded that VeriSign suspend its wildcard. Compl. ¶ 94. After  
weighing the threat of suit by ICANN against the continued operation of the  
wildcard, VeriSign made a decision to suspend it. Compl. ¶ 95. Thus, any alleged  
injury was self-inflicted.

1 mechanisms set forth in the contract. But it is ludicrous to assert that the existence  
2 of a dispute over the meaning of terms of the contract creates a breach of the  
3 contract or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is clearly no  
4 express provision in the contract that prevents ICANN from asserting its own view  
5 of the contract's terms, and ICANN has obviously not frustrated VeriSign's right to  
6 receive the benefit of the agreement actually made merely by making assertions.<sup>11</sup>  
7 VeriSign can (although it chose not to until the filing of this complaint) take  
8 advantage of the dispute resolution provisions of the contract to resolve that  
9 disagreement. This seems particularly obvious where VeriSign's stated position is  
10 that the Registry Agreement does not even apply to these services (see section II.B.  
11 below); in those circumstances, VeriSign is obviously free to ignore ICANN's  
12 assertions, assuming it is comfortable in the correctness of its views.<sup>12</sup>  
13

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14 <sup>11</sup> VeriSign also states that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
15 has been breached because "it was understood and agreed between the parties that  
16 ICANN would not unreasonably withhold or delay consent to reasonable updates,  
17 upgrades, or other changes in the operation of or specifications for the registry."  
18 Compl. ¶ 30. But Paragraph II.35 of the Registry Agreement states that the contract  
19 and its appendices "constitutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto *pertaining*  
20 *to the operation of the Registry TLD* and supersedes all prior agreements,  
21 understandings, negotiations and discussions, whether oral or written, between the  
22 parties on that subject." RJN, Ex. E (emphasis added). See *Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l,*  
23 *Inc.*, 100 Cal. 4th 317, 348-349 (2000) (stating that an express provision of a  
24 contract trumps an asserted implied understanding).

25 <sup>12</sup> VeriSign's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to the Registry Agreement is  
26 also misplaced. VeriSign alleges that the agreement "expressly requires ICANN to  
27 indemnify VeriSign against any and all damages, liabilities, costs, and expenses,  
28 including reasonable legal fees and expenses, arising from VeriSign's compliance  
with an ICANN policy or specification established after the Effective Date of the  
agreement." Compl. ¶¶ 98, 103. In essence, VeriSign is claiming that, because the  
parties have a dispute concerning the meaning of "Registry Services," the  
indemnity provision means that ICANN should pay for VeriSign's attorneys' fees to  
litigate this dispute. But the Registry Agreement does not provide for attorneys'  
fees in the event the parties litigate a dispute. Absent explicit language to the  
contrary, a party to a contract may not invoke an indemnity provision when  
bringing an action under the contract itself. *Campbell v. Scripps Bank*, 78 Cal.  
App. 4th 1328, 1337 (2000) ("[T]he inclusion of attorney fees as an item of loss in a  
third party claim indemnity provision does not constitute a provision for the award  
of attorney fees in an action on contract."); *Myers Building Indus., Ltd. v. Interface*  
*Tech., Inc.*, 13 Cal. App. 4th 949, 962 (1993) (contractual third-party indemnity  
clause does not provide for attorney fees incurred in actions to enforce the  
contract).

1           **2.     Asserting ICANN's Contract Interpretation Is Not A Tort.**

2           VeriSign's fourth claim for intentional interference with contractual relations  
3 also arises directly (and solely) out of ICANN's assertion of its contract  
4 interpretation. Compl. ¶¶ 105-110. To state a claim for intentional interference  
5 with contractual relations, VeriSign must allege that: (1) there was a valid and  
6 existing contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant had knowledge  
7 of this contract; (3) defendant committed intentional acts that were designed to  
8 induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or  
9 disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) damages. *Scripps Clinic v. Sup.*  
10 *Ct.*, 108 Cal. App. 4th 917, 929 (2003). In support of this claim, VeriSign makes  
11 the bare assertion that, when ICANN sent VeriSign the October 3 Letter, ICANN  
12 "intended to disrupt [its] contractual relationship [with Provider]."<sup>13</sup>

13           Just as ICANN's mere assertion of its interpretation of the contract cannot  
14 constitute a breach of contract, nor can it be a tortious act.<sup>14</sup> *See Konecko*, 164 Cal.  
15 App. 2d 249 (a threat to do that which one has the legal right to do is not actionable  
16 by itself). It cannot be the case that ICANN's attempts to assert its rights under its  
17 contract with VeriSign can subject it to liability for interference with a separate  
18 contract VeriSign subsequently entered into with a different party.<sup>15</sup> *See Weststeyn*  
19 *Dairy 2 v. Eades Commodities Co.*, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2003)

