Kelly O. Scott (SBN 132186) 1 kscott@ecilaw.com Heather L. McCloskey (SBN 193239) 2 hmccloskey@ecjlaw.com ERVIN, COHEN & JESSUP LLP 3 9401 Wilshire Boulevard, Ninth Floor Beverly Hills, California 90212-2974 Telephone (310) 273-6333 4 Facsimile (310) 859-2325 5 Attorneys for REGISTERFLY.COM, INC. AND UNIFIEDNAMES, INC. 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION 9 10 THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR) CASE NO. CV 07-2089 R (PLAX) 11 ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, 12 **EXPARTE APPLICATION TO** Plaintiff. MODIFY INJUNCTION OR, IN THE 13 ALTERNATIVE, TO RECONSIDER ٧. ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 14 REGISTERFLY.COM, INC., and **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT** UNIFIED NAMES, INC. . 15 THEREOF 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Defendants RegisterFly.com, Inc. ("RegisterFly") and UnifiedNames, Inc. (hereinafter "defendants") bring this ex parte application seeking modification of the 20 preliminary and permanent injunctions entered by this Court or, in the alternative, 21 for reconsideration of this Court's entry of the preliminary and permanent 22 injunctions against RegisterFly. The portion of the injunctive relief which 23 defendants seek to have modified is the requirement for defendants to post the 24 notice on the website www.registerfly.com regarding the termination of its ICANN 25 registrar accreditation. The grounds for seeking modification of the injunctions is 26 that circumstances have changed since the time the injunctions were entered which 27 render that portion of the injunction unnecessary for protection of the public, and 28

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup LEP

IDOCS:12846.1:578361.1

serving no legitimate purpose, while causing injury to defendants' business. The grounds for seeking reconsideration are that there has been a change in facts since the Court's rulings on the injunctions, and that there was a manifest failure to this Court to consider facts presented to the Court which divest this Court of jurisdiction to enter a permanent injunction.

This Application is based upon this notice, the memorandum of points and authorities attached hereto, the declaration of Heather L. McCloskey re: notice and declarations of Kevin Medina and Heather L. McCloskey In Support Of Ex Parte Application and exhibits thereto filed concurrently herewith; such other matter as may be filed with the Court prior to the hearing on the motion; and the pleadings, records and files in this action.

Notice of defendants' intent to file this Application was given by e-mail on May 31, 2007. Plaintiff's counsel has indicated that plaintiff plans to oppose this application. (See Declaration of Heather L. McCloskey re: Notice, ¶2.)

DATED: June 4, 2007

ERVIN, COHEN & JESSUP LLP Kelly O. Scott Heather L. McCloskey

By: Nathur I McClo

Attorneys for REGISTERFLY.COM, INC.

AND UNIFIEDNAMES, INC.

ĺ		TABLE OF CONTENTS			
2				<u>Page</u>	
3	MEN	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES			
5	II.	I. INTRODUCTION			
6	II.	PER	RTINENT FACTS	2	
7		A.	Procedural History	2	
8		B.	RegisterFly Is No Longer A Registrar	4	
9		C.	The Difference Between A Domain Name Registrar And A Reseller	5	
10	III.				
11		A.	Basis For Ex Parte Relief	6	
12 13		B.	Standards For Determining Whether An Injunction Should Be Modified	7	
13	IV.	CON	NCLUSION		
15					
16			•		
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup LLP

| IDOCS:12846.1:578361.1

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES			
2	Page			
3	CASES			
4	A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (2002)			
5	Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001)			
6	Clark v. Coye, 60 F. 3d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1995)			
7	System Federation No. 91. Railway Employees Den't v. Wright 2011 C. C.			
8				
9	Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S.			
10	468 (1989) 11			
11				
12	RULES			
13	Central District California Local Rule 7-189			
14	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)			
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup LLP

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants RegisterFly.com, Inc. and UnifiedNames, Inc. (hereinafter "defendants") bring this *ex parte* application seeking modification of the preliminary and permanent injunctions entered by this Court or, in the alternative, for reconsideration of this Court's entry of the permanent injunction entered on May 25, 2007. Defendants do not wish to modify the entirety of the injunctive relief granted, but rather, only the portion of the injunctive relief which affirmatively requires defendants to post a notice on the www.registerfly.com website that their accreditation as an ICANN registrar has been terminated.