20           <sup>13</sup> VeriSign's intent allegation is contradicted by the October 3 Letter itself.  
21 According to VeriSign, ICANN sent a letter to *VeriSign* asserting that ICANN  
22 intended to enforce its rights under ICANN's contract with *VeriSign*. Compl. ¶ 37.  
23 VeriSign made a choice to suspend the wildcard, and now it apparently earns less  
24 money from its contract with Provider. Compl. ¶ 108. VeriSign elected not to  
25 protect its relationship with Provider. The absence of any *factual* allegations that  
26 ICANN intended to interfere with VeriSign's relationship with Provider constitutes  
27 an independent ground for dismissal of VeriSign's fourth claim.

28           <sup>14</sup> California law precludes the assertion of a tort claim that is based only on  
an alleged breach of contract. *See Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc.*, 14 Cal.  
App. 4th 612 (1993) (affirming sustaining of demurrer on plaintiff's cause of action  
for intentional interference with business relations because the only real conduct  
alleged was breach of contract).

<sup>15</sup> Indeed, if ICANN is correct in its interpretation, the terms of the Registry  
Agreement itself prevented VeriSign from enjoying the fruits of its subsequent  
contract, not ICANN's assertion of its contract rights.

1 ("fact that [the defendant] knew [enforcing its right of foreclosure] would interfere  
2 with Plaintiffs' contracts 'may be regarded as such a minor and incidental  
3 consequence and so far removed from defendant's objective that as against the  
4 plaintiff the interference may be found not to be improper.'" (citation omitted)); *see*  
5 *also* Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. j ("If the actor is not acting  
6 criminally nor with fraud or violence or other means wrongful in themselves but is  
7 endeavoring to advance some interest of his own, the fact that he is aware that he  
8 will cause interference with the plaintiff's contract may be regarded as such a minor  
9 and incidental consequence and so far removed from the defendant's objective that  
10 as against the plaintiff the interference may be found to be not improper.").

11 In addition, ICANN's assertion of its contract position in the October 3 Letter  
12 is a protected communication under California's litigation privilege. Under  
13 California law, a "'communication[] preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing  
14 of an action or other official proceeding [is] within the protection of the litigation  
15 privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).'" *eCash Technologies, Inc. v.*  
16 *Guagliardo*, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting *Dove Audio,*  
17 *Inc. v. Rosenfeld*, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 784 (1996) (granting 12(b)(6) dismissing  
18 all state law tort claims based on privileged letter); *Aronson v. Kinsella*, 58 Cal.  
19 App. 4th 254 (1997) (confirming immunity of prelitigation statement made in  
20 connection with proposed litigation that is "contemplated in good faith and under  
21 serious consideration").

22 By VeriSign's own admission, ICANN's October 3 Letter to VeriSign is a  
23 communication protected by the litigation privilege. VeriSign alleges that in the  
24 Letter ICANN asserted the wildcard "was inconsistent with the 2001 .com Registry  
25 Agreement and threatened VeriSign that, unless Site Finder was suspended  
26 forthwith, ICANN would initiate legal proceedings against VeriSign." Compl.

1 ¶ 37. Thus, the October 3 Letter was a "demand letter," and California law bars any  
2 tort claims based on it.<sup>16</sup>

3 **B. VeriSign's Allegations that the New Services Are Not Even Subject**  
4 **to the Registry Agreement Defeats its Contract Claims.**

5 VeriSign alleges that the new "services" it has sought to offer are not even  
6 the subject of the .com Registry Agreement. Compl. ¶ 73. Nevertheless, the basis  
7 for VeriSign's second, third, fifth, and sixth claims is that ICANN's conduct with  
8 respect to those proposed new services constitutes a *breach of the Registry*  
9 *Agreement*. Compl. ¶¶ 77-82. This makes no sense: if these services are not  
10 "subject to" the Registry Agreement, then ICANN cannot have breached the  
11 agreement by taking views concerning the services, since those views are irrelevant.  
12 Either VeriSign's actions that were challenged by ICANN are properly the subject  
13 of the .com Registry Agreement (which ICANN contends), or they are not (as  
14 VeriSign contends in paragraph 73). VeriSign's inconsistent pleading cannot  
15 survive a motion to dismiss. *Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.*, 140  
16 F. Supp. 906, 908 (S.D. Cal. 1953), *rev'd on other grounds*, 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.  
17 1956) (dismissing claim where inconsistent allegations are pled in the same claim);  
18 *Eichman v. Fotomat Corp.*, 880 F.2d 149, 164 (9th Cir. 1989) (party cannot claim a  
19 breach of contract for obligations not within the contract).