The relevant case law is clear that this Court retains the inherent power to modify, alter or dissolve an injunction at any time on consideration of new facts or changed circumstances. As demonstrated herein, defendants have met their burden. More specifically, at the time the injunction was issued, ICANN argued, and the Court accepted, that defendants had the ability to continue to register domain names, and thus, the notice provision advising purchasers that www.registerfly.com was no longer an accredited registrar was necessary to protect the public at large. At the present time, however, defendants have ceased any and all registrar functions and have removed all language on the www.registerfly.com website that references defendants as domain name registrars (defendants are still resellers of domain names but this is not at issue in this action and is not the subject of ICANN's claim for injunctive relief). Thus, the notice that the Court ordered defendants to post on the www.registerfly.com website is moot, serves no legitimate purpose, and merely works to damage defendants' business reputation and goodwill as all users who access the website for other of defendants' legitimate business services are called to question the notice contained thereon. Thus, of present, the injunction has an overly punitive effect which is expressly contrary to the public policy concerns espoused as the rationale for injunctive relief in the first instance.

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup LLP

IDOCS:12846.1:578361.1

-1-

1 2 order. As relevant hereto, a motion for reconsideration may be based on the emergence of new material facts occurring after the time of the decision and/or a 3 manifest showing of the Court's failure to consider material facts presented to the 4 Court before its decision. As argued with respect to defendants' motion to modify 5 specific portions of the preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, the fact that defendants no longer acts as a domain name registrar and the efforts they have taken 7 in this regard are new and material facts that warrant the Court's reconsideration of 8 9 its prior order. Moreover, at the time of hearing on the permanent injunction, the Court failed to consider material facts presented which divest this Court of 10 jurisdiction to enter a permanent injunction. More specifically, the parties entered 11 into an agreement to arbitrate any and all disputes, which agreement to arbitrate 12 permitted the respective parties to file an action outside of the arbitral forum solely 13 and exclusively for the purpose of obtaining a temporary restraining order and/or 14 preliminary injunction. Thus, defendants request that this Court reconsider the 15 granting of the permanent injunction on the basis that such order exceeds the

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

PERTINENT FACTS

Procedural History A.

In order to obtain its ICANN accreditation as a domain name registrar, RegisterFly entered into the Registrar Accreditation Agreement ("RAA") which fully sets forth the terms of the accreditation. The RAA also provides, in Section 5.6, specific procedures for the resolution of disputes arising under the RAA, including the right for either party to elect to initiate arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association. (Medina Decl., Exh. "A".)

jurisdiction boundaries dictated by the parties' agreement to arbitrate.

In the alternative, defendants move this Court for reconsideration of its prior

26

28

The RAA, which is in RegisterFly's former name, Top Class Names, Inc., is attached to the Complaint filed by ICANN, and is attached to the Declaration of Kevin Medina, filed herewith, as Exhibit "A".

²⁷

On March 17, 2007, ICANN gave notice to RegisterFly that the RAA would be terminated as of March 31, 2007. (Medina Decl., ¶3.) Pursuant to Section 5.6 of the RAA, RegisterFly initiated arbitration proceedings on March 28, 2007 with the American Arbitration Association seeking resolution of the dispute. (Medina Decl., Exh. "B".) RegisterFly filed a demand for arbitration, seeking a determination that (a) the termination was inappropriate, null, and void, and (b) the RAA remains in full force and effect. RegisterFly also requested a stay of the termination until a determination has been made – which is provided for in the RAA.²

On March 29, 2007 – after RegisterFly had initiated arbitration proceedings – ICANN filed this lawsuit. Pursuant to Section 5.6 of the RAA, the remedies available to ICANN from the Court once RegisterFly invoked the arbitration provision were limited to the provisional remedies of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to be in place until resolution of the dispute through arbitration.

The RAA provides, in Section 5.6, in pertinent part:

For the purpose of aiding the arbitration and/or preserving the rights of the parties during the pendency of an arbitration, the parties shall have the right to seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief from the arbitration panel or in a court located in Los Angeles, California, USA, which shall not be a waiver of this arbitration agreement.

(Medina Decl., Exh. "A") Consistent with this provision, the Complaint filed by ICANN on March 29, 2007 seeks imposition of *preliminary injunctive relief*.