20 In a variation of this allegation, VeriSign makes a series of allegations that  
21 the new services it has sought to offer do not fall "within the meaning of 'Registry  
22 Services,'" and, apparently for that reason, are not subject to VeriSign's obligations  
23 under the contract. *See* Compl. ¶ 36, 43, 51, 59. While ICANN does not share this  
24 view, ICANN, unlike VeriSign, does not take the position that VeriSign's particular  
25 interpretation of the contract is a breach of that contract. But taking this allegation

26 <sup>16</sup> Indeed, had ICANN filed suit against VeriSign for breach of contract, that  
27 suit would have been protected activity under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine  
28 discussed below. The notion that a letter threatening to file suit — clearly a less  
aggressive act — could be a tort is absurd. *See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear*  
*Stearns & Co.*, 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1123, 1133-1134 (1990).

1 as true for the purposes of this motion, it logically follows that ICANN cannot  
2 breach the contract by asserting positions that are not relevant to the contract.<sup>17</sup>  
3 Notably, VeriSign has not, and cannot, allege that the Registry Agreement places  
4 any affirmative obligation upon ICANN *to avoid* directing actions to non-"Registry  
5 Services."

6 **III. VERISIGN'S ANTITRUST, CONTRACT, AND TORT CLAIMS**  
7 **ARE NOT RIPE.**

8 "A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 'contingent future events  
9 that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.'" *Texas v. United*  
10 *States*, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1997) (quoting *Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.*  
11 *Co.*, 473 U.S. 568, 580-581 (1985). The "basic rationale" of the ripeness doctrine is  
12 "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from  
13 entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387  
14 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).

15 VeriSign's Sherman Act, contract, and tort claims (claims 1-6) are not ripe  
16 because they depend on future contingencies: all require a predicate finding that  
17 ICANN's asserted position on the underlying dispute with respect to VeriSign's  
18 proposed services is incorrect. If ICANN is right, ICANN's assertion of valid rights  
19 under the contract could in no way be anticompetitive or a breach of the contract.<sup>18</sup>  
20 Thus, the Court cannot decide claims 1-6 in the absence of a determination on the  
21 central dispute between the parties (*i.e.*, whether the contract applies to VeriSign's

22 <sup>17</sup> For example, if ICANN argued that the Registry Agreement gave ICANN  
23 the right to have input on the type of health plans that VeriSign offered to its  
24 employees, VeriSign presumably could and would ignore ICANN's views, since the  
offering of health plans to employees is not a "Registry Service or otherwise  
governed by the agreement."

25 <sup>18</sup> Indeed, ICANN's alleged "threat to initiate legal proceedings" under the  
Registry Agreement (Compl. ¶ 37) also is protected from a Sherman Act attack by  
26 the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. See *E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor*  
*Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); *United Mine Workers v. Pennington*, 381 U.S.  
27 657 (1965); see also *Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt*, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367  
(5th Cir. 1983) (the litigator is not protected only when he strikes without warning:  
28 "If litigation is in good faith, a token of that sincerity is a warning that it will be  
commenced and a possible effort to compromise the dispute.").

1 services). *See, e.g., Systems Council EM-3 v. AT&T Corp.*, 159 F.3d 1376, 1383  
2 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (contract claim unripe because premised on unactualized  
3 possibility); *Johnson v. Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Corp.*, 951 F.2d 1268, 1273  
4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring actual termination of physician privileges for section 1  
5 claim to be ripe).

6 Courts do not allow the interposition of antitrust issues into contractual  
7 disputes because the factual and legal complexity of antitrust claims would "convert  
8 a fairly simple contract dispute into such an unwieldy process." *Dickstein v.*  
9 *duPont*, 443 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir. 1971); *accord, e.g., Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem*  
10 *Prods., Inc.*, 526 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to "convert a facially  
11 simple litigation [over a contract] into one involving the complexities of antitrust  
12 law"). Allowing antitrust issues to be introduced into contract disputes "would  
13 threaten to involve parties claiming under the contract in litigation so protracted and  
14 expensive that they might be coerced into unsatisfactory settlements or be  
15 compelled to forego any prosecution of their claims." *Id.*, 526 F.2d at 599. Thus,  
16 even where parties attempt to assert antitrust claims as a *defense* in contract actions,  
17 courts often preclude them from doing so. *See id.*; *Arkla Air Conditioning Co. v.*  
18 *Famous Supply Co.*, 551 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1977).