² The Demand for Arbitration form filed by RegisterFly on March 28, 2007 is attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Kevin Medina, served and filed herewith, and was previously submitted to this Court with RegisterFly's response to the OSC re: permanent injunction attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Robert O'Neil of RegisterFly.

This Court entered a temporary restraining order on April 16, 2007 and a preliminary injunction on April 26, 2007. These remedies are authorized by the RAA, despite the fact that an arbitration had been initiated on March 28, 2007. (Medina Decl., Exh. "A".) Further, however, this Court entered a permanent injunction on May 25, 2007, which clearly exceeds the permissible relief which may be obtained by ICANN under the RAA. (*Id.*) In opposing the entry of the permanent injunction, RegisterFly submitted in its papers evidence of (1) the status of the pending arbitration proceedings, and (2) the limitations on the relief which may be granted ICANN by this Court under the RAA. Despite submitting this evidence, the Court noted during oral argument on May 25, 2007 that it had not been presented with evidence of the pending arbitration. (McCloskey Decl., ¶3.)

B. RegisterFly Is No Longer A Registrar

Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, and even prior to RegisterFly initiating arbitration proceedings to have a determination made whether ICANN's cancellation of RegisterFly's accreditation as a domain name registrar, ICANN voiced to RegisterFly that it strongly desired for RegisterFly to cease acting as a registrar, and to transfer all of its registered domain names to some other ICANN-accredited domain name registrar. (Medina Decl., ¶3.) Upon receiving this request in mid-March of 2007, RegisterFly began negotiations to sell all of its registered domain names to another ICANN-accredited domain name registrar. (*Id.*) Of course, such a significant sale and transfer of data to a purchaser took a great deal of effort and time to accomplish. (*Id.*) RegisterFly informed ICANN of the status of these efforts at every step of the process and informed ICANN on Friday, May 25, 2007 that the transfer was all but finalized. (*Id.*) ICANN announced the completion of the transfer on May 29, 2007. (*Id.*, Exh. "C".) Upon completion of the transfer

The evidence submitted included RegisterFly's demand for arbitration, filed March 28, 2007 and the RAA, which were attached to the Declaration of Robert O'Neil as Exhibits "B" and "A", respectively.

of RegisterFly's domain names to Godaddy, RegisterFly ceased being a domain name registrar and, given the status of its ICANN accreditation, is unable to recommence providing the services of a registrar until that dispute is resolved. (Medina Decl., ¶¶7-10.) RegisterFly no longer has access to domain name registries, has no access to its registrar account, and is incapable of acting as a domain name registrar. (*Id.*) Thus, even if RegisterFly wanted to act as a registrar, it could not do so. (*Id.*)

Given RegisterFly's inability to act as a domain name registrar, requiring RegisterFly to continue to post the notice on its website regarding the termination of its ICANN registrar accreditation serves no purpose whatsoever, and threatens to injure RegisterFly's remaining business. RegisterFly continues to offer services other than those of a domain name registrar, such as reselling domain names (registered by ICANN-accredited registrars), web site hosting, ssl certificates, site builder tools to name just a few items. (*Id.*) RegisterFly has been a reseller of domain names for the past six (6) years and only last year become operational as a registrar. (*Id.*) Over 65% of the value of RegisterFly is not in the reselling or sale of domain names. (*Id.*) If the notice requirement of the injunction is continued, it will have a detrimental impact on RegisterFly's domain name reselling business, as the notice does not make mention that RegisterFly has transferred those names for which it was the registrar to another entity and, therefore, the names that can be purchased on the www.registerfly.com website are names for *resale*. (*Id.*)

C. The Difference Between A Domain Name Registrar And A Reseller

ICANN has never raised any objection to defendants' acting as a reseller of domain names, and has no reason to do so. ICANN's counsel's continued insistence that there is something inappropriate about offering the ability to search for and purchase domain names on www.registerfly.com is simply misleading this Court in reliance on the Court's lack of understanding as to how domain name sales and registrations work. The failure of ICANN to accurately inform the Court as to the

nature of the activities undertaken by RegisterFly has rendered the Court's orders overreaching and inappropriate. Therefore, an explanation of the difference between a registrar and a reseller of domain names is warranted.