## 19 CONCLUSION

20 VeriSign's first six claims for relief are deficient as a matter of law, and the  
21 deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Therefore, ICANN urges the Court to  
22 dismiss VeriSign's first six claims for relief with prejudice.

23 Dated: April 5, 2004 JONES DAY

24  
25 By: \_\_\_\_\_  
26 Jeffrey A. LeVee

27 Attorneys for Defendant  
28 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR  
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<b>Page</b>
1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
2 BACKGROUND REGARDING ICANN.....	2
3 SUMMARY OF VERISIGN'S ALLEGATIONS.....	4
4     Wildcard Allegations.....	4
5     WLS Allegations .....	5
6     ConsoliDate Allegations.....	6
7     Internationalized Domain Name Allegations.....	6
8     Marketing Program Allegations .....	7
9 LEGAL STANDARD .....	7
10 ARGUMENT .....	8
11 I. VERISIGN'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1 CLAIM .....	8
12     A. VeriSign Has Failed to Allege Any Facts that Support Its Section 1 Claim.....	8
13         1. VeriSign's "Conspiracy" Allegations Are Insufficient.....	9
14         2. VeriSign's Allegations of Anticompetitive Effect Are Insufficient.....	14
15         3. VeriSign Has Not Alleged Antitrust Standing Or Antitrust Injury.....	15
16 II. VERISIGN'S SECOND THROUGH SIXTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF SHOULD BE DISMISSED .....	17
17     A. There Is No Violation By Merely Asserting A Contractual Position.....	17
18         1. Asserting ICANN's Contract Interpretation Is Not A Breach .....	18
19         2. Asserting ICANN's Contract Interpretation Is Not A Tort .....	21
20     B. VeriSign's Allegations that the New Services Are Not Even Subject to the Registry Agreement Defeats its Contract Claims.....	23
21 III. VERISIGN'S ANTITRUST, CONTRACT, AND TORT CLAIMS ARE NOT RIPE .....	24
22 CONCLUSION.....	25
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

1 **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

2

3 **CASES**

4 *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,*  
387 U.S. 136 (1967).....24

5 *Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co.,*  
141 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1998).....15

6 *Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,*  
486 U.S. 492 (1988).....12

7 *Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric*  
8 *Surgery,*  
185 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1999).....11

9 *Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig.),*  
10 89 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1996).....7

11 *Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,*  
12 971 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1997).....10

13 *Arkla Air Conditioning Co. v. Famous Supply Co.,*  
14 551 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1977).....25

15 *Aronson v. Kinsella,*  
16 58 Cal. App. 4th 254 (1997).....22

17 *Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,*  
18 459 U.S. 519 (1983).....9, 15

19 *Bill's Coal Co. v. Bd. of Public Utilities,*  
20 682 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1982).....18

21 *Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,*  
22 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.C. N.J. 1998).....12

23 *Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,*  
24 429 U.S. 477 (1977).....15, 16

25 *Campbell v. Scripps Bank,*  
26 78 Cal. App. 4th 1328 (2000).....20

27 *Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey,*  
28 68 F.3d 828 (3rd Cir. 1995).....19

*Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,*  
745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).....9

*Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt,*  
694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).....24

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**  
**(continued)**

		<b>Page</b>
3	<i>Columbia River People’s Utility Dist. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co.</i> ,	
4	217 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).....	11
5	<i>Consolidated Metal Prods. v. American Petroleum Inst.</i> ,	
6	846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988).....	12
7	<i>Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp.</i> ,	
8	467 U.S. 752 (1984).....	11
9	<i>Dickstein v. duPont</i> ,	
10	443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971).....	25
11	<i>Dotster, Inc. et al. v. ICANN</i> ,	
12	Case No. CV 03-5045 JFW.....	2
13	<i>Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld</i> ,	
14	47 Cal. App. 4th 777 (1996).....	22
15	<i>E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.</i> ,	
16	365 U.S. 127 (1961).....	24
17	<i>eCash Technologies, Inc. v. Guagliardo</i> ,	
18	127 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2000).....	22
19	<i>Eichman v. Fotomat Corp.</i> ,	
20	880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989).....	23
21	<i>Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller &amp; Smith Holding Co.</i> ,	
22	14 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 1994).....	10
23	<i>Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah College of Art &amp; Design</i> ,	
24	244 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001).....	9
25	<i>Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc.</i> ,	
26	24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000).....	19, 20
27	<i>Healthamerica Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Susquehanna Health Sys.</i> ,	
28	278 F. Supp. 2d 423 (M.D. Penn. 2003).....	11
	<i>Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst.</i> ,	
	287 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Az. 2003).....	12, 16
	<i>Hentzel v. Singer Co.</i> ,	
	138 Cal. App 3d 290 (1982).....	18
	<i>Johnson v. Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Corp.</i> ,	
	951 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1991).....	25
	<i>Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc.</i> ,	
	14 Cal. App. 4th 612 (1993).....	21

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**  
**(continued)**

		<b>Page</b>
3	<i>Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.</i> , 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1934).....	18
5	<i>Kingray, Inc. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n</i> , 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).....	8
6	<i>Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.</i> , 359 U.S. 207 (1959).....	12
8	<i>Konecko v. Konecko</i> , 164 Cal. App. 2d 249 (1958).....	18, 21
9	<i>Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n</i> , 884 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1989).....	8, 9, 14
11	<i>Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.</i> 753 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1985), <i>cert. denied</i> , 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).....	10
12	<i>McDaniel v. Appraisal Inst.</i> , 117 F.3d 421 (9th Cir. 1997).....	16
14	<i>McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co.</i> , 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).....	14, 15, 16
15	<i>Moore v. Boating Industry Ass'ns.</i> , 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987).....	12
17	<i>Myers Building Indus., Ltd. v. Interface Tech., Inc.</i> , 13 Cal. App. 4th 949 (1993).....	20
18	<i>Nat'l Ass'n of Review Appraisers &amp; Mortgage Underwriters v. Appraisal Found.</i> , 64 F.3d 1130 (8th Cir. 1995).....	14
20	<i>Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs. (U.S.A.), Inc.</i> , 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987).....	10
21	<i>Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery &amp; Printing Co.</i> , 472 U.S. 284 (1985).....	8
23	<i>Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC</i> , 630 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1980), <i>cert. denied</i> , 450 U.S. 917 (1981).....	9
24	<i>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns &amp; Co.</i> , 50 Cal.3d 1118 (1990).....	23
26	<i>Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n. v. Medical Service Ass'n. of Pennsylvania</i> , 745 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir. 1984).....	13
27	<i>Pulver v. Avco Financial Services</i> , 182 Cal. App. 3d 622 (1986).....	19

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**  
**(continued)**

		<b>Page</b>
3	<i>Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co.</i> , 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).....	15
4		
5	<i>Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.</i> , 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990).....	8
6	<i>Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc.</i> , 704 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1983).....	12
7		
8	<i>Rutman Wine Co. v. E. &amp; J. Gallo Winery</i> , 829 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1987).....	9, 14
9	<i>Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.</i> , 859 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1988).....	7
10		
11	<i>Scripps Clinic v. Sup. Ct.</i> , 108 Cal. App. 4th 917 (2003).....	21
12	<i>Serpa Corp. v. McWane, Inc.</i> , 199 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1999).....	17
13		
14	<i>SouthTrust Corp. v. Plus Sys.</i> , 913 F. Supp. 1517 (N.D. Ala. 1995).....	17
15	<i>Sprewell v. Golden St. Warriors</i> , 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).....	7
16		
17	<i>Stanley v. University of S. Cal.</i> , 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).....	19
18	<i>Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.</i> , 140 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Cal. 1953), <i>rev'd on other grounds</i> , 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).....	23
19		
20	<i>Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n</i> , 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 1966) <i>aff'd</i> , 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968).....	14
21		
22	<i>Systems Council EM-3 v. AT&amp;T Corp.</i> , 159 F.3d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1998).....	25
23	<i>Tanaka v. University of S. Cal.</i> , 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).....	8, 14
24		
25	<i>Texas v. United States</i> , 523 U.S. 296 (1997).....	24
26	<i>Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.</i> , 473 U.S. 568 (1985).....	24
27		
28	<i>United Mine Workers v. Pennington</i> , 381 U.S. 657 (1965).....	24

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22  
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24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**  
**(continued)**

	<b>Page</b>
<i>United States v. Grinnell Corp.</i> , 384 U.S. 563 (1966) .....	9
<i>Ventura County Christian High Sch. v. City of San Buenaventura</i> , 233 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (C.D. Cal. 2002) .....	19
<i>Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Tandem Prods., Inc.</i> , 526 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975).....	25
<i>Weststeyn Dairy 2 v. Eades Commodities Co.</i> , 280 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (E.D. Cal. 2003).....	21

**STATUTES**

15 U.S.C. § 1.....	8
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 .....	22

**RULES**

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .....	1
Local Rule 7-3 .....	1