The difference between a reseller and a registrar is not obvious from simply viewing a website and seeking to purchase a domain name. As a registrar, entities have direct connections/access to each respective domain name registry. (Medina Decl., ¶11.) For example, when a domain name is purchased, a registrar uses its registry connection to check availability of the requested domain. (*Id.*) If available, the registrar then uses the required purchase commands with the required attributes (all established by ICANN) and this would secure the name via the registrar's account. (*Id.*) The purchase would debit the registrar's registry account. (*Id.*) The same goes for domain name management. (*Id.*) When a client wishes to change the name servers of a domain name, the registrar would use its credentials to authenticate at the registry and make the required changes. (*Id.*)

The role of a reseller is different. Resellers do <u>not</u> have direct registry access. (*Id.*, ¶12.) Rather, a reseller uses a registrar's application programming interface to check domain names, purchase or manage. (*Id.*) Any purchases of domain names from a reseller are deducted from the reseller's account. (*Id.*) When names are registered, the actual registrar whose name it is will show as the registrar of record, not the reseller. (*Id.*)

RegisterFly's new role is strictly as a reseller of domain names, and it uses an ICANN-accredited registrar to actually serve as the registrar of record. In addition, RegisterFly provides a suite of additional services outside of domain name registrations (e.g. hosting, ssl certs, site tools, etc).

III. ARGUMENT

A. Basis For Ex Parte Relief

Good cause exists for the requested ex parte relief. The need for this motion did not arise until very recently – when (1) RegisterFly's transfer of all of its domain

name registrations to Godaddy.com, an ICANN-accredited domain name registrar, was finalized so that RegisterFly no longer has any registrations or any ability to act as a domain name registrar, and (2) on May 25, 2007, when this Court entered a permanent injunction against RegisterFly. The need for the requested relief is urgent because the notice requirement of the injunction entered against RegisterFly no longer serves any purpose whatsoever, and is effectively punishing RegisterFly—which is not a permissible basis for injunctive relief under the RAA. There is insufficient time to have this motion heard on regular notice, as the punitive aspect of the injunction is causing and will continue to cause RegisterFly irreparable injury to its reputation, good will, and customer relations until it is lifted.

B. Standards For Determining Whether An Injunction Should Be Modified

Because an injunction by its very nature is a judgment of prospective application subject to continuing supervision, and because injunctive matters are generally open-ended in nature, a trial court retains the inherent power to modify, alter or dissolve the injunction at any time on consideration of new facts or changed circumstances. *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (2002). In this regard, the relevant portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Section 60(b) provide that, on motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding where "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application" or for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. FRCP R. 60(b) sub. 5 and 6. This provision clearly provides a Court the power to modify an injunction upon such a showing.

The Supreme Court's decision in *System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees Dep't v. Wright*, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) and the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Clark v. Coye*, 60 F. 3d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1995) are instructive. In *System Federation*, the Court acknowledged that an injunction is subject always to

adaptation as future events may shape the need:

There is also no dispute that a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen. . . . [T]he court cannot be required to disregard significant changes in law or fact if it is 'satisfied that what it was been doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong.

Id. (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932)).

Further, in *Clark*, the Ninth Court made clear that this premise is especially true as it relates to permanent injunctions: "Because permanent injunctive relief controls future conduct, federal courts must be sensitive to the need for modification when circumstances change. [Internal citation omitted]. A sensitivity to the need for modification is particularly important when an injunction involved changing conduct and facts not predicted at the time the injunction was issued." *Clark*, 60 F. 3d at 604. As demonstrated herein, there are newly discovered additional facts that were not, nor could have been raised, at the time of the hearing on the OSC re Permanent Injunction that warrant a slight modification to the Court's prior order.

C. The Preliminary And Permanent Injunctions Entered Should Be Modified Based On A Change In Circumstances

At the time this Court entered the Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, RegisterFly still possessed and maintained domain name registrations, so its conduct in connection with those registrations was the subject matter of the dispute pending in arbitration. However, since that time – and as acknowledged by ICANN on May 29, 2007, RegisterFly has since sold and completed the transfer of all of its registrations to Godaddy.com, an ICANN-

5

accredited registrar. (Medina Decl., ¶7-9) RegisterFly no longer has any direct access to any domain name registries. (*Id.*) RegisterFly no longer has any access to its registrar account. (*Id.*) Thus, even though the status of its ICANN-accreditation is still at issue in the arbitration proceedings, RegisterFly is incapable of functioning as a registrar. Since the notice provision of the injunctions entered against RegisterFly were for the purpose of protecting the public seeking to utilize RegisterFly's registrar services, the notice provision no longer serves any purpose.

In addition, with this change in status, this notice provision is in violation of the terms of the RAA, which provides, in Section 5.6, that the injunctive relief available to ICANN is limited to the purpose of "aiding the arbitration and/or preserving the rights of the parties during the pendency of an arbitration[.]" (Medina Decl., Exh. "A".) No such purpose is being served by this provision since RegisterFly is no longer able to offer the services of a registrar.

D. In The Alternative, This Court Should Reconsider Its Ruling Granting The Preliminary And Permanent Injunction As A Result Of A Change In Circumstances

Pursuant to Central District California Local Rule 7-18 ("Local Rule 7-18), a motion for reconsideration may be made on any the following grounds: (1) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court at the time of hearing that could not have been reasonably known to the party seeking reconsideration, (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such decision, and/or (3)a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before its decision. As demonstrated herein, each of these three standards for reconsideration is met for separate, yet equally persuasive, reasons.

3

4 5

7 8

6

11

10

12 13

15 16

17

18 19

20 21

22 23

24 25

26 27

28

New Material Facts Have Emerged After the Time Of The Hearing 1. On The Motion re Preliminary/Permanent Injunction.

Since the entry of the temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction, RegisterFly is no longer able to function as a registrar and has transferred all of its registrations to Godaddy.com, an ICANN-accredited registrar. (Medina Decl., Exh. "A".) As a result, there is no longer any purpose served by the notice requirement in the injunctions entered, and the injunctions serve only to punish RegisterFly. Under Clark, this Court "must be sensitive to the need for modification when circumstances change." Clark, supra, 60 F. 3d at 604. This change in circumstances especially warrants a change in the injunction because, as discussed in Clark, "A sensitivity to the need for modification is particularly important when an injunction involved changing conduct and facts not predicted at the time the injunction was issued." Id. The injunctions entered include the mandatory injunction requiring the posting of the notices described herein. Since the conduct which the notices are intended to prohibit is now impossible, the notice requirement serves only to punish RegisterFly, which is not a valid reason to enjoin conduct.

2. At The Time Of Hearing On The Order To Show Cause Why Permanent Injunction Should Not Issue, The Court Failed To Properly Consider That It Did Not Maintain Jurisdiction To Enter A Permanent Injunction.

In its papers opposing the entry of the permanent injunction, RegisterFly informed the Court both of the fact that RegisterFly had instituted arbitration proceedings prior to the initiation of this lawsuit and that the RAA provided that the parties could seek only provisional remedies from a Court if either party invoked the arbitration provision in the contract. (McCloskey Decl., ¶3.) Thus, ICANN is limited to obtaining a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction which may remain in effect until the resolution of the arbitration proceedings

initiated to determine whether the termination of RegisterFly's ICANN accreditation is appropriate. However, in granting the permanent injunction on May 25, 2007, this Court ignored the limitations imposed by the RAA's arbitration clause, and rendered that clause completely meaningless in entering the order for a permanent injunction. This ruling shows a manifest failure by this Court to consider the facts presented to it at the May 25, 2007 hearing, namely that RegisterFly had invoked the arbitration clause prior to ICANN filing this lawsuit and that the arbitration clause contained in the RAA limited the relief which this Court could grant to the provisional remedies of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.

Defendant does not contend that this Court does not have the authority to enter a preliminary injunction in this action, nor, with the exception of the changed circumstances outlined above, does Defendant contend that the preliminary injunction was granted in error. Rather, Defendant maintains that the Court failed to consider its jurisdictional boundaries in its issuance of the permanent injunction.

Applicable authorities make it clear that the parties' agreement within the RAA to arbitrate this dispute will be enforced, and will be enforced specific to the terms provided for therein.

The Federal Arbitration Act was designed to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. It is intended to put arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. The Supreme Court has specifically held that the FAA has "the primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms and its application merely permitted the courts to give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties." (internal quotations omitted) *Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc.*, 275 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting *Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.*, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989). Specifically, the FAA was intended to "allow arbitration to proceed *in the manner provided for in the parties' agreement.*" (emphasis in original, internal quotations omitted) *Id.*

As set forth in Defendant's Response to Order to Show Cause, the parties to this action entered into a Registrar Accreditation Agreement ("RAA") which governs the parties' relationship, and, in fact, serves as the predicate for ICANN's breach of contract action. (Complaint, Attachment 1). The RAA provides specific procedures for the resolution of disputes arising under the RAA, including the right for either party to elect to initiate arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association. (Id., Section 5.6.) Upon receiving ICANN's termination letter, on March 28, 2007, RegisterFly.com, Inc. initiated arbitration proceedings pursuant to Section 5.6 of the RAA. (O'Neil Decl., ¶5.) On the following day, March 29, 2007, ICANN commenced litigation before this Court. (Id., ¶6.)

For the purpose of aiding the arbitration and/or preserving the rights of the parties during the pendency of an arbitration, the parties shall have the right to seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief from the arbitration panel or in a court located in Los Angeles, California, USA, which shall not be a waiver of this arbitration agreement.

In pertinent part, the RAA Section 5.6 provides as follows:

(Medina Decl., Exh. "A" (emphasis added)) Consistent with this provision, the Complaint filed by ICANN on March 29, 2007 seeks imposition of preliminary injunctive relief. (Id.) With the commencement of arbitration proceedings prior to the filing of this lawsuit and knowledge of the limitations on the relief ICANN is permitted to obtain from this Court under the RAA, RegisterFly chose not to oppose ICANN's request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief. However, the imposition of a permanent injunction was both opposed by RegisterFly and patently inappropriate.

When one considers the practical implications of the Permanent Injunction entered by this Court on May 25, 2007, the reason for the Supreme Court's ruling

becomes abundantly clear. If the permanent injunction stands, then RegisterFly must forever continue to maintain on its website the notice concerning its ICANN accreditation, regardless of the outcome of the arbitration proceedings instituted to challenge the appropriateness of the termination of RegisterFly's accreditation. In effect, the entry of this preliminary injunction renders the arbitration agreement contained in the RAA completely meaningless. IV.

CONCLUSION

The requested ex parte relief should be granted. The injunctions entered against RegisterFly should be modified to eliminate the requirement that RegisterFly post the aforementioned notice on its website, since the circumstances which justified entry of that injunction have changed and such a requirement no longer serves the purpose of "preserving the rights of the parties during the pendency of an arbitration" which is the only basis permissible under the RAA. In addition, the permanent injunction should be vacated, since ICANN is not entitled to such relief under the RAA and, since the filing of the arbitration demand on March 28, 2007 – prior to the filing of this lawsuit on March 29, 2007 – this Court lacks jurisdiction to enter such an injunction.

18 19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

DATED: June 4, 2007

ERVIN, COHEN & JESSUP LLP

Elochen

Attorneys for REGISTERFLY.COM, INC.

Kelly O. Scott Heather L. McCloskey

Heather L. McCloskey

AND UNIFIEDNAMES, INC.

21

20

22

23

24

25

26

27

1 PROOF OF SERVICE BY HAND-DELIVERY 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ss: 3 **COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES** 4 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 350 S. Figueroa 5 Street, Suite 299, Los Angeles, California 90071. On June 4, 2007, I served the document described as EX PARTE APPLICATION 6 TO MODIFY INJUNCTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO RECONSIDER ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 7 SUPPORT THEREOF on the parties in this action by delivering a true copy thereof enclosed in 8 a sealed envelope addressed as follows: 9 Jeffrey A. LeVee Samantha Eisner 10 Jones Day 555 S. Flower Street, 50th Floor 11 Los Angeles, CA 90071-2300 Tel: (213) 489-3939 12 Fax: (213) 243-2539 13 Attorneys for Plaintiff 14 I delivered such envelope(s) by hand to the office of the addressee(s). 15 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. 16 EXECUTED on June 4, 2007 at Beverly Hills, California. 17 18 By: Shrum Salin Print: Sheldon Solin 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Ervin, Cohen & Jessup LLP

28

IDOCS:12846.1:578692.1